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Abstract 
Diese Dissertation befasst sich mit dem Phänomen der Institutionalisierung von der 
Außenbeziehung der Europäischen Union (EU) mit der Ukraine, Russland und Belarus. 
Die Untersuchung dieses Prozesses erfolgt anhand der EU Kooperation mit diesen 
Ländern in den Bereichen Visaerleichterung, Rückführung von Personen mit irregulärem 
Aufenthalt in der EU in die entsprechenden Herkunfts- und Transitländer, Grenzraum-
überwachung und Asylpolitik. 
Die eigentliche Institutionalisierung setzte mit dem Inkrafttreten des Partnerschafts- und 
Kooperationsabkommen mit Russland 1997 und mit der Ukraine 1998 ein. Mit den 
aktuellen Verhandlungen über ein neues Assoziierungsabkommen werden der Grad der 
Institutionalisierung und die gesetzlichen Rahmenbedingungen weiter intensiviert. Mit 
Belarus hingegen kam es aufgrund anhaltender Menschenrechtsverletzungen und der 
mangelhaften, demokratischen Praxis nie zur Unterzeichnung eines Partnerschafts- und 
Kooperationsabkommen. Im Laufe des Annäherungsprozess der EU mit seinen 
Nachbarschaftsstaaten wurden 2004 mit der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik (ENP) 
und der Strategischen Partnerschaft anhand ’4 Gemeinsamer Räume’ mit Russland, 
sowie 2009 mit der Osteuropapartnerschaft zusätzliche Strukturen geschaffen, um die 
Zusammenarbeit in wesentlichen Politikbereichen zu konkretisieren und geeignete 
Hilfsmittel und Förderprogramme bereit zu stellen. 
Die Interaktionsformen der jeweiligen Akteure haben sich im Zuge dieser Institutional-
isierung wesentlich verändert. Im Gegensatz zu so genannten ‚harten’ Mechanismen, die 
in der Tradition von positiver und negativer Konditionalität stehen; haben sich in den 
letzten 10 Jahren vermehrt Politiknetzwerke etabliert, die im Sinne ‚sanfter’ Mechanismen 
auf Überzeugung, Informations- und Wissensvermittlung und Unterstützung bei 
Implementierungsprozessen setzen. Im Sinne der Freiwilligkeit, stellen diese 
Politiknetzwerke ein Angebot der EU dar, die aufgrund von thematischen 
Förderprogrammen von den Partnerländern genützt werden können. 
Die Arbeit stellt sich die Fragen, warum und unter welchen Bedingungen Staaten zur 
Mitarbeit in den vorhin erwähnten Politiknetzwerken bereit sind und welche 
Voraussetzungen erfüllt sein müssen, dass effektiver Regeltransfer von EU Gesetzen und 
Normen in Drittstaaten ermöglicht wird. Das Ziel dieser wissenschaftlichen Arbeit ist es 
daher, Erklärungen über die Potentiale aber auch die Limits einer möglichen Integration 
von Drittstaaten anhand von EU-geführten Politiknetzwerken zu liefern. 
  
Abstract 
This thesis tackles the phenomenon of the institutionalisation of European Union’s (EU) 
cooperation with neighbouring countries such as Ukraine, the Russian Federation (RF) 
and Belarus. The institutionalisation started with the entry into force of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1997 with the RF and in 1998 with Ukraine, and is 
continuing into the present day with the current negotiations between the EU with the 
Ukraine and RF on an enhanced association agreement. The institutional framework 
currently in force has been revitalised by several initiatives, such as the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the ’Four Common Spaces‘ with the RF in 2004, as well 
as the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009. Given the dense institutional framework of the 
EU’s international cooperation with Eastern European countries, in which 
intergovernmental networks are utilized to coordinate and regulate crucial issues, we may 
label it ’governance between governments‘ or ’External Governance‘.  
Furthermore, this paper emphasises the importance of institutionalising cooperation 
through the introduction of task-specific policy networks, which can, in the long-run, 
guarantee a harmonisation and internalisation of norms, rules, and objectives (e.g. 
Lavenex 2008 and Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2008). In addition to conventional foreign 
traditional tit-for-tat strategy, several less-hierarchic modes and strategies find their way 
into the EU’s external policy coordination in its attempts to solve collective problems (e.g. 
Lavenex 2008; Weber/ Smith/ Braun 2008; Meloni 2007; Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 
2005). However, as this cooperation is merely on a voluntarily basis, this paper raises the 
following questions: why do third countries agree on institutionalising their cooperation 
with the EU, and how can this institutionalisation lead to legal approximation between the 
EU and neighbouring countries as efficiently as the ’accession conditionality? Therefore, 
this paper stresses the importance of several conditions that determine the extent and 
efficacy of institutional settings for cooperation in IR. This may help to figure out limits to 
and possibilities for integrating third countries into EU policies without offering EU 
membership. 
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1 The Shift in EU’s External Policy to Eastern Europe – 
Application of New Modes and Instruments in 
International Cooperation 
This study provides an in-depth understanding of how the European Union (EU) achieves 
their objectives to achieve harmonised regulation in sensitive policy areas with 
neighbouring countries, in order to curtail possible externalities. During the Eastern 
Enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007, the EU responded to new geopolitical realities in 
Central and Eastern Europe with a new approach, aiming to tighten relations with its 
neighbours in Eastern Europe. This new approach attempts to approximate neighbouring 
countries to EU norms, rules and procedures by facilitating dialogue and cooperation on 
crucial policy issues. This is done by an institutionalisation of the EU’s interaction with 
third countries, starting with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the Russian 
Federation (RF) in 1997 and Ukraine and Moldova in 1998. Nowadays, the EU’s External 
Policy towards Ukraine, Moldova and Russia on migratory issues, namely visa facilitation, 
readmission, border management and refugee protection, is characterised by a highly 
institutionalised cooperation. Cooperation between the EU and Belarus on the respective 
issues evolved in the recent years. 
In regard to the phenomenon of institutionalisation and legalisation of International 
Relations (IR), an in-depth analysis is done to scrutinise the shift in EU’s external policy 
from governance by conditionality to ‘soft’ modes within issue-based policy networks (e.g. 
Lavenex 2008; Weber/ Smith/ Braun 2008; Meloni 2007; Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 
2005). Assisted by technical and financial aid, these ‘soft’ modes refer to persuasion, 
information exchange of best practice models and knowledge transfer, and range from 
policy-emulation over informal agreements to binding interstate law. Cooperation, 
therefore, might be ad-hoc or instead formalised by a set of institutional conventions and 
legal constraints. Introducing these ‘soft’ modes into foreign policy is an attempt to enable 
cooperation with a less binding character and less commitment, as it keeps the 
cooperation more flexible, mostly technocratic and depoliticised. 
This innovation in the EU’s external policy deserves a closer look as it provides an outlook 
for less hierarchical policy coordination between states, which may help to overcome 
potential deadlocks. A principal question is, firstly, why third countries agree on tightened 
institutional cooperation by introducing policy networks based adherence, when 
cooperation is merely voluntarily demand driven and, further, how this can lead to legal 
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approximation between the EU and the neighbouring countries as efficiently as the 
“accession conditionality” (Schimmelfenning 2007).  
Hence, the analytical part of this study investigates how and why the EU’s external policy 
towards Eastern European countries becomes institutionalised and, further, inquires into 
the conditions determining the modes of the cooperation between the EU and its partners. 
The research questions are discussed through the lens of the core concepts of 
International Cooperation and Europeanisation in order to scrutinise crucial conditions for 
institutionalisation in IR and how it effects further cooperation afield. A theory-led 
explanatory model will be deduced to grasp the correlation between crucial conditions and 
distinct modes of interaction. 
Further, according to a varying degree of institutionalised interaction across countries and 
policies, a comparative case study of the EU’s external policy towards Ukraine, Belarus 
and RF on migratory issues, namely visa facilitation, readmission, border management 
and refugee protection, will be done. This thesis conducts an analysis on applied modes, 
making the core distinction between hierarchical versus non-hierarchical policy 
coordination (e.g. Lavenex 2008; March/ Olsen 1998), in order to scrutinise crucial 
prerogatives and conditions that determine the extent and the efficacy of institutionalising 
intergovernmental cooperation. 
Following that, this study may consequently help to figure out limits and possibilities in 
integrating third countries into EU institutions without offering EU membership. Thus, we 
conclude with a prospect on deepening institutional integration of the EU’s relations with 
neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe, thought as a possible third way of integration 
between an EU membership and being outside of any EU policies. More broadly 
speaking, this study takes part in the debate over the limits and possibilities of cooperation 
between the EU and the permanent 'outsider' states. According to current and highly 
salient debates on a possible membership of Turkey, it seems to be very promising to do 
research on alternative forms of cooperation and modalities of integration into EU 
institutions. Besides, Ukraine, Belarus and the South Caucasian States as well as 
countries of the Maghreb and Mashreq need a clear perspective for further cooperation. 
The EU’s lack of strategy, however, weakens its geopolitical position in the region, and 
thus weakens the possibility of creating an area of security, stability and prosperity. 
Beyond that, a clear and pro-active strategy can be a new impetus to overcome the 
blockades in EU-Belarus relations and improve the cooperation between them. 
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This study proceeds as follows: after discussing the area of research and the unresolved 
issues that remain, a comprehensive overview of the state of the art in this research area 
is given, in order to highlight former scientific findings and to delineate the necessity and 
innovative character of the present research project. Subsequently, we will describe the 
main research gaps that lead to the formulation of feasible research questions, which form 
the basis of the following study. 
Chapter 2 outlines the observed phenomenon of an ongoing institutionalisation of 
cooperation in the EU’s external policy and traces the development of a widespread 
institutionalised network of interaction between the EU and outsider states, and regional 
and international organisations. This chapter concludes with a more detailed insight into 
the legal and organisational dimension of the institutional framework of the EU’s external 
policy, into the relevant actors taking part in the described forum, and into the EU 
instruments supporting the cooperation on justice and home affairs (JHA)-matters. 
Subsequently, section 1.2 discusses the methodology of doing research on this 
correlation, in other words the methods used for collecting and processing the underlying 
empirical data and the selection of empirical cases. 
In Chapter 3, the operationalisation of the research question, ‘Why and how to get 
international cooperation between the EU and its neighbours institutionalised’ will be 
addressed. Chapter 3.1, therefore, scrutinises the external dimension of EU governance 
and analyses the EU’s attempts to prevent negative externalities by gaining influence in 
policy regulation in third countries, accomplished through the facilitation of interaction and 
cooperation in crucial policy areas and the installation of efficient institutions to coordinate 
relations. To grasp the EU’s interaction with third countries, the study refers to the two 
concepts of ’Europeanisation‘ – rational and sociological institutionalism – which provide 
explanations about the process of rule approximation within the EU and beyond; and, 
’External Governance‘ which gives insight into institutions and the structure of bilateral 
decision making (polity and politics dimension). Chapter 3.2 poses the question of why 
institutions evolve in IR and, therefore, starts with an introduction of the core concepts of 
international cooperation and discusses their theoretical background in order to explain 
why states agree to institutionalise their relations. Thus, the analysis in Chapter 3.3 
identifies the crucial conditions that impact the institutionalisation of international 
cooperation, and discusses their relevance in explaining the institutionalisation of the EU’s 
external relations by: 1) mapping the international environment and nature of relations 
between the EU and its neighbours; 2) figuring out the preference building within the 
states; and, 3) measuring the influence of issue salience. In Chapter 3.4, the analytical 
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hypotheses are presented, based on the theoretically elaborated correlations between the 
determinants of intergovernmental cooperation and the extent of institutionalisation and its 
respective modes of cooperation.  
The empirical part of the study contains three case studies on the EU’s external policy in 
migration management towards the RF, Ukraine and Belarus (Chapters 4-6). This thesis 
concludes with a discussion of the empirical results and their explanatory value in order to 
comprehend the influence of certain conditions on the institutionalisation of EU’s external 
relations. Finally, it provides an outlook on further developments in the research area and 
EU’s external relations. 
1.1 Determining the Research Gap: State of Research to the 
Subject Matter 
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with RF (1997), Ukraine and 
Moldova (1998) mark an incremental process of institutionalising cooperation between the 
EU and its neighbourhood. Continued by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
Strategic Partnership (StP) with RF, both launched in 2004, and the 2009 introduction of 
the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative prove the importance of institutional ties in this 
specific cooperation between the EU and its neighbourhood. 
In this short period, whose changes have allowed for new empirical insights, a great deal 
of research has already been done to grasp this new momentum in foreign relations 
between the EU and its neighbours in Eastern Europe. Especially the Ukraine, Moldova 
and RF have been subjects of intense research (e.g. Zhyznomirska (2009), whose 
research concerns EU-RF cooperation on migration management). Wherever, little 
investigation has been done on Belarus, which does not take part in any of the EU’s 
foreign policy initiatives but is invited to engage in the new EaP (e.g. Council of the EU 
2009b). 
On the policy level, the state of the art in scholarly discussion about legal approximation is 
primarily geared towards the enlargement process, e.g. Trauner (2008) scrutinises EU 
rule transfer to the Western Balkans in the area of justice and home affairs (JHA). 
However, in the scientific literature on legal approximation, more and more attention is 
being paid to non-candidate countries, e.g. Meloni (2007) focuses on policy export at the 
core of internal markets to RF and Ukraine; Lavenex (1999) conducted research on the 
extension of EU asylum and immigration policies to Central and Eastern Europe; 
Wichmann (2007) dealt with JHA-elements of the ENP; Balzacq (2008), who did research 
 14 
on the external dimension of EU JHA from a normative approach; and, Wolff, Wichmann 
and Mounier edited a special issue on the ‘External Dimension of JHA’ in 2009. The 
preceding studies mostly used theoretical considerations on rule transfers to third 
countries and applied concepts, such as “Europeanisation beyond Europe” 
(Schimmelfennig et al. 2005; Schimmelfennig 2007) or “External Governance” (Lavenex 
2007; 2008). 
Important insights into the research on legal approximation in non-member states can be 
given by using insights from the Europeanisation literature, which is mainly based on the 
impact of the EU on policies and institutions in member states. Most of the literature 
handles Europeanisation as solely a phenomenon within the EU (e.g. Bulmer/ Radaelli 
2004; Cowles et al. 2001; Börzel/ Risse 2000; Radaelli 2000a/b; Knill/ Lehmkuhl 1999 and 
March/Olsen 1998). On the contrary, many authors have already envisaged third 
countries as a case of Europeanisation (e.g. Grabbe 2006, Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 
2005, Schimmelfennig et al. 2002, Radaelli 2000b), while some have also explicitly 
examined the externalities of the European regime on third countries from this point of 
view (e.g. Kruse 2003).  
While there is little literature studying the domestic impact of the EU beyond Europe, the 
academic input in this research field has increased over the last years. The process is 
ongoing and thus, further research is needed to complement the literature. The results of 
research on Europeanisation within the EU and member states, therefore, can be useful 
to the identification of different mechanisms with which the EU tries to induce changes at 
the domestic level of non-member states. Thus, a comprehensive understanding of the 
EU’s role in the international context requires an additional discussion of its impact on 
third countries which are affected, almost by default, by the process of European 
Integration (e.g. Mattli 1999: 59). 
Although most of the present research builds on rule transfer by conditionality, Lavenex, 
Belokurova and Lehmkuhl (2008), however, did an important turnaround in their study on 
new modes of governance in relations with non-member-states.1 They analysed rule 
approximation in non-member states from a governance perspective and scrutinised 
                                                
1 New-Gov Project No. 16 within cluster 3. (Revised version, September 2007): This project aims at 
examining how the EU manages its relations with third states through institutionalised forms of 
cooperation. The investigation covers six countries representing different forms of co-operation: 
Maghreb: Morocco and Tunisia; Eastern Europe: Ukraine and Moldavia; RF as non ENP-country; 
Western Europe: Switzerland and Norway as non ENP-country; in six major policy fields: drugs, 
organized crime, environment, transport, research, asylum & migration, police & judicial 
cooperation. 
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integration beyond conditionality by focusing on respective policy networks (Lavenex 
2008). Whereas this research focuses on how rules are transferred to third countries, the 
current thesis fills a void in the research by scrutinizing ‘why the respective Modes of 
External Governance (MEG) in the framework of ENP are chosen to govern 
interdependent relations with neighbouring countries?’ Apart from this leading research 
question, the study questions: How and to what extent is the interregional cooperation on 
migration management between the EU and its neighbouring countries institutionalised? 
Which modes of interregional cooperation prevail in various policy areas and countries? 
Why do modes differ across policies and third countries? And, what are the conditions that 
determine the design of the institutional frameworks of interregional cooperation? 
1.2 Methodology of the Research 
This chapter briefly delivers insight into the methodology of the research and the used 
empirical data. First of all, the sources for the empirical analysis are: 1) Secondary 
literature used for collecting data on examining state-to-state relations on the basis of 
economic data (e.g. FDI, trade balance), opinion polls and qualitative analysis on security 
threats as well as economic relations (e.g. country reports, action plans, strategy paper 
and minutes of specialised subcommittees); 2) An analysis of official documents provides 
information on the agreed modes of International cooperation and EU’s foreign policy 
strategy towards Ukraine, Belarus and the RF (e.g. Partnership- and Cooperation 
Agreements, Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement); And, 3) The main data 
source is semi-structured interviews with 47 officials from the EU, Ukraine, Belarus and 
RF. Subject of interest is the experience made by civil servants in this negotiation process 
between the EU and its partner countries (e.g. DG Relex; DG JFS; Council Secretariat; 
representatives of the ministries and the governments of the associated partner countries, 
as well as of representatives of Member States (embassies in the respective partner 
countries) and involved IO’s, as IOM, ICMPD, UNHCR. 
The research concludes with interviews with the researchers in the field (e.g. Sandra 
Lavenex (University of Lucerne), Olga Potemkina (Russian Academy of Science), Victor 
Shadurski (Belarusian State University, Faculty of International Relations), and Nico 
Lange (Konrad Adenauer Foundation)) to discuss and reflect major findings. (For the 
detailed interview list see appendix 10.2). 
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The variety and multitude of sources provide the analysis with a comprehensive empirical 
insight into the research area and help to scrutinise the correlation between the 
elaborated independent variables and the modes of intergovernmental cooperation 
between the EU and its neighbouring countries. The following figure illustrates the sources 
of measuring the respective variables. 
Figure 1. Defining Dependent and Independent Variables 
Conditions / 
Variables
Modes of interregional 
cooperation
MeasurementCharacteristics
International 
Normative Pressure
Issue Salience
Cost-Benefit 
Calculation
Credibility
Bargaining 
Power Dependencies & Bargaining Chips
Documents;
Interviews
Analysis of
bilateral relations;
Data on trade relations 
Yield of a statement or promise
Interviews;
Opinion polls
Interviews;
Analysis
Interviews;
Opinion polls
Interviews,
Documents
Comparison of costs and benefits; 
(opportunity structure, costs of non-
cooperation)
Politicisation of policy issues
by public debates and powerful 
stakeholders
Influence of other actors or
international organisations on
countries for rule approximation to 
„international“ rules and procedures 
(OSCE, CoE, UNHCR) 
Legalisation and 
Institutionalisation
 
1.2.1 Case Selection 
The study is designed as a comparative case study; by comparing three heterogeneous 
countries in terms of size, power and focus in external policy – RF, Ukraine and Belarus – 
and four policy sectors with varying degrees of legalisation and institutionalisation – Visa 
and Readmission Policies, as well as Border Management Policy and Asylum Policy. By 
doing so, the study is able to show how the modes and structure of International 
cooperation are determined by conditions of the macro- and micro dimension. The time of 
observation is limited to the entering into force of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement 1994/1997 until current agreements in 2011. The interest of the research is on 
the external dimension of JHA and its aftermaths for the International cooperation 
between the EU and RF, Belarus, as well as Ukraine. In particular, the analysis relies on 
the practice of cooperation in visa facilitation, readmission, border security and refugee 
protection. 
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The country selection takes place on the geopolitical dimension of the EU-periphery, 
semi-periphery and opposite centre. The factors: Bargaining Power and Credibility 
account for differences across the selected countries. Thus, the analysis contains: 1) 
Ukraine as a neighbour located in the periphery with a strong interest in EU integration in 
an otherwise post-Soviet space traditionally dominated by RF. Both countries attempted at 
an early stage to establish good and fruitful relations with the West in order to benefit from 
an access to Western markets, as well as with investors and military pacts to improve 
their geopolitical standing in the region. They partially follow EU precedence and welcome 
any cooperation to align with EU legislation. 2) The RF is “a state sui generis” (Interview 
with Commission official, Council/ Dpt. on JHA, Brussels, 21 April 2009). The Russian 
leaders see itself as a regional power and attempt to restore its influence in the 
neighbouring and former allied countries. Their interests are conflicting and additionally 
different methodologies or practices concerning the regulation of migratory flows hinder a 
fruitful cooperation. At least with the beginning of the 21st century the RF recognised its 
fall behind the EU’s fruitful initiatives in the common neighbourhood. Furthermore, the 
NATO extension to this common neighbourhood and the role the EU played in the 
revolutionary regime changes in Ukraine and Georgia led the RF to doubt the EU’s 
credibility regarding its policies towards RF. And, 3) Belarus as a semi-peripheral state 
affiliated with RF, has no official relations with the EU at all. There are hardly any attempts 
from EU officials to deepen relations to the current political leaders due to their “outright 
authoritarian regime” (Raik 2006a: 32). 
These three countries represent each a completely different situation for EU’s policy 
initiatives, by, at the same time, facing the same problems in tackling migratory issues. 
Following this, a variance is given between the countries, whereas the selected policy 
case studies are coherent throughout them. Moldova, which would also fit perfectly in this 
scheme, didn’t get selected, due to crucial similarities to the Ukrainian case. Other 
neighbouring countries of the ENP – in the Maghreb, Mashreq and Southern Caucasus – 
would make this case study sample too fuzzy, where else, a next step could be to 
compare the regions as such. 
Figure 2. Case Study: Country Selection 
   Ukraine 
Russian 
Federation Belarus 
       
EU - Credibility  high medium low 
Bargaining Power  low high medium 
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The EU is rather active in cooperating with these countries, although the circumstances 
for each country differ and provide a distinct scope of actions for the EU. Moreover, the 
policy dimension is almost similar in these four countries, whereas it is possible to draw 
conclusions and exemplifies best the different modes and structure of cooperation. The 
four policies – border control, readmission, visa facilitation and asylum policy – are on top 
of the agenda and have a high variance in their characteristics: 1) border control, which is 
also of self interest to the neighbouring countries and of low salience; 2) readmission 
policy, which is of high interest to the EU; 3) visa policy, which is high salient in the 
respective countries; and 4) asylum policy, which is marked by a high normative pressure 
of the international communities. Whereas all policy issues are a matter of political and 
technical cooperation, our analysis identified a high political cooperation in the case of 
visa policy and readmission and a merely technical cooperation for refugee protection and 
border management. This has a concrete impact on the choice of modes and structure of 
cooperation. 
On the Micro-level, comparison is done on the JHA-policies: Visa Policy, Readmission, 
Border Management and Asylum Policy. By doing so, the study is able to show the 
influence of the respective factors on modes and structure of International cooperation, 
quite independently from the macro dimension of interstate relation. The four policies are 
chosen, as the EU and RF, Ukraine and Belarus are rather active in cooperating in these 
respective issues and exemplifies best the different modes and structure of cooperation. 
Moreover, the policy dimension is almost similar through the three countries, whereas it is 
possible to draw conclusions from differences of cooperation in these respective areas. 
Figure 3. Case Study: Policy Areas in the Field of Migration Management 
  
Visa 
Facilitation Readmission 
Asylum 
Policy 
Border 
Management 
      
issue-specific power 
relation low high medium high 
Costs vs. Benefit low high high medium 
Salience high medium medium low 
International 
normative pressure low medium high low 
These four policies have a high variance of characteristics: visa policy, which is high 
salient in the respective countries; readmission policy, which is of high interest to the EU; 
asylum policy, which is marked by a high normative pressure of the international 
communities; and, border management, which is also of self interest to the neighbouring 
countries and low salient. Whereas all policy issues are a matter of political and technical 
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cooperation, in the case of visa policy and readmission the paper identified a high political 
cooperation, and for asylum and border management a merely technical cooperation, 
which has a concrete impact on the choice of modes and structure of cooperation. 
2 Genealogy of JHA in External Policy towards Eastern 
European Countries – Strategy and Objectives behind 
EU’s External Policy on Migration Management 
The observed phenomenon of institutionalisation within the EU’s external policy 
demonstrates the EU’s attempts to curtail possible externalities associated with 
transnational migration with its eastern neighbours, through intense and on-going 
cooperation in aligning policy regulation in sensitive areas. The ongoing process of 
institutionalising cooperation on migratory issues results from the increasing awareness 
that eastern neighbours are an incremental threat to internal security interests of the EU in 
the aftermath of the breakdown of the Soviet Union. The EU’s relationship with 
neighbouring non-member states in the east became one of the EU’s new priority issues. 
As with the enlargement, the EU moved closer to a neighbourhood that was perceived as 
a major source of ‘soft’ security threats such as irregular migration, organised crime, and 
human and drugs trafficking; there is no longer any ‘buffer zone’ between the core and the 
‘outside.’ Consequently, uncontrolled inflows of migrants and porous borders have been 
regarded as a major challenge to the EU’s internal security interests and were integrated 
into its external policy towards third countries. 
Because of its vulnerability to externalities from outside, the EU’s internal and external 
policy goals come closer together and call for a common policy approach (e.g. Lavenex 
2004: 680). In order to achieve the goal of a stable, safe, and secure Europe, the EU 
requires a good, functioning relationship based on mutual trust and close cooperation with 
the neighbouring 'outsider' states (e.g. Higashino 2004; Grabbe 2000; Lavenex 1999). 
Hence, there is a strong functional argument that the EU should engage more 
substantively with third countries in order to prevent the spill-over of insecurity into the EU 
(e.g. Wichmann 2008: 6). 
The process of recreating the EU’s external policy towards the east began in the 
aftermath of the breakdown of the Soviet Union and can be seen as a process of 
asserting its role in this new geopolitical environment. This paper attempts to understand 
in depth how the EU achieves their objectives to come up with common regulation of 
sensitive policy areas to curtail potential externalities. The European Union – at the time 
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facing increasing interdependencies of economic, energy supply, environmental, and 
security matters – reacted to the new challenges by: 1) ‘Inter-governmentalism’, in the 
sense of developing a common external and security policy (CFSP) and a common policy 
on JHA on the supranational level – the so called 2nd and 3rd pillar – with entry into force of 
the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. 
2) ‘Communitarisation’ or ‘Supranationalism’ of competences with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1999. ‘Communitarisation’, therefore, refers to the fact that JHA-issues 
were brought substantially under the European Community Treaty. These issues went 
from being ‘Union’ to ‘Community‘ competences. Since the entry into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty (European Council 1997), as the decisive landmark, the creation of a 
European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) has become a major treaty 
objective of the EU (Art. 1; Title VI and Title IIIa: Art. 72i). Finally, with the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty on the 1 December 2009, the EU’s scope of action in external 
relations was further extended and gained more competences in the area of JHA (e.g. 
Title V TFEU). 
3) ‘Externalisation’ (Boswell 2003) or ‘Extra-territorialisation’ (Rijpma/ Cremona 2007: 11), 
referring to the extension of internal policy objectives and regulation to third countries’ 
domestic policies through the introduction of new modes of cooperation in the EU’s 
external policy on Asylum and Migration Policy in the Tampere European Council 1999. 
Although primarily thought of as an EU internal security regime, the EU has developed an 
external dimension to its justice and home affair policies, impacting the EU’s interactions 
with the outside world (e.g. Wolff/ Wichmann/ Mounier 2009). The efforts to create a 
closer internal-external security nexus have been based on the understanding that the EU 
may enhance its problem-solving capacity in relation to transnational challenges such as 
the fight against irregular migration, organised crime or terrorism if it succeeds in 
engaging third countries (‘European Security Strategy’; Council of the EU 2003d). This is 
done by transferring its internal policy regulations to third countries and providing them 
with accurate financial and technical assistance to meet the internal standards. Apart from 
that, the EU tries to externalise risks to buffer states, in order to prevent negative 
externalities affecting the EU territory. 
In particular, in the course of the eastward enlargements in 2004 and 2007, the perception 
of neighbouring countries in the east as a major source of ‘soft’ security threats comes to 
the fore, caused by ill-demarcated and porous protected borders and a lack of expertise in 
migration and border management. As a consequence, the EU-proposed measures – with 
the ENP and the Common Space initiative with the RF – to improve migration 
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management and enable more effective border controls as elements of the neighbouring 
countries’ obligations to achieve its JHA-related objectives and enhance security in the 
wider European region (e.g. Council of the EU 2001: 2). These states were encouraged to 
improve the control of their ill-demarcated and poorly protected borders and to closely 
cooperate with the EU in the field of illegal migration. At the same time, the EU actively 
sought to bring them closer to core values of international refugee protection and to align 
their asylum policies to EU and internationally agreed-upon standards. 
This development received a great deal of scholarly attention; for instance, Rijpma and 
Cremona (2007: 12) described it as the “extra-territorialisation of EU migration policies 
and the rule of law” (e.g. Bigo/ Guild, 2005; Balzacq 2009; Wolff et al. 2009). Against the 
background of the EU’s efforts to minimise irregular migration to the Union, migration 
control policy has become a particularly important issue in the EU’s cooperation with third 
countries (Lavenex 2006). Various instruments that were introduced since the 1999 
Tampere Council deserve attention because they present a dynamic process of the EU 
searching for techniques and ideas regarding how to make migration governable and how 
to incorporate third countries into the system in an effort to stem migration flows into the 
EU territory. This indeed reveals the Union’s objective to expand its political space of 
governance beyond its borders. 
And, 4) ‘Institutionalisation’ of EU’s external policy towards third countries by introducing 
task-specific policy networks, meaning that negotiations and coordination of cross-national 
policy issues are done within coordinative and/or regulatory bodies by including several 
actors in the field (e.g. also ‘Network Governance’ by Sandra Lavenex 2008). With the 
signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1994 with Ukraine, 
Moldova and the RF – which entered into force in 1997 with the RF and in 1998 with 
Ukraine and Moldova – the EU launched a widespread institutional framework, forming 
the basis of bilateral cooperation in major policy areas. Additional initiatives, specifically 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or the Four Common Spaces with the RF, 
both launched in 2004, have deepened the cooperation within these institutions. 
Furthermore, the latest initiative for the Eastern Partnership in May 2009 – driven by 
Poland and Sweden – prove the EU objective of tightening institutional ties with 
neighbouring countries in the east (Council of the EU 2009a). Currently, since 2007, the 
EU is negotiating with the RF and Ukraine on a new enhanced agreement (NEA) to renew 
the basis for cooperation after the expired PCA, which was in the meantime extended on 
an annual basis. This new agreement will mark a new generation of association 
agreements. Both sides claim to provide a comprehensive agreement, to tackle common 
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interests and to go more into detail in policy coordination and in partial integration into EU 
policies (e.g. Sushko et al. 2007). 
In sum, we can draw on the conclusion that the EU’s external policy went through a major 
shift, according to applied modes and strategies. Apart from traditional foreign policy in the 
tradition of tit-for-tat, several less-hierarchic modes find their way into the EU’s external 
policy coordination to solve collective problems with third countries (e.g. Lavenex 2008; 
Weber/ Smith/ Braun 2008; Meloni 2007; Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2005). These ‘soft’ 
modes range from policy-emulation over informal agreements to binding interstate law. 
Cooperation, therefore, might be ad-hoc or rather formalised by a set of institutional 
conventions. As this paper argues, this new form of non-hierarchical coordination in 
foreign policy allows for cooperation within a broad area of issues on a voluntary basis 
and helps to overcome former deadlocks in interstate relations, e.g. in EU-Belarus 
relations. The change to non-hierarchical modes was a necessity as the previous 
hierarchical governance strategy towards candidate countries didn’t work towards non-
candidate countries. Hence, instruments and modes to govern interdependent policy 
issues and common interests in the region were adapted to the specific circumstances of 
EU relationships with non-members. 
2.1 Intergovernmental Coordination 
Several existing ad hoc groups, covering immigration, asylum, policing and law, were 
replaced by permanent structures under the auspices of the Council of Ministers. The 
given commitment to elaborate on a common policy on migration issues has already been 
raised by the Council of the European Communities (1989). The so called ‘Palma 
document’ sets out “areas of essential action [such as] a system of surveillance at 
external frontiers […] combating illegal immigration networks [and a] system to exchange 
information on people who are ‘inadmissible’ to the EC” (COM 1989). 
The adoption of the Palma document in 1989 marked the beginning of the transformation 
from ad hoc inter-state mechanisms to an institutionalised intergovernmental coordination 
(e.g. Bunyan 1993: 1). It is in the interest of all member states to concentrate their 
bargaining power in international relations, on an inter-governmental dimension to tackle 
upcoming challenges from outside the EU, so long as it helps to succeed in one’s own 
policy objectives. Furthermore, member states gained access to a new scope of action, 
redefining their role in a multipolar world order and increasing their sphere of influence, 
especially in ‘Wider Europe’ (e.g. Emerson: 2004), meaning the near European region and 
beyond.  
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The Palma document also introduced the principle doctrine of EU migration policies that 
continues to be: internal free movements require tough immigration and external border 
controls (e.g. Bunyan 1993). Furthermore, in 1991, the EU’s principle body, the Council of 
the EU, acknowledged at its Berlin conference that ‘illegal migration’ is a major political 
topic which should be addressed a) through joint efforts which should b) go beyond the 
EU’s boundaries (e.g. Düvell/ Vollmer 2009: 6). Together with the 12 EU member states, 
14 other European countries took part to work on joint measures. Already two years later 
in 1993, the 26 countries started the so-called ‘Budapest process’ to strengthen 
cooperation in the field of migration on an international and European level. To moderate 
the process, the signatories founded the International Centre for Migration and Policy 
Development (ICMPD), located in Vienna. 
On the EU level, the dialogue on JHA matters between ministers of the member states 
was named the ‘Trevi group’. Primarily founded in response to terrorist attacks in the 
1970s, it slowly extended its agenda to other JHA issues. The Council’s work, further, was 
supported by the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers, and Asylum (SCIFA), 
which operates under the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and 
prepares Council decisions within the respective policy areas. The committee is supported 
by the Centre for Information, Reflection and Exchange on Asylum (CIREA) and the 
Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and 
Immigration (CIREFI), both of which were founded in 1992 in order to facilitate the 
exchange of information between experts from the member states on issuing joint reports 
on countries of origin of asylum-seekers, on asylum seekers’ travel routes, and on legal 
and irregular immigration and the use of false or falsified documents. 
In addition, the EU member states initiated a major treaty revision, which resulted in the 
Maastricht Treaty’s entry into force in 1993 (Council of the EU 1992). The Maastricht 
Treaty resulted in an institutionalisation of intergovernmental coordination among member 
states on Foreign Policy and JHA matters. The member states agreed to create a 
common external and security policy (CFSP) and a common policy on JHA on the 
supranational level – the so called second and third pillar. Many of the practices and a 
large part of the structure in former Third Pillar policy-making were originated in the 
Coordinators' Group, like the Trevi Group and the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration. Title K of 
the Maastricht Treaty sets out the new structure for EU coordination in JHA. While the 
Coordinators’ Group disappeared, senior officials from each member state form the 
Coordinating Committee under the new treaty obligations. 
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Besides the treaty revisions of Maastricht, another agreement got a major say in the EU’s 
intergovernmental cooperation on JHA matters. In 1985, the Schengen agreement was 
signed by France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in order to 
improve their cooperation on migratory issues. Several measurements have since been 
implemented to succeed in their common goal of enabling free movement within the EU 
and securing the external borders from irregular immigration and criminal transborder 
activities. Following the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, this intergovernmental 
cooperation was incorporated into the EU framework on 1 May 1999. 
2.2 ‘Communitarisation’2 of Competences in EU’s External Policy 
on JHA Matters 
As a landmark of deepening cooperation with third countries, the creation of a European 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 has 
become a major treaty objective of the EU, set inter alia to harmonise and improve 
cooperation on police, customs, and justice in migration and asylum matters. When the 
Amsterdam Treaty came into force on 1st May 1999, the EC gained competence to 
launch external policy initiatives targeting JHA-issues by creating supranational 
responsibilities in formerly national affairs and altering the equation between state 
governments and EU institutions in policy-making and accountability (notably article IV, 
paragraphs 61 to 69 on 'visa, asylum, immigration and other politics regarding the free 
movement of persons'). This so-called ‘Communitarisation’ of competences is the reaction 
to the external dimension of JHA and the need for action in this policy area, which 
requires an effective and comprehensive framework for cooperation, “in which European 
institutions can adopt legal instruments and operative actions that respond efficiently to 
the challenges that affect the external dimension of the AFSJ” (Vara 2008: 545). 
In the following, member states transferred more and more JHA competences to the 
Community level, and authorised Community bodies to raise JHA-issues in its external 
policy (e.g. Lavenex 2004: 682; COM 2005b). However, any common policy in this area is 
intriguing as it touches a sensitive part of a nation state’s sovereignty, concerning 
regulation over who is allowed to enter, to stay and to work in their territory and under 
what circumstances this permission should be granted. At any rate, member states 
                                                
2 ´Communitarisation` refers to the fact, that JHA-issues were brought substantial under the 
European Community Treaty, in the form of the new Title IV EC. These issues went from being 
´Union` to ´Community` competences. 
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welcome a common policy in the field of migration management to tackle challenges 
related to it. 
The objective of creating a common policy was challenged by the ‘institutional mess’ of 
the EU political system (e.g. Gomart 2008: 9), which designates a fuzzy representation 
in external relations and an inefficient decision making in JHA policy-making and 
foreign and security policy with enormous and irresolvable internal contradictions (e.g. 
Wessel: 2000). The EU’s capability to act in IR is limited due to this institutional mess, 
which makes it impossible to pursue a coherent strategy over the years. One major 
reason for this is the strength of the Council in foreign-policy making and the six-
month rotating presidencies of the EU, which has a major impact on the respective 
foreign policy agenda during this period. If the EU wants to have a major say in IR, it 
has to develop its leadership on the supranational level. 
Given the ever greater importance involved in what we could refer to as the external 
dimension of the AFSJ, before the reform treaty of Lisbon, three primary needs are 
identified in relation to external policy on JHA matters: First, the need for greater co-
ordination between the policy areas (‘de-pillarisation’). Second, the need for greater 
coherence between the EU and its distinct Member States external policies (have ‘one 
voice’). Third, the need for a stronger projection of unity abroad (become visible within IR). 
These needs may be challenged by ensuing questions, such as: how to ensure the 
coherence of Union’s action and coordinate all the measures taken in foreign policy 
(including CFSP, trade policy, development aid, humanitarian action, financial assistance, 
etc.)? What can be done to ensure that the decision-making process allows the Union to 
act rapidly and effectively on the international scene? How far could the Community 
method be extended to other fields of action? 
First of all, in regards to the Union’s external action in JHA necessitates the development 
of a comprehensive approach that overcomes fractious and political divisions and 
combines different legal regimens of policy issues of Community competence. The current 
pillar division on such wide-ranging fields as human rights, good governance and rule of 
law, migration, asylum and border management, and the fight against terrorism and 
organised crime, has proven to be insufficient in order to cope with the main challenges 
posed by these issues (e.g. Julien-Laferrière/ Labayle/ Edström 2005; Balzacq/ Carrera 
2005). It follows that the JHA dimension needs cross-pillar coordination and 
measurements, which should be incorporated into the EU’s external policy. Apart from 
requiring close coordination between the institutions involved, the Commission insists that 
 26 
“there should be a clear link between internal activities aimed at creating an area of 
freedom, security and justice and external actions to support this process” (COM 2005b: 
7). However, for a long period of time, member states have proven reluctant to relinquish 
control over areas that are closely linked to the notion of sovereignty. 
Second, a lack of coherence not only weakens the position of the EU in IR; above all, it 
diminishes its credibility. This is caused, on the one hand, by distinct competences 
regarding policy issues across the three pillars. On the other hand, a coherent external 
policy is almost impossible as its priorities change according to the EU's six-month 
rotating presidency. E.g. the Spanish presidency in the first half of 2010 beckons the RF 
to push for the abolition of visa restriction for Russian citizens, which increased their 
expectation and in the long run frustration because of a lack of progress (e.g. EurAsia 
Centre 2010). Apart from that, the French presidency in the second half of 2008 took a 
decisive role, concerning its importance in IR, in tackling the Russia-Georgia conflict.  
Another crucial point is the relative power of each member state in the decision-making 
process in the Council and their individual foreign policy, which followed particular 
interests and were often not in line with each other, undermining the EU’s overall policy 
towards third countries – 27 separate states, “all of which have their own frequently 
divergent national interests” (EuRussia Centre 2008c). No example better demonstrates 
the intrinsic difficulty of forging a common foreign policy for the EU than the case of the 
RF. Especially in the case of the RF; there are crucial disagreements over a range of 
issues from democratic values to energy security throughout the member states.” 
“The EU has been deeply divided on this, not only because of economic considerations, 
but also because of differing perceptions rooted in historical and geographical factors” 
(EuRussia Centre 2008c). 
Thus, EU policy on RF has been challenged by the unanimity in the Council, Lithuania 
and Poland could veto the start of negotiations on the EU-Russia enhanced strategic 
partnership agreement. In this respect, it will not have escaped the Russian leaders’ 
notice that EU member states do not always speak with one voice on foreign policy. 
Another complicating factor was, and continues to be, the willingness of individual EU 
Member States, particularly those with a very large amount of influence such as France, 
Germany and the UK, which try to outdo each other by establishing special relations with 
the RF. The EU’s position is weakened by the individual actions of its member states, 
which limit the EU’s ability to present a united front when dealing with third countries. 
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Member states have an interest in a common European position, as long as it supports 
their interests; otherwise, they are prone to search for bilateral solutions to succeed. In the 
view of Hiski Haukkala, certain member states used EU foreign policy tools and 
declarations as: 
“avenues through which they expressed their collective disapproval of the Russian 
actions while using them simultaneously as shields under which they were able more or 
less to carry on business as usual in their bilateral dealings with Moscow” (Haukkala 
2009: 1763).  
With the Eastern enlargement, the disputes on a common strategy towards the RF 
increased, as the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe have their own 
agenda towards the RF, based on specific tensions and unsolved bilateral disputes, e.g. 
Poland, Baltic countries. A challenging issue for the EU’s external policy is, inter alia, that 
member states try to settle their individual disputes with the RF by using the EU as a lever 
to achieve their goals. 
On the contrary, individual member states try to outdo each other by establishing a special 
relationship with the RF. They evidently expect such a relationship to deliver more for 
them than a common European position. The RF itself seems to be benefiting from inter-
EU disagreements by entering into separate agreements with certain member states. 
Nevertheless, the RF cannot avoid the European Commission in all the fields of 
Community policy, such as trade, visa regulations and access to the single market. An 
additional problem is that member states that want to settle specific disputes with the RF 
use the EU as a lever to achieve their goals. 
With the entry into force of the reform treaty of Lisbon on the 1 December 2009, major 
changes have been undertaken to strengthen EU’s role in IR and improve the decision-
making on challenging issues of JHA. The ratification of the treaty has changed the 
institutional, legal and political framework of the EU and has a bearing on both the 
internal and the external dimension of the AFSJ (e.g. Part 5 ‘External Action by the 
European Union’ and Part 3/Title V ‘AFSJ’ TFEU). Hence, the revision attempts to 
increase the clarity in relations with the rest of the world, effectiveness and legal certainty 
and more effective action. Nevertheless, the resulting implications of the Lisbon Treaty 
have bearings on both the internal and the external dimension and its implication for the 
cooperation with third countries. The major changes relate to: 1) abolishing the complex 
pillar structure (‘de-pillarisation’), 2) empowering the ECJ; 3) simplifying the decision 
making on JHA matters; 4) the creation of a coherent external policy; and, 5) making the 
EU more visible in IR. 
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First, the abolition of the complex pillar structure (‘de-pillarisation’) and the 
communitarisation of the third pillar, called ‘Police Cooperation and Judicial Cooperation 
in Criminal Matters’ – resulting in a transfer of further competences in the respective policy 
areas to the Community level – will entail a clarification and simplification of the Union’s 
external competence and will help to improve the exterior projection of the AFSJ. The EC 
acquired major competences in all fields of Community policy, such as trade, visa 
regulations and access to the single market. In contrast, the CFSP “continues to uphold its 
inter-governmental character despite the formal abolition of the pillars” (Vara 2008: 546). 
Principal areas of FSJ are still shared competences between the Union and the member 
states (Art. 4 TFEU). Agreements in this field still require constant coordination between 
the EU and its member states throughout the negotiation process, which may give rise to 
considerable confusion in third countries. Rules for the negotiation of agreements 
between the EU and third countries are laid down in Art. 218 TFEU, but according to Vara 
(2008) these rules remain weak (ibid.: 549). 
Secondly, the application of what is called the ‘Community method’ to the PJC in criminal 
matters is “accompanied by the extension of the jurisdiction of the ECJ to the entire area 
of freedom, security and justice, repealing those specific mechanisms provided for in 
article 35 TEU” (Vara 2008: 550). 
“This change is very important as the measures adopted in this field may entail treading 
on fundamental rights. The Court shall be competent to review the validity and interpret 
the acts adopted within the sphere of the AFSJ” (ibid.) 
Furthermore, natural or legal persons should be enabled to gain access to protection of 
their rights within the sphere of the CFSP (Art. 215; 275 TFEU). Furthermore, the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ extends to control the legality of international agreements 
regarding matters already included in the third pillar. There is no doubt that the 
consequences of this extension of competences will have far-reaching implications in the 
external dimension of the AFSJ. 
Apart from that, the Lisbon Treaty refers to the values contained in the provisions devoted 
to the external action (Art. 3; Art. 21). Article 21 of the Treaty says that the Union’s 
external action will be guided “by the principles which have inspired its own creation, 
development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world” TFEU 
Art. 21). 
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“Including among others, the indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and International law. Although 
this specific reference to values in external action is made in the Title devoted to the 
‘General provisions on the Union’s external action,’ the EU also has to respect these 
principles in the implementation of the external aspects of the AFSJ (Art. 21(3)). In 
addition, the new Article 6 includes a direct reference to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (COM 2007c) that will enable its binding nature to be preserved” (Vara 2008: 554). 
The rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter will have the same legal value 
as the Treaties. The provisions of the Charter are legally binding for the European 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, as well as for Member States when 
they implement Union law (Art. 51 of the Charter).3 Consequently, the development of the 
policies included in the AFSJ is towards upholding fundamental rights in both internal and 
external actions. The incorporation of the Charter into the TEU means that the external 
action in police cooperation and criminal matters will forthwith pass from being developed 
within a merely intergovernmental framework to being fully subject to fundamental rights. 
If we consider that most of the measures adopted in the AFSJ have ramifications for the 
nationals of other States, the emphasis on the Union’s values and the incorporation of the 
Charter into the Treaty may have a positive bearing on the external dimension of these 
policies (e.g. Mitsilegas 2007: 497). 
Thirdly, the decision making on JHA matters was changed by extending the system of 
qualified majority voting (QMV)4 into the police and judicial cooperation and increasing the 
power of the European Parliament (EP) and national parliaments (Title III and Annex: 
‘Protocol on the Role of National Parliament in the EU’). The integration of PJC in criminal 
matters within the Community sphere implies the suppression of the specific legal acts 
currently available under the third pillar, the application of the ‘ordinary legislative 
procedure’ that involves the enhancement of the powers of the EP and the use of a QMV 
in the decision-making process (Art. 16 TEU), and the extension of the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice (ECJ) to all spheres of the AFSJ. 
                                                
3 Unfortunately, the exception of Poland and United Kingdom to the application of the Charter may 
have a negative impact on the development of the AFSJ 
4 Art. 16 TEU: The qualified majority voting stipulates a majority approval, when it is supported by 
1) at least 55 % of the EU Member States; 2) at least 65 % of the population of the EU; and, 3) can 
only be blocked by at least four member states. The votes for each member state are 
predetermined by the Treaty itself and apply a scale ranging from 29 votes each for the four largest 
Member States to 3 votes for the smallest. The definition of the qualified majority is going to be 
changed in November 2014 and will then be a double majority. 
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As another innovation, the roles of the EP and national parliaments were enhanced by the 
Lisbon Treaty (Title III TEU). On the one hand, the EP got more decisive power through 
an extension of the co-decision procedure, and, on the other hand, the national 
parliaments became included into the decision-making of the EU due to the principle of 
subsidiarity. The extension of the co-decision procedure (‘ordinary legislative procedure’) 
and competences in setting budgets5 will put an end to the democratic shortfall that 
characterises the procedure of Article 24 TEU (EP 2008; 2007a). 
“This democratic enhancement will obviously have its repercussions in the external 
dimension of all the policies included in the AFSJ. It is to be expected that the new 
powers vested in the EP by the Lisbon Treaty will enable it to influence the 
implementation of new actions undertaken by the EU both in policies on border checks, 
asylum, and immigration and in PJC in criminal matters” (Vara 2008: 555) 
The involvement of the EP should be the guarantee for an increasingly greater bearing on 
individual rights and freedoms. Besides the EP’s general control competences, the 
involvement of national Parliaments in the control of draft legislation in the institutions will 
also have repercussions on the external dimension of the AFSJ (Title II: Art. 12. 
‘Provisions on Democratic Principles’). The Treaty of Lisbon provides an even stronger 
role for national parliaments than that foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty as it pertains 
not only to the control of the principles of subsidiarity, but also the political mechanisms of 
control (e.g. Carrera/ Geyer 2007: 2f).  
Fourthly, although the EU was given a special status to take part in meetings of several 
IO’s – as in the case being recognised in the UN as a regional economic integration 
organisation with certain rights to observe negotiations within their meetings -- the Lisbon 
treaty provides the EU with a comprehensive legal status and recognises its international 
legal personality (Art. 74). It follows that the EU establishes a new international 
organisation which will replace and succeed the current European Community and EU in 
all their international rights and obligations (Art. 1). The EU can sign treaties, go to and be 
summoned to court and can become a member of international organisations. Article 216 
of the TFEU states that: 
“the Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or international 
organizations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is 
necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the 
                                                
5 The distinction between ‘compulsory’ and ‘non-compulsory’ expenditure got abolished. Thus, the 
parliament will decide on the entire EU budget together with the Council and has the final say. 
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objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is 
likely to affect common rules or alter their scope” [Member states, however,] “may 
negotiate and conclude agreements with third countries or international organizations in 
the areas of judicial cooperation in civil matters and criminal matters and police 
cooperation, in so far as such agreements comply with Union law” (Art. 218 TFEU). 
Finally, major changes of competences between EU bodies should increase the 
coherence and visibility of the EU’s external action. On the one hand, the treaty foresees 
the creation of the position of President of the European Council (for a period of 2.5 years) 
and of High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Both 
positions clarify, simplify and, hence, might make EU’s external policy more effective. 
Although the President of the Council will have a key representative role in IR, the real 
novelty is the creation of the HR – a hybrid institutional figure combining: a) the pioneering 
role previously played by Javier Solana as High Representative for CFSP (1999-2009); b) 
that of a Vice-President of the Commission in charge of external relations and 
coordinating other relevant portfolios; and c) the role hitherto played by the Foreign 
Minister of the country holding the rotating EU Presidency, namely, chairing the Council 
formation dealing with Foreign Affairs at large (Art.17-18 TEU), now separate from the 
General Affairs Council. The merging of these three posts to one gives the EU more 
coherence, continuity and visibility in external relations. 
“Now, the EU has one person who is responsible for influencing and implementing big 
foreign policy political decisions with the funding and staff to give input to, and implement, 
the course of action to be taken” (Euractiv 2010b). 
Besides the HR, the establishment of the new European External Action Service (EEAS) 
may help to improve the efficiency and coherence of the Union’s external action (Art. 
27(3)). The EEAS aims to assist the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy. In the new revisions, the new HR Catherine Ashton states that: 
“The aim of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the External Action Service is to 
enhance our global impact, by bringing together the wide range of instruments - civilian 
and military - in support of one political strategy. The watchwords are coherence, 
comprehensiveness and co-ordination” (Council of the EU 2010b). 
The ‘multi-hated’ position of the HR should guarantee the evolution of a more 
comprehensive and coherent approach in the EU’s external policies (e.g. Art. 22.2 TEU). 
The HR functions as the link between the Commission and the Council and administrates 
both agendas. Furthermore, the HR coordinates several Commissions that aim to bring 
about coherence across the entire range of EU common policies in external relations. In 
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the so-called ‘groups of commissioners’, the EU’s actions in external relations will be 
coordinated throughout several policy areas according to their respective competencies 
within the commissions. In 2011, this group of commissioners is chaired by the HR and 
encompasses the Commissioners for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy (Stefan 
Fuele), for Development (Andris Piebalgs), and for International Cooperation, 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (Kristalina Georgieva) (Art. 21). Others, such as the 
Commissioners for Economic and Monetary Affairs (Olli Rehn), the Commissioner for 
Trade (Karel de Gucht) or the Commissioner for Energy (Günther Oettinger), can be 
included if required. The procedures behind this coordination and the share of 
responsibilities between the fellow commissioners is not that clear, but it is widely 
expected that the HR will be involved in policy-specific talks with third countries as far as it 
touches politically strategic and sensitive issues. For instance, energy talks between the 
Commissioner for Energy and the respective RF’s counterparts should involve the HR. 
Figure 4. Foreign Policy-making Structures and Processes before Lisbon Reform-Treaty 
 
Source: Institute for International and European Policy. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. [Retrieved from 
http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/eufp/files/Foreign%20policy-making%20before%20&%20after%20Lisbon.pdf, 
23 February 2011] 
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Figure 5. Foreign Policy-making Structures and Processes under Lisbon Reform-Treaty 
 
Source: Institute for International and European Policy. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. [Retrieved from 
http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/eufp/files/Foreign%20policy-making%20before%20&%20after%20Lisbon.pdf, 
23 February 2011] 
The HR is supported by the new created European External Action Service (EEAS) (Art. 
27). 
“In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European 
External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic 
services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of 
the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded 
from national diplomatic services of the member states” (Art. 27(3) TEU). 
The EEAS brings the Commission’s 120 delegations, representatives of the Council and a 
contingent of national diplomats together under one roof. 
 34 
2.3 Externalisation of Internal Policy Legislations and 
Objectives6 
Although primarily thought of as an EU internal security regime, the EU has developed an 
external dimension to its justice and home affair policies, which has changed the EU’s 
interactions with the outside world (e.g. Boswell 2003; Wolff/ Wichmann/ Mounier 2009; 
Lavenex/ Wichmann 2009; Rees 2008). The efforts to create a closer internal-external 
security nexus have been based on the understanding that the EU may enhance its 
problem-solving capacity in relation to transnational challenges such as the fight against 
irregular migration, organised crime or terrorism if it succeeds in engaging third countries, 
particularly countries neighbouring the EU, in achieving its JHA-related objectives (e.g. 
COM 2002a, 2003a; Council of the EU 2002b). The reason why the EU is keen to improve 
cooperation with the neighbouring countries on internal security questions is the high 
degree of security interdependence. Because of the interdependencies of these policy 
areas, internal and foreign policy goals come closer together (e.g. Lavenex 2004: 680) 
and call for a comprehensive policy approach. This has further evolved into a formal 
external agenda designed to secure the area of freedom, security and justice for EU 
citizens, with further conflation of internal and external security in the EU (European 
Security Strategy 2003). 
Already in the mid-1990s, parallel to establishing a coherent supranational EU migration 
control system, efforts were made to expand this regime to third countries of origin or 
transit migration (e.g. Düvell/ Vollmer 2009: 7). 
“[…] policy makers in Europe have been intrigued by the idea of ‘externalizing’ or 
‘internationalising’ the hosting of asylum seekers and migrants attempting to reach, or 
already on, the territory of the EU” (UNHCR 2006). 
In 1998, the High Level Working Group Asylum and Migration (HLWG) was set up and 
mandated to: 
1) “develop a strategic approach and a coherent and integrated policy of the European 
Union for the most important countries and regions of origin and transit of asylum seekers 
and migrants, [n.b.: and in opposite to its previous mandate] without geographical 
limitations” (Council of the European Union 1999a); and, 2) to produce “horizontal 
analyses of a limited number of countries of origin of asylum seekers and illegal 
                                                
6 Parts of this chapter got also presented by the author at the ECPR 7th Pan-European Conference 
on International Relations. Stockholm, 9-11 September. [Bernhard Zeilinger: ’EU´s External Policy 
towards Eastern Europe on Migration Issues. Breaking New Ground in International Relations?’] 
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immigrants and ...to provide concrete suggestions for measures for managing and 
containing migration flows from these countries” (Council of the EU 1998b). 
The external dimension of EU asylum and migration policy covers several components, 
including (e.g. UNHCR 2006): 
• Refusal of entry to EU territory of persons coming from countries designated as ‘safe 
countries of origin’ or transiting through countries deemed to be ‘safe third countries’; 
• Interdiction at sea of persons attempting to reach EU territory; 
• The conclusion of ‘readmission agreements’ with countries outside the EU, by which the 
countries agree to accept the return from EU territory of migrants and asylum seekers who 
transited through the countries en route to the EU; and 
• Support to border enforcement and detention capacity in transit countries that border the 
EU. 
As a result of increased competences on the Community level, the Commission was able 
to raise new initiatives on interregional cooperation with associated third countries. Since 
the first Special European Council Meeting on Justice and Home Affairs in Tampere in 
October 1999, when cooperation with third countries in the area of migration was formally 
approved, migration matters have experienced an increased visibility in the EU’s external 
relations in order to integrate all countries of transit and origin into a comprehensive 
migration control policy and to export its policies (European Council 1999b). Some ideas 
that were introduced beginning with the 1999 Tampere Council deserve more attention 
because they represent the starting point for an intense process of the EU searching for 
techniques and ideas of how to make migration governable and how to incorporate third 
countries into the system in order to stem migration flows into EU territory. It was 
exemplified ’to put the fight against illegal immigration to the front of the community‘, to 
adopt ’any measure necessary‘, to enforce ’a closed door policy for those who immigrate 
illegally and who must be effectively deported‘; and to develop “a global approach for 
combating [n.b.: illegal migration] networks including all suitable measures, from country 
of origin to destination” (Council of the European Union 2002b). The rationality of 
governing immigration to Europe is based on a continuous search for new ideas and 
solutions to problems at hand by producing new knowledge and activating expertise of 
security apparatuses mobilised to govern political spaces through governing human 
mobility. This indeed reveals the Union’s willingness to expand its political space of 
governance by governing mobility and borders. 
The Tampere Council called on the Union “to develop common policies on asylum and 
immigration, while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders 
to stop illegal immigration and combat those who organise it and commit related 
international crimes” (Tampere European Council 1999). Further, in the Treaty of the 
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Functioning of the EU (TFEU) a few references are made to the external dimension of the 
AFSJ can be found in the TFEU (e.g. Vara 2008: 549). Article 78(2g) of the TFEU 
stresses the need to seek for close cooperation with third countries for the purpose of 
managing inflows of people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary protection. 
Article 70(3), however, emphasises the importance of implementing agreements with third 
countries for the readmission of illegal immigrants into their country of origin or 
provenance. 
The participants of the summit called for a common approach to asylum and migration 
issues, with an emphasis on partnership with countries of origin and transit of migrants, 
improved and effective asylum measures, and fair treatment for Third-Country-Nationals 
(TCN) who legally reside in the member states. Three interrelated community policies in 
the realm of migration management were approved: common asylum and immigration 
policy; immigrant integration policy; and external border management to stop any illegal 
movement across the EU borders. Since stemming illegal immigration into the European 
Union was a main concern of member states, the Council supported providing assistance 
to third countries with voluntary return and strengthening their ability to effectively combat 
trafficking in human beings and to cope with their readmission obligations. The 
Commission received a mandate – on behalf of the member states – to negotiate 
readmission agreements with relevant third countries. At this stage, there was no 
understanding of what ‘cooperation’ with countries of origin and transit actually meant; 
rather, one-sided thinking about the EU’s and member states’ interests in managing illegal 
migration prevailed (e.g. Zhyznomirska 2009: 6). 
At the Seville European Council of June 2002, member states called for a ‘targeted 
approach’ to the problem of migration management, with explicit reference to Common 
External and Security Policies and other European Union Policies as possible frameworks 
to penalise third countries who do not fulfil their obligations in border management and 
migration management (Seville European Council 2002). In response, the Commission 
recommended that the overall coherence of the EU external policies and actions be 
respected, with proper consideration given to the situation of each individual country. The 
Commission appealed for encouraging those countries “that accept new disciplines [n.b.: 
on a voluntarily basis], but not penalizing those who are not willing or not capable to do 
so” (COM 2002a). 
Hence, according to ‘positive conditionality’, the EU offers rewards to third countries in 
return for undertaking serious reforms in crucial policy areas. Meanwhile, there is hardly 
any European development aid, support for reconstruction, trade or technical cooperation 
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negotiations or agreements with countries of origin and transit migratory flows to the EU 
states that do not also include e.g. a paragraph on measurements to curb irregular 
migration and readmission policies. 
It was of interest to the EU to ‘extra-territorialise’ (Boswell 2003; Rijpma/ Cremona 2007: 
11) the management of security threats to neighbouring countries by exporting its own 
rules and policy regulatory instruments to neighbouring countries’ legislation and enhance 
cooperation in the respective policies (e.g. Bigo/ Guild 2005; Balzacq 2008; Wolff et al. 
2009). The ‘externalisation approach’ is a restrictive and control-oriented approach in 
which the EU passes classic migration control instruments on to non-member countries 
that have to agree on common regulations towards migration management, e.g. capacity-
building in the area of border control and the enhancement of non-member countries’ risk 
analysis and information-gathering capacities, and non-member countries taking their 
responsibility towards refugee seekers (e.g. Trauner/ Kruse 2008: 8). As a consequence, 
the EC Commission proposes a number of measures in its five year Action Plan for FJS, 
with detailed proposals to enhance non-member states’ capacities in order to improve 
their migration management and enable more effective border controls, considered to be 
crucial for neighbouring countries’ obligations to enhance security in the wider European 
region. This Action Plan follows the overall priorities for FJS set out in the Hague 
Programme – endorsed by the Brussels European Council in November 2004 (COM 
2005a). 
For example Ukraine and Moldova came under massive pressure from a number of EU 
member countries to curb irregular migration by improving their border control activities 
and document security, to agree on a common return policy of irregular residents in the 
EU, including their citizens as well as transit migrants reaching the EU through their 
territory, and, finally, to provide needed infrastructure to host refugee seekers and grant 
asylum according to international standards. As a consequence, responsibility for 
preventing unwanted migrants from entering EU territory has been shifted towards non-
EU countries (FFM 1997). Basaran (2008) calls this approach of externalisation a ’policy 
of delegation‘ that aims to transfer responsibility over population control and migratory 
flow through one’s own country (e.g. ibid: 344). Such practices turn these countries into 
“buffer zones” (Collinson 1996), tasked with halting and absorbing ’unwanted‘ migration 
flow into the core of the EU. Sometimes, however, EU countries are criticised for simply 
‘dumping’ politically unwanted immigrants on their neighbours’ territories, e.g. through 
migration containment and return policies, instead of recognising their international 
obligations towards refugees (e.g. Balzacq 2008). Therefore, some would argue that the 
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EU’s ‘burden sharing’ policy is a euphemism for ‘shifting the burden’ to its neighbouring 
countries, who are held responsible for keeping unwanted immigrants off EU territory and 
who could therefore become a ‘buffer zone’ for migrants unwanted in the EU (e.g. Düvell/ 
Vollmer 2009: 9). 
This process is facilitated through the 2004 initiatives of the ENP and the Four Common 
Spaces with the RF. One of the main objectives of the ENP is to develop a zone of peace 
and stability – “a ‘ring of friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and 
cooperative relations in an otherwise conflict-ridden neighbourhood” (COM 2003a). At 
least in rhetoric, the ENP highlights joint responsibility and common interests, especially 
when talking about a wide spectrum of security issues of a transnational character such 
as the fight against illegal migration, organised crime, or terrorism. The Commission’s 
Communication reflected this theme, declaring that “[a] shared neighbourhood implies 
burden-sharing and joint responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by 
conflict and insecurity” (COM 2003b: 12). 
It indeed can be argued that the external dimension of the EU’s principles and norms in 
internal security beyond its borders is reflective of the geopolitical ambitions of the EU 
broadly understood as ’the use of space for political purposes, that is, control and 
management of people, objects and movement‘ (Balzacq 2008: 1), and to establish itself 
as the core integration project in Europe by installing common institutions to regulate 
these policy issues and exert its influence in the periphery (e.g. Dimitrovova 2010: 7). The 
EU’s presentation of itself in the neighbourhood is focused on exporting and sharing its 
values with outsiders, and hence the ENP can be read as a carrier of the values of 
modernity. The values to be spread are merely technical and universal norms and 
therefore less controversial. Additionally, the EU’s legislation is seen positively and it is 
applied by countries voluntarily. The efficacy of EU’s regulatory model and its coherence 
with regulatory models of leading economies determines so to say its sense of superiority 
when it comes to its diffusion to other countries. 
 39 
2.4 The Institutionalisation of Interaction between the EU and its 
Neighbourhood7 
The EU not only attempts to develop a joint and coherent approach to migration, but also 
increasingly integrates source and transit countries in its neighbourhood into its efforts 
and has introduced formal and informal institutional set ups to facilitate the interaction and 
cooperation on crucial policy issues, inter alia as a reaction of the enlargement process. 
These include numerous multilateral and bilateral processes such as: EU accession 
processes (Europe agreements), European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Mediterranean 
Union (former Barcelona Process), Strategic Partnerships with BRIC-states and USA, 
Northern Dimension, Budapest Process8 and Söderköping Process9. 
Following the entry into force of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 
1997/98, the cooperation between the EU and its Eastern neighbours improved and 
became more successful on the basis of a comprehensive legal and organisational 
framework. The PCA forms the basis of bilateral cooperation in the major policy areas: 
trade, transport, energy, JHA and environment. The ENP also seeks to go beyond an 
economic rationale and create a: 
“ring of countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an 
increasingly close relationship” and offer a rich menu to move “beyond cooperation to 
involve a significant measure of economic and political integration” (COM 2004a). 
If the ENP countries agree and implement their action plans they will become significantly 
integrated into the EU space of governance, although not on an equal footing (e.g. 
Dimitrovova 2010:10). The initiatives contain all Eastern European countries with the 
                                                
7 Parts of this chapter got also presented by the author at the ECPR 7th Pan-European Conference 
on International Relations. Stockholm, 9-11 September. [Bernhard Zeilinger: ’EU´s External Policy 
towards Eastern Europe on Migration Issues. Breaking New Ground in International Relations?’] 
8 The Budapest process is a consultative forum of about 50 governments (e.g. RF, Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus) and ten international organizations, bringing together experts from countries 
of destination, transit and origin of migration. It addresses external border issues with the aim to 
coordinating measures for controlling irregular migration from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
(http://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/ICMPD-Website/Budapest_Process/What_is_the_Budapest_ 
Process_January_2010.pdf, last access 12 January 2011) 
9 The Söderköping Process was launched under the auspices of the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) in May 2001 as a proactive initiative to respond to the 
challenges of EU enlargement eastwards and to promote better cooperation on asylum and 
migration related issues among the countries situated along the future eastern border of EU 
Member States. The Process is coordinated by a Network of National Coordinators covering ten 
countries situated along the enlarged EU border: and a Secretariat which works to facilitate and 
enhance intergovernmental cooperation and information-sharing between the EU and Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine. (http://soderkoping.org.ua/page2864.html, last access 12 January 2011) 
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exception of Belarus. Belarus, under the leadership of Lukashenko, did not fulfil the 
political criteria for an agreement to deepen the cooperation with the EU, due to their 
democratic deficits. 
These established institutions were inspired by several policy initiatives over the years, 
such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) or the ‘Four Common Spaces’ with 
the RF, both launched in 2004, which facilitate interaction and enable a continuous 
cooperation on crucial topics. The latest initiative for the Eastern Partnership in May 2009 
– driven by Poland and Sweden – illustrates the EU’s objective of tightening institutional 
ties with neighbouring countries in the East (e.g. Prague European Council 2009). 
Furthermore, since 2007, the EU has been negotiating with the RF, Ukraine and Moldova 
on a new enhanced agreement (NEA) to renew the basis for cooperation after the expired 
PCA, which has in the meantime been extended on an annual basis. This new agreement 
will mark a new generation of association agreements. Both sides claim to provide a 
comprehensive agreement, to tackle common interests and to go more into detail in 
common policy coordination by partial integration into EU policies (e.g. Sushko et al. 
2007). It should provide for a strengthened legal basis and legally binding commitments 
covering all main areas of the relationship. The ENP, ‘Four Common Spaces’ with the RF 
and the outlook on the new enhanced agreement are a clear proof of a shift in the EU’s 
external policy towards neighbouring countries, given its increasing institutionalisation and 
the attempts of the EU to facilitate the cooperation and strengthen the engagement of 
neighbouring countries by including officials from third countries to elaborate on a 
common policy concerning migration in the region (e.g. COM 2003a; Saari 2006:5). 
Migration management cooperation on tackling soft security threats, accompanied by 
irregular immigration between the EU and Eastern European countries, addresses three 
major dimensions in the creation of a common area of ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’ 
(e.g. COM 2003a). These include, first of all, a comprehensive legal and organisational 
framework to evaluate the current situation on migratory issues, to elaborate on common 
interests and concrete measures, to monitor the agreed obligations, and to regulate the 
execution of the respective policy. Furthermore, as a second point, it provides necessary 
technical and financial assistance to support legal approximation and to improve certain 
standards of migration management. Thirdly, EU external policy involves governmental, 
intergovernmental and multilateral task-specific agencies to succeed in its policy 
objectives. For a closer look, this chapter proceeds in scrutinizing the cooperation 
between the EU and the RF, Belarus and Ukraine on migration management along these 
three dimensions. We chose migration management as a case study for EU’s external 
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policy towards Eastern Europe as it is the most advanced policy area in this cooperation 
besides trade. However, contrary to the rationality of trade issues, migration management 
deserve a closer look as it is more controversial and politicised which is assumed to be a 
good precondition for introducing a long-term and less hierarchical cooperation. 
2.4.1 The Organisational and Legal Dimension of EU’s External Policy 
The basis for the macro-institutional framework is laid down in the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA). In its nature, the PCA is embodied by a joint commitment 
to promote partnership and understanding for mutual benefit. The PCA opened a new 
chapter in the EU’s relations with Eastern Europe as it established a comprehensive 
institutional framework to provide for a continuous dialogue and cooperation. The 
deepening of institutional ties between the EU and its associated partner countries caused 
broadly ramified cooperation on several levels, which led in some policies to the sectoral 
integration of third countries into EU-led cross-national policy networks. We might term 
this form of international cooperation as ‘Sectoral Integration’ or ‘Network Governance’ 
(e.g. Lavenex 2008) in IR, whereas interstate negotiations and coordination of cross-
national policy issues are done within coordinative regulatory bodies by including several 
actors in the field. 
In this section, this paper will to explain the macro-institutional framework of the 
cooperation between the EU and third countries, which allows for certain cooperation. The 
political framework of the cooperation is laid down in the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA), signed with the RF, Moldova and Ukraine in June 1994 and entered 
into force in December 1997/98. Belarus, however, did not fulfil the criteria for an 
agreement to deepen the cooperation with the EU. The agreement contains an ambitious 
agenda on enhancing the cooperation on crucial issues, as trade, transport, environment, 
energy, justice and home affairs (JHA). The basis of cooperation is formed of mutually 
binding commitments to common values set out, for example, in article six of the PCA with 
Ukraine: 
A regular political dialogue shall be established between the Parties which they intend to 
develop and intensify. It shall accompany and consolidate the rapprochement between the 
Community and Ukraine, support the political and economic changes underway in that 
country and contribute to the establishment of new forms of co-operation. The political 
dialogue: 
– shall strengthen the links of Ukraine with the Community, and thus with the community of 
democratic nations. The economic convergence achieved through this Agreement will lead 
to more intense political relations; 
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– shall bring about an increasing convergence of positions on international issues of mutual 
concern thus increasing security and stability; 
– shall foresee that the Parties endeavour to co-operate on matters pertaining to the 
strengthening of stability and security in Europe, the observance of the principles of 
democracy, the respect and promotion of human rights, particularly those of minorities and 
shall hold consultations, if necessary, on the relevant matters (Council of the EU 1998a: Art. 
6) 
In institutional terms, the macro-institutional framework of the PCA is relatively centralised. 
At the top of the cooperation, the Partnership and Cooperation Council (PCC) is the main 
decisive political body, in which ministerial representatives of the partner countries meet 
with the EU Troika on an annual basis. Their main function is to exchange information and 
negotiate action plans to coordinate and align policy regulations. Furthermore, the PCC is 
the key monitoring body that observes the progress achieved in the realisation of the 
action plan commitments (Art. 90). The Cooperation Council is assisted by a Cooperation 
Committee that consists of senior and civil servants. They also meet on a yearly basis 
(Art. 92). Additionally, a Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (ParlCC) was established 
to bring together Members of the European Parliament (MEP) and, for example in the 
case of the RF, members of the Federal Assembly (State Duma and Council of 
Federation) and, for Ukraine, members of the Verkhovna Rada. The ParlCC compiles 
recommendations for the meetings of the Cooperation Council. Their meetings are held as 
often as necessary (Art. 95). 
An important innovation of the PCA with Ukraine, Moldova and the RF is the introduction 
of technical subcommittees in crucial policy areas and the Permanent Partnership Council 
(PPC) on JHA to tackle issue-specific technical and political issues. Whereas the PCC is a 
forum for political dialogue, the subcommittees and the PPC bear the potential for more 
horizontal or symmetrical discussions based on technical expertise rather than political 
considerations. In contrast to a political macro-structure, they are composed of civil 
servants from partner countries, EU member states and the Commission. Yet, in practice, 
RF prefers to send either high-ranking officials or diplomats (e.g. Interview with Official 
from the EC Delegation to the RF, Moscow, 28 May 2009). The meetings are held on an 
expert level to discuss joint priorities and technical problems encountered during the 
implementation of the subcommittees’ agreed road maps. The content for the 
subcommittees was set in the negotiated action plans within the 2004-established 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the case of Ukraine, and, within the Common 
Space Strategy in the case of the RF. 
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Figure 6. Institutional Framework of EU´s External Policy towards Neighbouring Countries on 
Migratory Issues 
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In the case of the EU-RF relations, the cooperation is along four thematic common 
spaces, namely the: Common Economic Space; the Common Space on Freedom, 
Security and Justice; the Common Space on External Security; and, the Common Space 
on Research, Education and Culture (13th EU-RF Summit in St. Petersburg: Joint 
Statement, Art. 2). The priorities listed in the road maps are rather vague; thus, they are 
the basis for ongoing consultations which rely on political commitment rather than legal 
obligation. The approximation to the EU acquis communautaire is not obligated, but 
serves as a model for guiding third countries in the conduct of domestic reforms. The 
common space on ‘Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ)’ is limited, addressing only illegal 
cross-border activities, including organised crime, money-laundering, illegal trafficking in 
human beings, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration. An ambitious road map was set in 
2003 at the EU-RF Summit in St. Petersburg, and adopted in 2005 at the EU-RF Summit 
in Moscow. This road map contains policy issues, upon which both parties want to 
enhance their cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. Technical 
subcommittees are responsible for implementing this road map, while monitoring the 
results rests with the EU-RF PPC on JHA at ministerial level. Other networks, such as the 
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joint visa and readmission committee and the visa dialogue, are excellent examples of 
advanced cooperation. The joint visa and readmission committees have the task of 
monitoring the application of the agreement, supervising the implementation of the 
agreement, exchange of information, and proposing amendments to the agreement, if 
deemed necessary. It consists of representatives of the associate partner countries and 
the European Commission acting on behalf of the European Community. European 
Commission representatives are assisted by experts from member states. The joint 
committee decisions are binding to the contracting parties. 
2.4.2 EC Assistance Instruments 
In the wake of the 2004 EU enlargement round, the EU has put aside targeted financial 
and technical assistance as well as opened some community programmes and agencies 
for associated neighbours (e.g. COM 2006b). The goal has been to promote reforms and 
to assist third countries in implementing them as well as to enable and support third 
countries in administrating their responsibilities toward migrants, e.g. establishing 
adequate humanitarian conditions in detention centres, guarantee needed health care to 
asylum seekers, and improve readmission procedures and the social reintegration of 
returnees. Some of the innovative tools of technical assistance being used to run certain 
projects for capacity building, training activities and law enforcement for regulatory 
convergence are being supported through mechanisms that have proved successful for 
candidate countries (e.g. Kelley 2006), e.g. targeted expert assistance (e.g. Technical 
Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX), AENEAS, CBC programme), seconding of 
staff by long-term twinning arrangements with EU Member States’ administrations and 
joint operations through participation in relevant Community programmes and agencies 
(e.g. European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). All of 
these instruments are demand-driven and as such “require a pro-active approach from the 
beneficiary administrations. It is for the individual Ministries, Services and Departments to 
identify their needs and make an application”10. 
The EU’s bilateral assistance priorities are elaborated by consultative meetings together 
with the associated countries and other relevant actors that are involved in the 
implementation of respective projects. The commitment of all actors to success in crucial 
policy objectives and to running certain projects is identified in the Country Strategy 
Papers (CSPs), covering overall policy objectives within a period of seven years, as well 
                                                
10 Website of the EC Delegation to Russia. [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/ 
tech_financial_cooperation/taiex_instrument/index_en.htm, last access 22 October 2011] 
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as in the agreed National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), which cover detailed annual 
programmes for a total period of three years. Further specific action plans with Ukraine 
and the RF were introduced by the High-level Working Group on Asylum and Migration, 
which was established: 
“to prepare action plans for the countries of origin and transit of asylum-seekers and 
migrants. The action plans carry out an assessment of the political, economic and human 
rights situations in countries of origin and provide a joint analysis of the causes and 
consequences of migration” (Council of Europe 1999b). 
According to these action-oriented papers, EU provides financial and technical assistance 
to support its implementation, e.g. for provisions in capacity building, training activities and 
law enforcement. 
Concrete projects are defined through a multi-step process. First, the EU sets out the 
priorities agreed on with their partner in a CSP (Council of the EU 2006d). Then, based on 
the CSP, the European Commission and the third country’s government work together to 
determine the financial resources to be allocated to the priority objectives and develop the 
National Indicative Programme (NIP). 
“The National Indicative Programme is intended to guide the planning and identification of 
financial cooperation with Russia according to a number of Priority Areas. The national 
allocation will be therefore be dedicated in the main to a closely-focussed, demand-led 
programme intended to further roadmap objectives identified as priorities for financial 
support” (COM 2006c: 3). 
Finally, based on the NIP, the European Commission adopts annual action programmes 
(AAP). These programmes establish the specific, detailed projects that match the 
objectives set forth in the CSP and NIP. These projects are funded under the legal 
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) and its specific 
Cross-Border-Cooperation programmes (CBC), which had replaced the former Technical 
Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) by 1 January 2007 (e.g. Council 
of the EU 2006d). The ENPI is designed to support sustainable development and 
approximation to EU policies and standards. The priorities are formulated in Action Plans 
and Association Agreements in accordance with the authorities of the associated 
countries and are also used in guiding assistance programmes. For the Financial 
Framework 2007-2013, approximately EUR 12 billion in EU funding are available to 
support these partners' reforms, an increase of 32% in real terms as compared to the 
period 2000-2006 (COM 2006e). 
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In addition, with the Programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in 
the area of migration and asylum (AENEAS), the EU offers targeted financial assistance 
to support third country governments in an effort to better manage migratory flows, and to 
combat illegal migration and trafficking in human beings. The AENEAS programme, 
adopted through co-decision in 2004, was funded with an overall budget of €250 million 
for 2004-2008 (COM 2006a). The programme pursed the general objective of bringing 
“specific, complementary assistance to third countries to support them in their efforts to 
ensure better management of migratory flows in all their dimensions” (ibid: 7). 
Regarding readmission agreements, the AENEAS programme was drafted to support third 
countries with regard to the social and professional reintegration of returnees, the 
establishment of adequate humanitarian conditions in detention centres, and the 
“strengthening of their institutional capacities to provide asylum and international 
protection and to develop national legal frameworks in line with the agreement” (ibid.). 
AENEAS was replaced in 2007 by the Thematic Programme on Migration and Asylum. 
2.4.3 Governmental, Intergovernmental and Multilateral Actors 
The implementation of the respective action plans and road maps in the relevant partner 
countries is assisted by several governmental, EU and multilateral agencies. Thus, in 
addition to the cooperation between EU agencies and state authorities of partner 
countries (including border guards, customs and policy, national security and other 
relevant authorities)11, the EU also uses the expertise and experience of International 
Organisations (IO’s) in the policy area of migration management and in the respective 
countries. The cooperation is limited to the areas of: initialisation, coordination and 
improvement of joint operations, funded merely by EU projects and programmes; 
exchanges of experiences, best practices in common conferences, and trainings; partial 
participation in meetings between the EU and its partner countries; and, advising on 
relevant EU institutions with regard to operational asylum and migration matters. 
In the following, closer attention will be paid to how agencies as well as organisations that 
operate on behalf of EU’s interests play a role in interregional cooperation on migration 
management. First, governmental agencies deserve a closer look, as they already have 
experience in cooperating with neighbouring countries as part of their regular foreign 
                                                
11 E.g.: Ukraine: State Border Guards (SBGS), State Committee for Nationalities and Religion 
(SCNR), Department for Citizenship, Immigration and Registration of Physical Persons of Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, Consular Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, State Department on 
Approximation of Legislation; Belarus: State Bureau for Passport Issuance, Office for Citizenship 
and Migration (Mol); Russia: Federal Migration Service (FMS); 
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policy and development assistance. Most of them are immediate neighbours and share 
the same borders. A brief summary of the most relevant: The Swedish Migration Board 
‘Migrationsverket’ and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SIDA, the 
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the Danish Refugee Council, the 
Hungarian Office of Immigration and Nationality, the Border Guard of the Republic of the 
Poland and the Polish Office for Foreigners, the Department for Asylum and Migration 
Policy of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, the Immigration and 
Naturalisation Service of the Ministry of Justice from the Netherlands, the Migration Office 
of the Ministry of Interior of Slovakia and the UK Border Agency. 
These agencies either run their own projects on a bilateral basis, or, which is more often 
or increasingly the case, they concentrate their resources and expertise on running 
common projects under the auspices of EC funded programmes or together with 
intergovernmental as well as multilateral agencies. In addition to agencies from the EU 
member states, agencies from non-member states also take part in common projects, e.g. 
USAID, U.S. Department of State, and the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC) (e.g. Interview with IOM official, Moscow, 17 June 2009). 
Secondly, EU agencies are a reaction to the increasing competences of the EC and their 
extending field of activity. Agencies at the EU level had been launched in order to bundle 
expertise and enable information exchange between the member states. In the wake of 
the enlargement process and facing new challenges, their mandate was extended to 
include neighbouring countries. Their task is to collect and provide expertise on certain 
policy issues and to undertake operational projects in order to support associate partner 
countries on e.g., the use of biometrics, data protection, and document security. 
The agencies implement certain projects according to a concrete given assignment of 
tasks, e.g., European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), the European 
Law Enforcement Organisation (EUROPOL), Centre for Information, Discussion and 
Exchange on the Crossing of Borders and Immigration (CIREFI), the European Border 
Surveillance System (EUROSUR), and the judicial cooperation body EUROJUST. 
Furthermore, experts of the EURODAC, a fingerprint data base, and FADO, a data bank 
for False and Authentic Documents, take part in the cooperation. FRONTEX activities are 
the most important when it comes to border security. The Warsaw-located agency acts on 
behalf of the Council Regulation as of 25 November 2004 (Council of the EU 2004b). 
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According to the Council Regulation, Frontex is authorised to sign working agreements 
with third countries and execute extra-territorial operations in the framework of “integrated 
border management” (ibid: Art. 14). Several working agreements have already been 
concluded with third countries and IO’s with regard to cooperation on border control and 
surveillance, and the readmission and training of border guards. Working agreements 
have to comply with international and EU laws such as the Schengen Borders Code and 
the Asylum Procedures Directive. 
Thirdly, we would like to mention multilateral agencies, which took over an important role 
in cooperation between the EU and its neighbours in the East. Especially in the case of 
cooperation with Belarus, most activities in the respective policies are enabled by projects 
of IO’s, financed mostly by the EU, its member states and partly by the USA (e.g. Interview 
with IOM official, Moscow, 17 June 2009). This is a consequence of the suspension of any 
and all official dialogue, due to serious violations of human rights and democratic 
principles. Therefore, other channels of interaction have also been established, to allow 
for cooperation on the approximation to EU norms and standards; these channels often 
receive support through IO’s as ’transactors; of EU’s interests. Thus, IO’s help in 
overcoming deadlocks in cooperation as well as facilitating interaction between several 
actors as they are seen as more credible than individual states. Prominent actors working 
on improving migration management in Eastern Europe are the International Organisation 
for Migration (IOM), the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) 
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  
 49 
3 Operationalisation: Building an Analytical and 
Theoretical Framework 
As previously described, we can observe an ongoing process of institutionalizing external 
relations between the EU and its neighbouring countries in the East. In the following 
paragraphs, we will tackle this phenomenon by introducing the relevant core concepts and 
drawing an analytical model. This chapter explores the topic of international cooperation 
between the EU and its neighbouring countries by illustrating the contextual and 
situational factors which influence the structure and mode of cooperation regimes. It 
scrutinises the correlation between conditions and specific structures and modes of 
cooperation and, therefore, offers an important contribution to the current debate on how 
to integrate non-member states in EU policies. 
Three major questions lay the basis on which we may build the analytical framework of 
our analysis: 1) how to characterise the structure and mode of cooperation and how to 
measure the extent of institutionalisation in international cooperation; 2) which conditions 
determine the mode of cooperation; and, 3) how can we relate these conditions to the 
extent of institutionalisation and the respective modes. Referring to major theories – as on 
negotiations and cooperation in International Relations (IR); on Europeanisation effects 
within and beyond the EU; and, theories on External Governance – the following sections 
are going to operationalise our research, elaborate on hypotheses and make them 
measureable for the analysis. First, the chapter begins with a tackling of the phenomenon 
of the external dimension of EU governance and, based on rational and sociological 
institutionalism, elaborates on a model to characterise the distinct modes of cooperation 
between the EU and third countries. Second, theories on IR are discussed in order to 
explain the processes of Institutionalisation in IR. Thirdly, this chapter scrutinises crucial 
conditions that explain the willingness of countries to institutionalise their interaction, 
which means to accept institutional constraints and legal obligations. 
3.1 External Dimension of EU Governance12 
Under the impression of the changed geopolitical configuration after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the wave of democratisation in 1989/90, the EU foreign policy changed 
                                                
12 Parts of this chapter got also presented by the author at the ECPR 7th Pan-European 
Conference on International Relations. Stockholm, 9-11 September. [Bernhard Zeilinger: ’EU´s 
External Policy towards Eastern Europe on Migration Issues. Breaking New Ground in International 
Relations?’] 
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rapidly. With the end of the bipolar world order, the EU had to define its own pattern of 
foreign policy and had to take on a more active role in the nearby region. A more effective 
comprehensive external policy of the EU was needed, as the EU became increasingly 
challenged by several international threats and negative externalities, which called for 
powerful leadership. Additionally, the wave of democratisation not only strengthened the 
international legitimacy of liberal democracy, but also increased the need to assist new 
democracies in their transformation towards democracy and market economy (e.g. 
Schimmelfennig 2007: 11). For decades, the EU operated within a relatively stable 
territory, defined by its member states and their coherent geopolitical, institutional, legal, 
cultural and transactional boundaries (e.g. Smith 1996: 13). Europeanisation was an 
exclusive process, implicating the harmonisation of legislation within the EU because of its 
exclusionary origin. Foreign policy was in the hands of the member states and therefore 
all the competences in this policy area belonged to them. The increased process of 
internationalisation leads, to some degree, to an “unbundling of territoriality” (Ruggie 
1993: 165) and precludes politics of exclusion.  
As a result, the EU has expanded its competences in external policy domains and has 
moved from its “politics of exclusion” towards a “politics of inclusion” (Smith 1996: 5) to 
reflect the changing demands of the European order. The ‘politics of inclusion’ or sectoral 
integration are seen as an ordinary strategy to tackle the consequences of 
interdependencies through the external projection of internal solutions (e.g. Lavenex 
2004: 695). Therefore it can be expected that the EU’s external governance may in the 
long run result in patterns of differentiated integration with associated countries in selected 
policy fields of mutual interest (e.g. Lavenex 2004: 695). The prospect of partial inclusion, 
as with a stake in the internal market, has to be beneficiary for the third country in the long 
run to result in its willingness for legal approximation. At the core of the processes stands 
the EU with its “centripetal effect in economic terms” (Rosencrance 1998: 18), which gives 
the EU dominance over third countries. 
These countries are dependent to some extent on a partial integration into the EU internal 
market as they are less developed in the economic, political and social spheres (e.g. 
Tirmaa-Klaar 2006: 8). The EU acts as the major centre of gravity in Europe. As Emerson 
(2004) points out in his “Wider Europe Matrix” (Ibid: 8), external governance is influenced 
by the relation between the centre and periphery whereas semi-centre and semi-
periphery. With the EU in the centre and the neighbouring countries as the periphery, 
there are semi-centres, like the RF, and semi-peripheries, like Central Asia or Iran. In its 
role as a centre of gravity in Europe, the EU has to deal with functionally-related 
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competitors, such as NATO, the OSCE, or the RF’s own Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) (e.g. Smith 2005: 7). 
The strategy of inclusion refers to the strategic attempt to gain control over policy 
developments in non-member states (e.g. Lavenex 2004: 685). The EU may aim to 
increase its international influence, stimulating and stabilizing democratic transformations 
by extending the EU’s legal boundary. Diffusion of EU legislation requires the ability to 
manage this transfer of rules to non-member states and the legitimacy of EU law in these 
countries. These processes of legal adjustment in a great variety of policy areas are 
accompanied by bilateral arrangements that are dominated by the EU. Apart from that, 
legal adjustment is supported by various forms of institutional affiliation linking third 
countries with the EU. However, instead of examining mutually advantageous 
relationships, in which parties voluntarily curtail their autonomy and delegate authority to a 
cooperative structure, the relation of the EU with third countries is characterised by power 
asymmetries. The EU acts as a regional hegemony that tries to extend its influence into 
neighbouring countries by rule transfer. It sets the conditions and dominates the process 
of harmonisation by offering partial integration into EU structures and policies. In the 
sense of this subordination of third countries it is difficult to speak about a real shift 
towards the “politics of inclusion” (Smith 2005: 8). 
In order to explain EU’s external policy, a clarification of the dimensions of EU’s external 
spheres, first and foremost, is needed. Michael Smith’s (1996) “concept of four 
boundaries” is a useful starting point to delineate the interaction between the EU and its 
associated third countries. The ‘concept of four boundaries’ makes a distinction between 
four boundaries: geopolitical, cultural, transactional and institutional/legal boundaries 
(Smith 1996: 13).  
Geopolitical boundary refers to the identity of the EU. It marks the distinction between the 
‘EU’ and ‘others’. Therefore, the identity of the EU is constructed by showing their 
differences vis-à-vis non-member states. The geopolitical boundary involves the 
definitions characteristic to the realist IR tradition, in which the “EU is seen as an island of 
security and stability opposing to disorderly outside world” (Smith 1996: 14). The EU is 
seen as the best reference model with regards to human rights, good governance, and 
rule of law, and accordingly the third countries should follow these established EU norms, 
procedures and rules (e.g. Tirmaa-Klaar 2006: 9). For example, the ENP strategy papers 
state: 
“The privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitment to common 
values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for 
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human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and 
the principles of market economy and sustainable development” (COM 2004a: 3). 
Cultural boundary is another classification that envelops the common practices within the 
EU, such as norms and values. As the soft-power model states, the “EU’s internal 
normative qualities will be translated into its external policies” (Tirmaa-Klaar 2006: 5). The 
willingness to adopt EU legislation corresponds to an extension of the EU’s cultural 
boundary. Only shared norms and values could lead to successful law diffusion in 
neighbouring countries. Transactional boundary stands for transnational interactions 
between EU and actors in third countries through a countless number of networks. 
Because of these complex relationships precise findings in this area are difficult to 
achieve (e.g. Smith 1996: 14). The extension of the cultural and transactional boundary 
precedes an extension of the legal or/and the institutional boundary of the EU to third 
countries, i.e. the enlargement process (e.g. Tirmaa-Klaar 2006: 6; 11). 
Within the categorisation of the four boundaries by Smith (1996) the institutional and legal 
boundary are merged. They mark the territory governed by EU law and EU institutions. On 
the one hand it consists of institutions that possess the competences to act within this 
boundary. On the other hand, the legal boundary refers to the regulatory scope of legal 
rules, and expands when parts of EU legislation are transposed upon non-member states 
(e.g. ibid: 15). Smith merges institutional and legal boundary whereas Lavenex (2004) 
comes to the conclusion that, concerning EU adoption to non-member states, institutional 
and legal boundaries can differ. This finding is important in order to grasp external 
governance. Hence, the legal boundary of European rules can be extended without a 
parallel institutional expansion. 
“The crucial criterion for external governance is the extension of the legal boundary of 
authority beyond institutional integration. In contrast to co-operation under an 
international agreement or convention, external governance takes place when parts of 
the acquis communautaire are extended to non-member states” (Ibid: 683). 
In sum, the extension of the institutional and legal boundary towards third countries 
extends EU’s scope of action and ability to have an impact on national policy regulation. In 
the following sections, the concepts of Europeanisation will be discussed in order to 
determine the major characteristics of legal approximation mechanisms. Following this, an 
explanatory model will be drawn to classify distinct modes of external governance. 
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3.1.1 Europeanisation beyond EU Member States: Processes and Mechanisms 
The current concept of Europeanisation has emerged within the literature on European 
Integration since the late 1990s. It is guided by the core analytical question over the extent 
to which EU organisations and policies have a relevant domestic impact in the member 
states. As already stated in the introductory chapter, the concept of Europeanisation also 
provides insights into capturing domestic impact in non-member states, e.g. in states that 
participate in the EU’s internal market (EFTA-countries) and in a significant number of 
other EU policies, and in the candidate states that need to adopt the acquis 
communautaire in order to qualify for membership (Western Balkans, Turkey). But is the 
concept able to cover the wider process of Europeanisation spreading well beyond the 
EU, within countries without any membership perspective? Does it give useful 
consideration to the external projection of European regimes and value patterns, which 
also affect the ways in which the EU will acquire influence in a wider global setting?  
In the beginning it is necessary to lay down a useful definition – of what Europeanisation 
is and should be and what it is not – in order to grasp the concept of how Europeanisation 
works. First of all, it is of importance to clarify the essence of being ‘European’ in 
‘Europeanisation’. By going through the common literature, the notion ‘European’ 
envelops EU norms, procedures and rules, mainly manifested in the acquis 
communautaire. Hence, Europeanisation is seen as the process of approximation to the 
EU acquis, which means that, on the basis of its market power and its political stability, 
the EU demonstrates a kind of “gravity centre” (Emerson/ Noutcheva 2004: 8) or 
reference model for neighbouring countries. In his study on rule transfer into the Western 
Balkans, Florian Trauner (2008) states that “the EU acts as the reference model for the 
modernisation of the political, economic and social systems of the state concerned” (Ibid: 
19). By defining itself as a normative power, the EU seeks, further, to spread its norms 
and values abroad and make them universally applicable. 
If European integration refers to the “process whereby national political systems become 
more closely linked within the European system” (Vink 2004: 3), the concept of 
Europeanisation is “crucially related to the feedback process of European integration” 
(ibid.). Another definition is given by Hértier (2001) and throws a different light on 
Europeanisation. She defines Europeanisation as: 
“a process of influence deriving from European decisions and impacting member states’ 
policies and political and administrative structures which may extend from a subtle and 
incremental re-orientation of national policy-making to substantial changes where 
 54 
European policies crowd out their national counterparts and modify patterns of political 
and administrative behaviour” (Hértier 2001). 
These Europeanisation processes are seen by Radaelli (2003) as: 
“Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared 
beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions 
and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures 
and public policies” (ibid: 30). 
This definition, which can be applied both to EU member states and third countries, 
stresses the importance of change in the logic of political behaviour as a “process leading 
to the institutionalisation in the domestic political system of discourses, cognitive maps, 
normative frameworks and styles coming from the EU” (Meloni 2007b: 23). In this way, 
Europeanisation is perceived as “a permanent two-level interaction with member states 
being both contributors to and products of European integration” (Trauner 2008: 16). 
Although most of the literature handles Europeanisation as a unique phenomenon within 
the EU (e.g. Börzel/ Risse 2000; Knill/ Lehmkuhl 1999 and March/ Olsen 1998), some of 
the authors already envisage relations with third countries as cases of Europeanisation 
(e.g. Grabbe 2006; Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2005: Kruse 2003; Schimmelfennig et al. 
2002: Radaelli 2000b). However, there are huge differences among the EU’s many 
associations with the entities with which it interacts. But, when we focus on the main 
mechanisms, the processes are similar, as the EU is always the core reference model for 
the process of legal approximation and covers a broad domain of political impacts across 
the triad of policy, politics (policy-making process), and polity (administrative structure) 
(e.g. Schimmelfennig 2007: 17). 
In tacking Europeanisation in third countries, one must explain how and why the states 
outside the EU adjust to norms, procedures and rules of an external power. The origin of 
the theoretical implications is rooted in research about compliance in member states and 
accession countries. To understand the processes within non-member state alignment, 
some conceptual fine-tuning is needed. The conceptualisation for Europeanisation beyond 
the borders of the EU has to give consideration to the genuine causality between the EU 
and third countries. As the whole process seems to be triggered by European decisions, 
there can be observed some intentionally or unintentionally domestic impacts (e.g. Kruse 
2003), taking place in a complex mix of formal and informal institutions and processes 
between and among states, citizens and organisations. Furthermore, the role of the EU 
can differ, whether the EU plays a pro-active role or remains passive. The most active role 
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of the EU is given to the conditionality scheme. In the social-learning and lesson-drawing 
scheme the EU remains a passive model for imitation. Thus, it has to be taken into 
account whether the transformation of political order, economic structure and societal 
beliefs is driven by the EU or by domestic processes. 
Europeanisation is driven by different institutional logics, defined by March and Olsen 
(1989): as ’logic of consequences‘ and ’logic of appropriateness‘. The two alternative 
logics of Europeanisation try to conceptualise the effect of institutions on an entity’s 
behaviour. In a rationalist manner, the ‘logic of consequences’ follows the misfit between 
EU and domestic norms, procedures and rules. The misfit is interpreted as an emerging 
political opportunity structure, which offers some actors additional resources to exert 
influence in the domestic domain. The actors are following a cost-benefit approach in 
which institutions have an impact by altering the expectations an actor has about the 
actions (e.g. Hall/ Taylor 1996: 939). In a constructivist manner the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ underlines the importance of processes of persuasion and socialisation 
as possible mechanisms of Europeanisation (e.g. March/ Olsen 1989: 160f.). 
Summarising the first considerations regarding Europeanisation, the classification by 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) provides a useful overview, as they include 
meanings of the ‘logic of consequences’ in their ’external incentives model‘. It follows the 
principal of conditionality and corresponds to the EU policy of ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’. 
Conditionality, therefore, is based on the direct, sanctioning or rewarding impact of the EU 
on the target government. This will change the cost-benefit calculations of the actors. 
Depending on whether the clarity and credibility of EU conditionality is given, the impact of 
external incentives increases with the size of net benefits (e.g. ibid: 11f.). Following the 
rational manner of the ‘logic of consequences’ there can also be an indirect impact on 
domestic norms, procedures and rules. This logic is based on an adoption of EU 
legislation voluntarily by domestic actors because they perceive them as solutions to their 
domestic problems. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) describe such a process as a 
“lesson-drawing-model” (ibid: 12). 
Finally, apart from intergovernmental interactions such as bargaining or persuasion, 
Europeanisation can also work through transnational processes via societal actors in third 
countries (e.g. Schimmelfennig 2007: 7). In line with the ‘logic of consequences’, societal 
actors or the market might also have an impact on national governments. Schimmelfennig 
calls this mechanism “domestic empowerment” (ibid.). The EU provides incentives for 
societal actors, or triggers processes of competition, which then change the cost-benefit 
assessments of the target government in the direction of Europeanisation (e.g. ibid: 7). 
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Figure 7. Mechanisms of EU’s Impact in Third Countries (Schimmelfennig 2007: 7) 
  Intergovernmental Transnational 
  Direct Indirect Direct Indirect 
Logic of Conditionality Lesson-drawing Domestic  Societal lesson- 
consequences through through Empowerment drawing 
  Compliance Communication through   
      Competition   
          
Logic of Socialisation Imitation Transnational Social imitation 
appropriateness through Through Socialisation   
  
Social learning & 
Communication lesson-drawing 
Through 
Social learning   
          
     
The introduced classifications above overlap with each other within different processes. 
Only conditionality can be contrasted clearly with lesson-drawing and socialisation (e.g. 
Schimmelfennig 2007: 7). According to the conditionality model, the EU sets its rules as 
conditions that the third countries’ national administrations must implement reforms to 
ensure that their national rules comply with those of EU legislation in order to avoid 
sanctions or to achieve rewards (e.g. Schimmelfenning 2007; Bauer et al 2007; Knill/ 
Lenschow 2005). Thus, the EU imposes conditions unilaterally in order to exert adaptation 
pressure on third countries administrations. The asymmetry, therefore, is obvious between 
the EU and neighbouring countries, based mainly on their economical prosperity. 
EU conditionality in general is described as a positive tool, which means that it uses 
‘carrots’ rather than ‘sticks’ to stimulate reforms in associated countries. This means that, 
if an associated country is doing well in fulfilling EU driven conditions, the EU provides 
financial support and technical aid and therefore increases its integration into EU 
institutions, its stake in the internal market, and so on. In the literature, relying on 
conditionality framework in foreign policy (Cremona & Hillion 2006; Kelley 2006; Magen 
2006 with regard to the ENP), a differentiation is done between negative and positive 
conditionality. Whereas negative conditionality means foreign policy by threat of sanction 
if requested claims are not fulfilled or to withhold a promised benefit in case of 
noncompliance, positive conditionality is based on the idea that the EU offers rewards to 
non-member states for fulfilling reforms. The use of sanctions or the stick approach is only 
used if the associated government violates the essential elements, which consist of 
respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Therefore, “the EU may suspend 
or terminate an agreement with a third country” (Schimmelfennig 2007: 11). 
The so called ‘carrot and stick approach’ of conditionality was successfully used as the 
main tool in the enlargement process and in EU foreign policy (e.g. Smith 2003). As the 
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enlargements in 2004 and 2007 showed, the most effective incentive for compliance with 
EU legislation is the prospect of EU membership. Therefore, the EU conditionality works 
rather well by offering membership to candidate countries. However, how can third 
countries be stimulated to adopt EU norms, procedures and rules if the EU does not 
dangle in front of them a membership perspective? According to this “accession 
conditionality” (Schimmelfennig 2007: 4), such an effective reward for third countries – 
and so the needed steering capacity for enforcing compliance in third countries – is 
missing. Therefore, the question arises: what could be other attractive incentives or 
decisive conditions for adoption? And, what are the alternative models applicable to 
induce these countries’ motivation for legal approximation with the EU acquis? 
As the membership prospect is absent in the ENP, the EU needs to increasingly rely on 
positive conditionality to entice states to move closer to European standards (e.g. 
Wichmann 2008: 8). Therefore, the EU links the granting of incentives to the commitment 
of the partner country to carry out certain political or administrative reforms. The decision 
whether or not to cooperate with the EU is the consequence of a partner country 
conducting a cost/benefit analysis. The better the cost-benefit balance between EU 
rewards and domestic adoption costs, the more likely it is for EU rule transfer to succeed 
(e.g. Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2004: 663f.). One way is to increase the amount of 
financial aid and technical support. Another way is to convince or persuade the partner 
countries of the need for reforms and alignment to EU legislation, which results in an 
about-turn from conditionality to flexible and merely unbinding modes of interaction, e.g. 
benchmarking, consultancy, and EU-sponsored policy networks (e.g. Schimmelfennig 
2007: 8). 
As Smith (2005) points out: “the EU must rely on other sources of power: 
leadership/agenda-setting, programme funding, access to its market [and] policy 
bargaining […]” (ibid.: 3). Moreover, the theoretical framework should not be limited to the 
rational cost-benefit calculation. An extension of the model to include constructivist 
mechanisms and beliefs (as identities and values) in the target country is needed. 
Because a significant inventive is missing, the legal approximation by third countries is 
based on voluntary actions. Thus, the research has to: 
“move beyond normative preoccupations and reconsider the importance of the 
fundamental factors that drive the behaviour of national policy-makers. These include 
national interest, the rationality and utility of policy transfer, the political salience of policy 
areas and domestic costs of policy change” (Citi/ Rhodes 2007: 21). 
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The difficult task will be measuring these ’push and pull‘ (Börzel 2000: 148) factors to 
result in causal findings. 
In contrast to conditionality, which stimulates third countries through granting specific 
rewards to harmonise with EU legislation, the alternative logic in international cooperation 
is of a sociological nature. It stipulates that non-member states can be enticed to follow 
the EU’s model through identification with the values and norms promoted by the EU 
according to the “logic of appropriateness” (March/ Olsen 1989: 160-162). The increased 
usage of sociologically inspired instruments in foreign policy is a reaction to weak 
incentives and coercive measures. Proponents of conditionality lost their main argument, 
which signified the about-turn from political conditionality to flexible and merely unbinding 
modes of interaction (e.g. benchmarking, consultancy, policy networks). Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier (2005) characterised these so-called ‘soft modes’ as “social learning” and 
“lesson-drawing” in the meaning of Habermas and Foucault (e.g. Ibid: 11f.; March/ Olsen 
1989; Meloni 2007b; Schimmelfennig 2007; Radaelli 2000; Knill/ Lehmkuhl 1999). Both 
modes operate along the “logic of appropriateness” (March/ Olsen 1989: 160-162), and 
presume that a partner country perceives EU legislation as legitimate and is convinced by 
its problem-solving capacity in crucial policy areas. Thus, this new form of pro-active 
external policy tries to persuade a partner of a proposed policy solution by emphasising 
the voluntariness of states to cooperate (Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2002). 
‘Socialisation’ or ‘social learning’ is seen as a process of internalisation of common norms, 
which creates mutual understanding, harmonises actor’s objectives, and leads to similar 
policy output. It is described as a “result of voluntary exchange of information and as a 
result of mutual learning between national policy-makers in EU-sponsored networks” 
(Schimmelfennig 2007:6). This may be triggered by proactive persuasion by the EU 
through intergovernmental communications and institutionalised EU-society links. The 
extent of ‘Social learning’ is determined by the accumulated experience of intense 
reciprocal interaction, most effectively through institutionalised interaction (e.g. March/ 
Olsen 1989: 13; Schimmelfennig 2007: 6; Rittberger/ Zangl 2005: 40; 46). As a 
prerogative for deepening institutional ties in interstate relations, the extent of reliance and 
credibility of each other is of decisive importance. Again, reliance and credibility would be 
increased by an institutionalised cooperation. Thus, reliance and credibility are both the 
impetus for institutionalisation as well as its output. 
Furthermore, this thesis argues that, as an institutionalised dialogue is initiated in low 
politicised policy areas, over time the partner country develops an identity  shaped by 
shared norms and values as a result of accumulated experience, and the likelihood of 
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initiating this sort of institutionalised cooperation in more problematic policy issues 
increases (March and Olsen 1989: 13). This supports the functional thesis, which denotes 
a spill-over of such an institutionalisation to other adjacent policy areas. This spill-over can 
also be a result of unintended momentum away from ongoing regularisation and beyond 
the competences that were originally agreed upon. The socialisation approach is designed 
to create opportunities for “imitations and demonstration effect” (Youngs 2001: 359). Such 
a persuasion is only possible if the promoted rules, norms and procedures are seen as 
legitimate to the domestic actors (e.g. Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2002) and as useful in 
increasing the efficiency and problem-solving capacities of internal policies (e.g. Lavenex 
2004: 680). The EU can be active in this process of Socialisation through persuasion, by 
providing information and exchanges of societal actors. Schimmelfennig (2007) refers to 
‘Socialisation’ as the main process of Europeanisation (e.g. ibid: 6). 
In contrast to Socialisation, the ‘lesson-drawing’ scheme does not assume that the actors 
in third countries identify with EU legislation, but instead assumes that they acknowledge 
EU legislation’s ability to create efficient policy regulation. Hence, if the government of a 
third country believes in the problem-solving efficiency of EU legislation, it will adopt or 
imitate the set of rules because of the expected benefits (e.g. Meloni 2007: 31; Young 
2001: 359; Bauer et al 2007). Lesson-drawing relies on a cost-benefit calculation. Only if 
the government of a third country believes in the problem-solving efficiency of EU 
legislation, will it adopt their set of rules because of the expected benefits (e.g. Meloni 
2007: 31; Schimmelfennig 2007: 6). 
The cost-benefit calculation plays a crucial role in the conditionality and lesson-drawing 
schemes. The willingness of a third country to adopt EU norms, procedures and rules and 
therefore to bear the costs of legal approximation depends on the expected reward. In 
more detail, the conditionality and lesson-drawing schemes assumes that “a State adopts 
the European rules if the expected benefits of EU’s rewards are higher than the costs” 
(Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2002: 5; Schimmelfennig 2003: 297). According to this 
logical finding, Geddes (2003) points out: “we need to go beyond the discussion of the 
formal transposition of EU law and questions of administrative capacity” (ibid: 189); in 
order to grasp other important implications of the process of adoption to the EU’s legal 
apparatus. In addition to the size of expected rewards and the size of adoption costs, 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) note the “determinacy of conditions” and the 
“credibility of threats and promises” as important sets of factors (ibid: 672). 
Credibility by itself is linked to the consistency of reward allocation and of actions 
demonstrated by EU foreign policy. Following Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005a), 
 60 
credibility of conditionality and the size of adoption costs are key variables influencing 
compliance. In opposition to the conditionality scheme, the credibility of EU rewards 
doesn’t play a role in the lesson-drawing scheme (e.g. Meloni 2007: 32). 
To sum up the soft modes in foreign policy, both processes, social learning and lesson-
drawing, are similar in some aspects, but differ substantially in the idealist point of view. 
Whereas social learning is more promising in the long term, lesson-drawing results in 
quick and efficient rule approximation, but may cause problems in the daily practice of 
transferred policy solutions. Governance by conditionality, on the other side, leads to the 
highest rate of rule transfer by incentives or coercion, but again often causes problems 
when reforms are instigated and new rules are implemented, as bureaucrats, who have to 
run the reforms in detail, lack an understanding of the normative basics. To sum up, any 
policy transfer without an internalisation of EU norms challenges the implementation of 
rules in daily practice (e.g. Wichmann 2008: 2). This paper argues that the logic behind 
these two policy instruments is often used complementary. According to their functional 
nature, conditionality is proper for short-term objectives, whereas the socialisation mode 
emphasises long-term objectives. Thus, conditionality-inspired policy instruments are 
often accompanied by socialisation-inspired policy instruments (e.g. Wichmann 2008: 2). 
As a consequence, a creative tension arises between the various objectives and 
instruments inherent in JHA cooperation with neighbouring countries (ibid: 3). 
A policy transfer by social learning or lesson-drawing can be institutionalised through 
policy networks, which facilitate the exchange of information and the coordination of 
financial or technical assistance. Lavenex et al. (2009) name this form of cooperation as 
’Network governance‘. It can be defined as transgovernmental co-ordination and co-
operation, negotiated in decentralised settings between different governmental and 
technical bodies (e.g. Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2004: 683). Network governance 
presumes: an apparent symmetry in: 1) An equal partnership, even though their relations 
are affected by the so-called “shadow of hierarchy” (Héritier/ Lehmkuhl 2008); 2) 
Voluntarism; and, 3) On the basis of common interests and common procedures. 
Apart from that, domestic factors also exert influence on legal approximation. On one 
hand, the misfit between European and domestic policies, processes, and institutions 
plays a crucial role in the cost-benefit calculation as well as political costs for the 
government in running unpopular reforms. This depends also on the specific policy area 
within which reforms should be undertaken. On the other hand, legal approximation 
depends on characteristics of the domestic structures as related to economic 
development, regime type, national security, or political stability, which form the driving 
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force for domestic reforms and the capability to carry out these reforms. With regard to 
regime types, Mattli and Plümper (2002) claim that, if a country is a democratic regime, 
the national political leaders have a greater incentive to push for reforms which would 
align their country with the rules and institutions of the EU. A problem arises when an 
associated country might be tempted to comply only symbolically with EU conditions 
because they are not capable of handling the reforms or because they simply want to 
keep their costs down. 
As the enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007 showed, the most effective incentive for 
compliance with EU legislation is the prospect of EU membership. Therefore, the EU 
conditionality works rather well by offering membership to well-aligned candidate 
countries. But how can third countries be stimulated to adopt EU norms, procedures and 
rules if the EU does not dangle a prospect for membership in front of them? According to 
the “accession conditionality” (Schimmelfennig 2007: 4), such an effective reward for third 
countries is missing. 
“In the process of eastern enlargement […] combined with the high volume and 
intrusiveness of the rules attached to its membership, have allowed the EU an 
unprecedented influence […] on the entire range of public policies in these countries” 
(Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2004: 669).  
The processes of Europeanisation will follow different mechanisms due to the fact that the 
most effective mechanism, conditionality, is weakened by the missing prospect for 
membership. On the other hand, competition and communication are hypothesised to 
have at least a limited long-term effect, to the extent that third countries are subject to 
market pressures generated through the EU and take part in EU-sponsored policy 
networks (e.g. Schimmelfennig 2007: 8). 
But can these instruments and strategies be as successful as the accession 
conditionality? How can the EU extend its leverage without the prospect of EU 
membership? There is not enough experience in transferring EU legislation abroad to 
have a good empirical value. More research is needed to figure out under which 
conditions these mechanisms can successfully lead to legal approximation in third 
countries. 
For this purpose, the analysis of the process taking place beyond the EU borders can 
indeed provide new insights and can contribute to the more general theoretical debate on 
the issue. As a matter of fact, an analysis of countries that are not included in the list of 
prospective members of the Union can improve our understanding of the nature of the 
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processes that are necessary in order to support the spreading of the European model, 
and furthermore it can facilitate the assessment of the scope conditions for the 
effectiveness of alternative mechanisms of Europeanisation (e.g. Meloni 2007: 6). The 
result of such research will be fruitful to theorise Europeanisation beyond the EU. 
“Whereas the literature conveys the picture that Europeanisation efforts beyond Europe 
are inconsistent and ineffective overall, this does not mean that there are no cases of 
consistent policy and effective impact. Searching for such cases and studying their 
conditions in comparison with similar cases may generate better knowledge on the 
differential effects and the conditions of Europeanisation in non-candidate countries” 
(Schimmelfennig 2007: 17). 
Researchers have to be extremely careful in attributing domestic change in third countries 
to Europeanisation. The general problem of Europeanisation research is, that it is difficult 
to separate EU influences from those caused by other international, transnational, and 
domestic processes (e.g. ibid: 10). It is of vital importance to take into account all these 
sources of influences in order to be cautious and avoid wrong conclusions. The risk 
derives on the one hand from conceptual overstretching and on the other hand from a 
possible overlapping between the influences of Europeanisation, Internationalisation and 
inner developments in the case of transition after political collapse. A good example for 
such multi-causality is the large-scale changes in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the wave of political, economic and societal transformations in post-socialist 
countries. Another aspect is the influence on policies that derives from the rapid 
expansion of international trade and from the increasing internationalisation of financial 
markets. Apart from that, the EU itself is influenced by these processes and is a part of 
international regimes. 
3.1.2 EU External Governance: Extending the Legal Boundary beyond EU Member 
States 
Whereas Europeanisation describes the process of legal approximation and covers a 
broad domain of political impacts across the triad of policy, politics (policy-making 
process), and polity (administrative structure), we will in the next step focus on how the 
EU and its neighbouring countries institutionalise their cooperation on transnational policy 
issues. In other words, we will grapple with the institutional framework that is used by the 
EU to extend its ‘legal boundary’ to neighbouring countries and, among other things, 
transpose EU legislation upon third-countries to move its regulatory scope beyond the 
circle of its member states. Although we know from the literature (e.g. Keohane 1984: 
138; Emerson 2004) that there are many unintended transfers of rules and values 
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between countries, this paper is merely interested in the intended actions taken by means 
of concrete instruments and mechanisms. External Governance therefore characterises 
the EU as a kind of international regime or regional hegemony whose norms, procedures 
and rules diffuse to neighbouring countries through institutionalised modes of interactions 
aimed at coordinating and/or regulating social issues and providing collective goods. 
“The crucial criterion for external governance is the extension of the legal boundary of 
authority beyond institutional integration. In contrast to co-operation under an 
international agreement or convention, external governance takes place when parts of 
the acquis communautaire are extended to non-member states” (Lavenex 2004: 683). 
Given the tightened institutional framework of the EU’s international cooperation with 
Eastern European countries, we may discuss External Governance in the sense of: 
“less than ‘government’, ‘governance’ is more than ‘co-operation’, as it implies a system 
of rules which exceeds the voluntarism implicit in the term co-operation” (Lavenex 2004: 
682). 
As Europeanisation may be defined as a “series of operations leading to systemic 
convergence through the process of democratisation, marketization, stabilisation and 
institutional inclusion” (Demetropoulou 2002: 89) and will presumably take place in a 
complex mix of formal and informal institutions and processes between and among states, 
citizens and organisations, External Governance explains the structure and processes 
that lead to legal approximation. According to the EU’s external policy, by using 
intergovernmental networks to coordinate and regulate the crucial issues, we might speak 
of ‘governance between governments’. 
External Governance refers to the relations between the EU and third countries. It is 
therefore conditioned by two main factors: one concerns the “perceptions of 
interdependence’, and the other ’institutional roles and capacities” (Lavenex 2004: 681). 
Both emerge as crucial determinants for external governance and express the conditions 
under which EU and non-member states work together (e.g. ibid: 685). The perception of 
interdependence (e.g. Keohane/ Nye 1977) explains why the EU chooses to engage in 
external action and hence to bind third countries to the fulfilment of internal policy goals. 
Lavenex (2004) sees external threats, and from this perspective EU vulnerability, as being 
on the one hand the driving force for EU initiatives for rule extension in its near abroad 
(e.g. Lavenex 2004: 685). On the other hand external threats also determine the “nature 
and degree of a state’s initial commitment to an alliance” (Smith 2005: 6). The expected 
benefits of cooperating with other countries are higher, while self-help often leads to 
suboptimal policy outcomes. Another question is which factors determine the choice of the 
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modality of cooperation? Rule transfer in third countries is not always a result of intended 
actions by the EU. Increasing interdependence also leads to legal approximation because 
of unintended consequences of EU policies (e.g. Trauner 2008: 16). 
Institutional roles and capacities are the major condition for any external action in the field 
of rule extension. They are part of foreign policy and explain rule extension as an attempt 
to manage the external externalities of the EU (e.g. Lavenex 2004: 681). The EU’s ability 
to manage its relations with these regions depends on the institutional setting within the 
EU. Institutional capacities refer to the dynamic distribution of competences and resources 
within the EU’s multi-level system and provide the background for the Union’s 
accountability to engage in governance activities (e.g. Lavenex 2004: 686). As Tirmaa-
Klaar (2006) points out, EU external policies comprise many dimensions and are not 
limited to activities within one pillar. “Institutional fragmented cross-pillar politics in EU 
policy-making has become prevalent in EU foreign policy” (ibid: 17). The role of EU 
institutions still varies greatly in policy formation across issue areas, especially in the 
realm of foreign and security policy. The analysis of the institutional setting of policy 
formation underlines the legacy of previous rules and procedures developed towards non-
member states. 
3.1.3 Conclusion: Introducing Institutions to Govern Beyond – Innovation in EU’s 
External Policy 
In the following, this thesis introduces a model, which helps to classify distinct modes of 
international cooperation along its degree of institutionalisation. Institutionalisation in this 
sense is defined as patterns of behaviour along common principles (shared objectives) 
and norms (shared values) as well as procedural and legal constraints (Keohane 1984: 
80), which constitutes the framework of interstate relationships by determining the 
distribution of power and setting the agenda. Thus, institutionalisation is a process of 
introducing common principles, norms and rules (legal dimension) as well creating 
common decision-making procedures in international cooperation (organisational 
dimension). 
The organisational dimension is characterised by the following conditions (Abbot et al. 
2000: 404f): 1) Frequency, e.g. the continuity and regularity of meetings; 2) Autonomy, 
e.g. the degree to which the institution is able to act autonomously within a previous 
agreed scope of action; and, 3) Competence, e.g. the degree of decision-making and the 
power to execute these decisions, e.g. to sanction free riders and to monitor adherence to 
agreed measures. Executable institutions, which are capable of executing their decisions, 
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are especially important in helping to increase its credibility. Each of these characteristics 
may be present in varying degrees along a continuum, and each can vary independently 
of the others. 
On the other side, the extent of the legal dimension of international cooperation is 
determined by (ibid: 401f.): 1) Obligation, i.e. the degree to which actors are bound by a 
rule or a set of rules (legally binding and enforceable); 2) Precision, e.g. the degree to 
which rules define the respective conduct they require or authorise; and 3) Delegation, 
e.g. the delegation of the authority to implement, interpret and apply the rules to a third 
party. 
According to the classification of Abbott/ Keohane/ Moravcsik/ Slaughter/ Snidal (2000) 
the extent of institutionalisation can be defined by procedural and legal constraints, which 
are: 1) Mandate to act, which means the authority or competence to decide on legally 
binding agreements and to execute and enforce them respectively (e.g. imposition of 
sanctions); and, 2) Procedures of decision-making, which defines legal constraints and 
the kind of actors (e.g. state officials or technical expert); and, 3) Frequency of meetings 
and consultations (bilateral interaction) (e.g. ibid: 401f). 
Based on the theory-led classification, the study makes the core distinction between 
hierarchical versus non-hierarchical policy coordination, which means that, apart from 
traditional foreign policy in the tradition of tit-for-tat, several non-hierarchic modes and 
strategies find one’s way into the EU’s external policy coordination to solve collective 
problems. These modes range from policy-emulation over informal agreements to binding 
interstate law. Cooperation, therefore, might be ad-hoc or rather formalised by a set of 
institutional conventions. 
The EU’s external policy is seen as a strategy to coordinate and control interdependent 
policy areas, as well as to secure and stabilise the neighbourhood. The modes and 
instruments may vary along two main logics: according to the literature on external 
governance of the EU, one distinction can be made for 1) ‘Governance by conditionality’ 
(Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2004; Cremona/ Hillion 2006; Kelley 2006 and with 
reference to ENP: Magen 2006), – according to ‘rational institutionalism’ (March/ Olsen 
1989). The ‘governance by conditionality’ or ‘external incentive model’ (Schimmelfennig/ 
Sedelmeier 2004: 663f.) interprets Europeanisation as an emerging political opportunity 
structure which offers some actors, behaving according to a ‘logic of consequences’ 
(March/Olsen 1989), some additional resources to exert influence in the domestic domain. 
The second distinction is for 2) ‘Policy networks’ (Lavenex 2008) – regarding ‘sociological 
 66 
institutionalism’ (March/ Olsen 1989) that facilitate interaction between actors. Policy 
networks, therefore, enable an institutional setting for information exchange, assistance 
and regulatory coordination on a voluntary basis. Rule adaptations are done following a 
‘logic of appropriateness’ (ibid), guided by shared understandings of what constitutes 
proper, i.e. socially accepted, behaviour in a given rule structure and, therefore, defines 
Europeanisation as the emergence of new rules, norms, practices and structures of 
meaning which states have to incorporate (e.g. March/ Olsen 1989; Meloni 2007; 
Schimmelfennig 2007; Radaelli 2000b; Knill/ Lehmkuhl 1999). 
Concluding the theory-led classification of the EU’s external governance modes, the 
analysis of the institutionalisation of the EU’s external relations is done through a model, 
which differentiates between four distinct modes with different governance characteristics 
and juxtaposes them along vertical and horizontal dimensions. On the vertical axes, 
differentiation is made for the legal dimension in the cooperation, whereas on the 
horizontal axes, the model differs on the organisational level of the cooperation. 
Figure 8. Modes of Intergovernmental Cooperation 
Legal Dimension
Organizational
Dimension
high
low
low high
Governance by 
Conditionality
„Regime“
Common Regulatory
Bodies
„Assistance“
Implementation networks
„Consultancy“
Information networks
(legally binding and enforcable/ 
ad-hoc negotiations
Legally non-binding/ mutual 
persuasion on demand)
(legally binding and enforcable/ 
authoritative decision making)
(legally non-binding and 
enforcable/ unilateral emulation
 
Note: Own adaption based on Lavenex’s (2008) model ‘modes of Interaction’ 
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The first mode, called ‘governance by conditionality’, is characterised by hierarchical top-
down command, which refers to the control and steering of cooperation by a hegemonic 
power. Adapting this distinction to the present context, we talk about a hierarchical mode 
of external governance when: 
“the role of European (i.e. supranational) law is strong, the conduct of a non-member 
state is bound by the predetermined obligations of the acquis communautaire and when 
there is an independent judicial review of the conduct of the non-member state” 
(Lavenex/ Lehmkuhl/ Wichmann 2009: 3). 
With respect to the institutional framework, hierarchic conditionality is characterised by a 
profound asymmetry between the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’ as well as by formal and 
centralised macro-institutions with dense interactions and little room for third countries to 
negotiate on their commitments. The EU sets its rules as conditions that the recipients 
have to fulfil in order to receive rewards. EU external policy in general is described as 
positive conditionality, which means that it uses carrots rather than sticks to stimulate 
reforms in associated countries. 
Apart from ad-hoc cooperation – based on a clear rational logic – several policy networks 
have been installed to facilitate cooperation on a widespread area of issues. These policy 
networks facilitate the exchange of information and provide a framework for coordinating 
intertwined national policies. 
Lavenex et al. (2009) name this form of cooperation as ’Network governance‘. It can be 
defined as transgovernmental co-ordination and co-operation, negotiated in decentralised 
settings between different governmental and technical bodies (e.g. Schimmelfennig/ 
Sedelmeier 2004: 683). Network governance presumes: 1) Apparent symmetry in the 
partnership, despite the existence of ”shadow of hierarchy” (Héritier/ Lehmkuhl 2008); 2) 
Voluntarism; and, 3) Common interests and common procedures. 
According to the theory of Europeanisation, non-hierarchical cooperation relies on the 
processes of social learning and lesson drawing in order to agree on common policy 
objectives. The extent of social learning is a result of accumulated experience by intense 
interaction with each other, which has its best effect through an institutionalised interaction 
(e.g. March/Olsen 1989: 13; Schimmelfennig 2007: 6; Rittberger/ Zangl 2005: 40, 46). The 
lesson-drawing model, in contrast, does not assume that a third country has internalised 
EU norms and rules, but acknowledges its ability to create efficient policy regulation. 
Hence, if a government of a third country believes in the problem-solving efficiency of EU 
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legislation, it will adopt or imitate the set of rules because of the expected benefits (e.g. 
Meloni 2007: 31; Young 2001: 359). 
Thus, next to the hard law nature of hierarchic conditionality and its asymmetric relation 
between the partners in cooperation, the other three modes are less hierarchic and 
include a multiplicity of soft law instruments. The three modes are understood as policy 
networks with particular specification; these are: 1) Cooperation in the way of ‘Dialogue’ 
within information networks (diffusion of policy-relevant knowledge, best practices and 
ideas, sensitivity to international challenges); 2) ‘Consultancy’ or ‘Assistance’, meaning 
financial and technical assistance within implementation networks, which refers to the 
voluntary and unilateral adoption of measures observed in other jurisdictions without an 
explicit agreement between different jurisdictions (cooperation among national 
bureaucrats and technical experts); and, 3) ‘Regime’, standing for regulatory networks 
(formulation of common rules and standards in a given policy area) (e.g. Slaughter 2005: 
52f.). ‘Regime’ is defined, according to Stephen D. Krasner (1983), as “institutions 
possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which facilitate a convergence of 
expectations” (Krasner 1983 cited in Slaughter 2005: 52). 
The second mode, ‘Information exchange’, describes a form of cooperation based on the 
exchange of information, as e.g. knowledge and best practice experience. It is 
characterised by a relative weakness of formal relationships, meaning a low degree of 
institutionalisation and legalisation, as there is no overarching legal commitment to 
cooperation, and approximation to the acquis is not the point of reference. Both partners 
are on par in this dialogue mode, even if there is an asymmetry between the EU and a 
third country in terms of bargaining power. Rather than being governed by a centralised 
macro-institutional structure and joint institutions, interaction occurs more ad-hoc and on a 
decentralised basis, e.g. within policy fields. The policy dialogue can be used to convince 
others to agree with ones’ own ideas in policy regulation and occur due to social learning 
or model drawing, which are used both as a vehicle for fostering norm adoption and 
compliance, and to enhance the level of policy implementation (e.g. Wichmann 2008: 8). 
In contrast to the first two modes, the following two modes are of a higher formal structure. 
Thirdly, ‘Implementation networks’ are a form of assistance of partner countries in coming 
up with policy solutions in order to tackle problems. Therefore, the acquis is the reference 
in the cooperation, and is seen as legitimate and useful in increasing the efficiency and 
problem solving capacities of internal policies (e.g. Lavenex 2004: 680). The partner 
country provides technical and financial assistance along its own agenda and with the aim 
to align others to its own legislation. 
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The fourth and concluding mode, ‘Regime’, is based on common regulatory bodies with 
highly advanced competences to negotiate on rules and procedures in respective policy 
areas. In contrary to networks of information exchange and implementation, here the 
regulatory networks act in a highly formal and symmetrical relationship with common 
rules, procedures, institutions, and decisions. This implies that, despite a dominance of 
the EU's agenda, third countries have to agree with the selection of topics of cooperation 
and can bring in their own priorities. The coordination of interdependence in network-type 
interactions requires a certain degree of institutionalisation and the existence of central 
coordination structures goes hand-in-hand with decentralised units of interaction; while 
ties can be formal and informal. The basis for interaction in networks is international law 
and voluntary agreements, and the norms used are inspired by the acquis but not 
precisely pre-determined. This goes along with a shared political rather than judicial 
monitoring of the implementation of agreed commitments (e.g. Lavenex/ Lehmkuhl/ 
Wichmann 2009: 4). 
3.2 Why Institutions Evolve in EU’s External Relations 
Given the modes of international cooperation, this thesis questions the preconditions that 
bring states into agreement on institutions and determine the applicable mode of 
international cooperation. However, the following questions remains: why should a third 
country accept the procedural and legal constraints that are demanded by the EU? Is the 
rising institutionalisation of bilateral and multilateral cooperation a reaction to the 
increasing challenges caused by a globalising world? The European continent especially 
faced major changes in the wake of the breakdown of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
We might assume that agreement upon common procedures and legal constraints, which 
tackle transnational policy issues, is undertaken to overcome an actor’s incapacity to 
overcome these issues efficiently by itself. 
To find a reasonable answer to these questions, we must, first and foremost, elaborate on 
the determinants that are responsible for states’ likelihood to institutionalise cooperation – 
and accept procedural constraints and legal obligations – between themselves and other 
states. In the following section, a short review of three strands will be given to depict the 
main components of international negotiations. More specifically, this thesis provides a 
starting point for an exploration of the factors that impact the negotiation setting, the 
issues and actors involved, and the structures and modes that characterise international 
negotiations. It settles on three basic aspects: bargaining power, interest and objectives 
(preferences), as well as the structure. In the following, these three aspects are clarified 
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by an elaborate theoretical and analytical framework, which takes into account rational as 
well as normative aspects. 
3.2.1 International Cooperation in a Triangle of distinct IR Theories 
The paper refers to three main theoretical approaches employed within the study of IR. 
According to them the willingness of countries depends on their aim 1) to maximise their 
individual power and to succeed in their rational self interest (realism) (e.g. Waltz 1979: 
79-101); 2) to improve cooperation for mutual benefit by reducing transactional costs and 
uncertainty (neoliberal-institutionalism) (e.g. Keohane 1984, 1989; Rittberger 1990; Zürn 
1992); and, 3) to act jointly on common problem-solving on the basis of shared objectives, 
norms and principles (constructivism) (e.g. Rittberger/ Zangl 2005: 45). Within the realm of 
international relations, diplomatic negotiation is central to the functioning of the system of 
nation-states. Within the realm of international relations, political dialogue is central to the 
functioning of the system of nation-states. A political dialogue facilitates interaction and 
helps to clarify issues of mutual interest. Additionally, increasing correlations among 
states have caused augmented interdependence, implying an increase in the vulnerability 
of states because of negative externalities. As a result, in order to prevent negative 
externalities and secure their own prosperity and security, states have an interest in 
cooperating with one another in the harmonisation of policy regulation. Additionally, 
intense cooperation has an enormous potential to generate beneficial outcomes for all 
parties. 
International negotiations cannot be explained simply by measuring an absolute beneficial 
outcome. International negotiations are not always about mutual interests or mutual 
benefits. In international negotiations, Realist theories see win-lose (zero-sum) outcomes, 
with recognition of clear winners and losers. But, as stated in the book of Starkey, Boyer 
and Wilkenfeld (2005): 
“Negotiation in the real world is, of course, far more complicated. Collaborative 
approaches to negotiation are based on the assumption that it is possible to achieve win-
win (non-zero-sum) outcomes, where the result is at last minimally acceptable to all 
involved” (ibid: 6). 
Raiffa (1982) support this statement and notes, “it is no longer true that if one party gets 
more, the other necessarily has to get less: they can both get more. They can cooperate 
in order to change the pie that they eventually will have to divide” (ibid: 131). 
An outcome must be considered in relation to the respective setting of each negotiation. 
Distinct conditions, therefore, determine the possible outcomes and give insights into the 
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structure and modes of international cooperation. One major factor is the objective of 
negotiations: is the negotiation aimed towards generating mutual beneficial outcomes 
through the use of common policy regulation, or is it about preventing negative 
externalities that could potentially result from these common policy regulations? Both can 
embody interests in common or specific to one actor and thus imply that the setting of 
cooperation differs. 
As already pointed out, every negotiation is about specific interests. Interests either 
emerge from rational cost-benefit calculation, their origin in the structure of cooperation 
and/or constructivist value based considerations. These three distinct approaches 
correlate with three dominant theories for international negotiations: Neo-Realism, 
Neoliberal-Institutionalism and Constructivism. These theories vary according to their 
assumptions about the decision-making processes of actors within the scope of 
international relations. Through the lenses of Neo-Realism and Neoliberal-Institutionalism, 
actor’s preferences are seen as a consequence of the attempt to gain the maximum 
outcome for themselves. The Constructivist or Idealist Theory on the contrary is lead by 
the norms of the actors, who determine which preferences are appropriate to the current 
negotiation. The thesis argues that there cannot be an exclusive use of theories. The 
phenomenon of international cooperation can only be explained by using an overlapping 
approach. The following section gives insights into the three major theories of international 
relations and highlights their contribution to explain international cooperation. 
First, in the tradition of ‘realist’ theories, the question of power is an all-embracing one. 
Their approach sees states’ relations within the international system as anarchic, where 
every state tries to be more powerful than the others in order to succeed in the fulfilment 
of their self-interests. The only restricting factor is the exercise of power of another state. 
The fear that another state could exercise power and harm its interests leads to the so-
called “security dilemma” (e.g. Mearsheimer 2001: 29-54; Waltz 1990: 29-37; Morgenthau 
1963: 75f). According to this idea, every state acts rationally to increase its power in 
relation to the others (e.g. Waltz 1979: 79-101). This competitive relationship, in turn, 
makes it impossible for fruitful cooperation regardless of the fact that both states would 
benefit.  
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (2000: 17f.) name three factors that are crucial for the 
willingness of states to cooperate with each other: 1) Historic relations between states and 
experience with former cooperation; 2) Perception of power relations; and, 3) Allocation of 
possible cost and benefits in order to gain or lose power in relation to other actors. This 
implies that, even if cooperation among states would be beneficial for both, each state will 
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take into account whether it or the other state will profit more or less in relation to each 
other, which precludes cooperation in most cases (e.g. Rittberger/ Zangl 2005: 37). In the 
perception of the realist literature, even international organisations and institutions are not 
able to solve the dilemma. One argument is that, as states don’t trust each other and seek 
self-protection, cooperation regimes only exist when they are introduced by a hegemonic 
actor, who expects a higher benefit and the security of its supremacy. If this hegemony 
loses its power position, the cooperation regime becomes weakened or suspended (e.g. 
Rittberger/ Zangl 2005: 319). 
‘Neo-realist’ theories attest that organisations and institutions are successful and effective 
only if a powerful state is the initiating force behind their foundation. This kind of 
hegemonic power is willing to bear the foundation costs because this hegemony expects 
to gain higher benefits through a more effective cooperation regime (e.g. Rittberger/ Zangl 
2005: 36). Of crucial importance behind effective institutionalised regimes are the power 
resources of this hegemony, which determine asymmetric power relations between it and 
other states. These power resources empower them to bring other states to accept the 
norms and rules of the initiated cooperation regime (e.g. Rittberger 2000: 201f.; Keohane 
1980). The modes to be used are ‘coercion’ (threats of sanctions) and ‘positive 
conditionality’ (stimulation by offering incentives). 
‘Neoliberal-Institutionalism’ (e.g. Keohane 1984, 1989; Rittberger 1990; Zürn 1992) 
agrees somewhat with the realist assumption about international relations. They overlap 
on the conclusion that the international system is marked by anarchy and that actors act 
only rationally and make their decisions in order to fulfil their self-interest at first (e.g. 
Rittberger/ Zangl 2005: 38). The two theories, however, disagree on the role of 
institutions. Realists see institutions as an instrument for powerful states to succeed in 
their interests in a more effective way. In the contrary, neoliberal-institutionalism states 
that cooperation regimes can also be welcomed by the majority of states; as such regimes 
are seen, at the very least, as more beneficial than no cooperation at all. 
Neoliberal-institutionalism considers that the increasing number of cooperation regimes 
results in a reaction to the rise of linkages and interconnectedness between states within 
a globalised international system (e.g. Keohane/ Nye 1989, 2000; Kohler-Koch 1990). 
These linkages lead to an increase in interdependence on and externalities of distinct 
policy regulation between states. States become more and more sensitive and vulnerable 
to externalities from policy regulations in other states (e.g. Rittberger/ Zangl 2005: 39). 
Countries stay abreast of these changes and build cooperation regimes on several policy 
issues as they cannot secure their interests on their own any more. Cooperation regimes 
 73 
help them to agree on common norms and rules within the regulation of policies on the 
basis of mutual interest (e.g. ibid: 41). 
In contrary to the realist position, neoliberal-institutionalists state that those cooperation 
regimes do not need a hegemonic power that initiates and dominates the negotiations. It 
is assumed that states agree on cooperation regimes with self-forcing power by norms 
and rules to regulate transnational policy issues. Compared to realists – who consider a 
powerful state as a necessity of the effectiveness and stability of international cooperation 
regimes – neoliberal-institutionalists see autonomy of cooperation regimes, on the basis of 
a mutual agreement, as possible. 
Hence, states agree to institutionalise their cooperation, even at a loss of their 
sovereignty, by committing themselves to common norms, rules and procedures, if they 
believe in its ability to tackle collective action problems and guarantee the fulfilment of 
internal policy goals by partner countries. In order to facilitate negotiation and to make 
their commitments more credible, states delegate extensive agenda setting, monitoring 
and enforcement powers to bilateral policy networks. This fact is particular relevant for 
collective actors such as governments whose leadership changes over time (e.g. 
Keohane 1984: 110). Thus, they accept a common set of norms and rules (e.g. ibid: 80), 
which constitutes the framework of interstate relationships by determining the distribution 
of power and setting the agenda. States accept a loss of their sovereignty and commit 
themselves on the common norms and rules within the regime due to the belief in 
beneficial outcomes of the accepted cooperation regime. Apart from that, negotiations on 
policy regulation cause high transaction costs, which can be reduced by formalised 
procedures within fixed institutional setting, which provide an arena for negotiation on the 
basis on agreed norms and rules (e.g. Rittberger/ Zangl 2005: 42f). Transaction costs are 
an indicator for costs, which arise ex ante and ex post of cooperation. Therefore, 
institutions are one way to reduce these costs, as ongoing interaction avoids the costs of 
information search, organisational expenditure, negotiation rounds, policing and 
enforcement costs, control measures and so on (e.g. Deutsch 1957; Dahlman 1979). 
Institutions provide an effective framework when they are able to contribute to the 
implementation of agreements as well as to sanction a member state which steps out of 
line or starts to free-ride. However, also without a powerful tool to sanction ‘free-riders’, 
states will take into account that, if they violate common agreements, they will damage 
their reputation. Further attempts to cooperate with other states will be harmed by former 
‘free-ridings’. Therefore, Rittberger and Zangl (2005) assume that states obey common 
agreements, even if an agreement is in opposition to their interest, as they see a benefit of 
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cooperation in the long-term. Furthermore, it plays a crucial role, whether states trust each 
other or not. The reliance and credibility of states result from their historical relationships 
and cooperation. They call this fact the “shadow of future” (ibid: 41), which keeps 
members in line. 
As reliance and credibility would increase through a strong institutionalised cooperation, a 
lack of them can also serve as motivation to agree on an institutionalisation as uncertainty 
in cooperation would be constrained by fixed procedures. In the case of a lack of 
credibility, actors might be more willing to accept institutional procedures, when the 
commitments are quite low. As a good starting point, actors could agree to install 
institutionalised information exchanges and allow for extensive interaction without any 
commitment. Uncertainty about actions of other states causes them to initiate cooperation 
in a long-term manner and to form institutions to fix the norms and rules of how to regulate 
policies. Distinguishing between egoistic self-interest and conceptions of self-interest in 
which empathy plays a role, 
“actors that interpret their interests as empathetically interdependent, in our terminology, 
may find it easier to form international regimes than those whose definitions of self-
interest are more constricted” (Keohane 1984: 13). 
As mentioned previously, capable institution is important to increasing credibility. Thus, 
states will be pushed to extend their cooperation from one policy area into others, even if 
they are not convinced of its effectiveness or are merely allowing the extension because 
policy issues are linked to each other. This implies that these states have to regulate 
interdependent policy issues. This ‘spill-over’ of common policy regulation is caused by 
the credibility, socialisation and internalisation of common norms and rules as well as an 
increase in knowledge regarding the interests of the other members (e.g. Rittberger/ Zangl 
2005: 40). 
According to Elinor Ostrom (1990), the central question of cooperation is: “how a group of 
principals who are in an interdependent situation can organize and govern themselves to 
obtain continuing joint benefits when all face temptations to free-ride, shirk, or otherwise 
act opportunistically” (Ostrom 1990). 
Thus, the cause of cooperation is not always because conflicts of interests between states 
force them to find a peaceful solution. Nevertheless, it makes a difference for the 
foundation and stability of cooperation regimes, if interests are divergent or mutual (e.g. 
Hasenclever/ Mayer/ Rittberger 1997: 44f; Rittberger/ Zangl 2005: 42). Other determinants 
of cooperation regimes are issue salience, power asymmetry and reliance on other states. 
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Whereas Neo-Realism and Neo-Institutionalism see ‘Rational Choice’ as the basis of 
decisions within international relations, social-constructivism is in opposition to these 
rational approaches. Social-Constructivism stands in the tradition of idealist theories and 
highlights, holding that decisions have a social component and do not necessarily follow 
rational arguments. In their concept of international negotiations, actors are influenced in 
their decision-making by cognitive maps, which define the normative frame that actors 
refer to when they come to a decision (e.g. Rittberger/ Zangl 2005: 45). Thus, decisions 
are made along the “logic of appropriateness” (March/ Ohlsen 1989). 
Cognitive maps determine norms and expectations and therefore determine how actors 
decide and act. Cognitive maps are not fixed, but build on the strength of past experience. 
They can change over time, which implicates the possibility of social learning. Thus, 
actor’s relations are reflexive ones (e.g. Rittberger/ Zangl 2005: 47). This effect has the 
strongest impact within institutions, as they determine strong relations. Institutions build on 
common values and objectives upon which the members agree. Through intense 
communications and informational exchange, social learning results in and impacts the 
formation of cognitive maps. Thus, institutions also help to stabilise and harmonise values 
and norms. These will lead to common beliefs and expectation, which probably result in 
common decisions. Furthermore, actors develop trustful relationships, as they get to know 
others’ belief systems and interests.  
The more intensely the actors interact, the higher the effects of Socialisation will be. Thus, 
socialisation effects are strongest between ‘epistemic communities’13 and ‘advocacy 
networks’. Both are marked by continuous and intense interaction within international or 
transnational committees or bureaucracies. Whereas epistemic communities have 
common ’causal beliefs‘, actors within advocacy networks share ‘principled beliefs’ (e.g. 
Rittberger/ Zangl 2005: 46). Both are organised in networks of knowledge-based experts 
who help decision-makers to define the problems they face, identify various policy 
solutions and assess policy outcomes. 
Institutions are not always found on the basis of common value and interest. More 
powerful states are able to initiate institutions and determine their norms and rules. 
Common institutions are made to cooperate on policy issues such as: free trade, human 
rights, environment, transport, and so on. These institutions are founded upon essential 
norms and rules. If a member violates these norms and rules, the international community 
                                                
13 Peter Haas defines an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognised 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area“ (Haas 1992: 3) 
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will sanction their ignorance. The standing of this state will suffer from this official 
denunciation. 
To summarise the main findings, every theoretical approach highlights a different view of 
negotiation processes within the international arena. While Neo-Realism stresses the 
importance of power and how power relations affect the interests of states, it faces 
explanatory shortcomings by revealing the basic phenomenon of bargaining complexity in 
interdependent relations. Neo-Institutionalism, on the contrary, highlights the role of 
institutions in negotiations as an influencing factor on the decision-making of actors. Both 
agree that rational arguments are the basis for decisions but disagree on the role of 
institutions. Social-Constructivism emphasises the social and idealist nature of actors. 
Every actor comes to a decision following his cognitive map about norms and objectives. 
If the norms and objectives are shared, actors would be in favour of institutionalising their 
interaction in order to succeed in its shared objectives.  
This thesis argues that continuous cooperation between actors within an institutionalised 
framework makes it easier to identify these needed collective interests through information 
exchange and knowledge transfer as well as normative socialisation effects (Sjöstedt/ 
Spector/ Zartmann 1994: 14). Actors learn more about the preferences and values of 
other partners on the negotiation table: with continuous interaction they are able to 
persuade each other through arguments and new information, which results in consensual 
knowledge about issues (Sjöstedt/ Spector/ Zartmann 1994: 16). Long-term relationships 
increase the credibility and confidence of actors, which leads to more integrative, 
cooperative problem-solving than that created through competitive actions. Besides, 
agreements on common norms, rules and values within an institutionalised framework for 
negotiations guarantee a stable relationship, as preferences stay more or less stable, 
even as representatives or political elites of a state changes (e.g. by democratic national 
elections). 
Institutions, in general, aim to reduce uncertainties in cooperation between states and to 
secure the exchange of information to gain the best possible outcome for all members. 
The individual objectives of participating states in agreeing on institutions as a basis for 
their cooperation are to: 1) Reduce transaction costs 2) Succeed in their self interest as 
much as possible, including, among others, the increase of individual power and 
influence; 3) Minimise security risks and costs from externalities of interdependence; 4) 
Spread their own norms and principles to other countries; and, 5) Secure the commitment 
of contractual partners so as to provide effective sanctions in case of free-riders. 
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3.2.2 Cooperation in Interdependent Relations 
A changed world order brings new challenges for the EU, but also introduces new 
opportunities. The globalisation processes gained a new dynamic, tightened the 
interdependencies between states and created fuzzy borders (e.g. Christiansen et. al 
2000), as the flow between the EU and the new independent countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe increased. This internationalisation of societies and markets resulted, on 
the one hand, in challenges as countries became more vulnerable to external 
developments, as e.g. organised transnational crime, irregular migration, trafficking of 
goods and human beings, etc. On the other hand, it opened up opportunities for the EU to 
take control of its dependencies on these countries. 
As countries become more vulnerable and sensitive towards developments in their 
neighbourhood, domestic policies become shaped by policy regulations taking place in 
other states. Thus, the linkage between domestic and foreign policies moved closer. As a 
result, countries strengthened their cooperation and coordination with each other in 
sensitive policy areas. According to this, interdependence is both the condition of possible 
cooperation, as well as the cause of cooperation (e.g. Spindler 2003: 103). 
These interdependent relations between states have distinct characters and provide 
different possibilities to make use of opportunities and to prevent or control threats. In this 
section, the concept of interdependence and its significance to determining cooperation 
between the EU and neighbouring countries will be explained. First of all, it is necessary 
to narrow the concept of interdependence and to strengthen its explanatory power by 
developing a coherent theoretical framework for the political analysis of interdependence. 
Following that, this paper discusses the linkage between interdependence and bargaining 
power, and how this might affect the choice of modes of cooperation between the EU and 
its neighbouring countries. 
The concept of interdependence, most simply defined, means the mutual dependency of 
states or actors. Thus a country or an actor is determined or significantly affected by 
external forces. Keohane and Nye defined interdependency as follows: “Interdependence 
in world politics refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or 
among actors in different countries” (Keohane/Nye 1977:8). To get a clearer focus of what 
interdependence is about; it is helpful to distinguish it from processes of 
interconnectedness. Whereas interconnectedness mainly is a precondition of 
interdependence, a clear distinction can be made concerning the costs of interstate 
relations. Whereas interconnectedness refers to the volume or frequency of exchange and 
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flows of goods and services and interaction between states; interdependence refers to the 
“reciprocal costly effects of transactions” (Keohane/ Nye 1977: 8). The extent of these 
costly effects determines the structure of interstate interactions, and affects bargaining 
power and the kind of cooperation and regulatory coordination of interdependent policies. 
Interdependency can be a sign of strength or weakness with regards to the power position 
of a state. Empirical research on interdependence is possible when mutual dependency in 
different policy areas is analysed and reciprocal effects of domestic, transnational and 
intergovernmental processes are taken into account (e.g. Kohler-Koch 1994: 224). First of 
all, we must evaluate how politics of a state are affected by external events. The main 
questions are: how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, 
and how great are the costs of these effects? To lay the groundwork for this analysis, in a 
first step we must make a distinction between ‘sensitivity’ and ‘vulnerability’ of a state vis-
à-vis external impacts and relates them to the concept of power. 
In terms of the costs of dependency, vulnerability can be defined as an “actor’s liability to 
suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered” (Keohane/ 
Nye 1977: 13). ‘Vulnerability dependence’ therefore can be measured by calculating the 
costs of making effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time 
(e.g. ibid.: 13). Accordingly, the vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on the 
relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face. This 
depends on a state’s ability to adjust national policies to deal with change and reduce the 
costs of disruption, such as readmission agreements in case of irregular migration, and on 
its ability strengthen cooperation in case of transnational organised crime and regulatory 
coordination in policies like aviation, environment, transport, trade. 
By contrast, sensitivity distinguishes an: 
“[…] actor’s liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to 
change the situation […] Sensitivity assumes that the framework remains unchanged. 
The fact that a set of policies remains constant may reflect the difficulty in formulating 
new policies within a short time, or it may reflect a commitment to a certain pattern of 
domestic and international rules” (Keohane/ Nye 1977: 12). 
Sensitivity to external events provide the basis for significant political influence only when 
the rules and norms in effect can be taken for granted, or when it would be prohibitively 
costly for unsatisfied states to change their policies quickly e.g. increasing oil prices, 
developments of foreign stock exchanges, ecological pollution, climate change, etc.  
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“The reality of globalization, and especially the current international financial crisis, is 
drastically challenging the existing system of world order, let alone the classical priorities 
of the so-called ‘Realpolitik’. […] Although the principles of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity still continue to be corner stones in shaping international relations, they can no 
longer provide a nation’s security and independence, even more so its economic 
security” (Smorodinskaya 2009: 1). 
The two dimensions, vulnerability and sensitivity, are both important characteristics of 
interdependence and determine power in international relations. If external developments 
or events put an actor in a disadvantageous position, that actor will probably try to change 
its position, if it can do so at a reasonable cost or transfer the cost to another actor. 
Interdependent relations constrain states’ autonomy and force them to react on 
externalities of other states. Whether a state is able to react to changes in favour of its 
interest depends on its individual power position. 
A state’s uncertainty about the actions of other state causes them to initiate cooperation in 
a long-term manner and to form institutions to fix the norms and rules how to regulate 
policies. Distinguishing between egoistic self-interest and conceptions of self-interest in 
which empathy plays a role, “actors that interpret their interests as empathetically 
interdependent, in our terminology, may find it easier to form international regimes than 
those whose definitions of self-interest are more constricted” (Keohane 1984: 13). 
Although the EU is the more powerful actor in its relations with most neighbouring 
countries, it is not able to translate this power into power over outcomes in interdependent 
relations.  
“Interdependence creates a discrepancy between distribution of power and creating of 
outcomes in concrete negotiations” (Keohane/ Nye 1977: 29). 
“One of the most important reasons for this is that the commitment of a weaker state may 
be much greater than that of its stronger partner. The more dependent actor may be (or 
appear to be) more willing to suffer” (Keohane/ Nye 1977: 18). 
Accordingly, interdependence is both: “the condition of the possible cooperation as well as 
the cause of cooperation” (Spindler 2003: 103; see also Lavenex 2004: 685). Apart from 
this, competitive interdependencies in economic terms are seen as a further argument for 
trade cooperation, as it regulates the exchange of complementary trade products (e.g. raw 
materials as oils compare to high technology). The reason for cooperation, therefore is, 
that the expected benefits of cooperating with other countries are higher, while self-help 
often leads to suboptimal policy outcomes. Interstate cooperation within common 
institutions helps to create “political and material problem-solving resources” (Lavenex 
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2004: 694). Whereas the EU is vulnerable to externalities from state action of neighbours, 
it is willing to bear the costs of creating institutions to ensure stable and consistent arenas 
for cooperation and coordination. In return, the EU uses these institutions to control the 
outcomes of its neighbouring countries and to increase its influence by extending EU 
norms, principles and rules. 
Theoretical approaches of IR theories bring into focus the conditions for cooperation and 
account for the function of power in interstate relations. To come up with current 
globalisation processes, the concept of interdependence will be added to the traditional 
theoretical approaches to give a more elaborated picture of reality in international 
relations. One major argument for cooperation is the interdependence between actors, 
which affects policy regulation among one another. Within the realm of the changed 
international environment, countries‘ internal policies became more and more vulnerable 
and sensitive to developments and externalities of policy regulation in other states.  
This thesis theoretically looks at how states act and decide within international negotiation 
processes. IR theories draw an initial picture of the complexity and characteristics of 
decision-making in international relations. Theoretical approaches of these IR theories 
bring into focus the conditions for cooperation and account for the function of power in 
interstate relations. To account for current globalisation processes, the concept of 
interdependence will be added to the traditional theoretical approaches to give a more 
elaborated picture of reality in international relations. The perception of interdependence 
explains why states decide to engage in external action. The expected benefits of 
cooperating with other countries in interdependent policy areas are higher, while self-help 
is supposed to lead to suboptimal policy outcomes. Interdependence is the driving force 
behind the EU’s rule extension in it’s near abroad (e.g. Lavenex 2004: 685) and the 
“nature and degree of a state’s initial commitment to an alliance” (Smith 2005: 6). The 
theoretical findings help figure out an analytical framework for grasping the negotiation 
settings and its characteristics and conditions. However, the theoretical arguments, which 
postulate the interdependence of actors in IR, explain why the EU attempts to extend its 
norms and standards to third countries, and hence facilitate interaction and coordination of 
policy issues.  
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3.3 Settings of International Cooperation: Clarification of 
Contextual Conditions in International Cooperation 
In the following, this section identifies the prerogatives to introduce common institutions to 
govern transnational policy issues and how they drive the institutionalisation process in 
external policy. There are hardly any attempts to specify systematically the conditions 
under which particular modes of policy-coordination are likely to be employed by the EU 
operating in its neighbourhood. Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (2000: 17f.) name 
three factors as crucial for the willingness of states to cooperate with each other: 1) 
perception of power relations, which we define as the bargaining power in interstate 
negotiations; 2) Historic relations between states and experience with former cooperation, 
which determine the extent of credibility of announced threats and rewards; and, 3) 
expectations and allocation of possible cost and benefits in order to gain or lose power in 
relation to other cooperation partners (cost-benefit calculation). Besides these three 
criteria from Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, the paper suggests to add two more 
conditions which determine the creation of common institutions: 4) Individual salience of 
the respective policy issue (extent of politicisation); and, 5) insistence on norms and 
principles to agree on common policy regulation stressed by the international community 
(international normative pressure). 
Understanding these characteristics and how they intertwine to affect the structure and 
modes of cooperation is of crucial interest to the current analysis. All five conditions in 
themselves determine, to some extent, whether states cooperate or not and whether they 
decide to deepen their cooperation by common institutions. Of decisive importance is the 
impact of all conditions together. Thus, the study builds on the assumption that the extent 
of the institutionalisation of cooperation depends on the strength and weakness of the 
influences of the individual conditions. Depending on which conditions are more 
influential, cooperation will be more or less institutionalised. Subsequent sections look in 
more detail at each of these elements. 
 82 
Figure 9. Contextual Factors in International Cooperation and Negotiations 
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In each distinct negotiation setting, actors have different space for manoeuvres in 
negotiations because of internal and external opportunities and constraints (Sjöstedt/ 
Spector/ Zartmann 1994: 13). Accordingly, cooperation on distinct issues will result in 
different natures of institutionalisation depending on individual bargaining power, 
congruence of actors’ interests, and on the salience of the respective issue. In the 
following, these determinants will be related to the supposed mode of cooperation in order 
to scrutinise their correlation to each other. 
First, on the macro-level, ‘bargaining power’ in state-to-state relation is seen as a crucial 
condition to explaining their relationship at all. Bargaining power of a state is determined 
by its power resources. However, a high power position does not automatically mean the 
usage of negative sanctions (negative conditionality), if a state does not agree. The 
possession of power also allows a state to use incentives to stimulate the willingness of 
another state (positive conditionality).  
Second, apart from the bargaining power of an actor, the expected costs and benefits are 
another crucial factor in the willingness of a country to agree on rule alignment. If the 
threatened sanctions are higher than the benefit of non-alignment or, to state it the other 
way round, if the announced reward for an alignment exceed the costs, “a State adopts 
the European rules if the expected benefits of EU’s rewards are higher than the costs” 
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(Schimmelfennig 2003: 297). Thus, the higher the expected benefit of an alignment, the 
more likely is EU rule transfer to succeed (e.g. Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2004: 663f.). 
Third, in addition to the size of expected rewards and adoption costs, Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (2004) note the “determinacy of conditions” and the “credibility of threats and 
promises” as important sets of factors (ibid.: 672). Credibility alone is linked to the 
consistency of the allocation of rewards and of actions demonstrated by the EU’s external 
policy. Thus, it plays a crucial role in cases of rule transfer by the conditionality approach, 
whereas the credibility of the EU rewards doesn’t play a role in the lesson-drawing 
scheme (e.g. Meloni 2007: 32). 
Fourth, according to domestic conditions, public debates play a decisive role in the 
decision-making process. State officials have to consider public interests as they are in 
the focus of the media and broad public debates. As a result, for issues that are high 
politicised by public debates, it is much more complicated for officials to come to an 
agreement in international negotiations as the public will be aware of the result (e.g. 
Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005: 72). Thus, the political costs for the government to run 
unpopular reforms increases. Especially in democratic political systems, officials require 
the electorates’ explicit endorsement in case of high issue salience. 
“Public sentiments about policy priorities have been an important factor in moving 
problems once relegated to various bureaucracies to centre stage in international 
negotiations […]” (ibid: 89). 
In the course of a globalising world, issues on the international arena increase and 
become more and more salient to states. The higher the salience of these issues, the less 
is the scope of actions for state officials in negotiations. It follows that negotiations on 
highly salient issues come increasingly into conflict, with less room for compromises. The 
complexity is not only caused by intense public debates and strong stakeholders interests; 
policy regulation might have an effect on other policies and therefore, low salient issues 
can affect highly salient ones – as well as vice versa – and thus become salient as well. 
Fifth, the adjustment pressure of other powerful actors has to be taken into account. They 
also intervene to secure their individual interest in this geopolitically sensible region of 
Eastern Europe. This may weaken or strengthen the position of the EU in negotiations 
with neighbouring countries. The EU has to deal with functionally-related competitors, 
such as the RF, US, China, NATO, United Nations, OSCE and Council of Europe (K. 
Smith 2005: 7). However, the EU also looks for cooperation with international organisation 
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and other countries as long as it supports its own interests. The normative pressure of 
other powerful actors in IR, therefore, has a cumulative effect on the EU’s external policy. 
In the following sections, this paper will go more into detail in order to scrutinise the 
possible impact of the highlighted conditions on the scope of action and the applied 
modes and instruments of the EU’s external policy towards third countries. 
3.3.1 Mapping the Context of International Cooperation 
Foremost, this paper examines the macro-level setting of intergovernmental cooperation. 
As already discussed in the introductory section, contextual factors on the macro-level are 
bargaining chips, credibility of the actors, and international normative pressure. These 
conditions determine the scope of negotiations between states and, in the following, the 
structure and modes of intergovernmental cooperation. The international and regional 
arena, in which all negotiations take place, is characterised by distinct interdependencies 
and interconnectedness between various actors. The power relations among actors – the 
system configuration – and the relative stability of that configuration are particularly 
important (e.g. Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005: 31). 
The process of internationalisation and globalisation of economies as well as new 
communication technologies changed the international system by making boundaries 
between states more blurry (e.g. Grant 2006). At present, crucial issues on the current 
global agenda require a huge effort for the broad cooperation between states. Different 
actors have different ideas and interests on solving the challenges created by these latest 
developments. 
Many of these crucial issues will be tackled on the international arena, in efforts to prevent 
negative externalities or change unfavourable situations to one’s benefit. Bargaining 
power, therefore, is defined as the power of states to catch their interests and objectives 
in international relations, or to say it with Goldmann: “A’s ability to cause B to behave in 
the desired way” (Goldmann 1979:12). Hence, the success and efficiency of foreign 
policies depend on the relative power resources of each actor, including their economic 
strength, access to scarce raw materials, technological headway, and military power 
(Sjöstedt 1979:45). Crucial external events and changes within the international system 
are kept in mind. 
The ability of an actor to bring another actor in line according to their own interests, 
according to Keohane and Nye (1977), is made up of 1) power as control over resources 
(Bargaining Chips), i.e. military, economic, raw material, and normative power; and; 2) 
power over outcomes (Structural Power), i.e. capabilities to influence political processes in 
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neighbouring countries (Keohane/ Nye 1977: 23f). Once this overall shape has been laid 
out, we will realise that determining bargaining power has become much more complex, 
owing to the increased importance of the credibility of contractual partners and other 
decisive actors in the international environment. These topics are central to the study of 
international negotiations, both as the focus of many contemporary negotiation dialogues 
and, in some cases, as situational factors influencing those dialogues. To sum up, the 
following four conditions are identified as the key determinants of bargaining power: 1) 
Bargaining Chips; 2) Institutional Power; 3) Credibility; and, 4) International Actors. 
(1) ‘Bargaining Chips’, which derive from control over resources and used as incentives in 
negotiations, refer to the concept of interdependence and its impact on the power position 
of countries. Bargaining Chips define the incentives that an actor can offer in negotiation 
in order to get, in turn, whatever the actor demands. An offer on its own can differ in its 
value, as it depends on the subjective assessment by the respective negotiation partner. 
The value of an offer has, on the one hand, a rational component, which refers to an 
individual’s cost-benefit calculation. 
On the other hand, the assessment is also determined by a normative and emotional 
component, which refers to the credibility an actor concedes to his negotiation partner. In 
the case of European foreign relations with EEC, incentives are, e.g., a stake into the 
internal market, visa facilitation, support on military technologies, and technical and 
financial assistance. In return, the EU seeks rule and norm harmonisation in order to 
succeed in internal policy goals of creating a prosperous and secure union. 
In the meaning of relative gain of power, power arises when a country is more dependent 
on something of value in another country. Hence, power emerges through an asymmetry 
of mutual dependencies. The power position of a country in international relations is 
determined by its specific sensitivity and vulnerability to external events, the extent to 
which strengthens or weakens a countries’ position in bargaining processes and therefore 
affects the choice of instruments or mechanisms to change an unfavourable situation to 
one’s benefit. It might be that a state is stronger in general terms, but is vulnerable in one 
issue, whereas the, so to say, weaker state has a better position in the bargaining process 
because e.g. of its monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic control of raw materials, such as oil 
or as a transit country for irregular migration. Therefore bargaining power is marked by 
vulnerability to external events in specific issues and ability for counteractions. Bargaining 
power is hence not constant between actors but can vary between specific policy issues. 
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(2) ‘Institutional Power’, as in power over outcomes, it is seen as the capacity of a country 
to carry out coercive actions in order to bring another state to behave in its strategic 
interest. The two dimensions are connected together, as the capacity of a state emerges 
from the translation of resources into power. It focuses on the organisational architecture 
and the procedures who lead the negotiations. 
(3) ‘Credibility’ is another decisive condition in bilateral relations, as it determines the 
willingness of a state to agree with another state on e.g. the mode and structure of 
cooperation, and to accept political conditionality as well as strong and binding 
commitments. Thus, credibility consists of the trust and sympathy an actor feels towards 
another actor. Conditions of credibility are historic relations and current inter-
connectedness between states. It is suggested measurements of these conditions can be 
done through an analysis of the existence or non-existence of a long-term relationship 
between actors, polls on public opinion, and examinations of the intensity and quality of 
interaction. 
(4) As another condition determining bargaining power, the impact of other powerful 
actors has to be taken into account, not only because they could possibly provide public 
goods as another option to a country (opportunity structure) (Starkey/Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 
2005:2). They also try to intervene to secure their individual interest in this geopolitical 
insecure region of Eastern Europe against or in support to EU’s ambition. This may 
weaken or strengthen the position of the EU in negotiations with neighbouring countries. 
The EU has to deal with functionally-related competitors, such as the US, China, NATO, 
United Nations, OSCE and Council of Europe (Smith 2005:7). The EU also looks for 
cooperation with international organisations and other countries as it helps to fulfil its own 
interests and helps it use international normative pressure to succeed in its own interests. 
3.3.1.1 Bargaining Power in Interdependent Relations 
In this section, the concept of power and the concept of interdependence will be linked. 
The elaboration is based on the assumption that the extent of power affects the way the 
EU governs its relations to neighbouring countries, in order to prevent or reduce negative 
externalities. Additionally, as discussed in the previous section, interdependence between 
actors itself has an impact on both the power of an actor in IR, and the extent of 
externalities. Therefore, this section will give insights into how power and interdependence 
are interlinked and how they both have an effect on the choice of governance methods for 
the EU’s rule transfer to its neighbourhood. Following this, the main questions asked will 
be: how to understand bargaining power by taking into account the interdependence 
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between actors, and how this power can be transposed into concrete instruments and 
mechanisms of extending EU legislation to third countries. 
Power in international relation is defined as the ability of a state to get others to do 
something they would otherwise not do. But what are the conditions defining the 
possession of power? It is difficult to measure power and to determine exactly by which 
conditions power emerges, because the causality between an action and an impact is 
elusive (Keohane/ Nye 1977: 11). One explanation is that the traditional concept of power 
changed radically after the Second World War, and the transformation of this concept was 
given a new dynamic in an increasingly globalised and internationalised world. In 
traditional thoughts, military power dominated other forms of power. “States with the most 
military power controlled world affairs” (Keohane/ Nye 1977: 11). Nowadays, the 
resources of power are becoming more complex, and consist of a broad variety of 
conditions (ibid: 11). 
“Since it is rare that all parties to a negotiation have equal power, conventional wisdom 
assumes that stronger actors will drive the better bargain and end up with the lion’s share; 
conversely, weaker actors have less clout and therefore get the shorter end of the 
negotiation stick. However, strength is often a matter of perception, as evidenced by the 
fact that power relations are among the. […] In the increasingly complex international 
environment of the twenty-first century, different elements of power will come to the fore 
under varying circumstances” (Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005: 40f). 
In IR, power can be understood as “A’s ability to cause B to behave in the desired way” 
(Goldmann 1979: 12), which means the ability to convince others to do something they 
otherwise would not do. This definition is restricted to an active attitude of a state. 
However, referring to power in a system of interdependent relations, power can result in 
changes in both: an active, as well as a passive, way. Thus, a conceptualisation of power 
has to take into account both political processes in interdependent relations and individual 
preferences. The starting point of a conceptualisation of power resources must be to 
define the possession of power. As Sjösted (1979) states it: 
“The possession of power can be described as a disposition to be powerful in relation to 
some other actor. [...] possession of power begs the question why A is able to have 
power over B. The explanation is A’s power base in relation to B which is equal to … 
(t)hose characteristics of A, of the relation between A and B, and of the system in which 
A and B are components which lead to A’s possessing power over B” (ibid: 41). 
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Goldman’s (1979) classification of sources of power, which contains the: “resource 
structure”, “dependence structure”, and “authority structure” between actors (ibid.: 16), fits 
best to our model. First, resource structure means the extent to which traditional notions 
of resources and capabilities remain tenable. Power resources of a state exemplify its 
control over properties of public goods, economical prosperity, knowledge and 
technological lead and military force (e.g. Sjöstedt 1979: 45; Goldmann 1979: 16; 
Keohane/ Nye 1977: 23f). These sources of power function either as “Bargaining Chips” in 
exchange process within interstate negotiations, or are used as threats to compel a third 
country’s approval.  
Second, dependence structure identifies mutual dependencies between actors. As mutual 
dependencies between states are asymmetric in most cases, the state that is less 
dependent on another state is in a better position. Thus, the specific structure of 
asymmetric interdependence determines the relative gain in power and the extent of an 
actor’s vulnerability to external events in specific issues, as well as its ability for 
counteractions. Interdependence always restricts autonomy and changes the context and 
structure of international bargaining an indirect relation resulting from resource 
dependency would be the stake into a state’s market, cooperation on crime and 
environmental issues, and so on. According to this, a strategy to bind other actors to the 
internal policy objectives is to increase their dependencies, e.g. by an increase of 
economic integration. 
In the meaning of relative gain of power, power arises when a country is more dependent 
on something of value within another country. Hence, power emerges through the 
asymmetry of mutual dependencies. The power position of a country in international 
relations is determined by its specific sensitivity and vulnerability to external events, which 
strengthens or weakens a countries’ position in bargaining processes and therefore 
affects the choice of instruments or mechanisms to change an unfavourable situation.  
It might be that a state is stronger in general terms, but is vulnerable in one issue, 
whereas the, so to say, weaker state has a better position in the bargaining process 
because of e.g. its monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic control of raw materials, such as oil, 
or its role as a transit country for irregular migration. Therefore, bargaining power is 
marked by vulnerability to external events in specific issues and ability for counteractions. 
Bargaining power is hence not constant between actors as it may vary between specific 
policy issues. 
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Major events and developments of an international magnitude that affect the bargaining 
power of the EU in the aftermath of the breakdown of the Soviet Union are: 1) the 
enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and 2007; 2) an ongoing internationalisation 
of national economies and of activities by business enterprises; 3) the impact of global 
phenomena, such as market crises and climate change, on domestic policies; 4) 
dependency on external oil and gas supplies; 5) international organised crime and 
terrorism; and, 6) increasing migratory flows into the EU. These developments in 
international relations mark major challenges for nation states, which make them more 
and more vulnerable to externalities. This changing international environment is the major 
impetus for states to search for close cooperation in their relationships to other states, in 
order to tackle externalities in crucial policy areas. This, in turn, changed the nature of 
foreign policy considerably. 
Bargaining power, therefore, cannot be defined as equivalent to power resources. 
Bargaining power means the power of states to make its interests and objectives heard in 
IR whereas power resources determine the power relation between states. Both have 
become much more complex, owing to the increased importance of such factors as cross-
national actors and forces, economic globalisation, and international media. These topics 
are central to the study of international negotiations, both as the focus of many 
contemporary negotiation dialogues and, in some cases, as situational factors influencing 
those dialogues (Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005:4). 
Thirdly, authority structure conversely stands for the structure and system that frame the 
scope of action in interstate relations (e.g. Goldmann 1979: 16; Keohane/ Nye 1977: 23f). 
It is closely linked to the leadership ability of an actor, which empowers the more powerful 
state to force another state to accept norms and rules of their cooperation and preserve its 
supremacy in the long term. It follows that power can be the crucial source of cooperation 
as well as the determining factor in how this cooperation will be structured. 
Hence, the power position of a state is also linked to the systemic condition and structure 
of the relationship between states. This category refers to norms and procedures that 
govern a relationship between states, by distributing power and determining the frame for 
executive action by e.g. restricting autonomy on certain policy issues. The norms and 
procedures can be in favour of one state and foster its power position. Three aspects 
determine the emergence of authority structures: (1) The state’s use of its dominance in 
international relations to set the norms and procedures that favour its power position; (2) 
High leadership ability because an actor is seen as a legitimate and ideal reference model 
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for policy regulation; and, (3) Bundling of power because of domestic coherence and unity 
within an actor’s community (e.g. Sjöstedt 1979: 45). 
The first aspect refers to the capability of a state to form an authority structure that 
strengthens its dominant power position. The dominant actor is “tempted to use its 
leadership position for the sake of specific, self-oriented gains” (Keohane/ Nye 1977: 229). 
States try to institutionalise cooperation by setting common norms, procedures and rules 
(e.g. Sjöstedt 1979: 45). One of the goals of such a strategy is to integrate states by 
participating in common regulatory regimes and therefore controlling their outcomes. If a 
state dominates the creation of norms and procedures of international relations, which 
determine the rules of the behaviour of states, it can be called a hegemonic power (e.g. 
Cox 1996: 83). Keohane and Nye (1977) define hegemonic power as a situation in which 
one state “is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate 
relations, and is willing to do so” (ibid.: 229).  
“As a stable centre of gravity in Europe, the EU also offers highly robust institutional 
mechanisms to facilitate regular norm transfer and policy coordination with its 
neighbours, as well as the prospects for continued positive relations through iteration and 
reciprocity” (Smith/ Weber 2006: 5). 
Another question also in this study is how a hegemonic power, such as the EU, translates 
its resources, both material and ideological, into rules for the system. 
The second aspect refers to normative properties, such as attractiveness, ideology and 
legitimacy. The power position of an actor is based on implicit consent by its periphery. 
The countries in the periphery accept the leadership of this dominant actor as they respect 
its normative ideals as a goal for themselves. Especially after the breakdown of the Soviet 
Empire, the new independent states and their populations called for a ‘return to Europe’. 
The majority of their populations saw their future in integration into Europe. The political 
elites have been well-advised to follow public interests, and the public opinion of a country 
remains a major criterion for how its officials act. The power of the EU in bargaining 
processes increased due to the support of neighbouring countries’ populations for 
integration into the EU. The governments established their legitimation through progress 
in rapprochement to the EU. Hence, the EU was able to act more powerfully in relations 
with these governments. An effective strategy in this case is blaming or shaming of 
actions by the respective country representatives. Furthermore, the authority structure is 
also encouraged by the impact of international actors. Internationally approved norms 
have an influence on interstate negotiations and support actors, who act according to 
these internationally approved norms (international normative pressure). 
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The third aspect of ‘authority structure’ refers to its domestic legitimation by its community. 
The basis for legitimation in nation states is their electorates, and, in the case of state 
unions, it’s their member states. The coherence within an actor’s entity is crucial for its 
power position in international relations (Keohane/ Nye 1977: 19). As mentioned here, 
other actors within a state become a crucial condition for the power of a state. The more 
coherent the actors within a state, the more powerful these countries will be in 
international relations. These conditions refer to the authority structure within a state. 
Powerful actors within a state can be civil society, economic elites, church, military forces, 
and so on. In addition, the EU is a union of sovereign states, and therefore contains 27 
member states that each has individual interests and power positions. 
“Even though the more powerful state may be less dependent in aggregate terms, it may 
be more fragmented internally and its coherence reduced by conflicts of interest and 
difficulties of coordination within its own government” (Keohane/ Nye 1977: 19). 
3.3.1.2 EU’s Capability to Govern Beyond 
After the previous elaboration on measuring bargaining power in interdependent relations, 
this chapter concludes by asking how an actor is able to transpose its power – such as 
control over resources (e.g. military, economic, raw material, normative) – into concrete 
actions, such as power over outcomes (e.g. Keohane/ Nye 1977: 23f). Keohane and Nye 
(1977) allude to the transposition of power as “[…] power measured in terms of resources 
or potential may look different from power measured in terms of influence over outcomes 
[…]” (ibid.: 18). 
Based on the determinants of the power of a state, the study, therefore, focuses now on 
how a powerful actor is capable of having an assertive impact on policy regulation in a 
third country. Thus, the paper scrutinises the correlation between the power relation and 
the applied mechanisms leading to rule approximation. We have previously mentioned the 
use of power resources to propose rewards or coerce an actor to fulfil specific 
requirements according to the conditionality scheme. Furthermore, the previous section 
mentioned the authority structure that allows the more powerful actor to introduce certain 
procedures and rules of cooperation, which perpetuate its supremacy in the long term as it 
determines the distribution of power between actors. 
The following model will sum up the previous sections, in an attempt to understand the 
correlation between bargaining power and the applied modes of cooperation. 
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Figure 10. Transposition of Power in IR 
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The basis for any cooperation is founded in the specific structure of interdependence and 
the power of an actor in terms of control over resources of the actors. These are both 
interlinked, and determine the bargaining power of an actor according to its specific 
vulnerability and sensitivity to externalities of other actors. Specific power relations at the 
international system level define the larger setting in which the negotiations take place 
and impact the options available to the actors in the negotiation. 
The particular extent of interdependence determines the “nature and degree of a state’s 
initial commitment to an alliance” (Smith 2005: 6). The expected benefits of cooperating 
with other countries are higher, while self-help often leads to suboptimal policy outcomes. 
Interstate cooperation within common institutions helps to create “political and material 
problem-solving resources” (Lavenex 2004: 694). This perception of interdependence 
explains why the EU chooses to engage in external action and hence to bind third 
countries to the fulfilment of internal policy goals. Lavenex (2004) sees external threats, 
and from this perspective EU’s vulnerability to them, as the driving force behind EU’s 
initiatives for rule extension in its near abroad (e.g. ibid.: 685). 
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At the core of the processes stands the EU with its “centripetal effect in economic terms” 
(Rosencrance 1998: 18), which allows the EU to dominate over third countries. These 
countries are dependent to some extent on a partial integration into the EU internal market 
as they are less developed in economic, political and social spheres (e.g. Tirmaa-Klaar 
2006: 8). As a stable centre of gravity in Europe, the EU also offers highly robust 
institutional mechanisms to facilitate regular norm transfers and policy coordination with its 
neighbours, as well as the “prospects for continued positive relations through iteration and 
reciprocity” (Smith 2005: 3).  
Asymmetrical interdependencies between the EU and its neighbouring countries are an 
intervening condition, determining how deep the cooperation will be. The degree of a 
country’s’ dependency on the EU strengthens or weakens, inter alia, the possibility of the 
EU to extend its legislation. According to this statement, the mode of governance refers to 
the willingness of a partner country to cooperate and approximate to EU norms, principles 
and rules. The EU has to acknowledge common goals and to make some adjustments 
themselves in addition to demanding that others conform to their design. Alternatively, the 
EU has to be aware of other alternative centres. In its role as a centre of gravity in Europe, 
the EU has to deal with other actors as RF and with functionally-related competitors, such 
as NATO, United Nations, OSCE and Council of Europe (e.g. Smith 2005: 7). 
Furthermore, the EU also looks for cooperation with International organisations and other 
actors that help it to fulfil its own interest. 
Another aspect of gaining power is the procedural power, determined by the 
institutionalised distribution of power in cooperation regimes. On the one hand, actors 
create institutions to increase the certainty of commitments and enable a reliable 
interaction in the long term on a variety of issues. On the other hand, institutions get 
initiated by hegemonic actors to preserve the status quo of relations and tighten its 
supremacy in the long term, as well as, legitimate future action.  
The ENP and the Strategic Partnership with the RF provide a framework for such 
bargaining processes between the EU and its associated neighbouring countries. It 
provides an arena for bargaining between states on the basis of common values, 
principles and rules (e.g. Schimmelfennig 2007: 11). The participating countries agreed on 
the common set of norms, principles and rules, which constitutes the frame of interstate 
relationship by determining the distribution of power and setting the agenda. The 
institutionalisation of interstate relationships can be used to control states’ behaviour, a 
fact that is particular relevant for collective actors, such as governments, whose 
leadership changes periodically (Keohane 1984: 110). Thus, the EU has institutionalised 
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its relationship with neighbouring countries in order to manage their interdependencies, in 
the regulation of interstate relations. 
Instead of examining mutually advantageous relationships, in which parties voluntarily 
curtail their autonomy and delegate authority to a cooperative structure, the relation of the 
EU to third countries is characterised by power asymmetries. The EU acts as a hegemony 
which tries to extend its influence into neighbouring countries through rule transfer. It sets 
the conditions and dominates the process of harmonisation by offering partial integration 
in EU structures and policies. In the sense of this subordination of third countries, it is 
difficult to speak about a real shift towards the “policies of inclusion” (Smith 2005: 8). 
The EU introduced these policies to foster cooperative relations and to increase the 
coordination of policies and take into account mutual interests. But why does the EU take 
into account mutual interests, as it is the dominant actor in this region? Although the EU is 
the more powerful actor in its relations with its neighbouring countries, it is not able to 
translate this power in power over outcomes in interdependent relations. 
“One of the most important reasons for this is that the commitment of a weaker state may 
be much greater than that of its stronger partner. The more dependent actor may be (or 
appear to be) more willing to suffer” (Keohane/ Nye 1977: 18). 
The EU is willing to bear the costs of creating institutions in order to ensure stable and 
consistent arenas for cooperation and coordination. In return, the EU uses these 
institutions to control the outcomes of its neighbouring countries and to increase its 
influence by extending EU norms, principles and rules.  
Finally, the question arises, how a powerful actor is able to carry out concrete actions in 
order to bring another state to behave in its strategic interest. As the EU ambassador to 
the US, João Vale de Almeida, stressed at a speech in Brussels in 2010, even if the EU is 
able to shape the agenda of its cooperation with third countries, its influence on the output 
and implementation of agreements is challenged in reality.14 Hence, procedural power has 
a limited effect on the immediate outcome, although this study argues that the effect in the 
long-term is undisputable, when taking into account social learning effects. 
However, the capability of an actor to gain influence in policy regulation in third countries 
emerges from a combination of power resources and procedural power. Depending on its 
weight, interaction will take place through soft modes (cooperative), or hard modes 
(coercive). As already discussed in Chapter 2.4, we distinguish between the conditionality 
                                                
14 Speech at the Garnet Ph.D. Alumni Conference on “Global Governance, Regionalism and the 
EU: Facing the Emergence of a Multipolar World”. Brussels, 4-5 March 2010 
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scheme – threat of negative sanctions (e.g. diplomatic pressure as shaming, breakpoint of 
cooperation) or the offering of incentives as rewards for successful reforms – and policy 
networks (information exchange, assistance and regulatory regimes). 
3.3.2 Preference Building among Actors on the Table 
Whereas the previous section dealt with the macro-level context of intergovernmental 
cooperation, this section focuses on the micro level, highlighting the respective actors 
within a state. Foremost, we must clarify the distinct actors and the roles they play in 
intergovernmental cooperation. Of interest are their specific preferences, which can be, on 
the one hand, of rational origin (cost-benefit calculation) and, on the other hand, normative 
ideas. Besides the conditions on the macro level (bargaining power, credibility, 
international normative pressure, etc.), the coherence or contradiction of preferences, 
ideas and objectives are crucial determinants of how to institutionalise cooperation in JHA. 
How issues of intergovernmental cooperation are perceived by the actors on the table is, 
therefore, of major importance, normative considerations influence the perception of 
cooperation as costly or beneficial for oneself. Furthermore, cooperation can lead to 
packaged deals, whose beneficial rewards outweigh the costs. 
This study will highlight the actors behind the decision-making process, scrutinise their 
role in the process, and generate a better understanding of how rational and normative 
considerations play out together. First of all, a classification of actors will be done. A 
variety of actors take part in cooperation on different levels. Therefore, any examination 
has to take into account all relevant actors. A first major distinction can be drawn between 
officials and non-governmental actors, which means actors who have an official mandate 
to negotiate on policy issues and actors who try to influence the decision-making process 
beyond the official negotiations through, for example, lobbying or mobilisation of protests. 
Official actors include delegated country representatives, who receive a mandate from the 
government and parliament. These negotiation teams contain civil servants (bureaucrats), 
experts of the fields (technocrats), government members (executive authority) or 
members of the parliament (legislature), as well as Court members (judiciary). A 
negotiation team generally involves a leader or chief negotiator, with other members of the 
team possessing specific expertise. In such cases, the team leader usually does most of 
the talking and seeks the advice and expertise of the other delegation members as 
deemed necessary (e.g. Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005: 41). 
Yet, many decision-making processes are more complex than those highlighted above. 
International negotiations are broadly defined to fully take into account non-traditional 
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actors and issues that are changing the landscape of today’s international system. 
Increasingly, a wide and divergent range of interest groups also participate in decision-
making and play a role in generating information (e.g. Sjöstedt/ Spector/ Zartmann 1994: 
16). Various actors, beyond or at the negotiation table, lobby at negotiations to represent 
their interests in the hope of influencing opinion and shifting perceptions of the problem 
itself (e.g. Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005: 92). Mainly, these actors take a critical part in 
the pre-negotiation and issue-framing process (e.g. Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005: 40). 
These non-governmental interest groups can take many forms – from objective scientific 
research institutes to advocacy, business, and lobbying groups. To name a few, these 
include the civil society, scientific community, media, business elites, minority groups, 
political parties, religious groups, and military. Hence, we can differentiate between 
negotiation actors at the table or in a caucus (horizontal dimension), and actors within a 
country who take part in decision-making (vertical dimension). 
The following includes a classification based on the conditions that affect decision-making 
in cooperation regimes: 1) Cohesion among actors; 2) Competence and authority; 3) 
Technical expertise; 4) Cultural distinctions; 5) Perceptions; and, 6) Egoistic self-interest 
(e.g. Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005: 40ff). 
(1) ‘Cohesion among actors’ involves the unity of actors in a country. Cohesion becomes 
more and more crucial for negotiations, as it affects the bargaining power of a country 
(e.g. Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005: 40). Ideally, all members of a negotiation team 
have reached a consensus about the issue under discussion, and work to advance the 
same interests and speak with one voice (e.g. Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005: 41). 
Alternatively, the government has enough power to follow their own interests and exclude 
other interest groups from the decision-making process (e.g. in autocratic political 
systems). 
“Although it is convenient to regard nation-states as monolithic entities, the reality of 
policy making is that many actors (diversity of actors) within countries vie for control of an 
influence over the outcomes of international negotiations. Members of legislatures with 
opinions on international affairs that differ from those of the head of state, bureaucrats 
who work on specialised problems, and interest groups, who champion certain causes 
often hold more narrow views on the desirability of certain policies. As a result, they work 
within the political system (and sometimes outside of it), to produce foreign policy 
decisions that will change the negotiations” (Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005: 92). 
The EU is a specific actor, covering a varied range of actors. As a union of sovereign 
states, the EU consists of 27 members, each with their own individual interests and power 
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positions. Coherence as a condition is crucial for the power position of the EU in 
international relations. 
“Even though the more powerful state may be less dependent in aggregate terms, it may 
be more fragmented internally and its coherence reduced by conflicts of interest and 
difficulties of coordination within its own government” (Keohane/ Nye 1977: 19). 
(2) ‘Competence and authority’ of actors constitute their possible scope in negotiations 
and their commitment to agreements. Depending on their mandate the commitments that 
actors in negotiations get from their country, can be either strong or weak (e.g. Starkey/ 
Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005: 46). The various extent of commitment determines the structure 
and mode of interaction. For example, a narrow mandate for actors makes it difficult to 
make concessions or agree on package deals, thus placing a high premium on 
compromise (e.g. Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005: 74). The mandate also defines the 
allocation of resources for actors to work out expertise to come to elaborated agreements. 
(3) ‘Technical expertise’, in a next step, refers to knowledge and information on issue 
details. There is a crucial difference if experts or civil servants dominate in negotiations or, 
in other words, if the decision follows technical implications or political interests. 
(4) ‘Cultural distinctions or similarities’ among negotiators affect their perceptions about 
policy issues and also about the willingness to come up with strong commitments in 
cooperation regimes. Sources of cultural similarities would be long-term relationships, 
cultural ties and interconnectedness between countries. In the tradition of constructivist 
theories, cultural distinctions become less prevalent as the interaction between actors 
increases. The exchange of information about objectives and perceptions also rises, and 
creates the basis for further cooperation. Thus, the actors can figure out the issues they 
agree on, and determine the reasons behind disagreements on other issues. Aware of 
distinct interests, actors can negotiate on these interests and try to persuade each other 
or succeed in concessions in order to create a mutually beneficial outcome. Intense forms 
of interaction and cooperation lead to socialisation and harmonisation in norms and rules 
among actors, such as rules of procedure in cooperation regimes, as well as objectives. 
The phenomenon of socialisation can be observed especially within epistemic 
communities and advocacy coalition, which form the basis of intense interaction. 
5) There is a human dimension to the negotiation game that should not be ignored. Actors 
are shaped in their decisions by their perceptions of their opponents in the negotiation. 
Perceptions are made of one’s own or culturally transmitted experiences in relation to the 
actors of another country. Thus, perceptions are based on interpretations of opponent’s 
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actions and interests according to the historical relation between these actors. The 
relationship between the EU and the RF has an especially long tradition of mutual 
misunderstandings, which leads to a huge mistrust between these powers. Nevertheless, 
trust is the implicit condition for a fruitful cooperation. Otherwise, mistrust is an 
incremental source of conflict and avoids common actions, increasing the potential for 
conflict. This dilemma can only be solved by intense interaction in order to exchange 
information about objectives and interests. Further evidence of a trustful actor is its 
standing in the international community. A positive standing would require an active 
participation in international organisations and international regimes (e.g. Starkey/ Boyer/ 
Wilkenfeld 2005:72). 
6) Lastly, this study also will take into account the self-interest of actors, as an influential 
source of decision-making. An examination of their individual self-interests will be done, 
taking into consideration the factors that differentiate between actors’ motivations in 
negotiations. These self-interests include: increasing individual power position in the 
decision-making process by allocating resources, and competences to succeed in 
beneficial negotiation outcome. 
3.3.3 Issue Salience in a Changing International System 
The third aspect of the negotiation setting is issue salience, which bears in mind 
conditions that affect possible conflicts of interest on policy issues and agenda setting. 
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to illustrate how the issues involved in particular 
negotiations shape the negotiation themselves. It focuses on: 1) the types of issues 
debated in international negotiations - technical, security, economic issues, etc. (agenda 
setting); 2) how salient these issues are in the public debate, e.g. politicisation through 
public attention, interest group activities (stakeholder interests of labour groups, religious 
groups, etc.); and, 3) how the salience of issues affect decision-making (Starkey/ Boyer/ 
Wilkenfeld 2005: 85). 
First of all, the section begins with a classification of issue salience, as it is of high 
significance to the raised question on the outset of this section. The traditional high-low 
politics scheme is a good starting point for an examination of how issues determine 
structure and modes of state-state cooperation. It states that issues of high politics affect 
essential needs of a state, such as e.g. essential security and economic interests, 
whereas issues of low politics are seen as less problematic, such as e.g. environment, 
transport, education, culture and movement of people. This distinction is not necessary 
true in all cases, as it depends on their individual importance for a country (e.g. 
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environmental issues in the case of the after-effects of the Chernobyl disaster). Hence, 
Starkey, Boyer and Wilkenfeld argue (2005) that, according to the high-low politics 
schemes, issues of high-politics are in the competences of high officials, whereas issues 
of low-politics have usually been perceived as “the purview of lower-level career officials 
often buried deep within faceless bureaucracies” (ibid.: 86f). 
Faced with a changed international environment, the internationalisation of world trade 
and finance, combined with the rapid pace of communication technologies and 
transportation developments, led to the increasing linkage of states and caused them to 
become more sensitive and vulnerable to externalities, not only in high-politics issues. 
Hence, this thesis calls for an extension of the high-low politics scheme, as the 
dichotomous classification turns out to be limited in explaining intertwined issues in 
interdependent relationships, where the line between low and high politics becomes 
increasingly blurred. As Starky, Boyer and Wilkenfeld (2005) state,  
“[…] the high/low approach overly simplifies the stakes for the interested parties by 
ignoring variations in salience. Focussing on salience gives more insight into why the 
same issue might at one point in time be very important but at other times of seemingly 
little consequence for the various stakeholders. […] Understanding variations in issue 
salience for the actors involved in international negotiations is an important step in the 
effort to build a more complex understanding of the ways issues affect negotiations” 
(ibid.: 91). 
In sum, the usefulness of distinctions made by the high/low political scheme is limited by 
the fact that it does not weight the importance of issues. A framework is needed, which 
can measure political importance in order to take into account the stakeholders of the 
distinct issues and their weight in the public debate. “In essence it is not the issue itself 
that generates stakes for the actors involved but rather the interests that underlie the 
issues for each and every actor involved” (Sebenius 2002 In: Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 
2005: 90-91). In other words, what an actor values most highly will define which issue are 
of high or low importance for them. 
The following section discusses the conditions that determine the perception of issue 
salience. Three dimensions are seen to affect the salience of an issue: 1) Agenda setting; 
2) Stakeholder interests; And, 3) Politicisation in public debates. Firstly, Agenda setting 
defines which issues come on the table, as well as by whose initiative and for what 
reason. Thus, this study asks about issue development, issue ownership and objectives. It 
is argued that consensual knowledge about issues, accomplished through the exchange 
of information and knowledge transfer, are the basis of getting an issue on the negotiation 
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table. It’s a kind of common learning process that occurs due the evolution of a common 
agenda. 
“In the best of circumstances, these factors can produce a consensual understanding of 
issues and interests, thereby enabling a shared search for solutions to proceed among 
the negotiating parties” (Sjöstedt/ Spector/ Zartmann 1994: 14). 
Secondly, ‘Stakeholder Interests’ affect the salience of an issue, depending on the 
stakeholders’ power and influence within the political system. Stakeholders take the 
initiative on agenda setting and exert their influence on decision-making, in favour of their 
own particular interests. They will push hard for solutions by mobilising the public and the 
revocation of political support by (e.g. Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005: 94f). The 
presence of such pressures at the domestic level is a particularly important factor in 
determining issue salience for state officials, whose negotiation space in international 
negotiations is determined by these pressures (e.g. ibid.: 91). Thus, the study has to take 
into account the relative power of the respective actors in the political debates. 
Thirdly, public debates play a decisive role in the decision-making process, as the 
electorate legitimises decisions and is needed to support the political elite. Hence, state 
officials have to consider public interests as they are in the focus of the media and broad 
public debates. As a result, high politicisation of issues by public debates makes it more 
complicated for officials to come to an agreement in international negotiations, as the 
public will be aware of the result. Especially in democratic political systems, officials 
require the electorates’ explicit endorsement in cases of high issue salience (e.g. ibid.: 
88). In sum, issues within the international arena increased in prevalence and are 
becoming more and more salient to states. The higher the salience of these issues, the 
more restrictions there are on the possibility for state officials to come to agreement. It 
follows that negotiations on highly salient issues come increasingly into conflict, with less 
room for compromise. The complexity is not only caused by intense and emotionally 
public debates and strong stakeholders interests; linkages and externalities of policy 
regulation also connect issues together. Therefore, low salient issues can affect highly 
salient ones, as well as vice versa and thus become salient as well.  
Another aspect concerns the negotiation of low and highly salient issues at the same time, 
which opens a broad space for manoeuvres to succeed in joint agreements (e.g. package 
deals). 
“However, an increase in issues can also enhance the probability of a successful 
outcome to the negotiation since the number of combinations of favourable outcomes for 
each of the actors to consider is increased. In effect, as the number of issues increases, 
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the situation has the potential to change from one where a single actor wins and the other 
loses (zero-sum) to a more mutually beneficial one that offers opportunities for each actor 
to win something (positive sum). Once this happens, it is possible for both actors to come 
away from the negotiation feeling that they won at least some issues” (Starkey/ Boyer/ 
Wilkenfeld 2005: 48). 
Hence, it is possible to transform difficult and even deadlocked negotiations into ones with 
possibilities for mutually beneficial outcomes for all by linking a set of issues (package 
deals) (e.g. Starkey/Boyer/Wilkenfeld 2005:49). As an example, the EU attempts to create 
such linkages between progress on human rights and the achievement of free trade by 
moving both issues in a favourable direction for both parties in the negotiation. 
3.4 Analytical Hypotheses 
As highlighted in the above sections, a variety of conditions at the macro-level (Bargaining 
Power and Credibility) and at the micro-level (Cost-Benefit Calculation, Issue Salience 
and International Normative Pressure) determine whether or not states are willing to 
cooperate, as well as how they cooperate with each other. This study investigates the 
correlation between these conditions and the applied modes of cooperation along the 
institutionalisation and legalisation scale. Furthermore, we must take into account the 
interconnections between the conditions and how the extent of the institutionalisation of 
cooperation depends on the strength and weakness of the influence of the individual 
conditions. Depending on which conditions are more influential, cooperation will be more 
or less institutionalised. In the following, we will discuss major correlations between the 
conditions and modes of cooperation on policy regulation. 
First, on the Macro-Level, Bargaining Power in state-to-state relations is seen as a crucial 
condition in explaining their relationship. Bargaining power is made up of a state’s power 
resources on the one hand, and its relative gain on the other. Power resources mean the 
potential ability to use coercive actions against another state, which must behave in the 
interest of the more powerful state. However, a higher power position does not 
automatically mean the usage of negative sanction (negative conditionality). The 
possession of power allows a state also to use incentives to stimulate the willingness of 
another state (positive conditionality).  
The EU’s external policy towards Eastern Europe mainly uses positive conditionality, and 
therefore we want to scrutinise the crucial bargaining chips in their negotiations. The most 
promising incentive – offering EU membership – is missing in this respective relation. 
Other crucial rewards are: access to the EU market; financial and technical assistance in 
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order to modernise their industrial properties, especially in the sector of gas production 
and heavy industry; facilitation of transnational people-to-people contact; and knowledge 
transfer in public management. 
But it is not only the absolute value of power that is decisive for estimating one actor’s 
bargaining power. It is of crucial necessity to take into account the meaning of its value in 
relation to the negotiation partner. Thus, the bargaining power of a country increases if the 
opposite country is more dependent on something of value. Hence, power emerges by 
asymmetry of mutual dependencies.  
It might be that a state is stronger in general terms but vulnerable in one area, whereas 
the weaker state has a better position in the bargaining process because e.g. of its 
monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic control of raw materials, such as oil or its position as a 
transit country for irregular migration. Both – absolute and relative values of power – 
determine a country’s position in bargaining processes, and therefore affect the choice of 
instruments or mechanisms to change an unfavourable situation. According to theories on 
international negotiations, we hypothesise that: 
(H 1) ‘Bargaining Power’: The weaker the power position of the EU in relation 
to its neighbouring countries, the less the EU will be able to force another state 
to accept conditionality or to set up the institutional agreements for international 
cooperation to the EU’s own benefit. As a result, the modes will be less binding 
and more informal (>> low in the organisational and legal dimensions). 
Given the assumption that the EU is interested in preserving its powerful position towards 
neighbours in Eastern Europe in the long run, we also could argue that the EU uses its 
power to set an institutional framework that reduces the uncertainty of state actions 
instead of gaining beneficial outcomes in the short term. Although the EU has to accept a 
limited scope of action, a mutual agreed institutional framework guarantees a stabilisation 
of cooperation for a longer period. 
Second, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) point out that the “determinacy of 
conditions” and the “credibility of threats and promises” are important sets of factors that 
are crucial to the potency of the bargaining power (ibid: 672). Credibility is linked to the 
consistency of reward allocations and the consistency of actions demonstrated by EU 
external policy. Following Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), credibility of 
conditionality and the size of adoption costs are key variables influencing compliance. In 
Opposition to the conditionality scheme, the credibility of EU rewards doesn’t play a role in 
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the lesson-drawing scheme (Meloni 2007: 32), as the partner country is already convinced 
of the policy solution capacity of the EU legislation. In the case of any lack of credibility, 
cooperation only takes place if institutional constraints hinder infringements and limit the 
room for possible misinterpretation and ‘free-riding’. 
(H 2) ‘Credibility’: The higher the credibility of the EU, the stronger are the 
commitments that are agreed upon (>> high in legal dimension). If the 
credibility of the EU is lacking, actors prefer to fix the agreements through 
institutional ties and reject strong commitments (>> high in organisational 
dimension, low in legal terms). 
Apart from the conditions on the macro-level – bargaining power and credibility – the 
thesis adds three more conditions that correlate to the applied modes in international 
cooperation. As the third condition we ascribe a major role to the cost-benefit calculation 
of expected rewards to adoption costs. If the threatened sanctions are higher than the 
benefit of non-alignment or, to state it the other way round, the announced reward for an 
alignment exceeds the costs: “a State adopts the European rules if the expected benefits 
of EU’s rewards are higher than the costs” (Schimmelfennig 2003: 297). Thus, the higher 
the expected benefit of an alignment, the more likely is EU rule transfer to succeed (e.g. 
Schimmelfennig/ Sedelmeier 2004: 663f.). The argument made here is about rational 
choice in decision making and therefore assumes: 
(H 3) ‘Cost-Benefit Calculation’: The higher the expected beneficial outcome 
of cooperation, the more a state is willing to accept a high commitment on the 
legal dimension and/or to institutionalise cooperation to a high degree. 
What influences the cost-benefit calculation are merely the costs of non-cooperation and 
the alternative opportunities that would allow a country to succeed in its self interest. In 
the case of Belarus and Ukraine, the RF is a possible alternative to the EU and therefore 
strengthens their position in their relations with the EU. The RF, therefore, plays a crucial 
role in the EU-Belarus and EU-Ukraine relations. According to the benefits of cooperation 
and the possibility of eventual legal approximation, we observe a high willingness in areas 
in which a high number of reforms are demanded, such as e.g. border management, 
combating organised crime, refugee protection, trade reforms, and rule of law. 
Furthermore, the EU stimulates reforms in partner countries by offering financial and 
technical assistance, as well as offering package deals; on the other hand, costly reforms 
are linked to beneficial rewards, such as e.g. linking visa facilitation with the readmission 
agreement. 
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Fourthly, according to domestic conditions, the salience of particular issues play a 
decisive role in the decision making process. State officials have to consider public 
interests as they are in the focus of the media and broad public debates. As a result, when 
issues become high politicised by public debates, that makes it more complicated for 
officials to come to an agreement in international negotiations regarding these issues, as 
the public will be aware of the result (e.g. Starkey/ Boyer/ Wilkenfeld 2005: 72). Thus, the 
political costs for the government to run unpopular reforms increase. Especially in 
democratic political systems, officials require the electorates’ explicit endorsement in case 
of high issue salience. In sum, issues on the international arena are increasing, and 
becoming more and more salient to states. The higher salience of these issues, the less 
likely it is that state officials will come to an agreement on these issues. It follows, that 
negotiations on highly salient issues come increasingly into conflict, leaving less room for 
compromise The complexity is not only caused by intense and emotional public debates 
and strong stakeholders interests. Individual policy regulations are often closely linked to 
each other, and thus influence policy outcomes. Therefore, highly salient issues can affect 
low salient ones, as well as vice versa, and thus, these low salient issues become salient 
as well. The importance and emphases of a policy issues on the agenda is taken into 
account in Hypothesis Four: 
(H 4) ‘Issue Salience’: The higher the salience of a particular policy issue, the 
lower the level of commitment to cooperation will be, and thus the lower the 
degree of institutionalisation and legalisation in international cooperation will 
be. 
Fifthly, another condition takes into account the international arena and the international 
actors that pressure for alignment in particular policy areas and influence the relationships 
between the EU and its neighbourhood countries. They also intervene to secure their 
individual interests in this geopolitically sensible region of Eastern Europe. This may 
weaken or strengthen the position of the EU in negotiations with neighbouring countries. 
The EU has to deal with functionally-related competitors, such as the US, UNHCR, OSCE 
and Council of Europe (e.g. K. Smith 2005: 7). However, the EU also looks for 
cooperation with international organisation and other countries as it helps to fulfil its own 
interest and to use the international normative pressure to succeed in its own interests.  
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According to these, Hypothesis Five argues: 
(H 5) ‘International Normative Pressure’: The more EU requirements agree 
with normative pressure applied by the international community, the more 
partner countries are willing to implement them and will accept cooperation in 
the respective policy area. In such cases, at least, the degree of legal 
commitments will be high. 
Especially in policy areas such as refugee protection and combating organised crime and 
trade, international organisations such as the Council of Europe, UNHCR, OSCE, and the 
WTO play a decisive role in rule approximation to internationally agreed standards by EU 
neighbours. If EU objectives are coherent to postulations made by the international 
community, partner countries are more willing to build on announced financial and 
technical assistance by the EU to implement international standards. 
The analysis adds another hypothesis to expand its evidence. Therefore, it tests the 
evidence of the respective conditions throughout the course of time, by observing the 
effect of changes in the degree of any condition. The reason of a change might be of 
exogenous (e.g. financial crisis, gas-conflict Ukraine-RF or Belarus-RF) or endogenous 
(e.g. elections, armed conflict) nature. 
(H 6) ‘Change’: If an exogenous or endogenous event changes the following 
conditions: power relation, cost-benefit-calculation, issue salience, credibility 
and/or international normative pressure, the mode of cooperation also changes 
along the extent of legal and organisational dimension in international 
cooperation. 
Hypothetically, we assume that any change in conditions can also be without any effect on 
the mode of cooperation, when cooperation is institutionalised to a minimum extent. 
Hence, once institutions are founded, there can only be an increase and deepening of 
institutional ties and processes because a downgrade of institutional ties would result in 
major costs. Although this argument is in the tradition of the rational approach – which 
sees the balancing of costs and benefits as the source of any decision and therefore 
would argue that abolishing former institutions would create major costs – we add a 
constructivist argument, makes the case, that the process of institutionalisation has its 
own dynamic as it leads to side effects of internationalisation of common institutions by 
social learning and increases the credibility between actors, which pushes a deepening of 
institutional ties further ahead. Therefore, our relevant anti-thesis state: 
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(A 6) ‘Unidirectional Change’: A change of conditions leads to an 
enhancement of institutionalisation rather than leading to a downgrade, 
because a certain amount of institutionalisation follow its own dynamics and 
preserve the status quo of institutional ties even when the preconditions are 
unfavourable for a partner country. 
According to this constructivist argument, we argue that, after a certain extent of 
institutionalised interaction, actors become used to each other and confidence increases 
as a result of common experiences (epistemic communities). Reliance and credibility 
increase through an institutionalised cooperation. Thus, reliance and credibility are both 
the impetus for an institutionalisation as well as the outcome of such. Furthermore, this 
paper argues that, due to the fact that institutionalised dialogue begins in low politicised 
policy areas, the likelihood to begin such institutionalised cooperation in more problematic 
policy issues increases. This supports the functional thesis, which represents a spill-over 
of such an institutionalisation to other policy areas. Or, on the other hand, this spill over 
can also be an unintended side effect of ongoing legalisation beyond primarily agreed 
competences. Therefore, hypothesis seven states: 
(H 7) ‘Functional spill-over’: A certain extent of institutionalised cooperation in 
one policy area affects interrelated policy areas and therefore calls for 
extending the institutional framework to this affected policy areas. 
In sum, the following table illustrates the assumed correlations between conditions and 
modes. It should be read as follows: Hierarchic governance is a result of an asymmetry in 
power relations favourable to the hegemony based on a certain amount of credibility. 
Furthermore, reforms are costly for the partner country. But if policy issues are less salient 
and the international community is not putting pressure on the issue, the political costs are 
minimal and the officials can bargain along rational arguments. This figure defines an 
ideal case based on the analytical model. In the following sections, the analysis will test its 
explanatory power in practice. 
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Figure 11. Correlation between Conditions and Modes in International Cooperation 
 EU attributes  policy specific characteristics  
 Bargaining  Credibility  Cost-
  
Salience  Int. 
   Power   Calculation   Pressure  
Hierarchic 
Conditionality  
(++) (+) (++) (-) (-) 
Information 
Networks  
(- -) (-) (+) (++) (+) 
Implementation 
Networks  
(-) (+) (- -) (- -) (++) 
Regulatory 
Networks  
(-) (++) (-) (-) (-) 
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4 EU-RF Cooperation: A possible Strategic Partnership 
under changed Circumstance? 
The end of the isolationist period during the so-called ‘Cold War’ opened a new era of 
partnership between the RF and the EU. Nowadays, the RF is a ‘strategic’ partner of the 
EU for several reasons. However, the RF remains an independent power which is not 
currently a candidate to the EU integration process, and neither does it wish to become 
one, at least in the near future. 
This partner is also an unpredictable one because it still has to go through an uncertain 
era of political, economic, demographic, social and geopolitical transformation, and thus 
differs from the model proposed by European democracies. The development of the RF is 
ambiguous, as the successor state of the Soviet Union goes through an transformation 
process and is therefore still in the making. These internal dynamics are unpredictable 
and will be observed by the EU with strong interest. As long as RF’s development remains 
unpredictable, the EU is tempted to be prepared for distinct drawbacks and new 
opportunities. 
Although RF’s foreign policy reflects the internal struggles, RF’s lack of reliability as a 
partner for the EU cannot only be explained by internal factors. As many scholars argue, 
RF’s alternation in its policy towards the EU is also a reaction to diffuse signals sent by 
the Commission and member states (e.g. Roth 2009; Gomart 2008). A cohesive EU 
foreign policy towards RF is needed to improve the cooperation by strengthening its 
position and making a concrete offer. Subsequently, the main evidence of this uncertainty 
is the incapacity of both parties to jointly formulate their strategic goals in their relations 
and to define common values, interests and tasks, although, both actors are aware of 
shared objectives and the necessity to formulate a common policy to tackle 
interdependent policy issues as trade, migration, energy, environment and security in the 
interest of political stability, lasting security, and economic prosperity in the whole region. 
Their joint effort to develop close cooperation with each other is based on the assumption 
that EU-RF interdependence cannot be avoided and will only get stronger in the future. 
It is of crucial importance to tackle mutual dependencies to succeed in internal policy 
goals as well as seise the chance of benefiting from improved trade relations and 
increased political dialogue. Yet, for a variety of other reasons, the two parties seem 
strained on a multitude of issues, including but not limited to: the expansion of the NATO 
and the EU on the European ground; NATO-plans to install an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
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system in Poland and Czech Republic; NATO-oriented security architecture of the EU; 
energy-hungry markets of the EU and its vulnerability on unsecure gas transit routes; 
resolution of frozen conflicts (e.g. Transnistria, Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, South-
Ossetia); economic interlinkages; security externalities; unexpectedly rapid economic 
recovery of the RF; and, international conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq; Iran, Kosovo, and in 
the Maghreb and Middle East. 
Whereas RF constitutes not only the main parameter of European security but also a 
strategic trade and energy partner for the EU, a fact pinpointed ever since the 10th EU-RF 
Summit of November 2002, RF sees in the EU and its member states strong partners to 
succeed in the task of 
“not only sustaining economic growth, but also diversifying the economy away from oil 
and gas, as well as stimulating investments and innovation, to modernize its system of 
governance, to build a civil society, to integrate growing numbers of immigrants, and to 
alleviate the economic effect of RF’s dire demographics” (Trenin 2005a: 8). 
Unlike Ukraine, the RF has never declared its willingness to join the European process; it 
can be assumed, that the usual EU instruments, which are merely based on the principles 
of conditionality and gradual rapprochement, are ineffective with the RF for the most part. 
What is more, the EU finds itself confronted by a player who openly defies its values, 
insofar as the RF insists on a cooperation that is not based on a system of legal 
constraints and common values. Further, the RF takes up a fending stance on European 
regulations and standards, presuming them as weakening its sovereignty (e.g. Gomart 
2008: 13). 
Despite many achievements since the early 1990s, both parties have clearly failed in 
building a trustful and credible relationship. Twenty years after the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union and the subsequent conclusion of the Cold War mentality, the EU and the 
RF didn’t not succeed in establishing a fruitful cooperation throughout the European 
continent and strengthen its strategic position on the global level. Accordingly, the 
relationship should be analysed in the broader context of their domestic and foreign 
politics. However, the EU-RF partnership is essential for both actors. For better or for 
worse, the EU-RF relationship is strategic in every sense of the word. Both, the EU and 
RF, want to be taken seriously as global actors and they need to rethink their external 
priorities. 
“The EU is a strong partner for Russia and the EU must be intensified in the interest of 
political stability, lasting security, and economic prosperity in the whole region” (Andoura 
2008: 15). 
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In the following section, the study sheds light on the current cooperation between the EU 
and the RF and goes more into detail about the cooperation on migratory issues in order 
to scrutinise crucial factors for improving cooperation through institutional ties, thereby 
furthering the interests of both parties. In a first step, the analysis gives a review on the 
development of EU-RF relations from 1991 to 2011 and how it was shaped by internal and 
external factors. Section 4.2 scrutinises the nature of EU-RF relations and investigates 
possible factors explaining why cooperation is lacking, and where we see prospects for 
progress in the near future. 
The EU-RF relationship is outlined by a range of issues: (1) the interdependence of 
economy exchanges and energy resources; (2) geopolitics in the case of the common 
neighbourhood; (3) Europe’s security architecture; as well as, (4) systemic divergence and 
the gap in values. Section 4.3 gives insight on the institutional framework of the EU-RF 
cooperation introduced in 1997 by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and 
gives an outlook on the current negotiations on the New Enhanced Agreement (NEA), 
which will replace the PCA. Further, an investigation is done on how the PCA was 
implemented in the case of cooperation on migratory issues. Finally, the results will be 
discussed and matched with the theoretical background of the analysis, with the aim of 
figuring out the crucial condition for a substantive deepening of the partnership by 
institutionalising its interaction and cooperation. 
4.1 Four Phases in the Development of EU-RF Relations in the 
Aftermath of the Breakdown of the Soviet Union 1991 
In the period after the end of the bipolar world order and RF’s rise as the heir of the Soviet 
Union, the geopolitical order, especially in Europe, was changed completely and opened 
up huge room for manoeuvre. Nearly all the former Communist governments in Central 
Europe were overruled by public upheavals and turned towards democratic state systems. 
The Soviet Union was dissolved at the end of 1991, with the beginning of full 
independence for the twelve remaining republics and the breakup of the three Baltic 
States. At the same time, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was launched 
at a summit in the Kazakh capital of Almaty as a loose confederation, not comparable to 
the old Soviet Union. The RF, the new name of the Russian republic, was generally 
recognised as the legal successor of the Soviet Union, and membership of e.g., the UN 
Security Council passed seamlessly to it. 
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The search for their new national identity remains at the top of current Russian public 
debate. The process of redefining its new role in international and regional relations goes 
along with misperceptions and miscalculations of the new reality. The two dominant actors 
in Europe, the EU (with its key member states France, Germany, Italy and United 
Kingdom) and RF, have gone through this still-unsettled process since 1991 in order to 
figure out its new role in this changed geopolitical area. The process that EU-RF relations 
were subjected to, in the aftermath of the breakdown of the Soviet Union, can be 
differentiated into four phases: 1) Rapprochement between naive ‘EU-phoria’ and national 
self-assertion after the transition period (Yeltsin I); 2) Stagnation (Yeltsin II, Putin I); 3) 
Depression (Putin II); And, 4) Normalisation or New Pragmatism in EU-RF relations 
(Duopol leadership Medvedev/Putin). 
4.1.1 Rapprochement between naive Euphoria and National Self-Assertion after the 
Systemic Transition (Yeltsin I, 1991-1996) 
Firstly, in the post-soviet phase from 1991 onwards, RF’s first president Boris Yeltsin and 
a new generation of political elites had to redefine their role in international relations and 
in the region. The end of the bipolar world order opened up new space for manoeuvre for 
new actors, as well as for the EU in creating a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) through the treaty of Maastricht in 1993. In this context, the relationship with the 
EU, as the counterpart in the region, becomes, under the struggle of the transition process 
into a democracy and market economy, a fundamental part of Russian foreign policy.  
Vice versa, the EU, after the entry into force of the treaty of Maastricht in 1993 and the 
introduction of a CFSP, incrementally acquired more competences in foreign policy, to act 
on behalf of its member states interest and tackle issues of geopolitical magnitude in its 
near abroad. This was a clear reaction to the major changes in Europe and the need for a 
common policy and a strong voice to represent a capable power, which provides stability 
and prosperity. In its first strategy towards RF in 1995, named “European Union’s Strategy 
for Future EU/Russia Relations” (European Council 1995: Annex 8), the EU emphasised 
its goal of encouraging: 
“the progressive integration between Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe” 
[and states its commitment to] “establishing a substantial partnership with Russia in order 
to promote the democratic and economic reform process, to enhance the respect of 
human rights, to consolidate peace, stability and security in order to avoid new dividing 
lines in Europe and to achieve the full integration of Russia into the community of free 
and democratic nations” (ibid.). 
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In addition, the EU even states that future European decisions related to Western security 
institutions should be taken into consideration, in an effort to avoid misperceptions 
capable of jeopardizing the new cooperative relationship with RF (ibid. article 8.). 
Furthermore, the EU responded to these regional upheavals by offering technical and 
financial assistance and thus contributing to economic cooperation and stability in the 
continent. Relations between the EU and the RF were initially modelled on a Trade and 
Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed at the end of 1989. In 1990, the European Council 
in Rome resolved that closer ties with the Soviet Union were desirable so that the EU 
could open its doors to provide technical and financial assistance to the RF and asked the 
Commission to start the negotiations over an extension of the cooperation (European 
Council 1990). 
It is in this context that the negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) (European Council 1997) did not come into force until 1 December 1997, due to 
misperceptions within the EU member states and between the EU and the RF about the 
nature of cooperation. The PCA with the RF is more comprehensive than the former TCA 
but not as comprehensive as the agreements signed with the Central European candidate 
countries at that time. These agreements with Central and Eastern candidate countries 
aimed at the harmonisation of their legislation with EU legislation, whereas, the EU and 
RF slightly attempt to facilitate its cooperation on an equal basis. Thus, the EU-RF PCA 
includes a framework for regular political dialogue, with an EU-Russia conference at the 
highest political level twice a year to discuss both the political and economic transition. 
This period of cautious rapprochement was characterised by high expectations in 
economic terms and was seen as a chance to secure the regional supremacy of the RF 
during this challenging time of political instability and economic breakdown. Both the 
economic and political interests go together with the interests of the new oligarchic 
business elites, who have slipped into the political sphere (e.g. Mommsen 2004; Bunce 
2004, Merkel 1999). Another aspect, which explains the interest of the RF for a prosper 
cooperation with the EU, is its objective to preserve its supremacy in Eastern Europe 
(especially in the Black Sea region), the Southern Caucasus, and Central Asia. 
Furthermore, the Yeltsin regime hoped to repress the scope of action of the USA in the 
Wider Europe region by deepening cooperation with the EU and its member states. 
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4.1.2 Stagnation and Frustration (Yeltsin II, Putin I): Internal Challenges and 
unaccomplished Expectations. 
Secondly, the re-election of Boris Yeltsin for the presidency of the RF in 1996 took place 
under difficult circumstances and heralded a period of stagnation in the EU-RF relations. 
One of the reasons was the weakness of Yeltsin’s leadership; its unpopularity and the 
depressed economic recovery which lead to a setback of RF’s claim to be a prosperous 
and stable global power. Further, the EU was not able to fulfil RF’s expectations in 
providing enough assistance and a clear strategy for cooperation with the RF in the long-
term during this challenging transition period (e.g. Andoura 2008; Kempe/ Smith 2006). As 
a consequence, the ruling political elites got under incremental pressure; they tried to 
appease their electorate by a revival of nationalism and called for national unity also by 
military force (e.g. 1st Chechen War 1994-96). This development leads to a more 
increasing unilateralist foreign policy and isolation from the West. Even the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), who came into force 1997, was not able to encourage 
the relation between the EU and RF. On the one hand, it happened too late and on the 
other hand, the scope of action within the PCA was rather too limited to enable major 
cooperation in crucial policy areas (e.g. Andoura 2008). According to the ‘underachiever’ 
EU, RF changed its strategy in foreign policy and displayed a more unilateral policy in the 
common region of interest (e.g. Transnistria region, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Central Asia) and continued its autonomous policy in interdependent policy 
areas (e.g. Gomart 2008). Besides, RF enhanced its bilateral relations with major member 
states to succeed in particular interests (Schmidt-Felzmann 2008). 
However, the PCA was the first document to structure EU-RF relations from 1997 
onwards (e.g. Haukkala 2004). The Agreement established a partnership between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of one part, and the RF, of the other. 
The preamble of the PCA points out to “the importance of the historical links existing 
between the Community, its Member States and Russia and the common values that they 
share” and the goal of “strengthening the political and economic freedoms which 
constitute the very basis of the partnership” (Council of the EU 1997a). Moreover, article 1 
presents the “goals of the partnership”, which are: 
“- to provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the parties allowing 
the development of close relations between them in this field, 
- to promote trade and investment and harmonious economic relations between the Parties 
based on the principles of market economy and so to foster sustainable development in the 
Parties, 
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- to strengthen political and economic freedoms, - to support Russian efforts to consolidate 
its democracy and to develop its economy and to complete the transition into a market 
economy, 
- to provide a basis for economic, social, financial and cultural cooperation founded on the 
principles of mutual advantage, mutual responsibility and mutual support, 
- to promote activities of joint interest, 
- to provide an appropriate framework for the gradual integration between Russia and a 
wider area of cooperation in Europe, 
- to create the necessary conditions for the future establishment of a free trade area between 
the Community and Russia covering substantially all trade in goods between them, as well 
as conditions for bringing about freedom of establishment of companies, of cross-border 
trade in services and of capital movements” (Ibid.: article 1) 
The signing of the PCA was of crucial interest to both because it demonstrated the 
beginning of a new meaning in EU-RF relations, which was acquired via establishing 
institutionalised communication channels. This agreement marks a turning point in their 
relations even though most of its content is limited to oral intention and its implementation 
in concrete action is lacking (e.g. Kempe/ Smith 2006). However, the mutual attempt to 
foster cooperation is clearly expressed by this document. Both parties are addressed by 
the agreement as equals and are, therefore, given the possibility to tackle policy issues by 
addressing mutual interests. Following this, the agreement defines a kind of relationship 
proposed in very different terms than before, providing an institutionalised framework for 
an intense interaction and cooperation on crucial policy issues, which is based on 
common goals and a common procedure to coordinate interdependent policy issues. 
Hence, what can be observed is that the proposal of partnership is a very ambitious one, 
aiming at developing a democratic and market-oriented RF. A more subtle element is the 
inequality of status of them, as it gets clear that it is the overall goal of the cooperation to 
bring the RF closer to ‘European’ norms in political and economic terms, which are seen 
as the reference model for any modernisation. 
This new era in EU-RF relations, in the rising of the 21st century, is well expressed by two 
other policy papers. On the EU side, the EU member states approved the first Common 
Strategy of the European Union on Russia at the Cologne European Council 1999, with 
the goal to “strengthen the strategic partnership between Russia and the European Union, 
which is so crucial to maintaining peace and security in Europe and beyond and to 
meeting common European challenges” (European Council 1999: Art. 78). The policy 
paper further emphasises the necessity to integrate RF “to its rightful place in the 
European family in a spirit of friendship, cooperation, fair accommodation of interests and 
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of the foundations of shared values enshrined in the common heritage of European 
civilization” (ibid.). The strategic goals mentioned in the document are: 
“- a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Russia, governed by the rule of Law and 
underpinning a prosperous market economy benefiting alike all the people of Russia and of 
the European Union; 
- maintaining European stability, promoting global security and responding to the common 
challenges of the continent through intensified cooperation with Russia” (ibid.). 
On the RF side, the most prominent documents that demonstrate the change in terms of 
RF’s relation towards the EU are, on the one hand, RF’s “Middle Term Strategy towards 
the EU (2000-2010)” (RF Presidency 1999), which got launched in October 1999, two 
months before Putin’s inauguration; and, on the other hand a document, approved by 
Vladimir Putin in June 2000, which is called “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian 
Federation” (RF Presidency 2000). The first stresses the benefit of fruitful cooperation with 
the EU, in which the  
“[P]artnership with the EU can manifest itself into joint efforts to establish an effective 
collective security system in Europe on the basis of equality without dividing lines [...] in a 
high level of mutual confidence and cooperation in politics and economy” (RF Presidency 
1999: Art. 1.1). 
Putin’s takeover of the RF Presidency in 2000 continues, merely, the pro-EU foreign 
policy of the RF as it got stated in the ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’ 
that: 
“[o]f key importance are relations with the European Union (EU). […] The Russian 
Federation views the EU as one of its main political and economic partners and will strive 
to develop with it an intensive, stable and long-term cooperation devoid of expediency 
fluctuations” (RF Presidency 2000: IV. Regional Priorities).  
What attracts our attention is that the recovery of Russia’s great power status is put in 
evidence when Russian foreign policy goals are presented as: 
“[t]o ensure reliable security of the country, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, to achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community, 
most fully consistent with the interests of the Russian Federation as a great power, as 
one of the most influential centers of the modern world, and which are necessary for the 
growth of its political, economic, intellectual and spiritual potential” (ibid.: I. General 
Principles). 
Vladimir Putin’s presidency continued the inward looking policy of his predecessor in order 
to stabilise the regime that got decisively weakened under Yeltsin. His harsh note in its 
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internal policy towards former business elites, also named as oligarchs (e.g. detention of 
Chodorkowsky, Beresowski, Friedman, Potanin, et al.); regime critics; re-nationalisation of 
former state companies, which got privatised during the second term of Yeltsin’s 
presidency; and, internal ethnic conflicts (e.g. 2nd Chechnya war (1999-2000), uprising in 
Dagestan and Ingushetia) as well as in the ‘Near Abroad’ (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South-
Ossetia, Belarus, Ukraine) held also true in IR and towards the EU and its new member 
states (Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland) (e.g. Mommsen 2004). This recovered self-
confidence is also a consequence of soaring prices for oil and gas, the major exporting 
goods of RF which provided a better gain of the Gross-Domestic Product (GDP). Thus, 
the standing of RF in economic terms enhanced. According to the economic recovering 
and the strong leadership of Putin, the ‘bear has re-awaked’ and demonstrates its new 
attempt being a global player (e.g. Mangott/ Trenin/ Senn 2005). 
Smorodinskaya (2008) argues that the auspicious deployment strengthened Putin’s 
leadership in domestic and foreign politics. “It helps the Kremlin to conceal political 
centralization and compensates for outweigh failures in economic modernization” (ibid.: 
1). Hence, Putin has embedded a centralised political system of vertical-type governance, 
which (?) empowered the Kremlin as the ultimate authority in the Federation. Further, she 
stressed that: 
“[w]hen the system of subordinating verticals (‘verticals of power’) began to be re-
established in Russia, the national competitive market space started to shrink, and the 
subsequent ‘vacuum’ quickly filled up with powerful bureaucratic networks. In this 
bureaucratized, profit-oriented macroeconomic environment, transaction costs are so 
high that real development cannot take place by definition” (Smorodinskaya 2008: 2). 
With the economic recovery and the consolidated leadership of Putin’s presidency, RF’s 
occurrence in IR got more assertive and slightly aggressive. The RF turned back to its 
great power politics and rhetoric towards the international community. Or, as Gomart 
(2008) names it “after almost a century of isolation and self-isolation” Russia is returning 
“to global politics and [the] global economy” (ibid.: 3). In the case of the NATO 
enlargement and EU’s expansionist policy in the common neighbourhood, the RF used 
harsh anti-Western rhetoric, rejecting this unilateral policy in its former area of influence. 
After an improved relationship between the EU, US and the RF in the outgoing 1990s, the 
relationship gradually cooled and became more fraught. The reasons are miscellaneous. 
The Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) constitutes, first and foremost, 
the changing security architecture in Europe – strengthening NATO’s role and leaving the 
RF outside; and, Western advice on the transition to a market economy, which got blamed 
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for the severe economic crisis of 1998 (e.g. ibid.: 10). Gomart (2008) however, sees a 
reason for the cooling down in EU-RF relations in EU’s inability to anticipate RF’s recovery 
(e.g. ibid.: 8). 
Echoing Putin’s dissatisfaction about the progress in the EU-RF relations, he states RF’s 
commitment to the development of true cooperation and partnership: 
“we have so far failed to recognize the changes that have happened in our world over the 
past ten years and continue to live in the old system of values: we are talking about 
partnership, but in reality we have not yet learned to trust each other (…) [t]here are 
barriers and obstacles on that road that we are surmounting (?). However, if we leave 
aside objective problems and occasional ineptness of our own, we will see the beat of 
Russia’s strong, live heart. And this heart is open to true cooperation and partnership” 
(Speech by Putin at the German Federal Parliament on 25 September 2001).  
In his speech, it became clear that the European perception in RF has changed – an 
utterance that demonstrates an interest in changing the rules of the ‘European-Russian 
game’. It emphasises the necessity of a fruitful cooperation by not neglecting the gap of 
values. And, although transition is a ‘bumpy road’ it is the beginning of the introduction of 
a new language capable of conducting to constructive practices. The existing ‘gap of 
values’ therefore is a crucial challenge for EU-RF relations and for the development of a 
successful strategic partnership (e.g. Lynch 2004: 112). 
4.1.3 Depression as a Result of hardly any Progression in EU-RF Cooperation (Putin II) 
Vladimir Putin demonstrated great assertiveness vis-à-vis the EU during his second term, 
which is rooted in a series of awkward events, as e.g.: Western critics about Russian 
human rights abuses during the Second Chechen War (1999-2000); NATO’s and EU’s 
eastwards expansion in 2003 and 2004; Western support for the ‘coloured revolutions’ in 
Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004/2005); and receiving a check in the case of facilitated 
visa freedom for RF citizens (e.g. COM 2004b). The EU, however, was upset about RF’s 
increasingly assertive energy policy in the common neighbourhood and the missing 
willingness to respect human rights and democratic principles. At the same time, their 
trade increased considerably, owing to EU energy needs and increasing demand for 
products from EU member states.  
Both the 1997 PCA and the 1999 Strategic Partnership have failed to live up to individual 
expectations. Facing EU's inability to forge an efficient foreign policy towards RF hinders 
progress still further and is a result of its lack of commitment, leadership within the EU, 
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executive capacities and power, which left a broad space for mistrust on the credibility of 
the EU (e.g. Mendras 2006: 46f; Andoura 2008: 12; Hughes 2006). 
This lack of any real engagement made it easier for RF to hide behind a curtain of 
isolationist rhetoric and encourage demonstrating power in IR. However, their bilateral 
relationship is accompanied with serious suspicion and distrust. This assessment got 
supported by EU’s trade commissioner, Peter Mandelson, who stated that the EU-RF 
relations still “contain a level of misunderstanding and even mistrust we have not seen 
since the end of the Cold War” (COM 2007j). Despite positive signs of progress, every 
point of friction is considered as a sign of the “natural incompatibility” (Putin 2007a; 2011) 
between the parties and every initiative is seen as empty rhetoric. In example, the launch 
of the four common space initiative caused huge expectations on the Russian side, 
especially in the areas of trade, security and visa liberalisation. Due to this overcast 
expectations, the reality of progress in their relations caused frustration. 
That is merely a result of the clash between the positive accentuation of ‘strategic 
partnership’ and the emphasis of gaps and incompatibilities of goals and values. Since the 
2004 enlargement of the European Union to the East, relations between the EU and the 
RF have become increasingly tense. 
Following the EU expansion eastward, geopolitics in the region completely changed. As a 
reaction to the new neighbours of the EU, the Council initiated a new policy to tackle all 
arising issues. This policy is called the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and 
comprises all neighbouring countries in the East and the northern Mediterranean. The RF 
did not want to be thrown into the same pot as the EU’s other neighbours – treated like a 
neighbouring country of the EU than an equal power. Hence, the St. Petersburg EU-RF 
Summit in May 2003 launched exclusively the ‘Four Common Spaces’ Initiative, which 
contains strategic goals in four areas: the common economic space, the common space 
of freedom security and justice, the common space of external security, and the common 
space of research and education including cultural aspects (EU-RF Summit 2003). As 
pointed out in the declaration, the creation of these four common spaces takes place 
within the framework of the PCA creates a process of cooperation which 
“will be approached in a systematic way and on equal footing, with specific targets and 
reciprocal arrangements in each space. It will be realized gradually and methodically” 
(ibid.: Joint Statement). 
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In regard to the importance of the four spaces, economic cooperation is by far the most 
important. The Common Economic Space’ is aiming to facilitate trade relations and 
therefore deals with issues as investments, the protection of intellectual property, 
procurement and technical regulation. Dozens of official working parties have in any event 
gradually increased understanding of each other’s regulations and the improved contacts 
may be important in future negotiations. The ‘common space of cooperation in the field of 
external security’ is trying to elaborate commonalities of EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and RF 
foreign policy in areas of common or divergent interests, e.g.: involvement of the RF in the 
Kosovo conflict; Transnistria; support for EU’s military mission in Chad; and the role of 
NATO. The ‘common space of freedom, security and justice’ tackles issues as the 
promotion of the rule of law, democracy and human rights and also provides for 
cooperation between police forces and judicial authorities on such dossiers as illegal 
migration, human trafficking, combating international crime, exchange of counterterrorism 
information; last, the ‘common space of research, education and culture’, which is in 
principle politically non-controversial and therefore lends itself to closer cooperation. 
Cooperation aims to facilitate contacts and cooperation between higher education 
institutions and enables RF’s participation in EU research community by extending its 
research funds to RF’s research institutes and universities. 
This form of cooperation turned out to be more effective and resulted in concrete 
measurements. President Putin shows its satisfaction about progress by the new 
instrument in improving the cooperation in both interests. It got best expressed by an 
article, published on 25 March 2007: 
“Our common goal of comprehensive, intensive and long-term cooperation is bringing 
tangible results. Our joint efforts have already allowed us to build a solid foundation for a 
strategic partnership and promising joint projects. There is an increasing dialogue between 
various sectors of industry. We have a deepening sense of fellowship in our common 
struggle against new threats. Bilateral trade relations are flourishing and investments are 
growing. Cultural, humanitarian and educational contacts are widening. In the nearest future 
the Visa Facilitation Agreement will become effective” (Putin 2007b). 
This statement by Putin is supported by an assessment of Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni 
Grevi (2006), who see clear evidence that the EU is seen by the RF as their “key 
interlocutor” (ibid.: 111) when it comes to economic and political reforms. Although the RF 
presents itself as a great power with a far wider focus than Europe alone – profiting from 
its geopolitical position between the economically prosperous regions in Europe and Asia 
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–, it does not, however, allay uncertainties over the viability of its economic development, 
its political stability and its strategic ambitions (e.g. Gomart 2008). From this point of view, 
the evolution of EU-RF relations is crucial for a stable development in political and 
economic terms. 
4.1.4 The Medvedev-Putin Tandem: Normalisation or New Pragmatism in EU-RF 
Relations 
RF is now at a major turning point. It has a new parliament, a new President and a new 
Government. This turning point represents a historic opportunity for the RF and RF-EU 
relations overall. The EU-RF relationship in the last decade was characterised by many 
set-backs as elaborated above. Both parties were not able to put their relationship into 
perspective and define a common vision for their strategic partnership (e.g. Gomart 2008: 
1). Having undergone these periods of stagnation and depression, the Medvedev-Putin 
administration got more pragmatic in establishing cooperation with the EU, aiming at 
putting aside past differences and focusing merely on reviving trade and boosting RF’s 
troubled economy (e.g. ibid.). Overcoming the depression requires the identification of the 
crucial obstacles and the formulation of these obstacles in political terms. This means a 
better understanding of each other’s interest and possibilities as well as providing needed 
channels for these dual processes. The new presidency demonstrates a new-found 
pragmatism in its relations with the EU, which is based on the awareness of the 
interdependencies in economic relations and of the necessity to cooperate with Western 
economies to modernise its one-sided and very old-fashioned economy as well as its 
public administration, legislation and law enforcement (e.g. Barysch 2006). Especially in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis, growing economic calamities in RF (suffering from 
relatively high inflation, collapses in the stock market, banking crisis, capital flight, 
expected transition from budget surplus to budget deficit and a negative trade balance) 
(e.g. Dean 2004). 
At the eve of the EU-RF Summit in Khabarovsk on 21-22 May 2009, EC President José 
Manuel Barroso stressed the importance of bilateral dialogue: “Russia and the EU are 
interdependent. The global financial and economic crisis stresses the need to develop the 
potential of our relationship, remove obstacles and coordinate our efforts. Regular and 
frank political dialogue is the right way to manage our relationship and it must prevail in all 
times, no matter how difficult the issues at stake are” (Barroso in a Press Release at the 
EU-RF summit 2009). 
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Further, it should be kept in mind that the Russian economy has never been that 
integrated into the European economy. Apart from that, the EU is concerned about RF’s 
currency reserves in euro, which account for nearly half of some € 450 billion in total 
currency reserves (e.g. EurActiv 2010a). Consultations with RF’s Central Bank are 
needed, to avoid actions that could undermine confidence in the Euro. 
The current president of Russia is facing the formidable challenge of solving the internal 
problems described above while simultaneously diversifying the economy. To do so, he 
urgently needs support from western economies through technology exchange, FDI’s and 
management know-how. Medvedev emphasised in several speeches that the EU would 
be the promising partner to succeed in the needed modernisation of RF’s economy. His 
first visit as RF’s president in June 2008, thus, went to the most competitive economy 
Germany, where he made proposals to extend economic cooperation as well as 
mentioned the need to find a common policy on international security (e.g. Financial 
Times 6 June 2008). RF’s new willingness to cooperate is not a change in the value 
system, but driven chiefly by pragmatic politics. This pragmatism is based on the expected 
benefits to resurrect itself as a global power even through the help of western economies.  
“In the wake of pragmatic cooperation on the economic front, this could contribute to 
greater understanding of other issues, including the common neighbourhood and foreign 
policy issues such as Iran and Afghanistan. It could also be accompanied by moves to 
abolish visas and greatly expand educational and scientific exchanges“ (EuRussia Centre 
2009d). 
Is this new pragmatism a profound development or just a temporary one? We can’t 
answer yet, but as many of disputes could be solved, the current presidency of Medvedev 
gives reason to be optimistic for the upcoming decades. “It seems that all conditions are 
set to start a new page in EU-RF relations, a new step that would help overcome the 
always present suspicion and distrust between the parties” (Blanco 2010: 21). The new 
leader of the Kremlin has put a warmer face on ties with the West since he took over the 
presidency. 
Generally speaking, Medvedev’s modernisation strategy is about the European choice as 
a model for RF’s economic and political evolution and is convinced about the necessity for 
close cooperation with the EU and other Western economies to modernise its economy 
and place it on a broader footing. There is a good chance that RF’s new president will opt 
to change RF’s attitudes towards them. Medvedev belongs to a different generation – 
aged 46 in 2011 – he did not rise through the ranks of Communist Party officialdom, which 
are sometimes indistinguishable from imperial ambitions. The fact that Medvedev is not 
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part of the siloviki15 might be an advantage in this respect, but he also has the 
disadvantage of not having his own power base. Considering this, Dmitry Medvedev’s 
policy will be, merely, in line with his predecessor Vladimir Putin, who became rather 
popular during his presidency and took over the position as prime minister. It is a novel 
factor to have the former president as the current prime minister, which got considerably 
more power than the nine prime ministers before. Furthermore, it is rather paradox that 
Putin received major competences for economic development, whereas Medvedev, who 
is known as a supporter of a more liberal economy, is responsible for foreign and security 
policy. Even though Putin has to tackle major challenges in the wake of the financial crisis, 
he gained major competences which help him to remain a powerful player in RF politics 
and maybe to prepare its return to the Kremlin. 
Medvedev’s first visible action, however, has been observed with concern. In August 
2008, Russian troops attacked Georgia to assure the independence of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, which broke free from Tbilisi’s rule in the early 1990s. The EU member states 
expressed their resentment in a declaration at the European Council in December 2008. 
The declaration even recalls the values on which the partnership with Russia is based: 
“Our relations with Russia have deteriorated over the conflict with Georgia. The EU 
expects Russia to honour its commitments in a way that will restore the necessary 
confidence. Our partnership should be based on respect for common values, notably 
human rights, democracy, and rule of law, and market economic principles as well as on 
common interests and objectives” (Council of the EU: Report on the Implementation of 
the European Security 2008a: 10). 
Resentment in EU-RF relations was caused by the gas-related conflict in the beginning of 
2009 between RF and the Ukraine, which gives support to critics of EU’s energetic 
dependence to RF. This was the motivation for a declaration by the President of the EC, 
José Manuel Barroso, who stated in a declaration on 5 February 2009 that: “I look forward 
to discussing how we can work together to build-up trust and make the EU Russia 
relationship a more reliable partnership at all levels” (COM 2009d).  
“The fact that the RF is not perceived by the EU as a reliable partner shows the difficulty 
in moving on towards a relationship based on trust” (Blanco 2010). 
                                                
15 Siloviki is a Russian word for politicians, who serve in the security or military service, Get more 
information about Siloviki and their role in Russian politics (e.g. Bremmer/ Charap 2007) 
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The Russian-Georgian ‘Five Day War’ again fed Europe’s distrust towards Russia. 
Medvedev addressed this breakdown in trust and EU’s caveat by proposing the creation 
of an all comprehensive New European Security System at his visit to Berlin on 5 June 
2008, aimed at overcoming security tensions between the EU and the RF. Medvedev’s 
proposal envisages a European security pact with Russia’s participation, inherently in 
opposition to the NATO (e.g. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 9 June 2008). Additionally, the 
“Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” (RF presidency 2008), entered into 
force on 12 July 2009, seeks to deepen the ties with Europe, which is stated in the 
document as follows: 
“put our strategic relations with the European Union on a solid and modern legal basis 
and establish a legal space under the auspices of the Council of Europe that would span 
across the entire Europe” and stressing that “[f]rom the long-term perspective, it is in the 
interests of Russia to agree with the European Union on a strategic partnership treaty 
setting special, most advanced forms of equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation 
with the European Union in all spheres with a view to establishing a visa free regime” 
(ibid.). 
Foreign minister of the RF, Sergey Lavrov (2009), got clearer in promoting an own 
security architecture in Europe: 
“The existence of NATO contradicts the principle of ‘indivisibility of security’ because it 
results in the formation of two zones of different security, a ‘NATO area’ and a ‘non-
NATO area’; fragmenting the so-called pan-European space” (speech by Lavrov at the 
OSCE Annual Security Review Conference, 23 June 2009). 
On the EU side, the appraisal of the EU-RF relation so far arises that the EU has to take 
the situation and interests of RF more into account. Benita Ferrero Waldner, the former 
EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy stressed in 
a speech in Salzburg in April 2008 that 
“I think we need a more realistic approach to Russia that is based on facts” [and that the 
EU should] “talk to Russia as it is, rather than with Russia as we would like it to be” 
(Ferrero-Waldner 2008b). 
The insistence on democratic reforms and human rights issues often inhibited progress in 
the EU-RF cooperation. The EU has to compromise on this if they want to conclude on 
policy solutions in crucial policy issues as energy security, organised crime, environmental 
policy, trade and irregular migration. 
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“Previous summits under former President Vladimir Putin were often marred by rows over 
thorny issues such as human rights. RF will apply any measures of force to preserve the 
status-quo and keep the existing system of governance alive” (EurActiv 2010a). 
The Kremlin's chief political strategist Vladislav Surkov warned that the RF risks collapsing 
into chaos if officials try to tinker with the political system by flirting with liberal reforms: 
"If we add any sort of political instability to that then our development would simply be 
paralysed. There would be a lot of demagoguery, a lot of empty talk, a lot of lobbying and 
ripping Russia to pieces, but no development" (Surkov cited in: Kyiv Post, 26 October 
2009). 
RF enjoins any intervention into RF domestic politics which are related to its sovereignty 
and the fundamental issue of statehood. The rejection of any critics on RF internal politics 
concerns merely human-rights violations in Chechnya. Part of the problem with the EU’s 
response was its apparent desire to avoid damaging its ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia 
or risk alienating the country’s new leader at a very delicate time. According to the 1999 
Helsinki European Council’s declaration on the war in Chechnya “[…] there was a genuine 
concern on the EU’s part that by pushing Russia too harshly over Chechnya the already 
turbulent country could be nudged towards increasing isolationism which in turn could 
have unpredictable consequences for the country’s future development” (European 
Council 1999c). 
Moreover, as Stefania Panebianco (2006) points out, “the EU does not react with a 
coherent defence of human rights and democracy because, when dealing with crucial 
political or economic partners, pragmatism prevails over the defence of values and 
principles” (ibid.: 138). Thus, as EU’s strategy of trying to blame RF over its perceived 
violations of human rights during the Chechen conflict had little resonance, its critique  
simply became lip-service to its stated human rights ideals while allowing to pursue other 
policy objectives which it sees as more important.  
This is indicative of the Commission’s realism to see the cooperation more pragmatic in a 
way of focusing rather on common interests than to insist on one position too much. Both 
sides have to show willingness in order to conclude on policy solutions. This realism 
derives from the changed context in which EU-RF relation find itself: 
“Russia is back. For us, Europe is stronger and more stable with a strong and open 
Russia reaching out to the world. [...] In this new international security architecture, 
Russia is a key partner. We want to work as much as possible with a Russia that is ready 
to play its part. […]..) We have some well-known disagreements. From trade disputes to 
travel restrictions over whether media and organizations like the British Council can 
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operate in truly free and independent manner. But trade is booming. And cooperation 
expanding to a wide range of areas. This broad nature of relationship has a stabilizing 
effect. Nevertheless, we do not have a real strategic convergence yet. Still lingering 
mistrust here and there. I believe we are at a turning point” (Speech by Javier Solana at 
the 44th Munich Conference on Security Policy, 8-10 February 2008). 
To sum up, the cooperation under Medvedev got a more pragmatic drive, with an evolving 
respect for each other’s interest. Due to crucial obstacles, both are aware of their 
interdependence and are looking for beneficial cooperation. Gomart (2008) interprets it as 
“the two parties are unable to do without each other and cannot afford to avoid the 
redefinition of their partnership” (ibid.: 1). Whereas a clear common vision is still missing, 
both are willing now to improve their cooperation in order to succeed in internal policy 
goals. At the 27th EU-Russia Summit on 27 June 2008 in Khanty-Mansiysk, both declared 
the start of negotiations to the implementation of the new treaty that would substitute the 
PCA (Council of the EU 2008c). On this occasion, Medvedev stressed that: 
“[T]the future agreement will be an instrument for genuine rapprochement between 
Russia and the European Union. It should be built on the principles of equality, 
pragmatism, mutual respect for each other’s interests and, of course, common 
approaches to key security issues. It will lay the long-term foundation for the strategic 
partnership between Russia and the European Union” (President of the RF 2008a). 
According to the latest EU-Russia Summit on 10 June 2011 in Nizhny Novgorod, following 
issues are currently on their agenda: 1) a common free trade area, implying the RF 
accession to the WTO; 2) improve their energy dialogue; 3) implementation of RF’s 
launched Modernisation Partnership; 4) rapprochement between the NATO-led European 
architecture and the RF; 5) facilitate the cooperation on JHA-issues and create a visa-free 
area; 6) create a comprehensive follow-up agreement to the PCA covering all aspects of 
the relationship and provide an institutional framework to tackle them efficiently; and, 7) 
tackling the world financial crisis (Van Rompuy 2011). 
Already at the immediate previous EU-Russia summit on 31 May to 1 June 2010 in 
Rostov-on-Don, a major step in improving EU-Ukraine has been undertaken. First and 
foremost, the EU-RF Partnership for Modernisation was launched, aiming to strengthen 
their trade and economic partnership (Council of the EU 2010e) and to “contribute to the 
global recovery and stronger international economic governance” (Barroso in COM 
2010e). George Bovt, analyst at the EU-Russia Centre in Brussels, sees the enormous 
potential of this latest initiative and emphasises its success as supportive for Medvedev’s 
possible rerun for the presidential elections in 2012 (Bovt 2010). 
 126 
4.2 Nature of the EU-RF Relationship 
In this section the paper is going to scrutinise the relationship between the EU and RF in 
order to investigate whether and how these two actors are willing to cooperate on 
migratory issues. Therefore, the main controversial issues in this specific relation are 
going to be discussed, focusing on the factors determining the extent of institutionalizing 
cooperation – bargaining power, credibility, rational cost-benefit calculation, issue salience 
and international normative pressure. 
Since the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the Soviet-Union, EU-RF relations 
have been developing in a process in which the recovery of RF’s capacity of projecting 
power has been followed by episodes of major disagreements between them (e.g. Blanco 
2010). While the expansion of NATO; the enlargement of the EU and its neighbourhood 
policy eastwards; plans to install missile defence complexes in Poland and Czech 
Republic and the recognition of Kosovo’s independence were understood as being a 
threat to the RF; vice versa, RF’s approach concerning the delivery of gas to Western 
Europe (‘gas diplomacy’); its own concept of sovereign democracy and its hegemonic 
foreign policy towards the ‘Near Abroad’ − which culminated with the RF -Georgian war in 
2008 − made the EU constantly uncomfortable a nd reticent about the possibilities of 
strengthening ties with this neighbour that unfortunately cannot be ignored for the sake of 
its own interests (e.g. Blanco 2010).  
Before closing this very short and ‘down-to-the facts’ review, it has to be stressed that 
both actors are aware of their interdependence and that they have to find a way to 
cooperate, at least, in the most salient policy issues as trade and security. A speech, done 
1999 by the former High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, stresses the 
meaning of the relationship with the RF to the EU:  
“[d]eveloping the Partnership with Russia is the most important, the most urgent and the 
most challenging task that the European Union (EU) faces at the beginning of the 21st 
century. Building a partnership with Russia will not be easy, but I would argue most 
strongly that it is an opportunity we cannot afford to miss. This is why: Firstly, Russia is a 
natural partner of the EU. (...) This trade with Russia is mutually beneficial. Russia and 
the EU need one another. (...) Secondly, Russia is a country in transition towards 
democracy and market economy. It is strongly in our interest that this transition is 
successful so that we can live in harmony with Russia. (...) Thirdly, we need to engage 
Russia in partnership for security reasons. Russia is a natural security partner for Europe 
– our security is indivisible. We cannot have a secure Europe without a secure Russia. 
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(...) [W]e must in future guard against thinking that we know best what Russia needs” 
(Javier Solana, 13 October 1999). 
As the rational elements seem to be clear, we should also stress the importance of 
emotional elements covering this challenging relationship causing resentments as a result 
of: lack of trust; the traumata of the loss of the role as one of the two major global players 
and identity crisis within the RF. In the following, the section is going to elaborate on the 
briefly outlined issues in order to draw a comprehensive picture of the difficulties as well 
as possibilities of wide-range cooperation between the EU and RF. Whichever way the 
relationship with Russia is approached, economic and energy interests are on the core of 
their relations, which is considered in the following section. There then follows a section 
on the struggle on the common neighbourhood and policies on gaining influence in this 
geopolitical area. The next section considers the common space of external security, with 
particular attention to the NATO-oriented European security architecture and the EU-RF 
dialogue on IR issues. Finally, the paper responds to the question on the role of 
democratic values and human rights in their ratio-based cooperation. This chapter closes 
by screening the crucial conditions having an effect on the way of EU-RF cooperation. 
4.2.1 Interdependent Economies in a Globalising World 
EU-RF economic interaction increased significantly since 2000. Trade and economic 
cooperation is, nowadays, one of the most important factors in EU-RF relations, as the EU 
is RF’s largest economic partner, both in terms of trade and investment, whereas the EU 
draws almost one-third of its demand of natural resources from the RF (Eurostat 2011a). 
Besides, the Russian market is attractive for investors from the EU as its economic growth 
shows a stable GDP growth from 8.5 % in 2007 and 5.2 % in 2008. In 2009, the world 
financial crisis resulted in a decline of -7.8 % (COM 2011a). According to data from the 
IMF, the economic growth in 2010 was increased again to 4.0 and prognoses a slightly 
rise to 4.2 % in 201116. The World Bank, however, estimates an increase to 4.4 % in 2011 
and almost verifies IMF expectations on RF’s GDP growth17.  
Hence, their manifold economic relations have by far not reached the potential maximum. 
What is needed is a stronger coordination in internal market regulation (e.g. competition 
law, rule of law, fully employed market economies) and cooperation on enhancing bilateral 
trade relations. Crucial steps are taken, inter alia, by the Common Economic Space 
                                                
16 International Monetary Fund (IMF): http://www.imf.org, last access 23 May 2011 
17 World Bank: http://worldbank.orf, last access 23 May 2011 
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initiative in 2004 and the launch of the Modernisation Partnership 2010. Further steps are 
going to follow, as currently both are negotiating on a new Enhanced Agreement, which 
should contain a common free-trade agreement. A conclusion of this new Enhanced 
Agreement presupposes RF’s accession to the WTO, which is still a controversial topic for 
RF representatives. Besides, RF’s own regional integrationist projects – such as the 
Customs Union between RF, Belarus and Kazakhstan – are conflicting with the creation of 
a common free-trade area and could be the stumbling block for an enhanced partnership. 
Figure 12. EU27 Trade in Goods with the RF and in total in bln. EUR, 2000-2010 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Russian Federation                   
Exports 22.7 31.6 34.4 37.2 46.0 56.7 72.3 89.1 105.0 65.6 86.5 
Imports 63.8 65.9 64.5 70.7 84.0 112.6 140.9 145.0 178.1 117.7 158.4 
Balance -41.0 -34.3 -30.1 -33.5 -37.9 -55.9 -68.6 -55.9 -71 -52.1 -71.9 
Total EU27                     
Exports 849.7 884.7 891.9 869.2 953.0 1052.7 1160.1 1240.6 1309.9 1097.1 1348.8 
Imports 992.7 979.1 937.0 935.2 1027.5 1179.6 1352.8 1435.0 1566.3 1206.5 1501.8 
Balance -143.0 -94.4 -45.1 -66.0 -74.6 -126.8 -192.7 -194.5 -256.4 -109.3 -153.1 
Source: EUROSTAT Newsrelease: ‘Partial recovery of trade in goods between EU27 and Russia in 2010’, 9 
June 2011. [Retrieved from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/6-09062011-BP/EN/6-
09062011-BP-EN.PDF, last access 22 June 2011] 
Between 2000 and 2008, EU-RF bilateral trade “has been growing at an annual rate of 
20%. It is now three times larger than it was in 2000” (Ashton 2008). After a huge decline 
in 2009, as a reaction to the world financial crisis, in 2010 EU-RF trade relations again 
recovered. The EU had already become RF’s main trading partner by a share of 46.80% 
in 2010 of RF external trade amount. Others are China with 8.85%, the USA with 4.86% 
and Ukraine with 4.30%. However, RF accounts for 8.59% of EU’s total trade and, 
therefore, is its third largest trading partner behind the USA with 14.44% and China with 
13.86%. As for 2000, the RF’s share of EU’s external trade has amounted only 4.55%. 
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Figure 13. EU’s and RF’s main Trade Countries, 2005/2007/2010 
European Union  Russian Federation 
Country mln EUR %  Country mln EUR % 
USA 411.562,50 14,44%  EU27 224.036,30 46,80% 
China 395.128,80 13,86%  China 42.385,40 8,85% 
RF 244.893,70 8,59%  USA 23.279,50 4,86% 
Switzerland 89.559,50 3,14%  Ukraine 20.585,30 4,30% 
Norway 121.039,50 4,25%  Turkey 18.659,70 3,90% 
Japan 108.628,20 3,81%  Japan 17.857,90 3,73% 
Turkey 103.277,70 3,62%  Belarus 14.521,80 3,03% 
India 67.946,10 2,38%   Kazakhstan 11.638,80 2,43% 
TOTAL 2.850.636,30 100%     478.667,60 100% 
Source: DG Trade of the European Commission/ EUROSTAT. [Retrieved from 
[http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113440.pdf, 22 June 2011] 
Within the EU, Germany is by far RF’s main trading partner (30.4 % of total exports in 
2010), followed by Italy (9.2 %) and the Netherlands (7.9 %). Germany is also RF’s main 
importing country in the EU, accounting for 29.3 % of total imports, followed by the 
Netherlands (13.7 %), Poland (8.6 %) and Italy (8.3 %). Two important factors must be 
noted here. According to the divergent economic interaction with the RF, EU member 
states have different political and economic interests in their relations with the RF. 
Second, due to the EU accession of former Soviet Countries, EU’s dependency on natural 
resources as oil and gas increased. 18 
Figure 14. EU Member States’ Trade in Goods with the RF in mln. EUR, 2000/2010 
 Exports  Imports  Balance 
           
 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 
EU 27 22738 100% 86508 100% 63777 100% 158385 100% 
-
41039 
-
71877 
Germany 6660 29,3% 26276 30,4% 14263 22,4% 29933 18,9% -7603 -3657 
Italy 2521 11,1% 7923 9,2% 8336 13,1% 13078 8,3% -5815 -5155 
Netherlands 1796 7,9% 6077 7,0% 3901 6,1% 21700 13,7% -2105 
-
15623 
Poland 943 4,1% 5046 5,8% 5019 7,9% 13618 8,6% -4077 -8572 
Finland 2174 9,6% 4693 5,4% 3471 5,4% 9064 5,7% -1296 -4371 
United 
Kingdom 1066 4,7% 3618 4,2% 3256 5,1% 5740 3,6% -2190 -2123 
Lithuania 238 1,0% 2449 2,8% 1544 2,4% 5757 3,6% -1306 -3308 
Austria 711 3,1% 2873 3.3% 1132 1.8% 2170 1.4% -421 704 
Hungary 496 2,2% 2574 3,0% 2809 4,4% 5199 3,3% -2313 -2625 
Belgium 944 4,2% 3682 4,3% 1614 2,5% 6225 3,9% -670 -2543 
Source: EUROSTAT Newsrelease: ‘Partial recovery of trade in goods between EU27 and Russia in 2010’, 9 
June 2011. [Retrieved from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/6-09062011-BP/EN/6-
09062011-BP-EN.PDF, last access 22 June 2011] 
                                                
18 Source: World Trade organization (WTO). [Retrieved from http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/ 
WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=RU, 17 May 2011 
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As noted above (Fig. 12: ‘EU’s and RF’s main Trade Countries’), almost half of RF’s 
exports go to the EU; from that, two-third of the exported goods in 2009 consisted of fuels 
and mining products (69 %)19. The EU’s exports to the RF are more diversified and refer 
by a share of 79.8 % to manufactured goods including medicine, motor cars, mobile 
phones and aircraft20. In 2010, the share of imports of fuels and mining products raised to 
74.6 % (Eurostat 2011a). This corresponds to an increase to 118192.8 mln. EUR, 
compared to 35793 mln. EUR in 2000 (ibid.). Nowadays, RF provides 35.1 % of EU’s total 
imports of gas and oil, which amounts 63.2 % of EU’s imports from the RF (COM 2011a). 
Concluding on the data, Russian oil and gas exports are targeted solely to the EU market, 
which make the RF still a very regional and a global supplier of energy. 
Having in mind that RF has the largest reserves of natural gas, the second largest coal 
reserves and the eight largest crude oil reserves, we can suppose an increasing role of 
the RF as a provider for energy the forthcoming decades21. Further, according to the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration, the RF was the largest producer of crude oil in 2009, 
surpassing Saudi Arabia22. On contrary, the EU is one of the world’s largest importer of 
oil, gas and coal and its dependency on imports is expected to increase to 70 percent in 
2030 (COM 2000). As Gomart (2008) express it: 
“[t]he EU will therefore increase its energy dependency on all providers, at the head of 
which list is Russia: that country produces 12.3 percent and 21.3 percent of the world’s 
oil and gas respectively. Russian gas exports to the EU account for 84.8 percent of 
Russia’s total gas export and 26.3 percent of European consumption. Oil exports from 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the EU represent 83.3 percent of oil 
exports from this region and 38.7 percent of European consumption” (ibi.: 11).  
There is no doubt about EU’s dependency on gas supply from the RF, but we should 
break the vicious circle of polemics on who is more dependent on whom, i.e. Europe on 
Russia for its supplies, or Russian energy producers for their sales in the European 
market. What is challenging is RF’s dependency on its one-sided exports of fuels and 
mining products and its major quota in their GDP. It shows that RF’s economic recovery 
basically leads back to the increase of gas prices on the world market, which on the other 
hand indicates its vulnerability on world market prices on this one niche. To sum up the 
above discussed data on EU-RF economic interaction, following three crucial factors are 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. [Retrieved from 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=RS,  17 May 2011 
22 Ibid. 
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striking: (1) Energy Dependency, Vulnerabilities and Diversification; (2) FDI and 
Modernisation of RF’s economy; and, (3) legalisation and institutionalisation of bilateral 
economic cooperation. 
4.2.1.1 Energy Dependency, Vulnerabilities and Diversification  
First, EU-RF’s economic relations are mainly dominated by their trade of gas and oil. 
Whereas the EU covers almost one-third of its oil and gas consumption with imports from 
the RF, more than two-thirds of RF’s export revenue depend directly on its oil and gas 
exports to EU member states (e.g. Gomart 2008: 11). Therefore, although the EU is 
heavily dependent on RF’s energy supply, the RF itself is also heavily dependent on the 
EU market as the by far largest customer of its natural resources. This domination of trade 
of oil and gas makes both economies rather vulnerable to negative externalities, as 
decrease of gas and oil prices on the RF side, and disruption of energy supply on the EU 
side. Thus, the RF attempts to diversify its economy, whereas the EU seeks a 
diversification of its supplier countries and routes. 
On the one hand, the EU seeks to ensure a regular flow of gas and oil at a reasonable 
price. After all, the EU is heavily dependent upon Russian gas and oil. The EU is 
concerned about this dependency because the RF might not flinch from use EU’s 
dependency to succeed in its interests, as the RF has already done by the so called gas-
diplomacy towards Ukraine and Belarus. Especially the current ‘gas war’, at the beginning 
of 2009, between the Ukraine and RF weakened RF’s reliability as an energy provider. 
Furthermore, this was not the first time that Europe had suffered from spats between the 
RF and its transit countries, keeping in mind RF-Ukraine gas crisis in 2006/2007 and 
2008/2009, which left some EU countries with drastically reduced oil and gas supplies in 
the depths of winter. 
As Ukraine is by far the main transit country for gas from RF, around 18 countries of the 
EU suffered from the lack in delivery as many households couldn’t heat their homes for 
some weeks (Reuters, 7 January 2009). This conflict between RF and its ‘backyard’ sent 
a message to everyone and can be interpreted as a warning sign of RF’s future behavior 
in its external relations, even to the EU. Thus, the EU in general and member states in 
particular walk the talk on the objective to reduce its dependency on RF gas imports. 
Several new pipeline projects got set up: On the one hand, four member states (Austria, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania) and Turkey signed a framework agreement on the 13 
July 2009 and, thus, declared their support for the so-called Nabucco pipeline project 
which is going to connect the EU with Azerbaijan and potential gas producers in Central 
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Asia – especially Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan.23 A further connection with suppliers in 
Kurdish Iraq and Iran are not on the official agenda, yet. 
The shareholders of the Nabucco project are to an equal share of 16.67%: Bulgarian 
Energy Holding (Bulgaria), Botas (Turkey), MOL (Hungary), OMV (Austria), RWE 
(Germany) and Transgaz (Romania). This pipeline is proposed to go on line in 2015 by a 
capacity of 31bcm/ year24. A further diversification of gas delivery has been done by the 
2004 opened gas pipeline between Italy and Libya, which connects the EU with the 
broader Mediterranean. This pipeline project was contested as the leader of Libya, 
Muammar Gaddafi, has been the target of several embargos because of his anti-
democratic leadership. Despite seriously beginning to pursue its aim of diversifying its gas 
suppliers, it will take decades to significantly reduce RF-European energy dependence. 
Additionally, this cannot be managed only by diversification but also by applying new 
technologies and alternative energy sources. 
Günther Oettinger, commissioner for energy since 10 February 2010, pronounced the 
Nabucco project to be an important tool to gain more independence from RF. Apart from 
that, he stressed that the RF not only delivers its own gas but resells gas after acquiring it 
from third countries, as e.g. Kazakhstan. Oettinger call for a strategy to access the 
sources independently from the RF (e.g. Kurier 2010). The Nabucco project initiators, 
however, are still facing problems to get the needed quantity delivered, as needed 
procurement contracts are still not signed and the Russian Gazprom competes with 
companies from the EU on prices and conditions; e.g. Gazprom are also in contractual 
relations with the main gas producers in the region: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan. Further, the RF recently strengthened its ties with Turkey on energy 
cooperation and succeeded in signing an agreement on building a section of the South 
Stream pipeline on Turkish territory (EuRussia Centre 2010b). The fight over the main 
sources in the region almost reached its climax, and sees the RF in the forefront, which is 
caused by still closed ties with the main gas producer Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
Azerbaijan is playing a double card in order to attract both regional powers and even the 
Aliev clan favours a closer cooperation with the EU as it needs the RF in the region, 
especially in the ‘frozen conflict’ in Nagorno-Karabakh. In the case of Central Asian 
Countries, we can see the struggle for the EU to finalise agreements with former Soviet 
Countries. As for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, they held back from supporting the 
                                                
23 Website of the Nabucco pipeline project: http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com, last access 13 May 
2011 
24 Ibid. 
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Nabucco pipeline out of loyalty to Russia. Turkmenistan, however, turned to the Nabucco 
shareholders as a mean of revenge against the RF, after Gazprom abruptly cancelled the 
contract with Turkmenistan as the prices and the demand fell in the aftermath of the global 
economic crisis. But, according to policy experts, the authoritarian leader of Turkmenistan, 
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, is known as a not very reliable partner (e.g. EuRussia 
Centre 2009c). 
Besides the Caspian Basin and Central Asian region there could be some new potential 
gas providers to Nabucco. They are Iraq (mainly the Kurdish part), Iran and even Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia. Their participation would make the project unbeatable by Gazprom. 
However, so far their participation seems not credible which makes it possible for Russia 
to continue playing on disagreements between the participating countries as it tries to 
keep its important role in the European market. 
Figure 15. Pipeline Projects of Pan-European Interests (Inogate 2003) 
 
Source: Inogate (2004): INOGATE Developments 2001 – 2004 and New Perspectives. p. 10. [Retrieved from 
http://www.inogate.org/inogate_programme/inogate_resource_center/maps/gas_map_big.gif, 12 November 
2010 
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Apart from the EU’s diversification strategy of pipeline routes and suppliers the RF also 
initiates new pipeline projects to reduce the dependency on uncertainty transit routes by 
bypassing Belarus and Ukraine in the South and in the North. Especially, the so-called 
‘North-Stream’ pipeline is rather advanced and mainly supported by Germany and the 
Netherlands in cooperation with the RF, as it is a joint venture of five shareholders: 
Russian Gazprom (51%); German Wintershall/ BASF (15.5%) and E.ON Ruhrgas 
(15.5%); the Dutch N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie (9%); and, the French GDF Suez (9%). It is 
planned, that the ‘North-Stream’ pipeline will go on line in 2012 with a capacity of 55 bcm 
per year25. 
The second project of the RF is the ‘South-Stream’ pipeline, developed by Gazprom in 
cooperation with the Italian company ENI. The pipeline should deliver gas by 2015 
through Bulgaria to Western Europe under the Black Sea. In the last two years, several 
intergovernmental agreements got signed with the transit countries Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Hungary, Slovenia and Greece. Negotiations with Austria are underway and should be 
finalised by 2011 and connect the South Stream with the European pipeline network26. 
Both pipeline projects are a clear reaction to the proposed Nabucco pipeline and the 
critics on RF’s reliability because of recent delivery problems, trying to neutralise all other 
competitive options. 
The fact that some EU member states have their special bilateral energy relations with the 
RF, however, annoys bypassed member states such as Poland, the Baltic States and the 
Scandinavian states. They fear, first of all, a bickering throughout the EU member states 
on a common energy strategy and a common approach towards the RF. On the contrary, 
the RF aims with its pipeline projects to undermine competitive pipelines from the Caspian 
plate and to maximise the economic and political leverage of its energy assets and limit 
the EU diversification options. 
                                                
25 Website of the Nord-Stream AG: http://www.nord-stream.com, last access 12 May 2011 
26 Website of the South Stream project by Gazprom and ENI: http://south-stream.info, last access 
12 May 2011 
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Figure 16. Existing and planned Russian Gas Pipelines to the EU 
 
Source: Ukrainian Energy. [Retrieved from http://ukrainian-energy.com/articles/market_comments/160/, 12 
November 2010]. See also U.S. Energy Information Administration. [Retrieved from http://www.eia.gov/, 12 
November 2010] 
4.2.1.2 FDI and Modernisation of RF’s Economy 
RF’s economy is merely characterised by an old-fashioned heavy industry, and the main 
revenue of its GNP comes from its exports of oil and gas. Further, despite its former role 
in IR, RF’s share of the world economy doesn’t exceed 3% in 2005. Compared to others, 
the RF is by far behind the USA (22.5%), China (nearly 10%), Japan (7%), Germany 
(4.6%), the UK (3.5%) and France (3.4%) (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/ World Bank 2008). Hence, it would be wrong, though, to overestimate the 
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relative size of RF’s economy, whose GDP per capita is even behind Hungary and Poland 
and similar to Romania and Turkey. The national income it generates, however, is lower 
than that of Brazil and only doubled to that of Turkey. Compared to EU member states, 
RF’s GDP is similar to that of the ten new member states or the Benelux states together. 
Figure 17. GDP Performance in 2009 
 GDP per capita Population GDP 
 in USD Units in mln in bln. USD 
EU member states    
Austria 45,685.879 8.363 382.073 
Czech Republic 18,170.868 10.468 190.204 
France 42,409.874 62.637 2,656.407 
Germany 40,831.659 81.767 3,338.675 
Hungary 12,893.958 10.031 129.339 
Italy 35,250.810 60.045 2,116.637 
Poland 11,298.879 38.111 430.614 
Romania 7,609.603 21.462 163.317 
    
Russia 8,614.026 141.900 1,222.330 
Ukraine 2,568.653 45.706 117.404 
Belarus 5,190.787 9.480 49.209 
    
Others    
Norway 78,182.772 4.843 378.614 
Switzerland 63,535.942 7.742 491.923 
Turkey 8,711.161 70.538 614.466 
US 45,934.469 307.374 14,119.050 
China 3,738.952 1,334.740 4,990.528 
Brazil 8,360.327 191.481 1,600.841 
India 1,058.226 1,199.062 1,268.878 
Source: IMF, 20 June 2011. [Retrieved from http://www.imf.orgt/, 6 June 2011]  
DG Trade, European Commission. [Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/trade, 6 June 2011] 
RF’s economy develops far below its potentials. Its economy is less diversified and 
therefore high vulnerable to negative externalities. E.g. after economic rising for nearly a 
decade – as a result of the increase in oil and, consequently, gas prices –, RF’s economy 
completely fell sharply due to the international economic crisis; demonstrated by a 
negative growth of 7.8% in 2009 (COM 2011a). Its economy is old-fashioned, less 
competitive and merely based on raw materials. The main industries – strategic sectors, 
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including oil and gas, nuclear power, the mining of metals, arms, the aerospace industry, 
etc. – are under state control, e.g. the energy market is dominated by the two state-
controlled energy companies Gazprom – the second largest energy company in the world 
– and Rosneft (The First Post 2006). Thus, RF’s domestic and foreign economic policies 
are highly politicised and streamlined with an old-fashioned approach to security (e.g. RF 
presidency 2008). Smorodinskaya (2008) analysis of RF’s economic and energy policy as 
follows: 
“[t]his very approach has formed a leading motivation behind Kremlin’s course towards 
consolidating verticals of power in the Russian society, establishing control of state-
owned corporations over key sectors of economy, aggressive takeovers in foreign 
markets and retaining Russia’s image as a super-power, especially in the CIS” 
(Smorodinskaya 2008: 1f.). 
To grasp the importance of Gazprom, we have to take into account that it produces 95% 
of RF’s gas (EurActiv 2006). Without any major alternative competitors and bringing the 
internal production chain under political control of the Kremlin, the energy market is rather 
out-dated. As Kamp (2008) has expressed in an article: “mmismanagement and 
insufficient reinvestment of earnings are the primary causes of its obsolete pipelines and 
infrastructure” (ibid.: 29). 
To conclude, it is not only about EU’s vulnerability on gas import from the RF; it is also 
about RF’s needed access on the Western markets and to Western drilling technologies 
and expertise to increase its efficiency in gas production. What is needed to ensure a 
sustainable economic growth are: a diversification of RF’s economy; implementation of 
major market reforms and strengthening the rule of law; and attracting FDI’s and 
technology transfer to make the Russian economy more efficient and competitive. The EU 
as the closest player in the region plays a crucial role in the modernisation of RF’s 
economy and especially in the phase of the current global economic crisis. Although EU-
RF economic interaction increased significantly since 2000, it is still far below the 
maximum potential.  
The EU is already, besides being by far the most important trading partner for the RF, 
RF’s main investor, accounting for more than three-quarters of FDI’s in the RF. EU FDI 
stocks in the RF grew significantly since 2000. Between 2007 to 2009, EU stocks 
increased by a rate of 24% and hold by 88.8 bln. EUR in 2009 (Eurostat 2011b). However, 
the FDI flows fell from 27.3 bln. EUR in 2008 to almost zero in 2009 (0.7) and 2010 (-0.4), 
in the wave of the financial crisis (ibid.). 
 138 
Figure 18. EU’s main FDI Partners in 2009 
       Growth rate 
 2007 2008 2009 2007-2009 
         
TOTAL EU 27 3231.6 3319.8 3665.5 13% 
USA 1027.1 1089.5 1134.0 10% 
Switzerland 458.0 462.9 503.3 10% 
Canada 142.6 142,7 157.5 10% 
Brazil 107.7 108.5 132.2 23% 
Singapore 66.7 89.2 95.8 44% 
Hong Kong 89.3 89.3 92.9 4% 
Russia 71.5 83.2 88.8 24% 
Japan 74.8 78.4 84.0 12% 
Australia 69.9 70.3 82.8 19% 
South Africa 55.1 55.1 77.0 40% 
Source: Eurostat (2010): Eurostat Statistical Yearbook ‘Europe im Focus’ [Retrieved from 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-CD-10-220/EN/KS-CD-10-220-EN.PDF, 22 June 
2011] 
However, although the EU FDI’s stock grew constantly, it is far below its potential, ranking 
on 7th position of EU investments abroad. Notably, the RF economy, therefore, ranks 
behind countries as Canada, Brazil, Singapore and Hong Kong. This might be an 
indication for RF’s weak performance and an unattractive investment climate. The RF 
urgently needs FDI’s in order to modernise its economy, create a sustainable growth and 
be able to compete at the world market. RF’s economy faces an urgent need for action to 
attract FDI’s by improving their investment climate; the business climate has by far been 
sorely suffered by a lack of legal certainty. According to the current business climate of 
mistrust towards the RF and the unclear relations between business and political power, 
western enterprises and investors are cautious about entering the Russian market or 
signing Russian enterprises. Indeed, the well publicised cases of BP, Shell, Telenor and 
IKEA underline how much Russia still has to do in terms of fighting corruption and 
establishing the rule of law (e.g. EuRussia Centre 2009b). Otherwise, there are, for 
example, the French companies Renault, who participate in the modernisation of Russia’s 
Avtovaz car manufacture, and Electricite de France and others, which takes part at the 
South Stream or North Stream pipeline project (e.g. ibid.). 
The EU, as the closest and main trading partner and investor, has the financial resources, 
the technology and the know-how to improve RF’s outdated market. First and foremost, 
major reforms have to be undertaken to guarantee a minimum of reliable legislation and 
its enforcement. In particular, there is a need to facilitate the access to the Russian market 
for goods and services from the EU; ease its restrictive laws on foreign ownership; ensure 
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protection of intellectual property rights; improve the judiciary, facilitate border procedures 
for international transports; harmonise product standards and abolish trade infringements.  
The recent Common Space report notice major progress, made by the RF government by 
the last years to improve the investment climate in RF market and facilitate the trade 
relations with the EU (EEAS 2010; see also Meloni 2007a). However, further 
measurements are needed to tap the full potential of EU-RF economic relations. The EU, 
therefore, see RF’s accession to the WTO as a corner stone for a possible creation of a 
common free trade area to reach to a maximum of economic integration. A press release 
by the commission underlines the prospect of RF’s accession to the WTO for EU-RF 
economic relations: 
“WTO accession is likely to anchor Russia into an international rules-based trading 
system. It will enhance openness, transparency and predictability, which are key to 
attracting foreign investment and provide a foundation for improved economic 
governance” (COM 2004c). 
Additionally, the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, 
emphasised the necessity of the RF to join the WTO in a press conference during the EU-
RF summit on the 7 December 2010 in Brussels: 
“[…] truly modern economies are those that are open and shape the global rules 
of the game, not the ones that practice protectionism. Joining the WTO is also an 
important stepping stone towards deeper bilateral trade relations” (Barroso 
2010). 
Although the RF has proposed its application for WTO membership already in 1993, the 
accession process is marked by conflicting messages and doubtful efforts and didn’t result 
in a finalisation until now. However, the RF facilitated its own integrationist projects on 
initiating a custom union with Kazakhstan and Belarus which would be fully operational by 
the beginning of 2012. As RF’s envoy to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov stated, the Custom 
Union will not hinder RF’s path towards WTO accession as “Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus would join the organisation separately, but on a synchronised basis as part of 
their Customs Union” (EuRussia Centre 2009d). Be that as it may, the EU made RF’s 
accession to the WTO the precondition for a new NEA and a free trade agreement (FTA). 
WTO membership will obviously not resolve all the country’s economic woes, but it is a 
precondition for a level playing field with clear and enforceable non-discrimination 
obligations and rules to settle trade disputes. 
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On the other hand, the EU must also open their market for investors from the RF, which 
are waiting to invest their accumulated vast volumes of oil-gas dollars in strategic areas 
abroad. So far, EU member states mistrust state-controlled enterprises because they 
expect a politicisation of trade relations in the long term. To this end, Russian authorities 
started to build a very wide range of so called ‘development institutions’ - beginning with 
the Investment Fund and Development Bank ‘Vneshekonombank’ and re-nationalisation 
of enterprises in various ‘strategic’ branches, ending with a network of state-led 
corporations where foreigners are not admitted, like Gazprom, Rosneft, Rosatom, 
Rosnanotekhnologii and others (e.g. Smorodinskaya 2009:3). This is seen as being rather 
problematic, as most of the financially-strong enterprises are controlled by the Kremlin 
and it is expected that the ruling elites are advancing its vested interests over and above 
the national boundaries and try to convert trade into political advantage or vice versa. 
What seems to be commercial wrestling turns out to be a geopolitical match. The 
difference in RF’s trade relations towards countries who are well-disposed and others 
epitomises this geopolitical approach, e.g. economic blockades against westernizing post-
Soviet countries (Baltic countries, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia). Latest examples are the 
trade disputes with Poland and Lithuania, realising the North Stream and South project, 
bypassing the Baltic states, Poland and Ukraine (e.g. Smorodinskaya 2009: 3-4; Roth 
2009). RF’s politicisation of its energy policy is rather obvious and weakens its reliability 
as a trading partner. 
The EU provides assistance to support RF’s reform efforts and also signed a series of 
cooperation agreements (PCA in 1997; Strategic Partnership in 2004; and, Modernisation 
Partnership in 2009) to facilitate their cooperation on respective issues. Currently, both 
negotiate on a new Enhanced Agreement to take the next step in their economic relations, 
realising a common free trade area. The mandate to negotiate a new PCA contains a long 
list of subjects in the field of trade and economic cooperation with a view to removing 
obstacles to trade and investment and achieving the maximum possible convergence of 
legislation. In the face of its vulnerability in its energy relations with the RF, the EU tries to 
establish an EU-RF Energy Partnership in order to 
“enhance the energy security of the European continent by binding Russia and the EU 
into a closer relationship in which all issues of mutual concern in the energy sector can 
be addressed while, at the same time, ensuring that the policies of opening and 
integrating energy markets are pursued. With the strong mutual dependency and 
common interest in the energy sector, this is clearly a key area of EU-Russia relations” 
(European Council 2009). 
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The cooperation is still based on the EU-RF Energy Dialogue, which got launched in 2000 
at the EU-RF summit in Paris, and is in accordance with international obligations fixed in 
the Energy Charter Treaty27, which got signed in 1998 (COM 2009f). 
Over the last 10 years, their cooperation on crucial issues of economic and energy issues 
got rather institutionalised and regularised to establish uniform ‘rules of the game’, due to 
tackle their mutual dependencies and the high level of mistrust between them. 
Institutionalised and regularised cooperation on economic and energy issues may become 
the integrationist core of EU-RF relations, as it was the case with the European Coal and 
Steel Community for the EU integration, established by the Treaty of Paris in 1951 (e.g. 
Goncharova 2010: 9). 
European Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, stressed in a 
speech on the 24 September 2007 in Strasbourg the need to improve EU-RF relations: 
“Russia is not only a close neighbor, but it is also a strategic partner for the European 
Union. EU-Russia trade and investment is booming and our energy interdependence is 
growing. Russia is a key partner to tackle regional conflicts and global challenges. But 
much remains to be done to develop the full potential of our relationship” (Ferrero-
Waldner In: Blanco 2010: 19).  
Economic cooperation is by far the most crucial sphere of mutual interest and can be seen 
as the driving force for the new treaty. One of the priorities is the creation of a free trade 
area between the EU and the RF. Thus, the EU sees RF’s membership in the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) as a precondition for the coming into force of an enhanced 
new agreement, after which further widening and deepening of EU-Russia trade and 
economic relations can be pursued. In a speech in Moscow EU Commissioner for Trade 
Peter Mandelson (2007a) stressed that, “WTO membership is also a stepping stone for 
the further development of our bilateral relations” (ibid.). In another speech at the EU-
Russia centre, Mandelson (2007b) argues that the EU and Russia are experiencing a 
difficult period at a time when their relationship is structurally underdeveloped and 
politically over-sensitised. He made the case that the priority for the EU and Russia must 
be putting “the economic fundamentals in place, above all by integrating the EU and 
                                                
27 The signatories of the European Energy Charter, including the EU, former Yugoslavia (except 
Serbia) and former Soviet Union states, undertook to pursue the objectives laid down in the Charter 
and to establish cooperation under a legally binding basic agreement, which became the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT). The Treaty and the Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related 
Environmental Aspects (PEEREA) got into force in 1998. The Trade Amendment to the Treaty's 
trade provisions is adopted, bringing them in line with the WTO rules. (Source: 
http://www.encharter.org/, last access 23 March 2011) 
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Russian economies better and getting Russia into the WTO” (ibid.). Andris Piebalgs, 
European Commissioner for Energy, noticed in the wave of the EU-RF PPC on Energy 
issues that:  
"[r]einforcing confidence between the EU and Russia, based on strong legal frameworks, 
is crucial. While negotiations on the new EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation 
agreement are already underway we also need to achieve progress in the short term” 
(Piebalgs In: COM 2009g). 
At the 26th EU-Russia summit, held on the 3 December 2010 in Brussels, the President of 
the European Commission José Manuel Barroso said: 
"We just achieved a bilateral breakthrough on Russia's WTO accession and strongly 
support Russia's efforts to become a member in 2011. This will strengthen trade and 
investment and contribute to shared economic growth. It should also give new 
momentum to our talks on a New EU-Russia Agreement. We will also give further 
impulses to our Partnership for Modernization, which is key in supporting political and 
economic reforms in Russia" (European Council 2010a). 
4.2.2 Struggle for Gaining Influence in the Common Neighbourhood 
The second challenging area of EU-RF relations are about geopolitics, stemming from the 
former Cold War politics. It is about their complementary policies on gaining influence in 
the common neighbourhood. RF itself demands its lead in its ‘backyard’ as successor of 
the former Soviet Union. On the contrary the EU tries to foster its relations with these 
countries and seeks for cooperation in major policy areas of possible negative 
externalities to the EU, as well as gaining access to growing markets in this region. Both 
powers in the region, therefore, have their individual objectives in the region, but avoid 
developing a common strategy. The common neighbourhood, or what is called ‘near 
abroad’ in Russian official rhetoric (e.g. Massari 2007), becomes a central focus for 
political power games. In this context, the EU is anxious about RF’s increasingly assertive 
foreign policy in recent years, prompted in part by the sharp increase in the strategic value 
of its stocks of fossil fuels, especially natural gas. Thus, the EU seeks to empower these 
states by developing their democracies and market economies through both bilateral and 
multilateral tracks while decreasing their dependence on the mighty RF. 
In this section, first of all, several policies and initiatives of the EU are discussed, which 
attempt to facilitate its interaction with the neighbours in the East and accomplish a partly 
integration into EU’s community of values. Specific attention is given to the implication of 
EU’s enlargement in 2004 and 2007, NATO enlargements and extension of Schengen to 
new member states on EU-RF relations, as well as specific policies, addressing the 
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countries in the common sphere of influence, such as the PCA, ENP and the current 
initiated Eastern Partnership. Second, the section analyses RF’s strategic attempt and 
policy initiatives to exert influence on the former Soviet satellites. At last, we discuss the 
implication of the EU-RF relations on the dissolution of frozen or current conflicts in the 
countries of the southern Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and in Moldova 
(Transnistria). 
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the former Warsaw pact countries turned their 
face to the west and searched for a new partner who could help them transform into 
market economies and democratic systems. The EU, as the second economically and 
military powerful player in Europe, attracted these countries, and thus most of them opted 
for a membership in the EU. Before of this, the EU signed Trade and Cooperation 
Agreements (TCA) with them (e.g. Hungary 1988; Poland 1989; Czech Republic 1990), 
launched financial and technical assistance programmes (e.g. PHARE) and finally 
adopted a pre-accession strategy at the Essen European Council (1994) – defining clear 
criteria for a membership perspective for countries in Central Eastern Europe (European 
Council 1994). Following this, the EU signed the so called ‘Europe agreements’ with 
applying countries which constituted the legal framework for implementation of the 
accession process. 
Finally, after the preparatory period, the three Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia became EU members in 2004 together with Cyprus and 
Malta. Bulgaria and Romania acceded in 2007. The 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement to 
RF’s former satellite states marked a turning point in the EU and RF’s mutual perceptions. 
On the one hand, the EU came closer to the RF territory, holds now the authority in a 
major part of the former Soviet Union and has increased its power in the region and on a 
global level. On the other hand, the new member states affect EU-RF relations as they are 
not afraid to bring issues to the table and turn EU’s RF policy to be more outspoken and 
critical (e.g. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia), whereas the old member states are more reluctant 
in provoking RF’s administration due to their economic interlinkages with the RF (e.g. 
Germany, Italy and France). Especially the rotating presidencies of the EU provide a 
major say in the EU’s foreign policy and set the agenda to a major extent, which makes 
the foreign policy of the EU more incoherent. Further, the gas demand of the new member 
states and their eastward oriented trade increases the dependency of the EU on RF gas 
supply and market access, and therefore, again, weakens EU’s power position in the 
region. At last, the enlargement affects the mobility of millions of people, as EU’s border 
regime moved eastward and now incorporates a more restrictive visa policy between 
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former allies. Especially with the accession to Schengen (European Council 1999), a new 
‘paper curtain’ or “Schengen wall” (Interview with official from the Belarusian Foreign 
Ministry, Minsk, 8 June 2009) divide the EU Europe from the rest. This is rather crucial for 
the case of Kaliningrad, which is now an exclave of the RF between Poland and Lithuania 
at the Baltic Sea, without any common border with its motherland. An acceptable solution 
for the Kaliningrad region got approved by a Council Regulation in 2003, establishing the 
Facilitated Transit Document (FTD) and Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD), both 
facilitating transit through EU territory to RF territory (European Council 2003). Further, 
the restrictive border regime divided regional communities, ethnic groups and even 
families, as e.g. Romans and Russians in Moldova, Finno-Ugric ethnics in the RF and 
cross-border communities as between Poland, Lithuania and Kaliningrad (Interview with 
Olga Potemkina, Institute of Europe at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 12 
June 2009). 
Apart from the big EU eastward enlargement in 2004 and 2007, the EU announced also a 
membership perspective to all Western Balkan countries as well as Turkey. Today, 
Croatia, Macedonia and recently Montenegro are EU candidate countries along with 
Turkey. In addition, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have expressed an interest in joining 
the EU, but the Union is not putting their membership on the agenda. Instead, EU’s 
eastern policy became more pro-active and now offers the willing countries in the east far-
reaching technical and financial assistance as well as a facilitated interaction and 
cooperation in areas of mutual interest. For this purpose, the EU launched several 
agreements and initiatives. Thus, the EU signed PCA’s at the end of 1990s with other 
former Soviet countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. A PCA was also negotiated 
with Belarus but has not come into force, according to the existing lack of democratic 
governance and human rights of the authoritarian leadership of Lukashenko. On the one 
hand, EU’s policies were a response to the demands of these countries to succeed in 
integration into the EU system. On the other hand, the EU also tried to extend its influence 
in the East to gain more power in the region. 
The PCA, more or less, provides the legal and institutional framework for EU-RF 
cooperation. The agenda of the interaction and cooperation within these institutions 
grounds on regional initiatives and policies. Worth mentioning are on the one hand the 
Northern Dimension (ND) initiative between Scandinavian Countries, Baltic Countries and 
the RF. The first Action Plan got adopted at the Feira European Council in June 2000 
(European Council 2000). On the other hand, the EU launched the European 
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Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Strategic Partnership (EaP) with the RF in 2004, 
thought as an instrument to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the 
enlarged EU and the new neighbouring countries. In recent years, two new initiatives 
within the ENP complement the current framework of interaction in the eastern European 
region. Firstly, we have to mention the Black Sea Synergy, which comprises the countries 
in the Black Sea basin, namely the South Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova. The Black 
Sea Synergy initiative was proposed by the European Commission in a communication to 
the Parliament and the Council in 2007. It got formally launched in Kyiv in February 2008 
at a summit of all littoral countries. 
Secondly, a new programme for the Eastern neighbours, called Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
got adopted at a Summit in Prague on the 7 May 2009 (COM 2008a). The Eastern 
Partnership instrument covers six post-soviet countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine and even Belarus, which is merely excluded from any EU external 
policies. As for the RF, it was invited to participate in the Eastern Partnership programme 
as an observer. The adopted joint declaration at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Prague 
attempts “to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further 
economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries” (Council of the 
EU 2009c). 
“We are trying to antagonise Russia with Eastern Partnership. We do not want to exclude 
them” (Interview with Commission official, DG JFS, Brussels, 17 April 2009). 
EU’s initiatives in the region are aiming to re-integrate the neighbouring countries as much 
as possible into the ‘European family’. As the relations with these countries evolve, there 
is natural differentiation between them, depending on their distinct aspirations and reform 
agendas, different relationships with the EU from a historical perspective and also with 
each other. Many of them have little in common. In this sense, it is a very heterogeneous 
group of countries. During recent years there have been a number of reversals in the 
apparently inevitable progression towards permanent democratic transformation and 
market economy. For example: weak leadership and chaotic parliamentarianism in 
Ukraine; manipulation of the 2009 presidential election results in Moldova; repression of 
political opposition in Georgia, authoritarian leadership in Belarus and Azerbaijan; and, 
lack of rule of law in all Eastern Countries. 
The Common Neighbourhood between the EU and RF agenda is equally complex and 
abounds in mutual suspicions and misunderstandings. It is the area of stiff competition 
between them, with both sides essentially agreeing on the ends – that the common 
neighbourhood should be a zone of security and stability – but diverging on the means. 
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The EU is keen to see these countries adhering to European norms and values, whereas 
the RF in turn would like to have a ring of loyal regimes to preserve its role as a regional 
as well as a global actor. Thus, the RF is considered about EU’s eastern policy, claiming a 
sphere of interest in the post-Soviet space. RF, itself denied being a part of the ENP or 
EaP. It refuses to be seen as a neighbourhood of the EU and either to be downgraded as 
being equal to Ukraine, Belarus and others. The RF considers the EU eastern policy and 
its role at revolutionary events in the region as affecting its crucial interests in this region. 
Any activity of the EU in RF’s ‘near abroad’ is seen as an assault against RF and harms 
EU’s credibility as a trustful partner. 
The flurry of the RF administration is caused by the fact that RF itself doesn’t have any 
attractive alternative to offer. As the EU-Russia Centre came to the appraisal, the RF is  
“unable to persuade the neighbours to cooperate with peaceful means and not able to 
offer an attractive transformation model, [thus] Russia places most emphasis on strong-
arm tactics. Instead of competing with the EU to offer concessions to the neighbours, it 
tries to ridicule the EU’s role, or create an image of the enemy. Both tactics are false, and 
lead nowhere” (EuRussia Centre 2009a). 
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, RF’s foreign policy was shaped by an identity 
crisis in the wake of the traumata of the fall as a former global player. Especially the loss 
of influence in their self-reclaimed post-Soviet backyard grieves the Russian 
administration. The RF sees itself as the successor of the Soviet Union and therefore 
seeks to regain influence as a global and regional actor. In reaction to EU’s competitive 
initiatives towards former member states of the Soviet Union, the RF itself seeks to secure 
its exclusive sphere of influence by its own regional initiatives. Because of RF’s limited 
possibilities to offer itself as an attractive, prosperous and powerful pole in the region, it 
adopted a more assertive policy to protect and project RF’s national interests. On the one 
hand, the RF provides financial and political carrots, as offering cheap loans or gas supply 
to a reduced price. On the other hand, the RF doesn’t flinch from pushing political 
pressure on countries to be loyal. E.g.: trade wars (import ban for products from Moldova 
from March 2006 to November 2007; those from Georgia from March 2006 to the present; 
and imports from Ukraine. Meat imports from Poland were banned between November 
2005 and December 2007); increasing gas prices for political leverage; and use of 
territorial claims and conflicts, as the independent movements in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, frozen conflicts in Transnistria and Nagorno Karabakh (e.g. EuRussia Centre 
2008b: 61). 
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Facing the near abroad as its own influence area, the RF is calling the West to refrain 
from spreading its influence in the post-Soviet space. We might observe a rivalry between 
two geopolitical projects, Russian and European, about the hegemony in the region. As 
Gomart (2008) points out: 
“the Kremlin is always careful to distinguish between Europe and the EU, as it still 
nurtures the hope of a European continent based on two pillars: a Western pillar (the 
Union) and an Eastern pillar (led by Russia). This approach can be seen in the principle 
advocated by the Kremlin in its EU relations - a dialog between equals. A sign of this 
formula’s success is that is not contested, even though it does not correspond to the real 
balance of power” (ibid.: 13). 
The shared neighbourhood is, therefore, one of the most difficult areas of negotiation 
between the EU and RF. Most friction has laid in the cases Ukraine and Georgia and their 
Western-friendly policy, whereas Ukraine might do a turn back to the RF after the re-
election of Yanukovych in 2010. Recent RF rhetoric on zones of influence and its 
perception of the Eastern Partnership as a form of anti-RF coalition harmed the 
cooperation between the two regional superpowers (e.g. EurActiv 2010a). As already the 
enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007 have contradicted RF’s agenda for the region, the 
neighbourhood initiatives of the EU annoy Russia’s administration. In reaction, the RF 
itself started to form its own regional alliances on security and economic matters. Its 
attempt got supported by the consolidation of Russian leadership under Putin and the 
economic recovery driven by the rise of revenues from the gas market.  
At the same time, the RF is not stop for nothing, to restore its influence in the region.  
Therefore, the RF uses energy as a political tool for punishing or rewarding countries with 
supply patterns, prices and volumes depending on their stances towards RF’s policy. 
Russia’s immediate neighbours have experienced various degrees of pressure by 
Moscow to assure their loyalty and to prevent them from defecting to the West. The 
arsenal of instruments deployed for this purpose ranged from gentile military intimidation 
(e.g. Georgia 2008), to trade sanctions (e.g. Georgia 2006) and raising gas prices, or 
cutting off energy supplies (e.g. gas wars with Ukraine and Belarus). Apart from that, as 
regarding authoritarian regimes, RF’s policy of non-interference makes it easier to 
cooperate and receive loyalty from many countries in the east (e.g. energy contracts; 
military bases). 
Furthermore, the enlarged EU has tangled itself up in its own contradiction around solving 
its internal decision-making ability and strengthens its unity in foreign affairs. The 
neighbouring countries miss a clear perspective in its relation with the EU and therefore 
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look about alternatives. Thus, we could observe countries oscillating between being more 
Russia-friendly and articulately pro-Western, depending on their proposed benefits. 
In recent years, the RF itself launched some ‘integrationist projects’ to counterweigh 
Western initiatives. A key role in RF’s policy towards it’s near abroad is taken by the 
formerly Moscow-centred Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Putin and 
Medvedev pledged to make the CIS their top foreign policy priority to facilitate trade within 
the former Soviet allies and to maintain the control over gas and oil sources and export 
routes (e.g. Ria Novosti 2010b). Further, the RF administration attempts to create their 
own security architecture to guarantee an RF friendly and peaceful neighbourhood. 
Founded on 8 December 1991, the CIS comprises all former Soviet-Republics, except 
Ukraine, which is de facto participating, but legally not a member country, and, the Baltic 
States, which chose not to join28. Georgia left the regional organisation on 18 August 
2008, as reaction to the armed conflict in South Ossetia (e.g. ibid.)29. Currently, eight 
countries are full CIS members (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, the RF and Tajikistan). Turkmenistan is an associate member30. 
RF’s policy towards CIS-countries follows two main objectives, namely to avert security 
threats, both external and internal, and to pursue its economic interests abroad. According 
to these ends, the RF initiated the formation of two regional groups under the Russian 
banner, such as the CIS Free Trade Area (CISFTA) and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO) in the early nineties. However, the CISFTA agreements to create a 
common free trade area were never signed (Ria Novosti 2010d).  
Facing the difficulty to conclude on a common agreement with all CIS states, the RF in the 
meantime agreed with Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine on the creation of a Common 
Economic Space at a meeting on 23 February 2003. The Common Economic Space 
would involve a supranational commission on trade and tariffs that would be based in 
Kiev, would initially be headed by a representative of Kazakhstan, and would not be 
subordinate to the governments of the four nations (e.g. Tinibai 2010). 
The Customs Union between RF, Belarus and Kazakhstan came into existence on 1 
January 2010 as well as a unified customs code (effective from 1 July 2010); with a single 
market envisioned for 2012 (Ria Novosti 2010c). The Customs Union is open for other 
countries to join as well. The Custom Union should be the first step in establishing a 
                                                
28 Interparliamentary Assembly of Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
http://www.iacis.ru/. Last access 23 June 2011 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
 149 
broader EU-type economic alliance of former Soviet states. Further, Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin didn’t preclude seeking collective entry of the Customs Union to the WTO in 
the future. However, Vladimir Putin seeks further integration on economic issues. The 
Eurasian Economic Community (EurASEC) got founded as a progression to the Custom 
Union. It is based on the 1996 Custom Union between the RF, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
and associates also Central Asian countries Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and 
got launched on the 10 October. 
Recently, Putin raised the idea to improve the regional cooperation by the establishment 
of an ’Eurasian Union’ earliest in 2015, which would "build on the experience of the 
European Union and other regional coalitions" (Putin cited in BBC, 4 October 2010). 
"We won't stop with this and have set an ambitious goal to reach the next, higher level of 
integration — the Eurasian Union. […] We offer a model of a powerful supranational 
body, which could turn into one of the modern-day world’s major hubs and play an 
effective role in linking Europe to the thriving Asia-Pacific region” (Putin cited in The 
Moscow Times, 5 October 2011). 
Another integrationist project is the launch of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
(CSTO), which came into effect in May 200231. The Treaty got signed by Armenia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined the 
intergovernmental military alliance in 2006. All signatories declared not to join any other 
military alliances or other groups of states, while aggression against one signatory would 
be perceived as an aggression against all. Thus, no one of the member states should ever 
be a member of NATO of the EU. 
The closest ties between the RF and a neighbouring country could be observed with 
Belarus. Both states complied with the foundation of a common Union State on the 2 April 
1996, sharing the objective to create a common currency, citizenship and freedom of 
migration, military units, flag and coat of arms and collecting a value added tax (VAT) to 
finance the Union State bodies (e.g. Zulys 2005). However, current events showed a 
slight turn of Belarusian administration to the West, foremost as a reaction to the RF’s 
refusal to provide a loan to Minsk in the early 2010. Even though it is a tactic of 
Lukashenko to play the ‘Western Card’, it shows the pragmatism in Belarusian – RF 
relations and how fragile the ties between the allies are. The most challenging relations, 
however, arouse with Ukraine, even though the pro-Russian candidate for the Ukrainian 
                                                
31 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/csto.htm. Last access 23 June 2011 
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presidency Viktor Yanokuvych won the elections on the 7 February 2010. Ukraine is doing 
well with their Janus-faced foreign policy, trying to benefit from both sides with all options 
to put pressure on one partner. Thus, the new president declared to follow an ‘out-of-
blocs’ policy, which means neither an alignment with the Western bloc NATO than the RF-
led CSTO (Ria Novosti 2010e).  
Although the RF administration got rather active in forming regional groups to tighten its 
relations with the former Soviet republic in the near abroad, the integrationist projects are 
still at the beginning and show less progress. The sovereign countries of the CIS are 
aware of the dominant partner RF and the inequality in their partnership. Furthermore, the 
RF model doesn’t really attract the neighbouring countries. The RF tries to attract them by 
offering financial support and special prices for natural resources. Besides, the former 
superpower shows that they are not flinching away from using their military power to put 
through their interests; but as the latest CIS summit in Chisinau, Moldova, has shown, the 
CIS has proved itself as incapable of setting out and following any common agenda, as 
well as using any kind of effective mechanism of multilateral cooperation, never mind any 
thoughts of integrationist power. Referring to the last CIS summit in Chisinau, Moldova, 
the presidents of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and the biggest supporter of the CIS 
Kazakhstan, were absent – the first time since the establishment of the CIS in 1991. 
Although their absence was caused merely by particular interests, it is a clear proof of 
how weak the organisation is and how the member states are annoyed by the dominance 
of the RF. Especially Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are cautious of any 
influence of RF, as they are eager to keep control over their own oil and gas deposits and 
export them directly to West Europe without unnecessary middlemen. To bring it to the 
point, RF, more or less, has failed to create an attractive cooperative model that does not 
resemble a new form of domination over its neighbours (e.g. Gomart 2008: 13). 
To conclude, the battle on gaining influence in the common neighbourhood remains one 
of the major stumbling blocks in EU-RF relations. Both regional powers are trying to exert 
influence on the common neighbourhood, but with divergent interests. Whereas (While) 
the EU is entering RF’s sphere of geopolitical interest, the RF sees itself as the successor 
of the Soviet Union and tries to preserve its zone of vital interest in the former Soviet 
Republics and Warsaw Pact countries. This difference in history is also a major aspect 
when it comes to understanding the difference in the distinct policy towards the common 
neighbourhood. As Gomart (2008) points out: “the ‘battle’ therefore comprises a 
psychological and identity dimension that is often ignored by the European Union in its 
exchanges with Moscow” (ibid: 5). 
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After the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the loss of the status as a global power, the 
RF felt itself in a defensive position. They faced, first, the expansion of the NATO to their 
former allies; second, the accession to the EU of most of the allies as followed by the 
extension of the Schengen area; and, third, efforts of the EU to integrate the common 
neighbourhood in their area of interest (e.g. ENP, EaP). The RF reacted like a defiant 
child, seeing itself helpless against initiatives of other actors. Using the energy trump card 
among other arguments, it sought to build up bilateral relations with friendly countries, 
while accusing countries which had turned to the West. Under Putin, the RF became 
consolidated, not least because of the energy recovery caused by the increased prices for 
oil and gas. The invigoration of its self-confidence can be observed in its foreign policy in 
IR. The RF was merely eager to offer an alternative for the ‘near abroad’ against Western 
initiatives. Furthermore, the RF administration consistently refuses to treat the EU as a 
single actor in IR and even does not resign from confronting US policies in the region (e.g. 
ABM systems, NATO extension to Georgia and Ukraine). 
Especially EU’s approach to strengthen its ties with the common neighbourhood peeves 
the RF, which sees EU’s course of action as hostile against RF’s interest (e.g. Interview 
with Commission official, DG Relex, Brussels, 21 April 2009). Their distinct approach 
reflects a broader cleavage between the two powers in the region. Relations between the 
EU and the RF for the years to come will depend not only to a small degree on whether 
this gap could be bridged. The EU also should have in mind to be more sensitive when 
entering former areas of influence and dominance (maybe: in entering areas where other 
countries held considerable influence not long ago…). In a report of the Dutch Advisory 
Council on International Affairs (AIV), the members come to the conclusion that:  
“[i]t will be exceedingly difficult, however, for the EU to convince Russia that the EU’s 
close ties with the former Soviet republics are not directed against Moscow and that the 
EU looks upon its ties with them as a matter of mutual interest and not, like Russia, as 
part of a zero-sum game” (AIV 2008: 30). 
“[…] the Russian view does seem still to be that, ‘this is an area where they have a 
sphere of influence themselves’. They have privileged say, what these countries do. I 
don´t say that it’s an attempt to turn back to Soviet Union, Soviet empire, certainly not. 
But they do feel that these are countries, where they have an privileged interest. We 
don´t accept, that these countries have not choice. We don’t insist them to turn their back 
on Russia, but we want them to be free, that they can work with whoever they want to” 
(Interview with Commission official, DG Relex, Brussels, 21 April 2009). 
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However, this struggle between the EU and the RF is not only an issue between these two 
actors; it affects wide-ranging issues in IR. Their relationship has a direct impact on: 
internal politics in the countries of the common neighbourhood; geopolitics on energy; 
ensuring a stable and peaceful environment as, e.g., solving the frozen conflicts in the 
region, or accounting for peace in the western Balkan region; and the global security 
architecture. RF and the EU also influence the conduct of major powers in the region, 
among those the United States and China, but also countries such as Turkey, India and 
Japan. 
The negative impact of these dissenting approaches can be notably observed with the 
issue of resolving the frozen or simmering conflicts in places like Moldova, Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. The conflicts are the biggest obstacles on the way to prosperity 
and security in this region. The EU would like to see the frozen conflicts in the region 
resolved and seeks to play an active role in the peace process, whereas Russia is 
satisfied with the status quo, as it ensures political leverage over the secessionist entities 
and up to a point over the sovereign states of the region, especially Georgia and Moldova. 
It allows the RF to impose pressure upon them. The addressed conflicts are Transnistria, 
which has declared its independence from Moldova, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
which have separated from Georgia. Further, the conflict around the Armenian occupation 
of Nagorno-Karabakh is also waiting to be solved32. RF’s role is clear: on the one hand it 
is part of the game, which means it actively is involved and supports the secessionist 
groups; and on the other hand it is the only key to solve the conflicts. RF’s actions range 
from military presence in South-Ossetia and Abkhazia to mediation in Transnistria and 
Nagorno-Karabakh. In all three cases it became clear that any restoration of territorial 
integrity will be possible without cooperation from the RF and that they would be well 
advised to adopt policies that accommodate Russia. 
The Transnistria dispute is a good example for this approach. After years of being 
sanctioned by the RF (e.g. import ban for agricultural goods, increase of gas prices), the 
RF administration signalled a way out of this conflict and even considers a reunification of 
the country as possible. This turnaround in RF’s position in the conflicts is a reaction of 
the Moldovan indication to satisfy RF’s condition by guaranteeing permanent neutrality 
and recognising Russian ownership of Moldovan companies and property ‘sold’ by the 
                                                
32 Although the Security Council resolution No. 822 calls for a removal of Armenian troops, the area 
is still occupied by Armenian soldiers. Text of the resolution got retrieved from http://www.unhcr. 
org/refworld/docid/3b00f15764.html, 24 November 2010. To get a general overview about UN 
resolutions in this case have a look on: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ 
N07/478/35/PDF/N0747835.pdf, last access 23 June 2011 
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Transnistrian ‘government’ to Russian companies (e.g. AIV 2008: 32). As a first step, the 
Moldovan president, Vladimir Voronin, announced Moldova’s withdrawal from GUAM, the 
regional organisation of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, which Moscow 
regards as anti-Russian (e.g. ibid.). An interesting difference has arisen in recent months 
in RF’s approach to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where the RF explicitly insisted on 
independence of the Georgian provinces.  Additionally, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, 
the political leverage can clearly be observed in negotiations with Azerbaijan on gas 
businesses with the West. 
Another conflict is closely linked to RF’s foreign policy; it is the case of secession 
movements in Kosovo and Republica Srpska. As a close ally, the RF supports Serbia’s 
position in the region. In the case of the declaration of Kosovo’s independence in 2008, 
RF officials argued that if Kosovo’s independence is going to be recognised by the 
International community, other secession movements in Republica Srpska, Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia should have the right to do the same for themselves. It is rather obvious 
that RF’s policy in this case is a rather pragmatic one, to gain a higher political leverage in 
the region. 
Although we observe rather controversial approaches in both policies to the common 
neighbourhood or call it their common zone of responsibility, their policy has not to be 
confrontational at all. It should be of both interests to detect areas of mutual objectives 
and to emphasise building confidence in their relations. For the moment, we have the 
impression, as Gomart (2008) points out, “that self-absorption fuels the current depression 
by distracting the EU-RF coupe from the real challenges and opportunities it faces” (ibid.: 
1). Especially security and energy matters provide every legitimate opportunity for the EU 
and the RF to cooperate with each other and for mutual benefit. Exceptionally, the frozen 
conflicts in the region can only be solved by their combined efforts. Both actors will be well 
advised to rather prioritise the common objectives than keep on stressing the disparities.  
Moreover, comparing official statements of both actors that refer to the common 
neighbourhood, we see several similarities in their objectives: In May 2007 the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, said that 
“relations with the CIS countries [are] the chief priority of Russian foreign policy’ and that 
‘Russia is interested in having friendly, prosperous, democratic and stable states along 
the perimeter of its borders” (translated from Russian, AIV 2008:30). 
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In contrary, the EU ‘Wider Europe initiative’ proposes that: “the communication proposes 
that the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a 
‘ring of friends’ - with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative 
relations“(COM 2003a: 30). 
The challenges in the common neighbourhood clearly need a concerted action by the EU 
and RF. Legvold (2007) stressed in its publication of 2007 that “the EU would benefit from 
understanding that Russian policy toward it is fuelled, in part, by strong resentment. It 
should take care to analyse more carefully the reference to the past used by the Kremlin” 
(ibid.: 10). As the EU expands its influence towards countries perceived by the RF as its 
area of influence, a more sensitive approach would be more appropriate. It would be 
helpful to acknowledge RF interests in their geopolitics in the region and develop an 
integrated approach of common objectives. To mention some examples: an adjustment of 
their foreign policy on global challenges as terrorism, global warming, irregular migration 
and conflicts of a global scope; the creation of a common security architecture for Europe; 
a cooperation to ensure energy supply for Europe as in the case of accession of new 
energy sources and modernisation of the current gas and oil pipeline’s; and the 
development of a Europe-wide free trade area. Both actors would be doing well to develop 
a common vision for the shared neighbourhood which presupposes a common vision of 
EU-RF relation in the long term. European security governance urgently needs a RF as 
one of the stakeholders in order to solve frozen conflicts in the region and to prevent 
security threats to evolve. 
4.2.3 Security Architecture in Europe and US Atlanticism 
The security situation in Europe completely changed after the end of the bipolar world 
order. Besides new challenges, attended by an ongoing globalising world, new security 
governance is needed to fill the new vacuum after the strict divide in a Western bloc 
(NATO), and an Eastern bloc (Warsaw Pact). Whereas the US-lead NATO follows an 
expansionist policy in Eastern Europe, the Moscow-lead military pacts face a decline. 
Thus, the RF administration fears a decrease of its influence in the region and a loss of 
power in support of US dominance, the former antagonist power. Although the EU and 
NATO are two separate actors, a clear link between the US Atlanticism and the EU-RF 
dialogue occurs. Most of the EU member states are already member of the NATO, and 
the most powerful ones look back on a beneficial cooperation in post-war Europe. 
Currently, neighbouring countries as Ukraine and Georgia asked for the membership. It 
would be ignorant to think this should not affect RF’s interests; of course it does, and the 
EU should be careful not to ignore RF’s perception. 
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Following that, the EU, as the West in general, should not underestimate RF’s strategic 
importance in major security questions, as well as its special relations in Central Asia. 
Thus, in the long term, a solid security partnership between them is needed if the 
questions important to both, the EU and RF, are to be answered. EU-RF cooperation on 
security matters is far below their potentials. Especially in the case of the mentioned 
‘frozen conflicts’ in Europe, a close cooperation pledges a sustainable conflict resolution. 
Further, RF’s influence in Central Asia is of strategic importance to EU’s foreign policy. 
Currently, security governance in Europe faces two major issues: First, cooperation 
between the EU member states and the RF concerning independent European security 
architecture; second, impact of US Atlanticism and the dominance of the military alliance 
NATO on the EU-RF security cooperation. 
First, the EU-RF security cooperation is about many separate issues, merely of regional 
interest and of varying degrees of importance, as e.g. the disputed independence of 
Kosovo, declared in 2008; conflict resolution of frozen conflicts in Transnistria and 
Nagorno Karabakh, as well as peace building in Georgia’s separatist provinces Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia; combating terrorism and smuggling of weapons; NATO alliances of 
European states; American plans to place an ABM shield in Central Europe; and the 
implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Most of the issues 
in the field of security policy are subject of serious RF-EU disagreements. An intense 
dialogue is needed to be able to improve the situation. In effect, misperceptions lead to 
mistrust and turned the relation in a power game. RF does not see its interest taken into 
account by the EU, whereas they do not see a chance for a common agenda and a need 
to accept EU’s lead into the security dialogue. 
Underestimating RF, therefore, could constitute a serious threat to European security and 
EU’s ability to provide a stable environment for development. Regarding its historical 
standing in the region, its geopolitical position, its military power, and its huge nuclear 
arsenal gives reason to be a strategic partner of the EU and even for the US. There is no 
way to built European security without RF’s participation, and respectively, RF’s good will. 
On the contrary, a common European security strategy could be beneficial for RF’s 
administration. According to Sergey Lavrov, foreign minister of the RF since 2004, RF’s 
strategy is to see their country as an independent pole with a right to its own place in the 
development of a multi-polar world order. Recalling memories of the 19th-century ‘concert 
of Europe’, in which tsarist Russia played an important role, the Russian foreign minister 
Sergey Lavrov (2007) has referred to a “concert of the powers of the 21st century” (ibid.), 
with such countries as the US, RF, EU, China, India, Brazil and South Africa. Lavrov also 
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thought of an institutionalisation of the dialogue between them, exemplified by the G8. 
Thus, the RF calls for new security architecture, besides the current NATO dominance, 
which should include relevant military powers of the international community. 
President Putin shares Lavrov’s statement as he expressed his ideas about the new 
geopolitical reality in a speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 
2007: 
“I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today's 
world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in todays - and 
precisely in today's - world, then the military, political and economic resources would not 
suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis 
there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilization. […] We are seeing a 
greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent 
legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state's legal system. 
One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national 
borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational 
policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this? “ (Putin 
2007a) 
This evocation of multipolarity in the global order, in the sense of the RF administration, 
first of all, aims at a disempowerment of the US and its dominance worldwide. A 
multipolaritiy in global security cooperation should base, according to Putin and Lavrov, on 
an equal footing by all major states. Further, the RF calls for an independent security 
architecture in Europe, which should contain an own military alliance – displacing NATO 
from European ground. RF’s initiatives are a reaction to a chain of events, resulting in 
RF’s tougher stance with regard to European security. These events showed that security 
policy in Europe takes place beyond RF’s participation and interests instead of being a 
decisive part in the European security architecture. Being outside and see itself targeted 
by actions against its interests, the RF perceives the EU as a non-credible strategic 
player, often not distinguishing its actions and motives from those of NATO (e.g. Zielonka 
2006: 156). 
The RF administration has for years complained about disregard for its interests and 
about western actions such as: western security policy in the Western Balkans (bombing 
of Serbia in 1999, backing for Kosovo’s independence); EU’s support for NATO’s 
expansionist policy in the common neighbourhood; alleged interference in the internal 
affairs of CIS countries; the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the 
effort to build a missile defence shield (e.g. Putin 2007a). It is a pity that as a result RF 
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bared its teeth, supported by its economic recovery in the beginning of this century. In 
terms of security issues, RF administration made its statements clear by serious 
opposition against US influence on Europe, e.g. against anti-ballistic facilities in Poland 
and Czech Republic, and is not flinching from using its military force to pursue its interest 
in its near abroad, e.g. attacking Georgia in August 2008. Coincidentally, the RF raised 
ideas of new forms of engagement between RF and the EU on security matters, 
independent from US influence – aiming to empower Europe to go its own path lead by 
the two regional powers EU and RF. 
The Georgia crisis, however, marked a watershed in one sense. The EU, under French 
presidency, became rather active in mediating between the two rivals, Georgia and RF. 
For the first time, the EU occurred as a coherent actor and the French role in negotiating 
the ceasefire agreement got accepted by both rivals as their mediator. Further, the EU 
member states made clear that they aren’t willing to tolerate RF’s course of action and 
decided to stop the negotiations on the new Association Agreement. Right after the 
Georgian-Russian war, the European Council’s Report on ‘the Implementation of the 
European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World’ stated that: 
“[o]ur relations with Russia have deteriorated over the conflict with Georgia. The EU 
expects Russia to honour its commitments in a way that will restore the necessary 
confidence. Our partnership should be based on respect for common values, notably 
human rights, democracy, and rule of law, as well as market economic principles serving 
common interests and objectives” (European Council 2008a: 10). 
RF appreciates a strong partner in Europe, as long as it pursues the same interests and it 
neglects US dominance in European and global affairs (e.g. Massari 2007: 2; Splidsboel-
Hansen 2002). Thus, the opposition of several member states of the EU towards the US-
invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan were welcomed by RF administration despite the fact 
that it shows the possibility of the EU distancing itself from American initiatives through 
NATO. Vice versa, the EU is aware, that RF is a: 
“major factor in our security and prosperity [and that] there are few if any problems we 
can deal with on our own. [...] International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue 
our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and 
through partnerships with key actors” (European Council 2003: 13-14). 
Seeing that, RF strongly favours an independent European security policy and, therefore, 
calls for reforming the present European security structures around the US-led NATO and 
proposes the ratification of a common European Security Treaty (President of the RF 
2009). 
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Related to RF’s attempt in creating an own European security architecture, Dmitry 
Rogozin, Russian ambassador to NATO, stated in an interview that, “Great powers do not 
join alliances, they create alliances. And if we consider ourselves to be a country with the 
right to independence, to its own constitution and to its own view of the world order, why 
should we join someone else’s alliance?” (Rogozin cited in EuRussia Centre 2008d) The 
RF proposal for a European Security Treaty (Permanent Mission of the RF to the EU 
2009) should be a first step to create an own security architecture lead by the two 
European powers EU and RF. Thus, the influence on Europe by the US-lead alliance 
NATO should be repelled and displaced by new forms to guarantee security in the region. 
As Vladimir Chizhov, RF’s ambassador to the EU, pointed out in a speech in 2010: 
“the treaty may be used as a basis to develop systematic and constructive dialogue on 
wide-spectrum of security issues – arms control and confidence-building measures, 
cooperation between all organizations and actors in the Euro-Atlantic security space, 
elaboration of common approaches to conflict settlement as well as to counter global 
security challenges” (Chizhov 2010). 
Although there is still not such an agreement in prospective, the security cooperation 
between the EU and RF has improved, especially after 9/11 (e.g. De Spiegeleire 2002; 
Trenin 2002). The signing of a joint declaration on further practical steps in developing 
political dialogue and cooperation on crisis management and security matters at the EU-
Russia summit 2002 and the Common Space initiative (2003), including a Common 
Space on external security, marked the beginning of further commitments to improve its 
cooperation on security matters (13th EU-RF Summit in St. Petersburg: Joint Statement, 
Art. 2). As a result, the RF became notably involved in the implementation of the EU’s 
CFSP. 
To mention RF’s role in contributing to peacekeeping operations under the EU flag, as 
recently in Chad (European Council 2008b): The RF military force provided logistical 
support for the EU peacekeeping mission in Chad. It may be another strategic goal to 
empower the EU as an independent actor and make them less inclined itself so closely to 
US-driven policies in global affairs, however, the RF shows its willingness to cooperate 
with the EU in such military missions, which was unthinkable some years before. Another 
joint action worth mentioning is the joint statement about the Gaza crisis, signed by High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton on behalf of the 
EU and RF’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the EU-RF summit in Rostov-
on-Don in June 2010 (Council of the EU 2010f). 
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Further, both parties are aiming to improve their consultation mechanism. On the one 
hand, the Political and Security Committee of the EU initiates several meetings with the 
RF on security matters (Andoura 2008: 5). On the other hand, German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy are calling for the creation of a new security 
committee between the foreign ministers of the EU, currently held by the British Catherine 
Ashton, and RF, currently held by Sergey Lavrov (New York Times, 17 October 2010). 
The new committee should enable the: 
“exchange [of] views on current issues of international politics and security […] and 
develop guidelines for joint civil/military operations [and] make recommendations [on] the 
various conflicts and crisis situations […]” (EuObserver 2010).  
This ‘positive’ development was preceded by a trilateral summit meeting between the 
leaders of France, Germany and RF in Deauville in 2010. Besides, other European 
countries feel excluded from the process, as it seems to them that the major countries 
have monopolised it. We will see how Catherine Ashton is able to bring France and 
Germany back to form a joint strategy of all EU member states and strengthen EU’s 
respective institutions in the field. Anyway, this trilateral summit meeting helped to 
increase the certainty and trust between the EU and RF. 
Second, the chapter is going to scrutinise the impact of the ‘Atlantic factor’ and the 
dominance of the military alliance NATO on the EU-RF security cooperation. As one of the 
heritages of the Cold war, the RF is still frightened about US influence on Europe’s ground 
– primarily not seen as an immediate threat as such, but as an ongoing spread of its 
influence in Europe and the RF’s zone of influence in the long-term. Thus, RF’s is afraid of 
losing power in this zero-sum game in aid of the US. As stated before, this reasons RF’s 
attempt to create an own independent security architecture in Europe, with itself as the 
main military power on the continent. The EU, however, is seen as being a junior partner 
of the US, whereas the membership to the US-led NATO of 22 out of 27 EU member 
states would be a clear evidence for this. 
Anyhow, US-RF relations undergo a long period of mutual tension which changed in the 
recent years to be more pragmatic. The transatlantic dialogue between both former 
duopolies got a new fresh impetus, building on a generous letter that was sent in 2009 by 
Obama to Medvedev, stating that: 
“it’s time to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we can and should 
be working together with Russia” (Cited by Vice-President Joe Biden at 45th Munich 
Conference on Security Policy, 7 February 2009). 
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This opening to this new American emphasis on a pragmatic relationship with the RF got 
prepared by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton with her counterpart Sergey Lavrov in 
spring 2009. Their aim was to overcome tension between US and RF during the Bush 
administration, where the US either took action against RF’s interest in e.g. bombing of 
Serbia in 1999; pushing for NATO enlargement eastwards;  recognizing of Kosovo’s 
independence in February 2008; invading Iraq in 2003; supporting Georgia’s President 
Saakashvili; entering RF’s sphere of interest in Central Asia by opening military bases in 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, mostly to ferry troops and material that got 
transported in and out of Afghanistan (CNN 2010); and the planned ABM system on 
European ground. 
The most challenging issues in EU-RF relations are, at the moment, the NATO expansion 
and the planned ABM facilities in Poland and Czech Republic.  With regard to the NATO 
enlargement in 1999 (Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland) and 2004 (Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), the RF does not enjoy the post-soviet 
space and its old sphere of influence under the influence of Western allies. Any further 
expansion is strictly defeated by the RF administration and any ambition in this direction 
would be seen as an aggressive act against RF. 
Thus, the decision on 3 April 2008 by the NATO in Bucharest to open negotiations with 
Ukraine and Georgia to become a member (NATO 2008: Art. 23) has been put on the 
back burner. In the wave of the Bucharest meeting of the 26 leaders of the NATO, Putin 
told in a press conference that: “The appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders 
will be taken by Russia as a direct threat to the security of our country” (Bloomberg 2008). 
And, with a side-blow to U.S. plans to establish a missile shield in Central-East Europe, 
Putin stressed in an interview: 
"We are concerned that if these countries become part of NATO today, tomorrow we will 
see offensive missile systems deployed on their territory which will pose a serious threat 
to us" (Ria Novosti 2008). 
Several NATO members, such as Germany and Netherland, stressed that the NATO has 
to be aware of potential pros and cons of such an enlargement, as e.g. the possible 
repercussions on relations with third countries like the RF. In turn, other NATO member 
states, mainly from Eastern Europe, expressed concern about being intimidated by the RF 
and feared, further, a weakening of Western position on democracy and human rights 
issues. These NATO members from the East would, however, even go further, as 
Lithuania’s Minister of Defence Rasa Jukneviciene stated, and call also for Belarus to join 
NATO (The Lithuania Tribune 2010). Many of these Eastern European Countries still 
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value NATO for its original purpose, as a “bulwark against Soviet aggression. […] Having 
endured occupation or the subsuming of national independence within a Soviet empire, 
they are still deeply suspicious of Moscow’s intentions” (The Times 2006). 
Another big test for the RF-NATO relations was the current dispute over the US plan on 
installing an ABM shield in Europe, which the RF views as a threat. In reaction to the 
respective plans of the Bush administration, the RF threatened to deploy Iskander short 
range missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave adjoining Poland if the US does not step back in 
creating an ABM shield in Eastern Europe. When US President Obama took over the 
leadership, the new administration decided to scrap the plans of his predecessor for a 
moment and started consultations with its RF’s counterpart going ahead with plans to 
deploy a joint ABM system against possible missile shots from Iran. With regard to the 
debate on an ABM missile system on European ground, EU’s strategic marginalisation is 
really striking (e.g. Allison 2006). 
This new tone in US-RF relations also increased the climate in RF-NATO relations, where 
both are calling for a new dialogue or partnership is a result of a common understanding 
that both are facing the same challenging issues and expect to solve it by cooperating. 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, secretary general of NATO, puts it like this:  
“We now have a great opportunity to build security not only in Europe, but across the 
entire Euro-Atlantic area — as NATO and Russia set aside old differences to work more 
closely together. [...] Long after the Cold War ended, NATO and Russia continued to look 
at each other with suspicion. Yet, the case for broader, more solid NATO-Russia 
cooperation became more and more compelling as threats to the security of our nations 
increased in number and complexity. Terrorism, nuclear proliferation, cyber crime and 
piracy are just some of the new global threats that now affect all of our nations” 
(Rasmussen 2011). 
The NATO and the RF have recently signed several agreements (e.g. Partnership for 
Peace 1994; Military Cooperation Agreement 2005; Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START I) and action Plans (e.g. Action Plan on Terrorism) as well as declared their 
willingness to cooperate on conflict resolution in the respective conflict regions (e.g. 
NATO-Russia Council 2011; 2010). 
Another though issue got on the agenda of a common strategy in IR between the US and 
RF. It is the case of dealing with Iran and its proposed nuclear programme, whether for 
peaceful use of nuclear energy or to be able to produce weapons of mass destruction in 
the long term. Recently, the Medvedev administration shows cooperativeness and is 
willing, as a member of the UN Security Council, to support stepping up sanctions against 
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Iran, if they neglect cooperation with the IAEA on the use of uranium. Regarding this, the 
RF has decided to postpone the supply of the S-300 anti-missile system to Iran following 
the UN Security Council resolution which contains sanctions against Teheran (The 
Washington Post 2010). 
“By other terms of the resolution, the Council decided that Iran should not acquire 
interests in any commercial activity relating to uranium enrichment and other nuclear 
materials or technology in other States, and that all States should prevent the transfer to 
Iran of any tanks, armored combat vehicles, large- caliber artillery systems, attack 
helicopters, or missiles and related systems or parts” (UN Security Council 2010). 
This new found ‘harmony’ between the Obama and Medvedev administration affects of 
course the EU-RF relationship and has enormous benefit for security matters in Europe. 
Whereas the ‘Atlantic-factor’ caused suspiciousness in the past these new forms of 
interaction between the US and RF allow for a new impetus for EU-RF relations. However, 
the fact that the US are keen to engage with RF on a wide range of issues aroused not 
only consent but a lot of criticism by several new member states of the EU. Especially the 
former Warsaw Pact Countries still face the RF as an existential threat, as recent tensions 
in Georgia have shown. 
Further, they express concern about US future bearing on democracy and human rights 
when it comes to RF as well as their policy on the neighbouring countries. Others, such as 
Germany and the United Kingdom, welcome US decision to press the reset button with 
the RF and a possible positive spin off in EU-RF relations. They argue that it is too 
important for relations to be disrupted and that Russia can help in some of the “big picture 
items like Iran and Afghanistan” (BBC 2009). There is no doubt that this opening between 
the US and RF will have enormous significance for the security dialogue between the RF 
and the EU (e.g. De Spiegeleire 2010; Cameron 2009). Yet, at this point the EU’s priority 
should be built on how to construct European security with RF and not against RF. 
Considering this point, NATO is still the issue in Europe’s security architecture. Therefore 
any rapprochement between the NATO and the RF has a direct bearing on it. NATO 
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently emphasised in a key note speech, 
that: 
“[...] the time has now come for a fresh start in relations between the NATO nations and 
Russia. I think Lisbon will be the place we make that fresh start – with more cooperation 
on Afghanistan, a shared assessment of the security threats we face today, and, I hope, 
a way forward towards cooperation on missile defense” (Rasmussen 2010). 
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The will to search for closer cooperation with Russia is also manifested in the Lisbon 
Summit Declaration of the NATO Council on 20th November 2010 (see NATO 2010) and 
marks a clear improvement in RF-NATO relations since the Georgia crisis in August 2008. 
The participation of the RF at a NATO-Russia Council (NRC) as such was conceived as a 
means for fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic region. In their third summit, all 28 NATO 
members and the RF issued a joint statement and stressed: 
“[the] tremendous potential of the NATO-Russia Council through the continued 
development of their political dialogue and practical cooperation based on their shared 
interests. We underscore that the NRC is a forum for political dialogue at all times and on 
all issues, including where we disagree. We are determined to make full use of the NRC 
mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint 
action on a wide spectrum of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region […] with the aim 
of contributing to the creation of a common space of peace, security and stability in the 
Euro-Atlantic area” (NATO-Russia Council 2010, ‘joint statement’). 
Further, the RF made a major concession in supporting NATO operations in Afghanistan, 
agreed to facilitate railway transit of non-lethal ISAF goods through Russian territory and 
confirmed its interest in resuming its support to NATO’s counter-terrorist operation “Active 
Endeavour” in the Mediterranean Sea (e.g. ibid.). Regarding this examples, the two sides 
began to develop joint operational planning for operations and joint training for 
peacekeeping operation in the area (ibid.). 
But still there are a lot of tensions between the former opponents NATO and RF. The 
history of Russia-NATO has been contradictory and complex and cannot be changed into 
a fruitful and close partnership within a short period. That is why it is especially important 
today not to miss the opportunity to begin cooperation on a more wide-scale and equal 
footing which results in a relationship full of trust and common perceptions; and, although 
the ‘National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020’, approved by 
President Medvedev on 12 May 2009, evokes a less hostile attitude towards US and 
NATO in general, NATO is still considered by Russian elite as an adversary, if not enemy. 
According to the National Security Strategy (NSS), the US and NATO are still the main 
military threats for RF’s security. RF’s Security Council trace the military threats from the 
West back to: 
 “USA’s unilateral annulment of the Ant-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, as well as 
to the refusal of the NATO member states to ratify the Adapted Conventional Forces in 
Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1999, which caused Russia to suspend this treaty in December 
2007” (Security Council of the RF 2009). 
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As another threat, the RF perceives NATO’s expansionist policy in RF’s near abroad and 
criticises its attempt to grant the military alliance a global role (e.g. Haas 2009; Schröder 
2009; Dimitrakopoulou/ Liaropoulos 2010). As former President Putin made already clear 
in his speech at the 43rd Munich conference on Security Policy: 
“I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization 
of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a 
serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: 
against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our 
western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those 
declarations today? No one even remembers them?”(Putin 2007a) 
The National Security Strategy still shares this concern, again stresses its resentments 
against the accession of former Soviet republics and strongly opposes any further 
enlargement into RF’s backyard to include Ukraine and Georgia, as announced in 
Paragraph 23 of the “Bucharest summit Declaration” (Nato 2008). The RF, however, 
wishes the NATO to stop its expansionist strategy in Europe and to agree on a neutral 
buffer zone, meaning neutrality of Ukraine, Georgia and other countries in the common 
neighbourhood as soon as possible, to restore stability and security in the region (e.g. 
Korduban 2010). As in the case of Ukraine, the newly elected President Viktor 
Yanukovych abandoned its former application to be accepted as a member by the NATO 
and stressed the geopolitical importance for Ukraine to be neither a member of NATO nor 
of CSTO, but be a neutral partner with good relations to both. 
"It's certain that Ukraine was and will be non-aligned state... We strive neither to join 
NATO nor the CSTO. We'll maintain a neutral status," Yanukovych said in an interview 
with the Komsomolskaya Pravda (Kyiv Post 2010a). 
However, there is still a lot in the flux, according to Europe’s security architecture and the 
role of the RF in international security architecture. Over the last years, the NATO and the 
RF found a way to get along in a more cooperative way. Thus, the RF got more relaxed 
about NATO’s role, although it stresses its one-sided dominance by the US 
administration. It becomes increasingly integrated in the broad Euro-Atlantic security 
architecture through, among others, its partnership with the EU, the NATO-RF council and 
its membership of both the Council of Europe and the OSCE of which it is a founding 
member. 
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4.2.4 Systemic Divergences: Democratic Values in a Rational Interest-Based 
Relationship 
The EU continues to claim that human rights, rule of law and democratic values are an 
important component of its formal relations with the RF and is not getting tired in 
emphasising RF’s necessity to run certain reforms, aiming to overcome the disparity of 
values by promoting its own norms and values. The apparent objective of this approach 
appears to be to socialise the RF to ‘European’ human rights norms and standards 
through dialogue and cooperation with Russian government officials and civil society 
organisations. This ‘Europeanisation’ of RF’s norms, values and procedures should 
guarantee that the RF develops into a credible partner in the region. 
Systemic congruencies, therefore, are a precondition for fruitful and stable partnership 
in IR, making its policy more predictable and legitimate, rather than having 
cooperation on occasional or sporadic basis. A common set of values and decision 
making procedures have to be shared in order to result in mutual understanding and 
trust in vice-versa politics (e.g. Blanco 2010). Thus, the EU included a humanitarian 
clause in the PCA, which oblige the RF part to respect the international norms on 
human rights (Council of the EU 1007: Art. 2), otherwise, the PCA will be suspended 
by the EU (ibid.: Art. 107). Further, the EU has provided a number of policy 
instruments aimed at promoting human rights in its relations with the RF, such as: 
financial assistance (TACIS, EIDHR) and political dialogue within the Common 
Spaces and the more recent Human Rights Consultations (e.g. COM 2010f; 
Weersma-Haworth et al. 2008). 
The further democratisation of RF’s political system is a high salient issue in EU-RF 
relations. The EU and IO’s – as the CoE, OSCE and UNHCR – are still calling for reforms 
and stress in their assessments about RF’s democratic transformation that the current 
status and the progress made are not at all satisfying. It became increasingly clear that 
the Russian political system was not evolving as hoped and the separation of powers 
necessary in a democracy would not yet be forthcoming. The RF administration shows 
less respect for human rights and authoritarian tendencies in the political systems are still 
the case. The fast transition from the Soviet autocracy to a more pluralist Western-style 
political model and towards market economy in the nineties resulted in a period of chaos, 
upheaval and decline of RF’s economy. After Yeltsin’s weak leadership, Vladimir Putin 
returned to a more centralised and autocratic style of leadership which was perceived by 
RF’s citizens as a return to political stability and economic recovery. The RF defines its 
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political model as a ‘sovereign democracy’, meaning first of all the sovereignty of the state 
authority above individual interests of citizens to restore order and security and to reject 
intervention from abroad (e.g. Lynch 2004: 112; Okara 2007; Kampfner 2010: 104). 
Areas of crucial concern are: human rights abuses in Chechnya; lack in freedom of 
speech and of an independent media; relegating Civil Society organisations to the fringe 
and limit Western contacts; the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; as well 
as fair elections (e.g. Council of the EU 2006c). In regard to the RF, the EU Annual 
Human Rights Report 2007 states that: 
“Although human rights in Russia are guaranteed by the Constitution, and despite 
Russia’s participation in many international human rights conventions, the EU continues 
to have concerns about the human rights situation in Russia, in particular regarding 
freedom of opinion and assembly, freedom of the press, the situation of Russian non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society, respect for the rule of law and the 
situation in Chechnya and other parts of the North Caucasus” (COM 2007k). 
Especially the second Chechnya war in 1999 evoked a lot of criticism from the 
International community. The Helsinki European Council on 11 December 1999 agreed on 
the ‘Declaration on Chechnya’ in which RF’s sovereignty and rights to fight terrorism were 
acknowledged but which openly criticised RF’s lack of respect for human rights 
demonstrated in its incursions in the Chechen Republic (Council of the EU 1999c: Annex 
II). Sanctions were implemented like the suspension of some PCA provisions and the 
transfer from part of TACIS funds to humanitarian assistance. Recently, another crucial 
case causing criticism from the EU and IO’s were the murder of the journalist Anna 
Politkovskaya in 2006. 
The importance of upholding international human rights standards in Russia is something 
referred to in virtually all the documents governing EU-Russia relations. A human rights 
clause became a compulsory part of all external agreements with non-EU countries in the 
nineties and did so in the case of the signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) with the RF in 1997. In respect of practical implementation of human rights 
protection, the EU settled a number of instruments. In 2005, the EU and RF established 
Human Rights Consultations within the framework of the Common Space initiative. The 
purpose of the Consultations is to discuss internal and international human rights issues 
and call for a close cooperation with the UN, the Council of Europe (CoE) and the OSCE. 
Further, the EU in particular is actively involved in financing projects to improve the human 
rights situation in the RF. The so called European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR) has been already involved in over 250 projects since its launch in RF in 
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1997 (e.g. EuRussia Centre 2011). The projects are aiming to support the development of 
democracy, the protection of human rights and the civil society in the RF. 
Considering the fact that the RF is a party of the most important human rights instruments 
(ECHR) and furthermore a member of the CoE and the OSCE, we could assume RF’s 
compliance with their obligations. But, as all major reports state, the RF is far away from 
respecting standards and norms entailed in this treaties. Thus, the EU and its key partners 
in the field of HR – CoE, OSCE and UNHCR – continue to insist on RF’s greater 
observance of human rights and compliance with the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights. The RF became full member of the CoE in 1996 and, thus, a party to the 
ECHR. Being a member of the CoE, the RF declared to respect the minimum standards of 
human rights and the rule of law, as laid down in the treaty. Thus, the RF is subject to 
monitoring of its human rights record by the Council’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), its 
Commissioner for Human Rights, and it’s Committee of Ministers. Besides assuming 
international obligation through its membership to the CoE, the RF is also a member of 
the OSCE. The OSCE is the second serious key actor – since the Helsinki Final Act in 
1975 – focusing on human rights. 
Incidentally, the CoE, not the EU, has the primary responsibility for human rights and is 
the most direct channel for holding Russia to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The EU itself is hampered by a number of 
organisational features, meaning that the RF will always be an external part which must 
be negotiated with. Although RF is an important member of the CoE and the OSCE, to be 
a member does by no means prevent a member from going its own way in terms of 
designing its political system. Many cases of human rights violations – mostly relating to 
the situation in Chechnya – have been brought to the ECHR against the RF. The 
international community’s concerns about RF’s systemic lack in protecting human rights 
have undermined its credibility. The RF refuses criticism from mostly western states and 
wishes not be lectured and patronised by them constantly. All-too-obvious European 
interference provokes a great deal of irritation in a country basking in regained self-
respect. 
Its explicit opposition to a system based on Western values is justified by RF’s 
administration by arguing that the Russians are not yet ready for the way of democracy, 
exemplified by Western democracies (e.g. Baker/ Glasser 2005: 377). It has to be argued 
that the RF has no substantial tradition of political pluralism to be referred to. People are 
used to a strong political leadership as long as it provides sufficient welfare, prosperity 
and security. 
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RF’s democracy is seen from scientific observers as managed and guided by the Kremlin 
administration, who decided what kind of democratic reforms should be undertaken and 
what role Civil Society should play within the RF political system. The RF labelled itself 
thereafter as a ‘sovereign democracy’, which: 
“carries two simultaneous messages to Russian society. The first message says that we 
are a party wielding state power and a sovereign elite, and the sources of our legitimacy 
are found in Russia, not in the West, like it was during the ‘guided democracy’ of the 
Yeltsin era. Second, being a power-wielding force, we are the guarantors of Russia’s 
sovereignty and survival in the context of globalization and other external super-threats” 
(Okara 2007). 
This implies RF superior role about democratic transformation according to: 
“a society's political life where the political powers, their authorities and decisions are 
decided and controlled by a diverse Russian nation for the purpose of reaching material 
welfare, freedom and fairness by all citizens, social groups and nationalities, by the 
people that formed it” (Putin’s deputy head of administration Vladislav Surkov in 
Kampfner 2010: 104). 
Thus, the RF has been irritated by the EU’s financial support of Civil Society organisations 
and its insistence on greater media freedom as well as on human rights in general, 
especially in the long standing Chechen conflict. However, the NGO scene sees in EU’s 
action not more than paying lip-service to its stated human rights ideals while pursuing 
other policy objectives (e.g. energy and security concerns) which it sees as more 
important (e.g. Bindman 2010). However, EU officials see the key for democratisation, 
rule of law and increasing civil society activities in fruitful cooperation on practical issues 
first, which imply the alignment of EU values in the long term. This pragmatism in EU-RF 
cooperation is also favored by the RF, as RF’s Ambassador to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov 
stresses: 
“The programme should be more focused on practical issues and contain no discussions 
of the benefits of European values,” Chizhov said. “We are thinking about technological 
exchanges, joint innovative projects with the EU; not the relationship of a patron and the 
favoured one” (Chizhov in Bovt 2010). 
4.2.5 Summary: EU-RF Relations at a Glance 
Up to today, EU-RF relations, although having achieved some accomplishments in 
improving their interaction, are still trapped in geopolitical rivalry and serious diplomatic 
tension on economic and security matters, which prevent a fostering of their cooperation. 
As has been discussed in the previous sections, the relationship is merely outlined by a 
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range of issues, as: trade relations; geopolitics and Europe’s security architecture; JHA; 
as well as systemic divergence and the gap in values. The range of issues discussed 
between the EU and the RF are best demonstrated in their biannual summits. In the 
following, this section likes to sum up the crucial issues and discuss their influence on the 
format of cooperation. 
As argued in the initial chapter on EU’s external governance, EU’s foreign policy gets 
more and more institutionalised and legalised due to interdependencies, geopolitical 
necessities, shared objectives and historical links. In this concluding section, the study 
scrutinises the link between macro-conditions, such as Bargaining Power, Credibility, 
Issue Salience, Rational Choice (Cost-Benefit Calculation) and International Normative 
Pressure, and the institutional and legal structure of their cooperation. 
“Mutual dependence is the most important element in forming conditions for rational 
choice in relations between Russia and the European Union. […] The axiom of Russian-
European interdependence remains […] the biggest straw to hold on to in order not to slip 
into confrontation. […] Mutual dependence is what it is – dependence that puts limits on 
sovereign rights and opportunities, which […] a state would seek to get rid of in one way 
or another” (Bordachev 2008: 3). 
The analysis delivers insights on how the two regional powers are going to put their 
partnership into perspective, what a common vision could be and which concrete 
objectives are shared by both. Three analytical questions arise out of this. First, how do 
mutual dependencies – in trade relations, energy supply for the EU and on respective 
security interests – have an effect on the format of cooperation? Second, can the current 
high level of mistrust, the divergence of values and the political system in general be 
obviated by a certain structure of cooperation? And, third, what can be concluded from 
this investigation on the macro dimension for our case study on EU-RF’s cooperation on 
migratory issues? 
The most obvious issues are relating to the bargaining power of an actor. Thus, the 
chapter emphasis, inter alia, the interdependency of economic and security matters 
between the EU and the RF. As pointed out by the President of the European 
Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, at a press conference at the 26th EU-RF summit in 
Brussels on the 7 December 2010, the main objectives of a new Enhanced Agreement 
should attempt “substantive provisions in all key areas, including trade, investment and 
energy” (Barroso 2010). He further stressed the common objective of the EU and RF to 
increase the economic growth in Europe through a close cooperation. This included a 
though interaction to tackle the global financial and economic crisis which harmed 
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Europe’s economy. Relating to this, both agreed at the 25th EU-RF summit in Rost-on-
Dov on 1 June 2010, to sign the Partnership for Modernisation. This document stresses 
the will to cooperate on: 
“common interest in enhancing bilateral trade and investment opportunities and in 
facilitating and liberalising trade in the global economy as well as strengthening and 
developing competition, including through Russia’s early WTO accession” (Council of the 
EU 2010e). 
Trade relations are always on top of the agenda, while the investigation shows a mutual 
dependency between the two economies: From the EU side, to develop new markets and 
ensure a constant flow of energy resources and, from RF side, to attract FDI’s and have a 
guaranteed bulk purchaser of their rich energy resources. Their interdependence is their 
motivation and driving force of any cooperation: 
“Our mutual interdependence is a reality. It is therefore not only in our shared interest but 
a political imperative for both sides to work together, as closely as possible, and on as 
many issues as possible” (Barroso 2010). 
However, their trade relation is not without any friction. The RF is aware of the 
dependency of EU on their gas supply and uses EU’s vulnerability as strength in the 
sense of power projection. Ultimately, the EU and RF have a direct bearing on geopolitics 
of energy which is in the process of becoming global in its reach. Such self absorption 
fuels the current depression by distracting the EU-RF couple from the real challenges it 
faces; trapped in a pure power game, both sides are unable to break away from the logic 
of a ‘zero-sum game’. 
The level of interdependencies changes all the time and so does the bargaining power of 
each actor. The EU had an enormous gain in power after the breakdown of the Soviet 
Union. Its power and influence in the region increased by the eastern enlargement of 2004 
and 2007, as well as being the only attractive and prosperous economy in the region. In 
military terms, most of the EU member states are associated with the NATO. The RF itself 
suffered from a huge decline. Its economy got in major troubles during the transformation 
process: its exports of manufactured goods to former allies decreased; the old-fashioned 
industry was not able to compete on the global markets; and the unsecure legislation 
frightened off FDI’s from abroad. As a result, its exports got rather one-sided, as it is 
merely dominated by the export of fuels and mining goods. 
After years of weak leadership by Boris Yeltsin and a patronised economy, the Putin 
administration was able to consolidate the RF economy and strengthen its leadership 
 171 
throughout the country and beyond in the beginning of the 21st century. Further, the Putin 
administration benefited from the increase of price and demand of natural resources. 
Because of this fragile economic recovery and the reloaded strong leadership, EU faced a 
different RF than in the nineties; filled with a new sense of self-confidence. Critics call 
RF’s regaining of strength also the ‘reawakening of the bear’, as a synonym related to the 
former great empire (e.g. Mangott/ Trenin/ Senn 2005; Emerson 2001). According to RF’s 
recovery in economic terms, its bargaining power increased and changed RF’s interaction 
with the EU. It changed that way, as RF’s poise lead to a renunciation from concessions 
made former.  
The RF is still trapped in the zero-sum power game and tries from case to case to 
increase its benefits and also increase the pay off for a concession. 
“It is clear that Russia is back, but this does not necessarily mean that Russia should 
avoid becoming too obsessed with prestige. The longer it continues its “soft-revenge” 
approach in its relations with the West, the less it will get the trust it needs to form the ties 
that will ensure its development” (Gomart 2008: 16). 
In reaction to this, the EU calls for ensuring the rule of law and the implementation of 
arrangements to hinder uncertain interaction through the institutionalisation of their 
cooperation. In a statement president Barroso emphasised the importance of “discussing 
how we can work together to build-up trust and make the EU Russia relationship a more 
reliable partnership at all levels” (COM 2009i). 
The common interests are prosperity, security and stability in the region of Europe on the 
one hand, and on the other hand both actors seek to lead this region by its own norms 
and rules. What follows is a footrace of a relative gain in power. Besides, both actors are 
aware of their interdependence in economic and security terms and search for 
improvement of their cooperation to deal with issues of common European security 
architecture on the ground and an effective framework to deal with their trade relations 
and the current financial crisis. The RF has many tools to influence the region. Therefore, 
the EU should try to engage the RF in resolving immediate problems in the common 
neighbourhood and encourage it to participate as a partner. The common neighbourhood 
could become a testing ground for constructive cooperation between the RF and the EU 
for their benefit and prosperity and for the sake of stability in the region. Besides, the RF 
itself is in need of technical and financial support from the EU in order to tackle: 
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“the task of not only sustaining economic growth, but also diversifying the economy away 
from oil and gas, as well as stimulating investment and innovation, to modernize its 
system of governance, to build a civil society, to integration growing, numbers of 
immigrants, and to alleviate the economic effect of RF’s dire demographics” (Trenin 
2005a: 8). 
Economic and trade relations are still by far the most important areas for cooperation. A 
free-trade area is already on the way but presupposes RF’s membership of the WTO first. 
As Kempe and Smith (2006) argue, the prospect of a free trade agreement with the EU is 
one of the carrots for further rule alignment of the RF (ibid.: 18). Further, the RF seeks to 
attract FDI’s to modernise and diversify its existing economic petrol-state model. In the 
area of energy, the EU and the RF have developed a close energy partnership and have 
launched in 2000 the EU-RF Energy Dialogue. 
Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs sees in the EU-RF Energy Dialogue a good 
chance to improve the relationship in general as:  
”[i]ts main objective is to promote trust and transparency in the EU-Russia energy 
relations, evaluate trade barriers and obstacles to energy investment and market 
development. The dialogue is a real potential for further development from which both 
sides could benefit, therefore it is important to further deepen this cooperation” (ibid: 6). 
The cooperation on these crucial areas has advanced in the last years. However, the 
cooperation is an expression of the interdependence of their economies and is based on a 
rational cost-benefit calculation, wrapped in the thinking of zero-sum, where one 
participant’s gains or losses are equal to the other participant’s losses or gains. In that 
zero-sum game, the RF is tempted to play with the West its vast energy resources and its 
specific role in regional frozen conflicts as a serious trump card, to increase its bargaining 
power and gain its benefit. 
A clear proof is RF’s demonstration of power from time to time and often in a 
chronological nexus to upcoming negotiations and summits. The fear of energy shortages 
is pushing individual EU member states, such as Germany, Belgium and Hungary, into 
Russia’s embrace and leads to underpinning strategies of a common EU approach to 
reduce its vulnerability on energy shortages. Amongst others, it has underlined the crucial 
need for the EU to build a real common energy policy and diplomacy. Even if Russia has 
global ambitions, mainly founded on its energy power, it will remain principally a Europe-
oriented regional power, at least for economic reasons (e.g. Gomart 2008: 17). The RF is 
aware of not being able to modernise and diversify its economy without Europe. The 
understanding of this strong interdependence should not be limited to economic and 
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energy issues. Another major issue is the cooperation on security matters, as the frozen 
conflicts in the region, combating international terrorism and organised crime. Both are 
looking for a common security policy; the EU in order to empower its position in IR and the 
RF in order to create security architecture on the European ground, in opposition to a US-
led NATO.  
This evolving circumstance also changed their relationship. Before, EU’s policy towards 
the RF was affected from its policy towards Europhilic countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe. In this sense, EU’s policy imposed strict conditions on cooperation and pursued 
its own interest first of all. The results, however, have clearly not met the policy ambitions, 
which were sometimes set too high. At the same time, The EU affronted the RF by several 
actions, as the eastern enlargement of 2004 and 2007, the extension of the Schengen 
acquis to former Soviet allies, increased its activities with former allies by the ENP and 
EaP initiatives and, the support for NATO expansion towards the East. These events have 
contributed to the fact that EU-RF relations have reached their record low. Russia’s 
assertive behaviour in foreign policy, coupled with the Kremlin’s consolidation of power at 
the expense of democratic freedom and human rights, is one part of the story. 
Their relationship nowadays faces the harsh reality in which positions of relative power 
between states still matter a great deal, governments at home tend to be judged on the 
results they get out of negotiations with other countries and national prestige is a major 
source of power. RF’s muscle flexing and assertive stance clearly entails demanding 
equality and reciprocity in any relationship with other superpowers. Henry Kissinger 
(1994) noticed in his book on International Diplomacy that the international system always 
attempts to balance the powers of certain actors over a certain period of time: 
„Of course, in the end a balance of power always comes about de facto when several 
states interact. The question is whether the maintenance of the international system can 
turn into a conscious design, or whether it will grow out of a series of tests of strength” 
(Kissinger 1994: 76-77). 
To conclude this issue, the EU and the RF have to create a common set of institutional 
and legal constraints to tackle their controversial relationship in an environment of mutual 
beneficiaries. The 2004 Common Space initiative came up with a scheme of this new 
nature of relationship by sticking more to an agenda of mutual interests, providing a 
number of beneficial projects and extending its financial and technical assistance. And, 
the currently negotiated NEA will start the beginning of a new generation of EU’s external 
governance and a possible fresh start for a real partnership between the EU and the RF. 
Of importance is the inclusion of a specific chapter on JHA in the NEA, which is not the 
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case for the PCA, as the competences on the supranational level have been limited on 
JHA before the treaty revision 1999 at the Amsterdam Council summit. 
Despite many achievements over the past twenty years, the EU-RF cooperation is still 
dominated by rational implications. However, to get a holistic picture of the nature of their 
relationship, we also have to take into account the irrational factors; determining the 
credibility of the actors: level of mistrust, certainty of action and the complementarities of 
values.  
The level of mistrust is rather high and originates from the after-pains of the cold-war 
logic, which dominated the relations for half a century. Further, EU’s intervention in the 
common neighbourhood and its alliance in economic and security matters with the former 
opponent the USA are a crucial source of tensions between the EU and the RF. In 
general, the common neighbourhood is a serious litmus test for EU-RF relations. 
“From this point of view, EU member states should be very careful about the respective 
countries in order to avoid its transformation into a political and symbolic battlefield 
between the West and the RF” (Gomart 2008: 16). 
Whereas RF’s intervention against Ukraine and Georgia created tensions at the EU side, 
the RF elites see in EU’s proactive intervention in the region an aggressive confrontation 
in their self-proclaimed sphere of influence. In the light of these political developments, the 
question is whether Russia can or must be seen as a power seeking to restore its 
influence in the area of the former Soviet Union. Is it a country preoccupied with 
increasing its international status and determined to restore its former glory and honour, 
one that demands respect as a great power and instils fear into other countries? 
Especially in the case of energy supply the EU does not  see the RF as a ‘reliable partner’ 
by referring to gas-related conflicts between the RF and Ukraine, which gives support to 
critics of EU’s energy dependence on RF’s gas and oil. Only a common approach or a 
transparent policy could reduce possible tensions in EU-RF relationship and cause an 
opportunity for closer ties to tackle common challenges in the region. 
Apart from these issues, uncertain policy actions diminish the credibility of both. On the 
one hand, both actors are in the flux. The RF has gone through certain ups and downs 
since the breakdown of the Soviet Union, which changed actors and foreign policy 
strategies. On the other hand, the EU has changed, too. Since the nineties, the EU grew 
into a union of 27 countries, facilitated its activities with third countries with the treaty 
reforms of Amsterdam 1997 and Lisbon 2009, and strengthened its foreign policy profile 
by a continuous transfer of competences in foreign policy matters, especially by the latest 
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treaty reform in 2009 at the Lisbon Council. Whereas the respective foreign policies got 
more certain in recent years, crucial uncertainties could be observed in the beginning of 
the 21st century. First, the RF under Putin took a stronger position in IR and appeared 
more self-confident in its relations with the EU. Second, EU’s policy towards the RF 
became more cautious and provocative with the accession of former Soviet countries, 
which got a major say in EU’s foreign policy due to its procedural rules (e.g. veto power 
for individual member states due to the unanimity rule in the Council). It follows that 
although EU’s supranational bodies are in constant contact with the RF administration and 
agree on certain aspects, when it comes to decision making, the Council – and therefore 
the member states – gives a ruling. This may irritate or disappoint EU’s partner states, as 
it happened with the veto from Poland and Lithuania on the start of negotiations on a new 
enhanced agreement in 2007 and 2008. 
Owing to the eastern enlargement 2004 and 2007, the discerning attitude of the new 
member states towards the former superior power RF affected EU’s-RF relations to a vast 
bulk. On the one hand, their hostile attitude is a consequence of their historic relation 
during the Soviet empire. On the other hand, the Central and Eastern European Countries 
are still afraid of the powerful neighbor. Several events, such as: the gas-related conflict 
with Belarus and Ukraine and the following shortage of energy supply; RF-Estonia conflict 
over a war monument; RF-Polish skirmish over the meat affair and the RF-Lithuanian and 
Latvian conflict over Russian minorities caused annoyance by both sides. 
As the new member states have a decisive power in the decision making procedure, they 
used it to exemplify their potency and took the supremacy of the EU as their ‘political 
hostages’. This way, the opening of negotiations for a new association agreement 
between the EU and the RF was postponed as new member states blocked it. This 
hampers for sure the EU-RF relations and makes the EU an incredibly actor in the eyes of 
the RF. As a consequence, the RF started to intensify its bilateral relations with member 
states and undermined the supranational bodies of the EU. 
“Bilateral agreements with Russia have undermined the EU´s ability to secure key policy 
goals. In the energy sphere, Russia’s deals with Italy, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria about 
pipelines and gas storage facilities undermine the key Nabucco pipeline project aimed at 
diversifying gas supply routes, Similarly, France, Germany and Italy signed separate bilateral 
visa-facilitation deals with Russia, which were deemed to breach Schengen rules and were 
thus suspended by the European Commission” (Leonard/ Popescu 2007: 16) 
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But as Gomart (2008) has stressed in an article: “Russia should not overestimate divisions 
among EU members and should understand that there is a growing lassitude toward 
Russia’s muscle flexing” (ibid.: 2008: 16). 
With the treaty of Lisbon, the decision making in the EU changed as well as its role in the 
foreign policy of the Union got strengthened. As a consequence, the Veto-power of 
individual member states got diminished by an extension of the Qualitative Majority Voting 
(QMV) procedure and it was made sure that EU’s policy will be more coherent. Besides, 
the EU profited of French’s presidency during the Georgian war, as Sarkozy’s 
administration enabled a clear proceeding in the settlement of the crisis in a very effective 
and rapid manner. 
Further, both need to develop a common vision on the basis of shared values to allow for 
fruitful cooperation and determine their role in this cooperation first, or as it is stated by 
Karaganov and Bordachev (2005): “the main factor that prevents Moscow and Brussels 
from overcoming the ambiguity and the crisis of confidence in their mutual relation is the 
lack of a long-term strategic vision” (ibid.). However, we also have to keep in mind that 
both actors themselves are still in the making and therefore pass through identity 
construction. Especially the RF is searching for their new national identity in a changed 
global environment by creating a nexus to the former superior status of Russia within the 
Soviet Union. In this crucial phase, the RF is rather sensitive towards influence from 
former opponents as it is still trapped in the dichotomy of values and symbolic acts during 
the cold war. An assessment of the present state of affairs might help address this 
dilemma. What we can still observe is a widespread divergence in values and perceptions 
between the two regional actors, which is a huge handicap for a fruitful cooperation. 
Several dossiers on RF’s democracy and human rights abuses irritated their 
administration, which sees these dossiers as an act of egomaniac and arrogance from the 
side of the EU, as well as an attempt to patronise the RF. The RF refuses any outside 
interference in their internal policies, as it was the case of the Chechen wars, national 
elections, freedom of media and the repression against social activists, referring to their 
proclaimed ‘sovereign democracy’ model. 
Finally, to sum up the basic findings, the prospects of positive cooperation between the 
EU and the RF are manifested by achieving: 1) a depoliticisation of their cooperation by 
focussing on concrete technical measurement; 2) to develop a common understanding of 
how the cooperation should look like in the medium and in the long term; and 3) to set up 
efficient institutions to improve their cooperation and make it more certain and 
sustainable. 
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First, what can be derived from the previous analysis of EU-RF cooperation is the 
‘politicisation trap’, meaning the dogmatic criticism on RF’s lack in human rights and 
democratic values. EU’s coercive diplomacy may be the wrong approach to deal with the 
RF’s on these issues. Massari (2007) sees in this a source of tension which puts 
obstacles in the way of a fruitful and efficient cooperation on a widespread area of issues.  
“While there has been significant progress in several areas of technical cooperation, the 
relationship has suffered from too many political ups and downs and a growing and 
mutual distrust” (ibid.: 1). 
As Massari and others argue, practical issues should dominate the agenda first, in order 
to find a deepened political will to foster their cooperation and align also in the field of 
human rights, rule of law and democratic values. This idea is formulated most clearly by 
Dmitry Trenin: 
“[t]he West should build relations with Russia on Russia’s term, achieve an acceptable 
balance of mutual concessions, and not be guided by certain normative principles such 
as the presence or absence of democratic reforms” (Trenin In: Shevtsova 2008). 
EU’s value-based approach, however, has proven to be ineffective in achieving its goal. In 
contrary, a more pragmatic approach could proof to be more effective concerning the 
respect of EU’s values and norms in the long term. As Hiski Haukkala (2005) noted: “the 
EU has sought to make a virtue out of the necessity: as enforcement and sanctions in a 
pragmatic manner in a hope of achieving some of the normative aims in the process” 
(ibid.: 16-17). A twin-track policy is suggested, in order to allow for a continuation of the 
EU-RF dialogue on practical issues, in defiance to RF’s breach of international laws and 
its lack of democracy. In this regard, Maull (2000) got cited in Haukkala, emphasising that 
“it is better to retain the dialogue and seek progress through positive incentives rather 
than negative sanctions and punitive measures” (Maull 2000 In: Haukkala 2005: 17). 
The necessity for cooperation is approved by both sides. The RF has to tackle the same 
challenges as the EU, including international trade, international terrorism, organised 
crime, irregular migration, financial crisis, let alone its own internal threats – the fragility of 
its petro-related economy, increase of poverty and looming demographic decline – where 
it would profit from external assistance (e.g. Karaganov et al. 2010). Further, both actors 
would be better off from a close cooperation in order to improve their competitiveness on 
the world markets as other countries of the BRIC (Brazil-RF-India-China) push on the 
markets. A close EU-RF alliance would prevent Europe to turn into a “monument to its old 
grandeur, while Russia would risk becoming a raw-materials backyard for a rising Asia”. 
(Karaganov et al. 2010). However, once they bring themselves to find together and 
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develop a common vision for their alliance, it could open a totally new dimension of EU-
RF relations that would benefit the entire continent. 
Hence, both sides will have to de-escalate the political discourse. After a proper dialogue 
is re-established, both should concentrate on topics offering real prospects of concrete 
measurements. For example, to try to work on a mutually beneficial energy deal, address 
the issue of illegal immigration, readmitting third country nationals, energy security, supply 
for EU troops in Afghanistan through RF territory, Kaliningrad transit etc.; without 
bothering too much about a big new treaty. In fact, ‘depoliticising’ the agenda is exactly 
what the RF had in mind when they were negotiating the Four Common Spaces. The RF 
insisted on a purely pragmatic approach to cooperation, while the EU sought to have a 
package deal that would condition progress in specific sectors on RF’s respect for 
democracy. Besides, depoliticise cooperation further reduces the political costs for each of 
them – especially in the case of high salient issues – and makes it easier to compromise 
on concrete road maps. This opportunistic sentiment is supposed to guide towards a new 
partnership between the EU and the RF, which is based, firstly, on gaining from a 
pragmatic relationship that provides a fair balance of interests that founds itself on 
common values in order to get used to each other. The notion of partnership is about 
promoting common interests as much as it is about mitigating conflicting ones. It implies 
mutual respect and a sober assessment of what is to be achieved. 
Secondly, both actors have to put their partnership into perspective; becoming aware of 
commonalities in policy objectives and developing a common vision for Europe and their 
partnership in the core of it. Moshes argues that “the list of shared foreign and security 
policy interests between the EU and RF is very long and if the internal problems on both 
sides could be overcome then cooperation could grow quickly” (Moshes cited in: EU-RF 
Centre 2007: 3). 
Furthermore, the RF has sought the EU’s help in improving RF’s economic process and 
modernisation and to put it back into the global sphere. On this basis, both have further to 
set up common values and rules to give their partnership a suitable format, as well as 
creating  a partnership in the spirit of mutual respect and confidence. Marius Vahl (2006) 
states that “[i]t has been suggested that the presence of common values, common 
interests and mutual understanding are essential criteria for a ‘partnership’, as opposed to 
mere ‘co-operation” (ibid.). 
Furthermore, the very notion of their partnership implies on the part of all to accept a 
degree of interdependence, and therefore of sovereign concession. On the Russian side, 
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those are the illusions that integration with the West could be attainable without 
substantial internal reforms. On the side of the EU, those are the hopes that Russia could 
develop by just acquiring Western norms performing as a junior partner.  
“An ambitious EU-RF policy would be successful only if the parties had a clear, shared 
understanding of the strategic prospects of their mutual relations. Thus far, RF and the 
EU have not acquired such an understanding. Therefore we have to limit ourselves to 
more modest goals even if this situation is unsatisfactory both for the Union and for RF” 
(Andoura 2008: 15). 
In the case of the EU, an internal debate on the nature of the political relations, which 
should beforged with the RF, cannot be delayed for much longer; it is a debate that will 
force the 27 member states to clarify its prospect of its policy towards the RF: “is Russia a 
partner or a threat? As long as the EU fails to deal with this dilemma, they will be unable 
to draw up a common policy” (Gomart 2008: 9). It is no longer possible to pretend to have 
a ‘strategic partnership33’ with the RF and at the same time treat it as a threat. The RF is a 
difficult partner, but a crucial one. In contrary to other neighbouring countries, the EU will 
not be able to set the agenda of their cooperation unilaterally. Thus, it also has to share 
the leadership of the cooperation and not only the burden. 
Whatever the case, the RF is currently allergic to what it sees as Western arrogance. The 
RF thinks the current cooperation is patronising and therefore one-sided. What is true, 
however, is EU’s approach in its relationship towards the RF to apply conditionality in any 
form, which refers to former policies towards candidate countries. With its regained self-
image as a great power, the RF no longer wishes to be ‘guided’ by the EU, as other 
neighbouring countries, on the path to democracy, the rule of law and a free market 
economy. 
The fact that the EU assumes it is allowed to maintain such a role towards smaller 
countries that have a realistic prospect of EU membership or a relatively low level of 
development (like most of the ENP countries) is understandable. It is also understandable 
that the EU adopted this attitude towards the RF during the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and the sharp fall in living standards that accompanied the standstill of the Soviet 
economy. However, such an approach is misplaced towards a former superpower that is 
back on the road to recovery. On the other hand, the RF seeks to be a perceivably crucial 
actor in International Affairs. Therefore it toes to accept international legal commitments 
                                                
33 Emerson (2001) defines strategic partnership as a kind of relationship, which “involves two 
actors that are powerful and capable of taking strategic action together” (ibid.: 45) 
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on human rights and to be an active participant in IR. The EU itself is accepted to be a 
legitimate gate keeper to enter IOs such as the WTO, to allow for close cooperation with 
the NATO or to be a partner in IOs such as the OSCE, OECD or UN. 
The EU itself has to keep this in mind when it seeks to improve its cooperation with the 
RF. Therefore, EU institutions need to change their mindset about the RF. The current 
mindset did not anticipate RF’s recovery and its consequences. Against this background, 
the EU has to treat the RF on an equal basis, in emphasising the win-win situation of 
cooperation instead of fixing too strict preconditions and telling them how to organise their 
society and their economy. The European Commissioner for External Relations and 
European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2008b), spoke wisely when she 
said “we should be sure to talk to Russia as it is, rather than with Russia as we would like 
it to be”. To sketch it, it means to stop pressing on barely shared values, and rather seek 
to exploit mutual interests and an institutional basis to continue finding out communalities.  
Third, what their relationship needs, to be more certain and efficient to deal with their 
mutual dependencies, is a well-developed system of bilateral ties at various levels. It will 
not be easy to move from an atmosphere of suspicion to one of mutual cooperation. It is 
of crucial need to agree on a legally binding basis and introduce an effective institutional 
set-up. A widespread institutionalisation of contacts between the respective 
administrations will increase the capacity of both parties to jointly formulate shared 
objectives in their relations and to define common values, interests and tasks. Thus, 
playing by the same rules, following the same objectives and having a continuing and 
sincere communication increases mutual trust and credibility in their relationship. The EU 
and RF already set-up such an institutional framework with the PCA in 1997 and currently 
negotiate on a new Enhanced Agreement, aiming to extend the areas of cooperation and 
to strengthen its bodies and networks by increasing its competences and scope of action. 
The PCA institutions have facilitated the dialogue and cooperation on widespread issues 
between the two administrations and lead to an improvement of the relationship. Several 
initiatives in the framework of the Four Common Space initiative and the Modernisation 
Partnership have enriched their partnership with an effective policy; resulting in concrete 
measurements and road maps. This and the increasing involvement of the RF in EU’s and 
Western actions created an atmosphere of good-neighbourliness and mutual 
understanding. The experience of putting the relation on an institutional and legal basis 
has been proven to be beneficial for both and built a solid basis for further integration to 
form a bilateral association. Two processes of the institutionalisation of EU-RF 
cooperation can be extracted: Socialisation and the Spill-over effect. First of all, the 
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analysis shows a slightly socialisation; meaning the alignment of policy objectives, getting 
used to the procedures of bilateral decision making and becoming aware of the 
importance of common values in their relationship. Secondly, as the current negotiations 
on the NEA, but also the Four Common Space Initiatives, the PCA, show, the areas of 
cooperation got extended from former core areas as economy and energy to more 
problematic and salient issues as JHA. 
4.3 Legal Basis and Institutional Framework of EU-RF 
Cooperation on Migratory Issues 
In this section, the paper is scrutinizing the institutional framework and the legal basis of 
the cooperation between RF and the EU and asks about the instruments and modes to 
tackle the respective issues of migratory matters. The question is in what framework and 
at what level can the EU best hold talks with RF with the goal of creating, in both parties’ 
interests, the maximum possible outcome of a safe, stable and prosperous Europe. The 
current EU-RF framework for cooperation is laid down with the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA), signed in June 1994. The PCA came into force in 
December 1997 and opened a new chapter in EU-RF relations. In its nature, the PCA is 
embodied by a joint commitment to promote a close cooperation on shared objectives for 
mutual benefit. The main aim is to establish a practice of regular consultations and 
permanent liaison links between the EU administration and its RF counterparts. 
Furthermore, on the EU side, the changes for its External Policy in the course of the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty might improve their relationship with the RF. The 
creation of the post of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and 
the new European External Action Service will have an impact on the coherence and 
consistency of its policy towards the RF. 
On an institutional level, the plethora of mechanisms within the EU-RF partnership 
encompasses joint structures (e.g. regular meetings of the EU Troika with the RF 
administration; a permanent council on JHA, trade, energy, ...; working groups), bilateral 
agreements (e.g. PCA, “Four Common Spaces”, Modernisation Partnership), and issue 
specific instruments (Action Plans, projects covered by e.g. TACIS or ENPI). The 
institutional framework for regular consultations between the EU and RF take place at five 
different levels: Troika meetings, bi-annual summits of Heads of State/Heads of 
Government, the Permanent Partnership Council (respective Ministers), the Cooperation 
Committee, issue specific sub-committees and the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. 
These levels are very centralised in nature. On top of the cooperation, the Partnership and 
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Cooperation Council (PCC) is the main decisive political body, where the RF’s president 
meets with the EU Troika in 6-monthly PCC meetings. Their main function is to exchange 
information and negotiate on action plans to coordinate and align policy regulations. 
Further, the PCC is the key monitoring instance which observes the progress achieved in 
the realisation of the action plan commitments (Art. 90). 
Figure 19. Institutional Framework of the EU-RF Cooperation on Migratory Issues 
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In 2003, the Partnership and Cooperation Council was replaced by the Permanent 
Partnership Council, which is constituted by ministers from the RF, the current and 
incoming EU presidency and the respective EU Commissioner. The PPC is the main 
decisive body in EU-RF cooperation and covers several policy areas, such as JHA, 
Energy, Transport, Agriculture, Environment, Culture, Science and Education. The 
dialogue within the EU-RF PPC on JHA is merely defined by a road map adopted in 2005 
(Council of the EU 2005b). It is their task to coordinate the implementing of this road map, 
develop respective action plans and monitor them. Several additional committees and 
working groups support the work of the PPC, which consists of experts in the respective 
ministries and think tanks and meet more recently and on an informal level. 
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The work of the PPC is supported by several working groups or committees. First of all, 
the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, which got established to bring together 
European and Russian parliamentary delegations – Members of the European Parliament 
(MEP) and the State Duma of the RF – which do recommendations to the PPC. Their 
regular meetings are held as often if necessary (Art. 95). Further, the Cooperation 
Committee is composed of senior EU and RF civil servants, who meet on a yearly basis 
and consult on EU-RF’s cooperation in general (Art. 92). The PPC, however, have set up 
numerous subcommittees and working groups tackling specific technical and political 
issues. One of the most obvious developments is the decision to consider some of the 
more contentious issues – human rights, civil society and visa liberalisation – on an expert 
level within issue-specific working groups. 
Although the institutional framework provides distinct forum for interaction, the EU-RF 
cooperation faces several limitations in getting operational results in measureable 
outcomes. The scope of action within these forums seems to be challenged by the 
complexity of the two actors’ decision making processes. On the RF side, several players 
are involved in drawing up European policy under the control of the presidential 
administration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has no real power in coordinating this 
process. However, the administration of the Foreign Ministry may recover some 
prerogatives with the new presidential administration. The presidential administration itself 
is lacking the political will to develop close cooperation as it will be forced to make 
concessions. Further, the internal political struggle in the beginning of the 21st century 
hindered an improvement of cooperation.  
On the RF side, the presidency is in charge to define the framework of the cooperation 
and the political dialogue with the EU Troika. Issue-specific ministries and agencies are, 
however, responsible to implement the adopted action plans and working agreements 
between the RF presidency and the EU Council; in the case of migratory issues, e.g., 
Border Guards Service; Federal Migration Service; Federal Security Bureau. 
On the EU side, the implementation of the action plan is supported by numerous financial 
and technical assistance programmes and EU agencies, which run certain projects 
together with their respective counterparts in the RF. In example, the EU agencies 
Frontex and Europol signed several working agreements with RF agencies. Apart from EU 
and national agencies, international organisations as well help with their expertise and 
knowledge on certain issues to implement specific projects, as e.g. IOM, who runs several 
projects on the implementation of biometric passports or the readmission of people. 
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4.3.1 Excursus: Negotiating a New Enhanced Agreement on EU-RF Cooperation 
EU-Russia relations are currently carried out under the auspices of the 1997 Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). This treaty was negotiated in 1994 during the Yeltsin 
presidency and modelled in the system of instruments open to other EU neighbours. The 
PCA entered into force in 1997 for an initial period of ten years and expired at the end of 
2007. Until a new agreement is in force, the former PCA is going to be renewed 
automatically on an annual basis. Both sides agreed about the need for a new agreement, 
largely due to the outdated existing PCA, but also because of the necessity to facilitate 
their increasing economic and human exchanges and to install an appropriate instrument 
to tackle global changes, as e.g. the current economic crisis, climate change and frozen 
conflicts. 
“The EU-Russia relationship has to find a clearer strategic rationale to put their 
partnership on more stable ground, taking into account the changes that have occurred 
inside Russia, within the EU and in the international system” (Massari 2007: 1). 
In the meantime RF’s re-found self-confidence fits uneasily to the concept of the current 
PCA. Therefore, it is not surprising that the RF repeatedly stresses its willingness to 
cooperate with the EU only on the basis of equality and reciprocity:  
“[t]he future agreement will be an instrument for genuine rapprochement between Russia 
and the European Union. It should be built on the principles of equality, pragmatism, 
mutual respect for each other’s interests and, of course, common approaches to key 
security issues. It will lay the long-term foundation for the strategic partnership between 
Russia and the European Union” (Medvedev 2008a). 
Furthermore, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner (2008a) stresses the need to update the 
legal framework of EU-RF relations “to reflect the substantial changes in both Russia and 
the EU since the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was negotiated in the 
early 1990s” (Ferrero-Waldner 2008a). How this is done will have a crucial bearing on the 
future of the bilateral relationship between the two biggest political actors in Europe. The 
former Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner stressed that:  
"The new agreement currently under negotiation is a chance for both sides to realise the 
full potential of our relationship, with well established ground rules in key areas. Russia is 
a crucial partner for the EU in international matters from climate change to the Middle 
East and Afghanistan but alongside these important topics we need also to maintain our 
channels of communication on issues where we do not agree, and notably our differing 
views on the respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia" (COM 2009d). 
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The negotiation of a new agreement are an opportunity for both for stocktaking and have 
a crucial bearing on the future of the bilateral relationship between the two biggest political 
actors in Europe to provide a solid basis for deepened bilateral relations covering all 
aspects of their relationship (e.g. Council of the EU 2008b). In the Commission press 
release of 3 July 2006, the Commission announces that: 
“the new agreement will provide an updated and more ambitious framework for the EU-
RF relationship […] based on recognition of common values such as democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law”. [It will cover] “the whole range of EU-RF cooperation”, 
including a “progressive deepening and development of trade relations and fair and open 
development of the energy relationship”, as well as “ambitious objectives on political and 
external security cooperation” (COM 2006f). 
This intention again got underlined by both parties in a joint statement on the launch of 
negotiations for a NEA, given at the EU-RF summit in Khanty-Mansiysk on the 27th June 
2008: 
“We agreed that the aim is to conclude a strategic agreement that will provide a 
comprehensive framework for EU/Russia relations for the foreseeable future and help to 
develop the potential of our relationship. It should provide for a strengthened legal basis 
and legally binding commitments covering all main areas of the relationship, as included 
in the four EU/Russia common spaces and their road maps which were agreed at the 
Moscow Summit in May 2005” (Council of EU 2008c). 
The question of the future of EU-RF contractual relations is dominating the current 
bilateral agenda in the next few years and it is of great significance for the development 
from a medium to a long-term relationship. The new agreement will comprise all areas of 
cooperation in political, security, economic, trade, scientific and cultural affairs, building on 
the four common spaces agreed in 2003. Further, it is going to adapt to new realities. 
When the PCA was negotiated from 1994 onwards, the EU and RF faced different 
challenges and possibilities than nowadays. The RF complains that the PCA was 
negotiated during a period of weakness and chaotic leadership and it expects that new 
negotiations will be carried out by two equals. The EU contends that the PCA needs to be 
replaced in order to provide a legal base for new policy areas that have been developed in 
the past decade, referring to EU’s internal shift of competences on the supranational level 
by the Treaties of Amsterdam (1999), Nice (2003) and Lisbon (2009). The 
‘Communitarisation’ of competences in the second and third pillar allow for a broader 
framework of cooperation than the current PCA.  Although the new agreement will 
comprise an increasing number of various specific areas, the cooperation will still remain 
split over many different agreements and projects in various specific areas. 
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Without a clear date of finalisation, the negotiation of a new agreement takes place 
already since 2007. It is the EC who conducts negotiations on all aspects of the future 
agreement, in accordance with a mandate issued to it by the Council. On the one hand, 
the negotiations are delayed by Polish and Lithuanian vetoes and the conflict in Georgia, 
but the conflicting points have since been overcome. On the other hand, the agreement 
should provide a sufficient framework to deal with a broad variety of issues. The difficulties 
are not only to find a good compromise between the EU and the RF, but also within the 
EU. Several legal issues regarding the future agreement between RF and the EU directly 
must refer back to the division of competences between the EU and its 27 Member 
States. According to the relevant procedural rules for the negotiation, signature, 
conclusion and implementation of an international agreement by the European 
Community, contained in Article 300 of the EC treaty, it is the EU Council that takes the 
decision by qualified majority or unanimity, depending on the type or content of the 
agreement (e.g. Andoura/ Vahl 2006: 7). Thus, regarding the scope of the future 
agreement, it would be exclusively concluded by the EU or by the EU and the Member 
States, as in case of a mixed agreement such as the current PCA.  
One should bear in mind that a negative vote by only one Member State in the ratification 
process would be sufficient to hinder the coming into force of the agreement. 
Remembering the vetoes of Poland and Lithuania on the opening of negotiations with the 
RF (e.g. Roth 2009), a consensus between the Commission and the RF does not 
automatically mean a successful approval by the Council. The EC, therefore, while 
seeking to influence the course of the EU-Russia dialog, also has to reach a compromise 
with EU members, as well as with the EP, who both pursue their own agendas. There are 
still a variety of bilateral frictions between the RF and individual Member states on the 
floor, which could challenge a positive approval in the end. This institutional clumsiness 
undermines the credibility of the EC at negotiations with RF representatives, which is a 
crucial pre-condition of achieving a positive outcome. In the light of all this, it seems clear 
that the EU and RF are faced with difficult and lengthy negotiation and ratification 
processes before a new comprehensive bilateral agreement to replace the PCA can come 
into force. Further, it is a tricky task to define a common vision on how the future 
partnership should look like as well as to elaborate a meaningful strategy, facing these 
distinct actors on the table. 
The current reforms by the Treaty of Lisbon have a positive bearing on the negotiations 
and on the nature of the agreement (see also Chapter 2.2). On the one hand, it extended 
the competences of the EC to further policy areas, as e.g. JHA, and dissolves the former 
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pillar structure of the EU. On the other hand, the supranational bodies of the EU got major 
competences in IR. The Lisbon Treaty provides the EU with a comprehensive legal status 
and recognises its international personality (Art. 74) in order to conclude agreements with 
States or IOs (Art. 37). The EU becomes a new international organisation which will 
replace and succeed the current European Community and European Union in all their 
international rights and obligations (Art. 1). Further, there is a renewed focus from the EU 
side now that a new Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
Baroness Ashton are in place, on treaty negotiations with Russia. “As a consequence, the 
coherence, unity and uniformity of the EU’s position prevailed” (Andoura/ Vahl 2006: 7). 
All these issues influence the EU-RF negotiations on a new enhanced agreement. But the 
main questions are what form this new agreement should take. On the RF side, it wishes 
to create an agreement which treats both signatures as an equal partner and to have the 
partnership anchored in an appropriate institutional framework (President of the RF 
2008b: ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the RF’).  
RF’s impression of contractual relations is contrary to EU’s pattern towards other third 
countries in Europe. They are not willing to play the role of a junior partner of the EU and 
accept EU’s rules, standards and values without discussing them. The EU should, 
therefore, involve the RF at every step of creating a new contractual basis and define a 
common vision for their future relations. The EU however aims towards a framework 
agreement, based on common strategic objectives and rules of procedure to deal with the 
vast area of cooperation built up in the intervening years, notably set out in the common 
spaces road maps adopted in 2005 (e.g. COM 2006g; European Council 2008c). They 
include to “continue to insist on a broad, wide-ranging and legally binding agreement 
based on a shared commitment to human rights, covering the whole range of cooperation 
between the parties” (Prystayko 2009). 
On the more technical level of negotiations, the two parties face the problem of the 
evolutionist pattern of their cooperation. Thus, beside the framework agreement, the 
detailed cooperation in the various policy areas could then be conducted separately within 
sector-specific agreements (e.g. Andoura and Vahl 2006: 8). The framework agreement 
could come in the form of an association treaty, which provides an increased flexibility for 
the EU-RF cooperation (e.g. Article 217 TFEU). The scope of the association treaty would 
allow for the possibility of supplementing with issue-specific agreements and not be 
limited to its specific legal basis as in the case of the PCA. 
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A new agreement raises a number of legal and political issues that will have to be 
addressed. As Andoura and Vahl (2006) state, “the EU has never concluded such an 
ambitious and comprehensive agreement with any third country, and the EU treaties do 
not provide any clear guidance as to how such an agreement might be concluded” (ibid.: 
5). Even with the US, one of the strongest allies of the EU, the contractual relations are 
not as comprehensive as it is planned with the RF. The EU-US relations are based on the 
Transatlantic Declaration (European Council 1990), the New Transatlantic Agenda 
(European Council 1995), the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (European Council 
1998) and the Framework for Economic Integration (European Council 2007). The 
institutional framework, defined by the Transatlantic Declaration in 1990, is rather similar 
to that agreed between the RF and the EU in the PCA of 1997. In addition, the EU and the 
US launched the Transatlantic Economic Council to improve their economic partnership 
(e.g. ibid.). 
Relations with other countries, as the BRIC states or Israel, have all a similar institutional 
framework but differ in the contents of their cooperation. Whereas economic cooperation 
is a main issue in all relationships, the political dialogue is only advanced in the case of 
Israel and other Mediterranean countries, by signing the Euro-Mediterranean Association 
agreement (European Council 2000b). The most developed relations with third countries 
are with the four EFTA states and the membership aspirants in the Balkans and Turkey. In 
the case of EU-Ukraine relations, negotiations of a new association agreement are on the 
way. For that reasons, both parties agreed on the Association Agenda, which aims at 
preparing for and facilitating the coming into force of the Association Agreement (COM 
2010a). 
None of the present models of the EU’s relations with third countries can be fully applied 
to the case of Russia. Each of these models is based on a unique historical, economic, 
political and cultural platform and cannot mechanically be transposed elsewhere (e.g. 
Karaganov et al.: 11; Matta 2007: 2). EU’s relation with the RF is rather specific in its 
nature, compared to EU relations with other third countries. It is characterised by crucial 
interdependencies in economic, energy and security matters, because of its size, 
hegemonic history and geopolitical position, which strengthen their respective bargaining 
power in negotiations with each other. However, the level of mistrust between the two 
actors is rather high and affects the conceded credibility and predictability. A strong 
institutional framework therefore is needed to allow for a fruitful cooperation and a stable 
partnership between them. The basis for a new agreement is the entirety of interests in 
crucial policy areas. In 2006 Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood 
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Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated that “RF is a strategic partner for the EU and we 
share many areas of interest and inter-dependence; it is important that these should be 
reflected in the new Agreement” (COM 2006f). The question is, however, what has been 
achieved so far and how could this ‘Russian Model’ of relations with the EU look alike? 
According to the Russian Foreign Ministry press release of 3 April 2009, cited in an article 
by Olena Prystayko (2009), the negotiations have already been succeeded by affirming “a 
common vision of the new agreement as a framework and a legally binding document, to 
be supplemented in the future by sectoral agreements” (ibid.). At the same time, the 
statement highlighted “certain, occasionally serious, differences in the approaches of the 
parties to fleshing out the agreement (ibid.)”. Disagreements still exist about the question 
on how far the framework agreement should rely on common values. Whereas the EU 
insists on a strong commitment to human rights and democratic rules, the RF calls for a 
pragmatic cooperation, based rather on mutual interests and technical cooperation than 
on interference in internal policies of sovereign states (e.g. Gomart 2008: 7). 
“The Russian side proposes that a short political agreement would be the best, arguing 
that the Agreement cannot regulate relations for decades ahead, because both sides are 
in a state of transition, just as the international environment is changing fast” (Prystayko 
2009). 
The question on the EU side concerns the optimal balance between common values and 
common interest in relations with the RF. While the EU has become increasingly 
concerned about the direction of RF on fundamental issues such as democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law, RF on its side is less inclined to accept a partnership based on 
European definitions of such common values. Andoura and Vahl (2006) note that “this 
was one of the most contentious issues in the negotiations on the Road Maps, and was 
eventually resolved by including only limited and vague references to such common 
values” (ibid.: 10). However, the EU wants at least a legally binding agreement, based on 
international agreements and obligations, as the basis for common values. According to 
Vladimir Socor (2008), the RF, however, “wants such a treaty to be brief, with a “general 
framework” character, without “excessive details” or “politicization,” and underscoring the 
purported “strategic” content to Russia-EU relation” (ibid.). Thus, the NEA should be 
evolutionary in nature in order to take into account EU-RF’s partnership sui generis (e.g. 
COM 2006h). 
In practical terms, the NEA approaches all the dimensions of their relationship, as “the 
framework would be complemented by a series of sectoral agreements which would be 
legally binding” (COM 2006h). Several of these sectoral agreements are already in force 
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or under negotiations and should be included in the new treaty34. As the previous PCA is 
still in force and becomes automatically extended on a yearly basis and several additional 
protocols and agreements cover issues beyond the PCA, there is no need to rush the 
process of negotiating on the NEA. The negotiations are still ongoing and a final date is 
not in prospect. 
4.4 Modes and Instruments of the Cooperation on Migration 
Management 
The cooperation in JHA matters is coordinated by the biannual meetings of the EU-RF 
Permanent Partnership Council (PPC). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the PPC is 
a forum of the respective representatives of each side. For example, at the PPC meetings 
in Kazan, 25-26 May 2010, the Russian side was represented by Alexander Konovalov, 
Minister of Justice and Presidential Special Envoy for EU-Russia JFS cooperation, and 
Minister of the Interior Rashid Nurgaliev. The EU side was represented by the Ministers of 
the Interior and Justice of the incumbent Spanish Presidency and by the responsible 
member of the European Commission Cecilia Malmström. The meeting was also attended 
by Stefaan De Clerck, Minister of Justice of Belgium, Melchior Wathelet, State Secretary 
for Asylum and Migration of Belgium, and Judit Fazekas-Lévay, State Secretary for EU 
affairs at the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement of Hungary (e.g. EU-RF PPC 
2010a; COM 2010a: 40). It is their task to identify concrete actions to realise the 2005 
agreed road map to guarantee their implementation by sufficient financial and technical 
assistance and to monitor their progress (e.g. 15th EU-RF summit 2005, Annex 2: 26-27). 
In addition to these formal meetings, further informal dialogue and expert meetings 
complement the coordination and monitoring of agreed actions, e.g. the joint committees 
monitoring the implementation of the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements and 
the visa dialogue (e.g. COM 2010a: 40). Besides, issues that are touching common 
commitments to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedom, are also tackled by 
the bi-annual Human Rights Consultations (e.g. ibid.). Further, “there is dialogue with the 
Council of Europe and the OSCE as regards the Federation with a view to upholding 
respect for internationally-agreed norms and standards” (Council of the EU 2006c: 23). 
                                                
34 Bilateral Agreements between the EU and the RF are listed on the Website of the EC on 
[http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/searchByCountryAndContinent.do?countryId=3853&country
Name=Russia, last access: 23 January 2011] 
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As the core institution for any cooperation in JHA matters, the PPC incorporates the 
objectives of the 2005 road maps into concrete action plans, mentioned in the Country 
Strategy Papers (2002-2006 and 2007-2013) and the National Indicative Programmes 
(2002-2003; 2004-2006; 2007-2010). The road maps are based on the 2003 launched 
‘Four Common Spaces’ initiative at the EU-RF Summit in St. Petersburg, including a: 
Common Economic Space; Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice; Common 
Space on External Security; and Common Space on Research, Education and Culture 
(13th EU-RF Summit 2003: Art. 2). A number of priority areas were identified by the 2005 
road maps, concerning migration management: Visa facilitation and readmission, among 
other issues as combating organised crime, border security and refugee protection, are 
set on top of the agenda on cooperation in JHA. As stated in the joint statement of the EU-
RF Summit 2005, both parties agreed to contribute to: 
“building a new Europe without dividing lines and facilitating travel between all Europeans 
while creating conditions for effectively fighting illegal migration [...] To facilitate human 
contacts and travel between the EU and Russia, ensure smooth legal border crossings 
and lawful stays on their territories, as well as to work together to tackle illegal migration 
and illegal cross-border activities” (15th EU-RF Summit in Moscow 2005: Joint 
Statement). 
The road map was adopted at the EU-RF summit 2005, which sets out the principal 
common objectives for cooperation on the ‘Four Common Spaces’ for the short and 
medium term (15th EU-RF Summit 2005: Annex). These road maps represent the working 
agenda of the EU-RF cooperation, which are rather vague and legally non-binding. The 
EU’s main objective is therefore to engage Russia to build a genuine strategic partnership, 
founded on common interests and shared values to which both sides are committed in the 
relevant international organisations such as the UN, Council of Europe, and the OSCE, as 
well as with each other in the bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. These 
interests and values include in particular democracy, human rights, and the rule of law 
(e.g. Council of the EU 2006b). The road map on JHA includes following migratory-led 
objectives: 
Figure 20. EU-RF Road Map on Migratory Issues (15th EU-RF summit 2005, Annex 2: 26-27) 
1.1 To facilitate the movement of persons / readmission  
- in the short-term, conclude parallel negotiations on an agreement on visa facilitation and an 
agreement on readmission  
- continue and intensify the visa dialogue at expert and political level to examine the 
conditions for a mutual visa-free travel regime as a long-term perspective. 
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1.2 To cooperate on border management and control  
- intensify discussions on border management, including border protection, and continue to 
support improvements of border crossing points, notably on the common border, and to 
improve cooperation between units on the common border  
- discuss issues of common interest in relation to the strengthening of Russia’s southern 
border  
- explore the possibilities of cooperation at operational level, where appropriate, between the 
EU and Russia in the framework, principally of the EU’s future border management agency  
- develop cooperation projects to step up the efficiency of border management, by 
strengthening the institutional and administrative framework and the capacity to implement 
border controls as well as improving border surveillance  (15th EU-RF summit 2005, Annex 2: 
23) 
1.3 To support an efficient migration policy  
- implement the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, 
supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime assess jointly the 
scale of illegal migration by exchanging information of migratory flows  
- exchange information on migration management policies and best practices, and cooperate 
as appropriate in this field in relation to third countries  
- develop an appropriate legislative framework related to migration management  
- provide appropriate support to the Border Guards Service with the possibility to set up Joint 
Training Programmes and Training Centres for Customs Officers and Border Guards  
- examine the possibility of cooperation projects to improve the management of migration 
flows, including the assessment of statistics and measures to fight against illegal migration  
1.4 To develop cooperation in the field of asylum policy  
- implement the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees and i.a. its 1967 
Protocol, including the right to seek asylum and respect for the principle of 'non-refoulement' 
by all countries in accordance with UNHCR recommendations  
- implement standard procedures relating to treatment of asylum applications, in accordance 
with UNHCR recommendations  
- protect individuals in the territory of EU Member States and Russia against possible threats 
to their life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or 
membership of a particular social group  
- not to subject permanent residents in EU Member States and Russia to expulsion contrary 
to the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ (15th EU-RF summit 2005, Annex 2: 24) 
2.2 To improve the security of documents, prevent the use of multiple identities, and 
falsified/stolen documents, which authorize the crossing of borders (travel documents)  
− discuss at expert level how the security of travel documents can be improved  
− promote cooperation, including through exchange of experience, on possible measures to 
stop the malpractice of multiple identities in regard to the production, control and storage of 
documents  
- apply legislation and rules to support criminalisation of the use of multiple identities  
− explore the possibility of using the Interpol database on lost and stolen blank and issued 
travel documents (ASF-STD) by national law enforcement agencies, in accordance with the 
Interpol Constitution, and to transfer data currently contained in national databases about 
lost and stolen, issued and blank travel documents to the Interpol database  
− exchange information about the introduction of biometric features in travel documents, 
based on ICAO standards 
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A revised version of the 2005 road map on JHA matters got adopted at the EU-RF PPC in 
Stockholm on the 2nd December 2009. This revised road map emphasises to: 
Figure 21. EU-RF Road Map on Migratory Issues (EU-RF PPC 2009) 
− continue to work on the EC-Russia visa facilitation and readmission agreements, 
− discuss possible amendments to the EC-Russia visa facilitation agreement with a focus on 
Kaliningrad and local border traffic agreements, 
− lend their support for swift negotiation; look forward to the Senior Officials’ report on the 
EU-Russia Visa Dialogue, 
− enhance EU-Russia dialogue on all migration issues, 
− examine border co-operation, 
− negotiate an operational agreement between Europol and Russia on personal data 
protection, 
− intensify anti-drug co-operation, 
− strengthen EU-Russia Co-operation in the fight against corruption and trafficking, 
− solve the current problems on judicial co-operation, 
- strengthen judicial co-operation in civil and commercial matters  
Representatives of the EU and the RF discuss in issue-specific expert meetings joint 
priorities and problems encountered during the implementation of the agreed road maps 
for the four common spaces and develop concrete action plans to succeed in these 
objectives. The priorities listed in the road maps are rather vague. Thus, they are basis for 
ongoing consultations relying rather on a political commitment than on a legal obligation. 
The approximation to EU acquis is not a must, but its legislation serves often as a model 
for guiding the RF in the conduct of domestic reforms. 
In order to implement this road map on JHA, the respective representatives of both sides 
at the PPC are to draft a more detailed action-oriented paper. From the EU side, the 
Council agreed on a modus operandi to arrange its assistance towards the RF. According 
to their statement at their Council meeting on the 26 November 2006: 
“these papers should include: i) an analysis of the issue and the EU’s objectives, drawing 
on relevant information from the EU’s institutions; ii) a summary of current action being 
carried out by both the Commission and by Member States; and iii) identification of what 
needs to be done at the political, technical and operational levels in order to meet EU 
objectives. In addition, information on the situation in the Member States and relevant EU 
agencies, such as Europol, Eurojust and Frontex, for example, has been included in the 
action-oriented paper on justice and home affairs concerning Russia” (Council of the EU 
2006b). 
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In regard to the implementation of the agreed road maps, the EU provides issue-specific 
technical and financial assistance within the ENPI, funding, inter alia: the administrative 
capacity building, improvement of border-crossing infrastructure and developing 
integrated border management systems (COM 2006g). E.g. a special program on Cross-
Border Cooperation (CBC) with Russia is funded by the EU with a total amount of EUR 
307.446 million (COM 2006d; Annex 2.1: 33), with a co-financing from the RF with the 
amount of EUR 122 million (Ehin/ Nahtigal 2008: 12). The overall amount of EUR 429.488 
million is used to provide financial assistance to seven CBC programmes. The seven joint 
CBC programmes got confirmed at the EU-RF summit in Khanty-Mansiysk, June 2008 
(ibid.). The CBC programme goals are, inter alia, to “ensure efficient and secure borders” 
(COM 2006d: 3) along the EU and the RF borders. Thus, both parties agreed on the 
following five land border and two sea basin programmes: Kolarctic/Russia, 
Karelia/Russia, SE Finland/Russia, Estonia/Latvia/Russia, Lithuania/Poland/Russia, Black 
Sea and Baltic Sea Region programmes. Another important supportive instrument is the 
2008 launched Common Space Facility, aiming to facilitate the interaction between 
bureaucrats of the EU and the RF in order to exchange information and knowledge. 
The demand-led programmes are open to national as well as international contractors in 
cooperation with respective authorities. In order to improve the coordination of the JHA 
cooperation between RF and the EU, RF introduced new institutions in the field of 
migration and border management. A State Border Commission and Federal Agency for 
Border Equipment of the RF were approved to support the State Border Guards (SBG); 
the Federal Migration Service (FMS) got reorganised and is now under the federal 
supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It got more competences and a broader 
mandate for implementing the visa facilitation and readmission agreement. 
On the EU side, the most prominent agencies running projects with RF authorities are the 
‘European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union’ (FRONTEX), Europol and Eurojust. 
Several agreements between agencies of both sides got signed in the last years to 
improve the coordination of common projects. During the EU-RF summit in November 
2003, an agreement with the Europol was signed by the respective RF counterparts, 
which defines the “tools of cooperation in strategic and technical information sharing” 
(Potemkina 2006: 40). Further agreements were agreed on between Frontex, the Federal 
Border Security Service of the RF, the Eurojust and the RF Prosecutor General’s Office 
(Council of the EU 2006c: 23). Apart from that, EU funded projects, furthermore, are 
implemented by IOs as the IOM, UNHCR or agencies from EU member states. 
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4.4.1 Visa Facilitation 
The extension of the Schengen area onto Central and Eastern European countries on the 
21 December 2007 (Council of the EU 2007e: Article 1(1)) marked a sensitive change for 
the mobility of RF citizens. The new member states had to implement the Schengen 
Acquis, which provide: measurement to make border controls more efficient; restrictive 
requirements to get a visa; close police cooperation; and the protection of personal data 
(Council of the EU 1999b: Annex A). In reaction to this, the RF claims to facilitate visa 
requirements for its citizen or even to offer complete freedom to travel without visas 
between the RF and the EU by taking the RF off the EU ‘black list’ of countries whose 
nationals need visas to come to the EU (Council of the EU 2001). Elena Prokhorova 
(2007) noted that the abolition of any mutual visa requirements would be a major step 
towards removing prejudice and suspicion between the EU and RF. 
A crucial case in this sense is the settlement of the RF exclave Kaliningrad oblast, whose 
citizen’s mobility towards its motherland RF got constrained by new visa legislation in 
former allied transit countries, especially in Lithuania and Poland from 1 July 2003 (COM 
2002d: 3). Before Lithuania’s accession to the EU and the implementation of the ‘National 
Action Plan for the Adoption of the ‘Schengen Acquis’, the RF and Lithuania had agreed 
on the ‘Provisional Agreement on Travel of Citizens’ in 1995 to regulate the transit of 
permanent residents in Kaliningrad oblast through Lithuania without any required visa or 
additional permission to stay in its territory up to 30 days (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Lithuania 1995 and Interview with Olga Potemkina, Institute of Europe at 
the Academy of Sciences, 12 June 2009). In the course of the eastern enlargement, the 
EU and the RF composed a joint statement on ‘Transit between the Kaliningrad Region 
and the rest of the Russian Federation’, including a comprehensive package of measures 
to facilitate the easy passage of borders, and in particular to create a Facilitated Transit 
Document (FTD) scheme (10th EU-RF summit 2002). Following this joint statement in 
2002, the Council of the EU adopted a Council Regulation on ‘establishing a specific 
Facilitated Transit Document (FTD), a Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD) and 
amending the Common Consular Instructions and the Common Manual’ (Council of the 
EU 2003d). 
The EU itself wishes a more facilitated visa regime, as EU citizen increasingly attempt to 
travel to RF for business or tourist reasons. Thus, both agreed to declare visa facilitation 
as one of their top priority within the Common Space of FSJ:  
“The EU and Russia agreed to examine the conditions for visa-free travel as a long term 
perspective. The EU and Russia agreed to conclude timely the negotiations on a 
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readmission agreement. We also agreed to promote the better use of existing flexibilities 
in the Schengen agreement. We want to facilitate to the greatest possible extend 
cooperation along the border between the Russia and the enlarged EU” (13th EU-RF 
summit 2003: Article 15).  
The 2003 statement was included in the road map of the Common Space of FSJ, where 
the main objective is: “to facilitate ease of movement between the EU and Russia, in 
particular for business, travel and tourism, within a context free of terrorist threat, 
organised crime and corruption” (15th EU-RF summit 2005: Article 1). What became clear 
is that the EU attempts to link the goal of establishing a visa free area between the RF 
and the EU with concrete measures to combat security threats that come along with 
cross-border mobility such as illegal migration; cross-border crime; human trafficking; 
smuggling of weapons and drugs. 
At the 17th EU-RF summit in Sochi on 4 May 2006, RF and the EU already approved the 
visa facilitation and readmission agreement (17th EU-RF summit 2006a; 2006b). The 
signature under the agreements was a landmark in the EU-RF relations on JHA and for 
relations with third countries in general. The EU-RF visa facilitation agreement is the first 
agreement in this vein with a third country (Joint Visa Facilitation Committee 2008, Annex 
8: 1). In the joint statement of the 17th EU-RF summit, the EU insisted to include the 
paragraph “recognising that this facilitation should not lead to illegal migration and paying 
attention to security and readmission” (17th EU-RF summit: ‘Visa Facilitation Agreement’ 
2006a). 
Whereas visa-free travel has been an issue of strong importance to the RF, the EU 
considered the signing of a readmission agreement a priority. Thus, the EU insisted on a 
package deal: facilitation of the visa procedures, coupled with a readmission agreement 
imposing on both sides legal and financial responsibilities to take back illegal immigrants. 
Linking both agreements with each other is a consequence of an interest driven foreign 
policy, aiming to create a win-win situation. 
“By opening up the prospect of easier travel and contacts between Russia and the EU, 
while at the same time providing for a more effective cooperation against illegal 
migration, the agreements go to the very heart of the Common Space” (Council of the EU 
2006c: 9).  
“The European Union’s relations with RF should be made subject to a conditionality 
principle, as is the case for the European Neighbourhood Policy. According to this 
principle, there can be no visa facilitation or visa-free travel without compliance with the 
rules of democracy and the rule of law” (European Parliament 2007). 
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The EU-RF agreement on visa facilitation, together with the readmission agreement, 
finally came into force in June 2007. The agreement stresses the need: 
“to facilitate people to people contacts as an important condition for a steady 
development of economic, humanitarian, cultural, scientific and other ties, by facilitating 
the issuing of visas to the citizens of the Russian Federation and the European Union on 
the basis of reciprocity” (17th EU-RF summit 2006a). 
The agreed facilitation of visas applies on categories of citizens such as business people, 
researchers, journalists, people taking part in cultural or sport events, or officials 
participating in government (17th EU-RF summit 2006c: Art. 5), who are going to benefit 
from a simplified procedure of applying for visas; but he facilitated issuing of visas is 
limited to multiple-entry short-stay visas (so-called C-visas) – up to 90 days in total; and/or 
transit visas (so-called B-visas), especially for transit from RF citizens living in the exclave 
Kaliningrad oblast (Art. 3(e)). 
The agreement consists of several measurements on how to facilitate visa requirements 
for the respective categories of citizens, which concerns: the mutual recognition of 
documentary evidence, regarding the purpose of the journey for the categories foreseen 
in Article 5 (Art. 2(2); the introduction of uniform fees which can be levied by the 
signatures, or exemption of fees for certain categories (Art. 6); and, finally, easing the 
rules of procedure for processing visa applications (Art. 7). The validity of issued visas in 
the frame of this agreement is limited to the Schengen area, which means that the 
provisions of this agreement do not apply for non-Schengen members UK and Ireland. 
Two associate members of the Schengen club are non EU members, Norway and 
Iceland, are invited to join the scheme (17th EU-RF summit 2006c: 1). However, Denmark 
– EU and Schengen member – decided to sign a bilateral, but finally equal agreement 
which entered into force on the 1 October 2008 (Denmark-RF summit 2008). 
The both contracting parties agreed to install a joint committee, which supervise the 
implementation of the agreement. The joint committee has the task to monitor the 
application of the agreement; to arrange the execution of the agreement; to exchange 
information; and to propose amendments to the agreement, if deemed necessary (Art. 
13). 
“Every time when a violation of the agreement gets observed. Our [experts] task is to 
collect all the shortcomings to bring it on the agenda of the joint committee. They ask 
people to send their complaints to the respective consulates” (Interview with Olga 
Potemkina, Institute of Europe at the Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 12 June 2009). 
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In this sense the committee is authorised to approve changes to the agreement, as long 
as it is within the agreed framework. In practical terms, the committee got active in the 
area of defining mutually acceptable documents which proof the affiliation to one of the 
above mentioned categories. In addition, the joint committee is authorised to establish 
legally binding rights and obligations, on the basis of reciprocity (Joint Visa Facilitation 
Committee 2008: Annex 8). 
The committee consists of experts in the field, representing the RF, such as FMS, SBG 
and from the Interior Ministry; and on behalf of the EU by the Commission DG JFS and 
several experts from member states (e.g. Interview with Official from the EC Delegation to 
the RF, Moscow, 28 May 2009). In the Implementation Guidelines, both parties “highly 
recommended that diplomatic and consular staff consistently follow them when 
implementing the provisions of the agreement” (Joint Visa Facilitation Committee 2008: 
Annex 8: 1). The members of the committee meet “whenever necessary at the request of 
one of the Parties and at least once a year” (Article 13(3)). According to the EU-RF 
Progress Report on the Common Space of FSJ, the joint committee on visa facilitation 
met twice a year in 2009, on the 12-13 March and 10-11 December (COM 2010a: 40). At 
their meeting in March, they also adopted their common implementing guidelines (Joint 
Visa Facilitation Committee 2008: Annex 8), in order to fulfil the requirement of the Article 
13 (4) of the visa facilitation agreement, postulating for the establishment of common rules 
of procedure for the execution of the agreement. 
The committee becomes active whenever the implementation is incomplete or not exactly 
formulated; and whenever one side claims a cause for a complaint according to a 
misleading execution of the agreement. First, the RF side is claiming the practice of 
charging higher fees as proposed by the embassies of EU member states, which often 
exceed the proposed fee of EUR 35 (Interview with Olga Potemkina, Institute of Europe at 
the Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 12 June 2009). This was the case as EU member 
states outsourced the submission of the respective visa application to so-called non-state 
’Visa-Centre’. These ‘Visa Centres’ charge an extra fee for handling the collection and the 
verification of needed documents. The individual Consular Offices of the EU member 
states confine themselves to issuing or denying visas according to the received 
documents and/ or chat with applicants. Given that the Visa Centres charge an extra fee 
for its services, the total fee for visa application exceeds the agreed fee. Although the RF 
administration is complaining, the Visa Centres have a decisive advantage for RF citizens 
living afar from the common location of member states Consular offices, as Visa Centres 
are also represented in major cities of the RF (Interview with Olga Potemkina, Institute of 
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Europe at the Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 12 June 2009 and with an official from the 
Finnish embassy, Moscow 19 June). 
Secondly, the EU side is concerned about two travel obstacles: the annoying registration 
procedure for EU citizens and unsecure RF documents (e.g. Interview with Official from 
the EC Delegation to the RF, Moscow, 28 May 2009). The second is a major issue, as far 
as the implementation of the agreement is concerned. The matter of concern is the weak 
control mechanisms and avoiding possible falsification of RF documents. First, the EU 
calls for a centralised register data base of all issued passports. The current system 
allows RF citizens to have more than one passport. Especially lorry drivers are suspected 
to take advantage of this lack of control and to hold more passports in order to apply for 
several short-stay visas, which allow entering the EU for a longer period than included in 
the EU-RF agreement on visa facilitation. Further, corrupt officers are able to sell 
additional passports or issuing fake documents, as in the case of declaring the purpose of 
the journey into the EU. Intense consultations are going on in the joint committees, 
according the mutual approval of documents and the verification of their validity. Referring 
to the passport security, the RF agreed to introduce biometric passports with 1 March 
2010. 
Third, the EC and the RF are disappointed about the varying rejection rate throughout the 
Schengen member state consular offices. The practice of the visa facilitation agreement 
cannot be satisfying, as long as the issuing of visa is not regulated. Member States of 
stricter visa requirements complain that the lax issuance of visas in other countries would 
lead to ‘visa-shopping’ (Interview with Official from the German Embassy in Ukraine, Kyiv, 
18 September 2009). Despite the 2005 introduced Common Consular Instruction (CCI), 
the distinct Consular offices, still, rate visa application differently (e.g. Salminen/ Moshes 
2009: 23ff.). The CCI provides the basic guidelines for visa practices and stipulates the 
conditions governing the issue of a uniform visa (Council of the EU 2005c). The CCI 
states that uniform visas may be issued only once the entry conditions laid down in Article 
15 of the Schengen Convention and Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code have been 
met (ibid.). This naturally leaves a lot of room for interpretation on the part of the visa 
official.  The harmonisation of day-to-day practice, however, is a matter of Local Consular 
Cooperation (LCC) between national liaison officers. In reaction to the lack of uniformity of 
the issuance of visas, the EU Commission, recently, finalised a “Handbook for the 
processing of visa applications and the modification of issued visas” (COM 2010a).  
As early as 2003, visa-free travel was designated a long-term goal and inscribed in the 
roadmaps of the Common Space of FSJ (13th EU-RF summit 2003: Art. 15). The signing 
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of the Visa Facilitation together with the Readmission Agreement is a logical first step in 
realising their common vision of a visa-free zone. Apart from the agreed facilitation of visa 
issuance to EU and RF citizens, the long term objective of waiving visa requirements 
remains still one of the important issues on the agenda as noted by RF’s President Dmitry 
Medvedev and President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy at a news 
conference following the EU-RF summit in Nizhny Novgorod on the 10 June 2011. 
“Visa-free travel has been and remains one of the important issues on the agenda of 
course. We have made progress, but there is still a lot of work ahead. This is not 
something that will happen in the next year or two, but at the same time, we need to set 
concrete objectives to move towards” (President of the European Council Herman van 
Rompuy 2011). 
A continuous dialogue on visa liberalisation between RF and the EU got introduced 
thereafter in 2007 by the PCC on JHA “at expert and political level aimed at defining the 
procedure for examining the conditions for a mutual visa-free travel regime as a long-term 
perspective, as set out in the Common Space” (15th EU-RF summit 2005, Annex 2, Art. 
1(1)). What the visa dialogue attempted to do was to solve challenging issues in visa 
relations between the EU and the RF. The dialogue mode provides a basis for ongoing 
information exchange on the legislation and practices concerning the movement of 
people. To get visa-facilitation and, in the long term, visa-free travel, RF has made 
considerable efforts in dealing with the following JHA related issues, in particular since the 
common space initiative in 2005: readmitting its own country and third country nationals 
from the EU into RF; assuming responsibility and fulfilling obligations for refugee seekers 
on the RF territory; and improving border management and document security. Regarding 
visa issues, the RF made major progress to harmonise its visa issuance in accordance to 
the ‘Schengen Acquis’ (e.g. Salminen/ Moshes 2009: 23-24). Despite to RF’s progress, 
the EU stresses the necessity for further steps before they would be able to talk about the 
abolition of visa duty for RF’s citizen (e.g. Andoura 2008:5). Although the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the RF, Sergey Lavrov, repeated many times that the RF is ready to 
pass to the visa-free regime in short terms, the EU “only see visa-free travel becoming a 
reality in the very long term, and only then if all the concerns are addressed” (Lavrov In: 
Salminen/ Moshes 2009: 7). 
The EU-RF Visa Dialogue consists merely of senior officials of the RF side, Interior 
Ministry and Consular Department of the Foreign Ministry, and from the EU, the DG JFS 
of the Commission, of the EU dealing with the main obstacles of a visa free travel. The 
members of the visa dialogue pledged to work on measures, based on a step-by-step 
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approach, which would pave the way to negotiations on an EU-RF visa waiver agreement. 
The results of their meeting are reported to the ministerial session of the Russia-EU 
Permanent Partnership Council on FSJ. Following the outcome of the 25th EU-RF Summit 
at Rostov-on-Don, 31 May to 1 June 2010, both parties agreed to call on the members of 
the Visa Dialogue meetings on the 24 September and 18 November 2010, to elaborate 
“an exhaustive list of common steps the implementation of which will open possibility for 
engaging in negotiations on a EU-Russia visa waiver agreement” (EU-RF PPC on FSJ 
2010), as far as the effective implementation of the Agreements on readmission and on 
visa facilitation is guaranteed (e.g. ibid.). President of the EU Commission José Manuel 
Barroso emphasised at a meeting with Premier Minister Vladimir Putin in February 2011 
the importance of visa-free travel for EU-RF relations: 
“on the visa issue, which is of great importance to Russia and the EU, we have launched 
joint work on a list of common steps towards a possible visa-free travel regime, as agreed 
last year. As soon as our Member States have agreed on the draft common steps, we will 
discuss these steps with Russia. We are also willing to launch negotiations on amending 
our visa facilitation agreement. I believe it is possible if there is good will from both sides 
to achieve progress on the visa issues” (Barroso 2011). 
The salience of visa issues in public debates to a politicisation of the dialogue between 
the EU and the RF on visa issues. Although the EU-RF cooperation is in practice 
dominated by trade, security and energy issues, the most irritable and visible issue for RF 
citizen remains the issue of achieving visa-free regime with the EU. Despite the fact, that 
only about ten percent of RF citizens hold a passport and would in theory be able to travel 
into the EU, we can assume that visa free travel is far more than a topic of practical 
necessity. It is rather an issue of the nationalist ego, to see oneself excluded from the 
main European continent, and, which is all the more striking, from former allied countries. 
The citizen got the impression not to be welcomed in a common Europe and, which is all 
the more affronting, to be seen as a security threat for Western European citizens. 
The decrease of the RF’s role in IR is also manifested in the EU-RF relations, where the 
EU is the more powerful actor – setting the agenda and the conditions of cooperation – 
and their relation is not seen by the public as a relation between equal European partners. 
During Putin’s presidency, the tone on the visa issue between the RF and EU 
administration was rather rough. The RF foreign minister Sergey Lavrov (2011), for 
example, does not get tired to stress that the abolition of visas is only a matter of political 
will by EU member states and emphasises that a lack of a clear perspective for a common 
visa free area hurts bilateral relations. "[…] I would pick out the global task of coordinating 
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a specific plan to transfer to a visa-free regime. This task is long overripe" (Lavrov in Ria 
Novosti 2011). President Dmitry Medvedev, however, said at a press conference that: 
"We should be moving to the main goal, namely, lifting the visa regime. But the main 
thing is not to politicise the issue and not to be engaged in impracticable projects. We 
should face the truth and see how the whole European Union is ready to [solve] this 
problem" (Medvedev in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 14 June 2010). 
Aware of the sensitivity of the visa issue, the EU is anxious to tackle the issue as a solely 
technical one. Although the EU officially stresses the importance of limiting the dialogue 
on visa issues to technical issues, internal debates show a differentiated picture. Apart 
from the technical categories, the political momentum behind visa-free travel between 
Russia and the EU is growing, due the fact that visa-free travel is not only based “on 
technical criteria but also on mutual confidence and a sense of security” (Finnish Foreign 
Minister Alexander Stubb 2010). 
Thus, the EU proposed a road map on easing people’s mobility and attempts to define 
clear preconditions for the abolition of visas. To have a visa-free deal, the RF needs to 
meet a minimum of issued preconditions, which include for example: the security of travel 
documents; the introduction of biometric passports; secure borders; corrupt 
administration; lack of a centralised population registry; facilitate RF’s tight registration 
procedure for non-residents; and the correct execution of the readmission agreement in 
accordance with international conventions on the repatriation of illegal immigrants (e.g. 
Council of the EU 2006b; Salminen/ Moshes 2009).  
First and foremost, the visa issue is used as a leverage to put pressure on the RF to stop 
human rights abuses in their country; return back to negotiations with Georgia; reform its 
politicised and inefficient judiciary; as well as using its influence in the region to solve the 
‘frozen conflicts’ in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh (e.g. Salminen/ Moshes 2009). 
Related to EU-RF’s dialogue on visa-free travel, member states further criticised RF’s 
hostile practise of ‘passportisation’ in Georgian provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
(e.g. Goble 2008; OSCE 2009). 
Second, the member states take into account the public attitude on a possible visa 
waiving for RF citizen. Politicians fear that if they would support a visa-free travel with the 
RF, this “could spark a backlash among voters in Western Europe, where high levels of 
migration from the ex-Communist east have become increasingly sensitive” (EurActiv 
2010a) But there are also countries which have a great interest to allow for facilitated 
travelling across the border. It is the matter between Finland and the Baltic States, where 
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ethnic minorities are living in the wider borderland. For example the Russian ethnic 
minority in Estonia called ‘Seto’ or the Finnish minority in the Republic Karelia or the 
Ingrian Finns in Leningrad Oblast on the RF territory. Thus it is not astonishing that these 
countries support the facilitation of people-to-people contact across the border. The 
Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb stressed that the EU and the RF should speed 
up the visa freedom process. 
“Visa facilitation is important,” he said. “I say this coming from Finland which is a ‘Russian 
visa superpower’. Last year we issued 740,000 visas to Russians, three times as many 
as the next biggest in the EU, which was Italy. It’s important to move on this” (Stubb in 
Financial Times 14 November 2010). 
Also Marko Mikhelson, chairman of the Estonian Parliament’s European Affairs 
Committee, favours an abolition of visas for RF citizens. "We definitely support visa-free 
[travel] between Europe and Russia once all requirements are met" (Mikhelson in the 
Moscow Times 2010). 
Related to borderland communities at external Schengen borders, the EU installed special 
financial and technical assistance in the course of the Eastern Enlargement in 2004, for 
bilateral cross-border cooperation, aiming to improve the development of these economic, 
social and environmental areas under specific conditions. Further, the EU introduced the 
Local Border Traffic (LBT) Permit as a tool to facilitate visa-free travel within these regions 
(COM 2009b). These LBT arrangements apply to residents living within an administrative 
district of 30 to 50 kilometres from the borders (EU Council of the EU 2006a: Art. 3). 
Permits may only be issued to persons who can proof a legitimate reason to frequently 
cross an external land border under the LBT regime. Schengen States which share an 
external land border with a non-Schengen country are authorised by virtue of the EU 
regulation EC 1931/2006 to conclude or maintain bilateral agreements with neighbouring 
third countries for the purpose of implementing an LBT regime (e.g. ibid.). 
The European Commission is authorised to approve an agreement with a non-Schengen 
country and is responsible to confirm its legality. (ibid.: Art. 13(2)). An LBT agreement may 
only be concluded if the neighbouring country grants at least reciprocal rights to the 
relevant Schengen state, and readmission of illegally staying persons from the 
neighbouring country is ensured. For local border traffic, fast lanes or special border 
crossings may be introduced (ibid.: Art. 13(3)). The maximum permitted period of stay 
may not exceed three months (ibid.: Art. 5). Negotiations on bilateral local border traffic 
agreements between the RF, on the one hand, and respectively Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
and Norway, on the other hand, were carried out in 2009. (COM 2010a: 41). 
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To sum up the major findings on the cooperation on visa facilitation the analysis showed a 
combination of hierarchical and network modes of governance. The negotiation process 
on the visa facilitation and readmission agreement was explicitly of a conditional nature, 
as both actors agreed on a package deal to link both agreements. However, the 
implementation of both agreements is coordinated by a joint committee. This so-called 
regulatory network got a clear mandate and sufficient competences to deal with the 
implementation within the agreed framework agreement. Due to the long-term objective of 
a visa waivers agreement, both created a visa dialogue, whose participants monitor the 
path towards a visa-free travel between the EU and RF. Based on defined conditions in 
the road map on visa free travel, experts from the EU and RF tackle a widespread range 
of issues – e.g. document security, data protection, human rights, border control and 
management, as well as combating corruption within RF’s public administration. 
The visa-dialogue is merely an information network, aiming to exchange information and 
expertise on efficient policy regulation in the mentioned policy areas, without a clear 
mandate or even competences to take binding decisions. The members of the visa 
dialogue are more or less congruent as the members of the joint committee, responsible 
for the implementation of the visa facilitation agreement. Anyhow, the visa dialogue 
elaborates on concrete measurements and monitors the policy developments and reforms 
on the RF side. Among the declared goals of the visa dialogue is to help to depoliticise the 
political debate on a visa-free travel due to concrete technical conditions included in the 
road map. 
Within issue-specific implementation networks on technical preparations for visa free 
travel, the EU provides financial and technical assistance in order to implement the action-
oriented papers from the visa dialogue and the joint committee on visa facilitation. 
Implementing actors are, amongst others, EU agencies (e.g. Frontex, Europol), EU 
member states’ agencies (e.g. SIDA) or IOs (e.g. IOM, UNHCR) together with RF’s 
national agencies (e.g. State Border Guards). 
4.4.2 Readmission Policy – Return Unwanted Migrants 
Negotiations between the EU and RF on a readmission agreement started in September 
2000, as the commission received the mandate from the Council (Council of the EU 
2005d: 4). The Negotiations on an agreement, encompassing the readmission of both 
national and third-country nationals (TCN), were initially very difficult and lacked 
substantive progress for a long period of time (e.g. Kruse 2005; Potemkina 2004). The 
first negotiation round failed as RF authorities viewed EU’s strategy as too intrusive into 
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their internal politics and did not accept it as a legitimate addition to the EU-RF 
cooperation framework (Interview Olga Potemkina, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy 
of Sciences, Moscow, 12 June 2009). It turned out that the crucial conflicting point is the 
readmission of TCN. As Rig and Huddleston (2007) emphasised: “since 1999, the EU has 
negotiated and signed agreements including readmission clauses covering only nationals, 
with 102 countries. Readmission agreements covering nationals and non-nationals have 
been concluded with only five (ibid.: 374) – Albania, Hong Kong Region, Macao, Russia 
and Sri Lanka (e.g. ibid.: 364). 
The EU was not able to conclude an agreement on readmission as long as it insisted on 
the readmission of TCN. The negotiations remained frozen for almost four years until the 
EU tailored an incentive package to meet the specific interest of the RF (e.g. Roig/ 
Huddleston 2007). Only after the EU initiated parallel negotiations on facilitated EU visa 
requirements for certain categories of people (e.g. businessmen, students) in return for 
signing the readmission agreement, a breakthrough was reached (e.g. Interview 
Potemkina 2009; Roig/ Huddleston 2007). The negotiations could be finalised at the 15th 
EU-RF summit in Moscow in 2005 and came into force in June 2007. Although the 
European Commission was in charge of the negotiations with RF, responsibility for the 
actual readmission of persons lies with individual EU member state. With their signature 
on a readmission agreement, both parties agree to readmit their nationals or third-country 
nationals who transited through their country and who do not or no longer fulfil the 
conditions for entry or stay in the territory of the requested country. Such agreements are 
being signed on the basis of reciprocity, meaning that all contracting states must be 
prepared to readmit not only their own citizens, but also third-country nationals on the 
same terms. However, with regard to Community readmission agreements with third 
countries of transit or origin, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which e.g. RF faces 
difficulties in readmitting irregularly entered or staying EU-nationals to the EU. 
Besides, the EU promised to provide sufficient technical assistance to meet the 
agreement and accepted a three-year transition period on readmitting TCN and stateless 
people (Art. 23(3). Therefore, the agreement will fully come into force in June 2010. In the 
meantime the RF was granted a ‘breathing space’ to have enough time to improve its 
respective legislative framework, to enhance the administrative capacity and to provide 
the required infrastructure, i.e. detention centres on its territory to host illegal immigrants 
in line with minimal human rights standards, as well as allocate enough budgetary means 
for deportation to further countries of origin. “An accord on mutual readmission has been 
concluded with Ukraine, talks are underway with Kazakhstan, Vietnam and China” 
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(Prokhorova 2007). Regarding the three-year transit period, Roig and Huddleston (2007) 
argue in their article that: 
“the transition period was employed by Russia first and foremost as a strategy to 
circumvent the obligation of returning non-nationals. In addition, the transition period 
gives Russia the possibility to sign as many bilateral readmission agreements as possible 
with neighbouring countries and other countries of origin in order to have the possibility of 
transferring third-country nationals readmitted from the EU to other countries” (ibid.: 373). 
Be that as it may, the deal was considered beneficial for both parties. RF gained facilitated 
travel opportunities for bona fide travellers while the EU was provided a lever to make RF 
sign a readmission agreement and improve RF’s reform efforts in the domestic justice and 
home affairs sector (e.g. Trauner/ Kruse 2008). At the summit, both parties agreed, 
further, to intensify cooperation in a range of related JHA issues, in particular border 
control, irregular migration, document security and data and information sharing (Council 
of the European Union 2005a).  
The EC-RF readmission agreement sets out clear obligations and procedures for the 
contracting parties on who has to be readmitted and under which conditions. It includes 
technical rules on the readmission procedure and transit operations, including: the content 
and format of the readmission application; source of evidence establishing nationality; 
data protection; and the respect of international obligations and standards. The 
readmission obligatory rules concern the category of people that can be readmitted 
between the contracting parties – country nationals, third-country nationals and stateless 
persons. A fourth category may be added, namely those persons that had been 
readmitted under the agreement but, in the course of new investigations, were discovered 
to have no link whatsoever to the requested country. The literature refers to these cases 
as “readmission in error” (Balzacq 2008: 22). 
The stipulations on the readmission procedure provide technical and detailed specification 
with regard to the process of readmission, including the verification of the purpose of 
readmission to the requested country, formal submission of a readmission application and 
the transfer of a person. Contrary to most readmission agreements signed between the 
EU and third countries, the EC-RF readmission agreement contains a strict time-frame for 
the submission of a readmission application. RF insists on a submission “within a 
maximum of 6 months after the requesting State’s authority has gained knowledge that a 
third-country national or a stateless person does no longer fulfil the conditions in force for 
entry, presence or residence” (Article 11(1)). A special accelerated procedure applies to 
persons who are apprehended in border regions: They may be returned within a few days 
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(Art. 6 (2)). The costs of readmitting a person, including transit costs, shall be borne by the 
requesting party (Art. 16). However, there is no institutionalised mechanism to prevent the 
respective state from demanding money from a readmitted migrant - a fact that has been 
met with criticism as it might lead to abuse: “For instance, how could the EU check that 
the individuals concerned are not sent to jail, for failure to pay back the costs incurred by 
the state in readmitting them?” (Balzacq 2008: 24). 
With regard to the guidelines on data protection (Art. 17), both parties agreed that 
personal data shall only be exchanged if necessary for the implementation of the 
readmission agreement and shall be “processed fairly and lawfully” (Art. 17(a)). Personal 
data must be “adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose” (Art. 17(c)) 
for which they are collected. However, while EC member states are requested to abide by 
the data protection directive 95/46/EC, the readmission agreement lacks similar 
obligations for the RF side: It only refers to legislation in the respective contracting country 
(Art. 17). Even though the issue of data protection is being discussed under the heading 
of security-based obligations, the lack of any concrete and effective data protection rules 
that apply to the RF government has important value-related implications. The lack of 
sufficient protection of personal data in the context of readmission puts the individual 
migrant in severe danger and violates international human rights standards.  
Article 18 of the readmission agreement clarifies all relevant obligations with regard to 
international humanitarian and refugee protection, including, in particular, the principle of 
non-refoulement35 (primarily the Convention of 28 July 1951; the Protocol of 31 January 
1967 relating to the Status of Refugees; the European Convention of 4 November 1950 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; and the Convention of 
10th December 1984 against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment). Moreover, some reference to the obligations and rights of returned persons 
can be found in other parts of the agreement. In the stipulations on the transit of third-
country nationals and stateless persons, it is outlined that the transit may be refused on 
grounds of: 
                                                
35 The principle of non-refoulment refers to article 33 of the Geneva Convention stating that “no 
contracting state shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership or a particular social group or political opinion” (Geneva Convention on the 
Status of Refugees 1951, Art. 33). In addition, article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) sets out: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment” (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, 
as amended by Protocol No. 11). 
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(a) If the third-country nationals or stateless persons run the risk of being subjected to 
torture or to inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment or the death penalty or of 
persecution because of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political conviction in the State of destination or another state of transit; or 
(b) If the third-country national or the stateless person will be subject to criminal 
prosecution or sanctions in the requested state or in another State of transit; or 
(c) on grounds of public health, domestic security, public order or other national interests of 
the requested state (Art. 14(3)). 
The EU was aware of the ill-developed RF tradition of dealing with asylum seekers and 
irregular migrants and their weak legislation in this area. Thus, both agreed first and 
foremost on a transition period of three years on readmitting third-country nationals and 
stateless people to give enough time to RF administration to harmonise its practice and 
legislation to those of the EU and in accordance to international obligations. Further, both 
set up a joint readmission committee, similar to those dealing with the visa facilitation 
agreement, being responsible for an efficient implementation of the agreement. As defined 
in Article 19 of the agreement, the joint committee was given the task of monitoring the 
application of the agreement, arranging the execution of the agreement, exchanging 
information and proposing amendments to the agreement, if deemed necessary. 
Committee decisions are binding on the contracting parties (Art. 19 (2)). It consists of 
representatives of the RF, such as FMS, SBG and from the Interior Ministry; and the 
European Commission DG JFS acting on behalf of the European Community. European 
Commission representatives are assisted by experts from member states. The DG JFS is 
supported by two EU agencies: The European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
(FRONTEX) and the European Law Enforcement Organisation EUROPOL. 
Both coordinate the operational aspects of readmission of irregular third-country nationals 
and thus play a decisive role in the implementation of readmission agreements (for more 
details, see Carrera 2007; Jorry 2007). For instance, FRONTEX developed a practical 
guide for the implementation of returns, which includes recommendations on how to 
adhere to human rights standards at each stage of the return procedure. It also organises 
common trainings for national border guards. EUROPOL, for example, seeks close 
cooperation with police and intelligence forces according to information exchange on 
migratory flows. 
When aiding in the implementation of the EC readmission agreement in RF, the EU seeks 
cooperation with international organisations, in particular the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM). For instance, IOM implemented a project called ‘Assistance to the 
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Government of the RF Federation in Establishing Legal and Administrative Framework for 
the Implementation and Development of Readmission Agreements’ (DIRA).36 It aimed at 
improving the RF government’s organisational, practical and legislative capacity to 
implement the readmission agreement. The project was described as “a platform for the 
expertise and knowledge interchange between the EU and RF in the field of migrants’ 
readmission and return” (IOM, 2008). 
More broadly, IOM has helped to implement several EU projects on JHA topics together 
with RF authorities, including projects on the usage of biometrics, facilitating reception 
centres for readmitted people and training authorities on new procedures in readmitting 
people. According to interviews with EU officials in Moscow in May 2009, IOM has been 
the most important cooperation partner of the EU with regard to readmission. Other 
cooperation partners include the UNDP and the UNHCR. Moreover, certain EU member 
states act as donors in RF in this regard, at times through their national implementing 
institutions such as the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). 
To run certain projects, supporting the implementation of the agreement, the EU provides 
financial and technical assistance to assist RF to assume the responsibilities deriving from 
the readmission agreement and to enhance efficiency in return procedures. Several 
projects benefited from the fund of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI, former TACIS) and the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange 
(TAIEX). Additionally, during the period from 2007 to 2010, the new ‘thematic programme 
on cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum’ provides EUR 50 
million for the assistance of countries along the Eastern migratory route (COM 2006a: 3). 
With regard to readmission agreements, the thematic programme provides financial and 
technical assistance for: the social and professional reintegration of returnees; 
establishing adequate humanitarian conditions in reception and detention centres; training 
of executive authorities; strengthening third countries’ institutional capacities to provide 
asylum and international protection as well as to develop national legal frameworks in line 
with the agreement (ibid). 
To conclude on EU-RF cooperation on readmission, the political decision and the 
negotiation of the readmission agreement was clearly of conditionality matters. Linking the 
visa facilitation and readmission agreement was therefore a critical juncture in EU’s efforts 
                                                
36 This project was funded by the governments of Germany and Finland and the EU under the 
AENEAS 2005. 
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to make RF sign the agreement on readmission of irregular residents. The full 
implementation was, just like in the case of the visa facilitation agreement, coordinated by 
a joint committee. Further, the EU, again, allocates funding to support RF’s law 
enforcement, especially for training of border guards and the policy and to build up the 
facilities to detain the irregular subjects in compliance with international standards and 
human rights. Apart from EU-RF cooperation on a common return policy, the analysis 
showed the need of a regional approach to deal with irregular subjects and their 
readmission to their countries of origin to guarantee the efficiency of readmission and the 
respect of human rights in dealing with these human beings. 
4.4.3 Border Surveillance & Management 
EU-RF cooperation on Border Control and Management marks a fundamental issue in 
their relations. It touches crucial JHA issues, such as: internationally organised crime; 
trafficking of humans, weapons, drugs and other goods; illegal migration; as well as the 
previous mentioned visa policy and readmission of people. However, an efficient border 
management and control to prevent irregular migration is a precondition for any further 
facilitation of visa issuance (e.g. EU-RF PPC on FSJ 2010). At the 24th EU-RF summit, 
held in Stockholm on the 2 December 2009, both parties agreed on major steps to 
improve their cooperation on border-related security issues (24th EU-RF PPC 2009). 
Many of the tackled issues in the visa dialogue are concerned with RF’s ability to 
guarantee border control and management in accordance with the road map on realising 
a visa-free area between the EU and RF (EU-RF summit 2005). To have a visa-free deal, 
the RF needs to meet a minimum of issued preconditions, which include for example: the 
security of travel documents; the introduction of biometric passports; secure borders; 
combat its corrupt administration; lack of a centralised population registry; and the correct 
execution of the readmission agreement in accordance with international conventions on 
the repatriation of illegal immigrants (e.g. Council of the EU 2006b: 4; Salminen/ Moshes 
2009). 
Thus, EU programmes were installed in order to help ensuring efficient and secure 
borders. The main challenges regard: the harmonisation and improvement of border 
crossing procedures (e.g. Custom control); human resources (recruiting, trainings); border 
infrastructure (surveillance equipment as night vision sights, infrared camera); travel 
document security and biometrics; combating organised crime through information 
exchange and data sharing between the respective authorities (e.g. COM 2006g: 6). 
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Certain points are on the agenda of the PPC, but there is no concrete roadmap in place. 
The delegation of the EU to the RF defines together with the Border Guard Service (BGS) 
a branch of the Federal Security Service (FSB), concrete projects on the basis of the 
National Indicative Programmes (NIP). Key roles in the cooperation on border 
management play the two specialised EU agencies Frontex and Europol. The RF was the 
first third country, where the Frontex signed a working arrangement which entered into 
force on the 14 September 2006 (e.g. Guild/ Bigo 2010: 21). And, as Olga Potemkina from 
the Russian Academy of Sciences noted: “[t]he Russian authorities of the border guards 
are quite satisfied with the assistance given by FRONTEX” (Interview with Olga 
Potemkina, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 12 June 2009). 
Most of the projects were administrated by Frontex and include: Implementing and 
developing border-crossing infrastructure; enhancing RF’s administrative capacity building 
and the management of the RF’s border checkpoints; modernising RF’s passport issuing 
arrangements to include biometric data; data processing and information exchange (e.g. 
COM 2010b; Ehin/ Nahtigal 2008: 13). As Olga Potemkina stressed in an interview, the 
new Russian passports are rather closed to the passports of EU member states (Interview 
with Olga Potemkina, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 12 
June 2009). 
The projects comprise: annual meetings at executive level, regular meetings of experts on 
risk analysis, training and research and development related to border management, as 
well as the possibility of involvement of the Russian border guard authorities, e.g. in joint 
operations under the aegis of the Frontex project on “Border Delegate Organisation” 
(BDO) (e.g. Council of the EU 2006b: 7). Under the BDO-project, Frontex coordinates the 
compilation of best practices in cooperation between the border guard authorities of EU 
Member States and the RF, carried out at local and regional level at their borders (e.g. 
COM 2010a: 41). 
Europol, however, concluded on the 6 November 2003 an agreement on Co-operation 
with the RF law enforcement authorities: Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal 
Security Council (Europol 2003a: Annex 1). 
"The European Union Member States and Europol place a high emphasis on cooperation 
with the Law Enforcement Authorities of the Russian Federation", stated Europol's 
Director Jürgen Storbeck, "The agreement constitutes the first step forward in 
strengthening our common efforts for combating organised crime more efficiently" 
(Europol 2003b). 
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Their respective representatives will hold regular working meeting and consultations (Art. 
11) to examine ways of combating transborder crime and illegal migration, inter alia 
enabling practical and operational cooperation on the common border (Art. 4). The 
agreement is the legal base for the cooperation in the area of combating organised crime 
provide for the following (Art. 5): 
- The exchange of strategic and technical information; strategic information includes e.g. 
information on enforcement actions, routes and methods used by smugglers, threat 
assessments and crime situation reports; technical information refers to issues of police 
methodology, administrative measures undertaken by police forces, etc. 
- exchange of law enforcement experience including the organisation of scientific and 
practice-oriented conferences, internships, consultations and seminars; 
- exchange of legislation, manuals, technical literature and other law enforcement materials; 
and 
- The possibility for trainings and the exchange liaison officers (twinning programme). 
Most of the financial and technical assistance is provided on a demand-driven basis and 
requires a Co-funding from the partner country. In the framework of the ENPI Cross-
Border Cooperation (CBC) several projects were implemented to meet the issued 
objectives in the National Indicative Programme 2007-2010 (COM 2006g: 6; COM 2010b: 
34). According to the formulated core objectives in the CBC Strategy Paper 2007-2013, 
Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner and the Russian Minister for Regional Development, Viktor Basargin, 
signed on behalf of their mandate the ‘Financing Agreements for five land border cross-
border co-operation programmes (CBC)’ at the EU-RF summit in Stockholm on the 18th 
November 2009 (COM 2009a). 
“The programmes have a total budget of approximately €437 million until 2013, and are 
funded by different sources: European Commission (€267 mio), Member States (€67 
mio) and the Russian Federation (€103.7 mio). The cofinancing by the Russian 
Federation confirms the spirit of partnership at the core of the European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)” (ibid.). 
First, most efforts are targeted on the build-up of modern border crossing infrastructure. 
EU funding within the ENPI CBC programme provides financial assistance to five border 
checkpoints at the EU-RF border: 
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Figure 22. ENPI CBC Land Border and Sea Crossing Programmes 
 
Source: Delegation of the EU to Russia. Cross Border Cooperation under ENPI. [Retrieved from 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/tech_financial_cooperation/cbc_enpi/index_en.htm, 14 
November 2010]. See also Regional Capacity Building Initiative, http://www.rcbi.info/pages/12_1.html, 22 
February 2011] 
Figure 23. ENPI Cross-Border Cooperation. Indicative Allocations in mln. EUR, 2007-2013 
 2007-2010 2010-2013 Total 
Kolarctic/ Russia 14.728 13.513 28.241 
Karelia/ Russia 12.101 11.102 23.203 
South-East Finland/ Russia 18.871 17.314 36.185 
Estonia/ Latvia/ Russia 24.915 22.859 47.775 
Lithuania/ Poland/ Russia 68.908 63.222 132.130 
Total 139.523 128.010 267.534 
Source: ENPI CBC Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Indicative programme 2007-2010, page 29 
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The EU funding covers several topics of cross-border cooperation. Investments in border 
infrastructure and Surveillance technology for border control are only one eligible issue 
provided by the EU funding. Of high importance was the funding of border-crossing 
infrastructures in Kaliningrad region. Several checkpoints were financed by the EU: 
Chernyshevskoye (EUR 8 miln.) Mamonovo II (EUR 13.3 mln.) and Sovetsk (EUR 10 
mln.) (COM 2010a:19). Further, the EU launched specific Sea–Basin programmes, where 
Russia inter alia takes part in the Baltic and Black Sea programme. (COM 2006e: 32).  
Second, a project on enhancing the management of the RF border checkpoints was 
funded by EUR 600,000 under the Common Space Facility. IOM together with the Federal 
Agency for Border Management of the RF (Rosgranitsa) are the implementing authorities 
(ibid.). The project started in September 2009 and aimed the “implementation of effective 
systems of state border management and efficient border control procedures with the final 
purpose of bringing closer together European and Russian practices and approaches 
towards management of common borders” (COM 2010a: 18).  
Thirdly, several trainings and workshops were organised under the financial instrument 
TAIEX of the European Commission. Over the last years the RF participated in a seminar 
on control-free travel (Vilnius, 11-13 July 2007), Study Visits on biometric passports and 
document security (Paris, 14-16 January 2008; Rome, 26-28 March 2008), workshops on 
efficient border management systems (Batum, 14.16 January 2008) and on international 
standards in migration statistics (Tallin, 31 March – 1 April 2009) (TAEIX activity reports 
2008, 2009, 2010). 
Fourth, Frontex launched several joint operations aiming for the improvement of 
information exchange and data processing between Frontex, EU member states and the 
RF border guards. Joint operations with the RF, as e.g. Mercury 2009 (EUR 87.911), 
Good Will 2009 (EUR 27.000) and Unity 2010 (EUR 99.000), are implemented through 
the voluntary participation of EU member states, as e.g. Estonia, Finland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Austria, Germany, and Schengen countries as Norway in the 
above mentioned operations (Frontex Work programmes 2011; 2010). According to data 
processing, both parties emphasised to ease their cooperation on data protection. After 
that Eurojust became active and looked for proper seminar and exchange programmes to 
foster RF’s data protection legislation on the basis of the Council of Europe 1981 
Convention on the Automatic Processing of Personal Data and of the 2001 Additional 
Protocol thereto (COM 2010a: 43). 
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To sum up, the cooperation on border control and management is merely on technical 
issues and therefore low salient and less controversial. However, although the 
cooperation is rather intense and frequent, it is less institutionalised and has a low degree 
of legalisation. Assistance by the EU is characterised by positive conditionality, in form of 
providing financial and technical assistance according to alignment to EU standards and 
rules. Detached projects are done merely by technical bodies as Frontex, on the EU side, 
and State Border Guards on the side of the RF. Many of these projects are also carried 
out together with the support of International Organisation, primarily with the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) and agencies from EU member states. According to the 
analytical model of four modes of governance, cooperation in this policy area happens 
merely within information networks – on the exchange of information, best practices and 
knowledge – and within implementation networks on executing certain measurements. 
4.4.4 Asylum Policy and Refugee Protection 
The EU attempts to facilitate cooperation in the area of refugee protection; this 
cooperation has two major objectives: to prevent mass immigration to the EU by asylum 
seekers through demanding RF’s responsibility according to international obligations in 
the field; and to improve RF’s legislation and capacity to guarantee asylum seekers rights 
in order to be able to readmit them to the RF. In order to reach success concerning these 
ends, the EU provides substantive funding to the RF. As stated in the recently published 
country report on the situation for refugees, asylum seekers and Internally Displaced 
People (IDP) in the RF particularly include: low recognition rates of asylum application; 
lack of access to interpreters and free legal advice; lack of access of NGO’s to detainees 
at border; violation of human rights in relation to asylum seekers by border guards and 
other respective officials; and returning individuals to totalitarian regimes such as 
Usbekistan, Turkmenistan, North Korea and China against the non-refoulement principle 
enshrined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 
Protocol and Art 3 of the 1984 Torture Convention (e.g. ECRE 2008: 3; ECRE 2009: 2; 
UNHCR ‘Regional Operation Profile’ 2011; U.S. State Department ‘Human Rights Report’ 
2009; U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants ‘World Refugees Survey’ 2009; 
Afshar 2005). With regards to the lack in guarantee asylum seekers rights, EU funding 
allocates primarily expenditure on the assistance of the implementation of international 
obligation into national legislation of the RF, and also supports the law enforcement 
agencies (FMS, Border Guards) as well as building the capacity to protect asylum seekers 
(e.g. investments in reception and detention centres, housing facilities and legal 
assistance) (e.g. ECRE 2008). 
 216 
The RF welcomed EU’s assistance to implement international obligations into RF’s 
legislation, such as in particular relevant UN Conventions from the European Convention 
of 4 November 1950 for the Protection of Human Rights, the Convention of 28 July 1951 
(the ‘Geneva Convention’) and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 on the Status of 
Refugees. (EU-RF summit 2005: Art. 18).  
The RF is a party to these respective documents and included their obligations in its 
legislation on refugees. The 1997 launched “law on refugees” (RF Presidency 1997), 
which got extended through several amendments, complies  with the major internationally 
agreed convention on the protection of refugee’s rights, but lacks in its daily practice (e.g. 
UNHCR ‘Regional Operation Profile’ 2011; U.S. State Department ‘Human Rights Report’ 
2009; U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants ‘World Refugees Survey’ 2009; 
Afshar 2005). The reform legislation on RF’s law on refugees in 2007, however, happened 
in close cooperation with EU law experts.  
“[T]he law was influenced very much by EU law. […] on the asylum policy the influence is 
rather high, as the EU has a high expertise on that and Russia not” (Interview with Olga 
Potemkina, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 12 June 2009). 
Regarding the raised criticism due to imperfections in existing legislation and legal 
practice, the EU is triggered to provide sufficient assistance to RF authorities in order to 
prevent a further transit to the EU of asylum seekers and to be able to readmit irregular 
immigrants to the country from where they entered the EU. Several programmes 
concentrate on law enforcement and support measurements to: enable the access to the 
asylum procedure (legal advice, contact to NGO’s, administrate appeal and access to 
courts…); improve the treatment by border guards and migration service staff of the FMS; 
provide human board, medical assistance and lodging; prevent the readmission of 
applicants to countries where they face a credible threat of torture (‘non-refoulement’); and 
respect their status during the open proceeding. 
First and foremost, the EU created an efficient network of contact points between the EU 
(COM and member states) and RF authorities responsible for migration and asylum 
issues; taking into account the experiences and best practices gained at a bilateral level 
(e.g. Council of the EU 2006b). These information exchange networks try to gain support 
for reinforcing the asylum system which helps to protect refugees in line with the Geneva 
Convention and to extend the system to include other persons in need of protection. In 
this regard, projects – funded by general programmes (TACIS, EIDHR, ENPI) and 
thematic programmes (AENEAS, Thematic Programme for cooperation with third 
countries in the areas of migration and asylum) are worth mentioning (e.g. ECRE 2008: 
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8). New forms of technical assistance are provided by targeted expert assistance (TAIEX); 
twinning arrangements with EU member states; and participation in relevant community 
programmes and agencies (FRONTEX) (e.g. ECRE 2008: 9). Further, the European 
Council launched the High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG) 
initiating projects in the context of the Global Approach to Migration. 
Following projects were realised recently (ECRE 2008, Annex 1):  
- ‘House for Asylum seekers and Refugees in St. Petersburg’ and ‘Complex action for 
improvement of refugees reception system in St. Petersburg’ (2005-2008, HLWG and 
AENEAS) 
- ‘Network of Legal Assistance to Refugees and Forced Migrants in Russian Regions’ 
(2005-2009, HLWG, AENEAS) 
- ‘Human Rights for Russia’s Refugees (2004, EIDHR) 
- Dialogue and Technical capacity building in migration management (2003-2005, HLWG) 
- Establishing a Legal and Administrative Framework for the Development and 
Implementation of Readmission Agreements (2007-2009, AENEAS) 
To sum up, EU-RF cooperation on asylum policy matters is less intense, even though the 
EU provides financial and technical assistance to improve RF’s policies and treatment of 
refugees and asylum seekers. Anyhow, as a matter of less interest to both actors, the 
cooperation is limited to ad-hoc cooperation within certain information and implementation 
networks. As the research has identified, RF’s attempt to align international standards in 
refugee protection is more a reaction to international normative pressure than because of 
EU’s efforts. However, the EU offers support by specific funds and twinning programmes 
in order to enhance asylum policy and refugee protection in the RF and prevent asylum 
seekers from entering the EU to seek asylum (e.g. Roig and Huddleston 2007). 
Furthermore, RF’s asylum policy has a direct bearing on EU’s return policy. 
4.5 Conclusion: Depoliticisation of EU-RF’s tense Relationship 
The EU-RF relationship is special in the sense that these are two regional powers, both 
attempting to gain influence in Central and Eastern Europe while remaining suspicious of 
each others’ actions. However, both have recognised that there is a critical need for 
cooperation, which could benefit both parties in the long run. Representing a vestige of 
twentieth century afflictions, both powers have been rivals for half a century, looking upon 
each other with mistrust and resentment. Under these circumstances, it is not an easy 
task to put their relationship into a constructive perspective; create an efficient framework 
for cooperation and develop a common vision for a fruitful partnership. However, their 
mutual dependencies, especially in terms of economics, energy and security, are crucial 
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for both and create a necessity for an enhanced cooperation. According to their mutual 
dependencies, the EU and RF jointly formulated a common vision in 2003, when both 
signed the plan of action on the ‘Four Common Space’ initiative, in a way inspired by the 
‘four freedoms’ exemplified by the EU integration process. 
EU-RF cooperation in these policy areas began to intensify in recent years. The PCA, 
entered into force in 1997, introduced a legal basis and an institutional framework in order 
to structure cooperation on a widespread range of issues. This PCA is still in force and 
has proven itself suitable in strengthening the EU-RF relationship and improving their 
cooperation in crucial policy areas. The common commitments to tackle challenges in the 
area of FSJ can only materialise through concrete cooperation. Then again, the 
established institutions have proven to be a good basis for their dialogue on migratory 
issues. The PPC on JHA has thus been of crucial importance, and has been assisted by 
technical subcommittees, such as the joint committee on visa facilitation and readmission, 
as well as the visa dialogue. In contrast to the political dialogue within the PPC, the issue-
specific committees are composed of civil servants of the RF, EU member states, and the 
Commission, providing for more horizontal or symmetrical discussions based on technical 
expertise rather than political considerations; yet, in practice, the RF prefers to send either 
high-ranking officials or diplomats (e.g. Interview with Official from the EC Delegation to 
the RF, Moscow, 28 May 2009). 
The PPC on JHA, therefore, is the main decisive body that coordinates and monitors EU-
RF cooperation on migratory issues. The members of the PPC define shared objectives 
and formulate road maps and action-oriented papers. These road maps are not legally 
binding texts than political commitments. However, NEA, under current negotiation and 
intended to replace the PCA, will be more obligatory in nature. 
Owing to the more binding nature of the current draft of the NEA, our analysis observed 
an ongoing institutionalisation and legalisation of the EU-RF relationship since the PCA 
was entered into force in 1997. The respective institutions gained more and more 
competences to regulate policy issues within the PCA framework agreement. 
Furthermore, initiatives such as the ‘Four Common Spaces’ (2004) and the ‘Modernisation 
Partnership’ (2009), as well as enhanced financial and technical assistance to the RF from 
the EU, supplied the framework with specific actions and projects. According to the 
applied modes of cooperation, the analysis has shown that cooperation within EU-RF 
networks is increasingly taking place, especially in terms of information exchange, support 
for implementing the agreed road maps, and on the common regulation of trans-border 
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policy issues such as the visa and readmission policy, laid out in the relevant visa 
facilitation and readmission agreement. 
Unlike the EU’s previous external policies towards candidate countries and other 
neighbouring countries – based on governance by conditionality – (e.g. Kelley 2006; 
Trauner 2008; Trauner/ Kruse 2008), EU-RF cooperation has taken a completely different 
drift, away from a purely EU-led coordination and towards a relationship based on 
reciprocity and mutual benefits. Accustomed to coping with aspiring countries, the EU 
faces new circumstances with the RF in its attempts to govern its neighbouring countries 
and extend to them its values, rules and procedures. The RF’s administration rejects any 
form of conditionality in the EU’s policy, as it prefers cooperation between equals over 
being patronised by the EU. Additional channels for interaction and cooperation were 
introduced by both, shifting the cooperation from the mere political level to issue-specific 
expert networks. 
However, the overwhelmingly issue – in the EU-RF cooperation on migratory issues – of 
visa liberalisation strikes the reciprocity principle at its core, and is used by the EU as a 
leverage point to demand for RF policy reforms in the areas of readmission, border 
security, and refugee protection. The EU’s offer of visa liberalisation in return for 
widespread reforms in RF migration management has proven to be rather effective, even 
though the RF’s official statements reject such an approach. A good example is the 
linkage of the visa facilitation and readmission agreements, which were signed jointly in 
2006 and whose enforcement depends on the full implementation of both agreements. In 
the wake of the implementation of the visa facilitation agreement, the visa dialogue was 
set up with the aim to coordinate and monitor the path towards the abolition of visa 
requirements. The respective road map for lifting visa requirements for RF citizen got 
adopted at the 27th EU-Russia summit meeting on 10 June 2011 in Nizhny Novgorod. It 
calls for major law reforms laid down in the Schengen acquis. The road map for visa-free 
travel between the EU and the RF contains also measurements in the areas of border 
management and asylum policy. 
Although the analysis shows a continuing dominance of the conditionality mode in EU-RF 
cooperation, it also stresses the limits of this mode, when it comes to the implementation 
of concrete reforms. Therefore, as already mentioned above, several networks came into 
existence, playing a crucial role in the EU and the RF’s cooperation in the salient issues of 
migration management. Being less institutionalised but highly legalised, the conditionality 
mode’s success is limited to low salient issues or vague framework agreements. The 
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conditionality mode implies high commitments and therefore complicates possible 
compromises. 
Thus, instead of an administrative vertical relation, horizontal partnerships in the form of 
networks were increasingly introduced with the goal facilitating EU-RF interaction in order 
to share information, assist in the implementation of agreed road maps, and regulate 
transborder issues on a collective basis. These networks presuppose efficient institutions 
that are based on clear procedures, rules, and shared values. According to the theoretical 
model, the analysis differentiates between three networks, distinct in their function, legal 
commitment and institutionalisation: information, implementation and regulatory networks 
(see also section 3.1.3). 
In the RF’s case, information networks have the crucial function of facilitating contact 
between  EU and RF bureaucrats, who share their information and expertise through 
formal or informal meetings, seminars, workshops, study trips, and training sessions 
related to policies, legislation and best practices of migration-related policies (e.g. Council 
of the EU 2006b). Several of these events were organised within the TAIEX-programme 
by the Commission DG JFS, EU agencies (Europol, Frontex), EU member states’ 
agencies, and IOM together with Russian counterparts (e.g. FMS, State Border Guards). 
Of course, EU-financed events aim, first and foremost, to promote their own solution 
policies for their respective issues. 
Apart from the promotion of EU norms and standards, the information networks help to 
elaborate on concrete reforms and formulate common objectives, which are defined in 
road maps and action-oriented papers. In connection with these defined measurements, 
implementation networks are created for the realisation of agreed measures. Accordingly, 
the EU provides technical and financial assistance to help the RF comply with defined 
goals through the ENPI and the Common Space Facility. EU-financed projects were 
mainly administrated by Frontex, IOM, or grant specific funds directly to RF bodies, aiming 
to support the RF’s law enforcement (e.g. Interview with Official from the EC Delegation to 
the RF, Moscow, 28 May 2009). The most institutionalised and legalised networks are 
regulatory networks, which are given the widespread mandate to create legally binding 
outcomes, such as e.g. EU-RF joint monitoring committee on the implementation of the 
visa facilitation and readmission agreement. 
After becoming familiar with the applied modes in EU-RF cooperation, this chapter will 
conclude with the analytical research question: “how do certain conditions affect the 
structure of and modes in EU-RF cooperation on migratory issues?” Therefore, the 
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conducted analysis scrutinises the impact of the Macro conditions, bargaining power, and 
credibility, as well as the effects of issue-specific conditions, cost-benefit calculation, issue 
salience, and international normative pressure, on the applied modes in cooperating on 
migratory issues. 
If we recall the EU-RF relationship since the breakdown of the Soviet, we can see that 
both are trapped in a serious cycle of suspicion because of the burdens of the cold-war 
Both have reclaimed the status of a regional power in Europe, and therefore see their 
relationship as a zero-sum game, which has been shown through their policies towards 
their common neighbourhood in Central and Eastern Europe. The RF faced crucial 
challenges in its transition from a communist autocracy and planned economy to a more 
open political system and market economy. In the wake of this systemic transition, the 
RF’s capacity for power projection has declined, and EU has been given the possibility to 
wield power over the RF, potentially transforming this country into one based on Western 
values and legislation. 
However, this potential has gone untapped, due mostly to the EU’s internal politics, which 
hindered a united and strong EU leadership in the region. After the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992) and the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the EU was given the opportunity to improve its 
role as a regional power, and began to make serious offers to the former Soviet countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast, the lack of a concrete offer to the RF during 
the early transformation process changed the RF’s regional approach. After the internal 
struggles that came about from its systemic transition and the financial crisis in 1998, the 
RF’s status in the region increased as a consequence of its economic recovery and the 
consolidated leadership of the Kremlin with the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000. 
RF’s re-strengthening – also named in the literature as the ‘reawaken of the bear’ (e.g. 
Mangott/ Trenin/ Senn 2005; Emerson 2001) – naturally threatens the EU side, and 
triggers increasing tension between the EU and the RF in their efforts to build a beneficial 
relationship. Additionally, the EU’s bargaining power has decreased due to increasing 
dependencies on RF supplies of oil and gas and vulnerabilities to possible externalities 
from RF policies in JHA, e.g. irregular immigration from or through RF territory and into 
the EU. Furthermore, the RF plays an important role in conflict resolution in the region. To 
conclude on power relations between the EU and the RF, the analysis sees a balancing 
out of power in regards to mutual dependencies in economic, energy and security 
relations. 
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Another crucial aspect of the EU-RF relationship is the lack of trust between the two 
regional powers, based on a 40-year-old cold war logic that divided Europe into a Western 
and an Eastern hemisphere (e.g. Interview with Olga Potemkina, Institute of Europe at the 
Academy of Sciences, 12 June 2009).. The lack of interaction and systemic divergences 
impeded a fruitful cooperation between the EU and the RF. Additionally, EU’s internal 
decision-making in regards to its interactions with external partners is complicated by 27 
individual agendas towards the RF, thus undermining the EU’s role in international 
negotiations. Numerous bilateral conflicts between former Soviet countries and the RF 
have also seriously complicated the EU-RF relationship; for example, Poland and 
Lithuania’s veto against the initiation of negotiations on an NEA best illustrates the 
inherent weakness of the EU as a foreign policy actor. 
Despite the uncertainty of this starting point, the introduction of common institutions and a 
clear medium for interaction by the PCA in 1997 facilitated cooperation between the EU 
and the RF and subdued former prejudices and suspicions. On both sides of the former 
East/West divide, the establishment of such an unprecedented cooperative network 
brought with it great expectations that failed to materialise, and therefore caused 
disillusionment about the relationship. On the other hand, the new institutionalised 
interaction and a firm economic grounding increased the level of confidence. As a 
consequence of increasing interdependencies and a high level of mistrust, both the EU 
and the RF have an interest in harmonising their legislation, and agreeing on common 
rules that would create stable expectations and predictable behaviour. 
In addition, the actors experienced increasing credibility because of good experiences and 
more recent tentative rapprochements in trade and security cooperation, facilitating the 
willingness to cooperate on more difficult issues, such as JHA. Additionally, initiatives 
such as the ‘Four Common Spaces’ and the Modernisation partnership have fostered the 
EU-RF relationship. Because of numerous interactions within a variety of information, 
implementation, and regulatory networks between knowledge-based experts, EU and RF 
rules, values, and objectives begin to coincide. The respective members are socialised 
within these networks, and internalise the modus operandi. Becoming an ‘epistemic 
community37, these bureaucrats are advancing the EU-RF relationship and pushing for 
extended cooperation. 
                                                
37 Peter Haas defines an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognised 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area“ (Haas 1992: 3) 
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Whereas the individual bargaining power and the credibility of the actors have a bearing 
on the overall relations, three conditions – cost-benefit calculation, issue salience, and 
international normative pressure – solely influence the individual modes and instruments 
applied in cooperation on border management, visa facilitation, readmission, and refugee 
protection. The first factor, cost-benefit calculation, is a crucial determinant when it comes 
to the implementation of concrete actions. As in the conditionality mode, costly reforms 
are rewarded with beneficial incentives. Such package deals are an effective instrument 
with which to outweigh costs with beneficial rewards, as is what happened in numerous 
cases: the readmission agreement, which was linked with the visa facilitation agreement; 
a road map towards a visa waiver agreement; and granted financial and technical 
assistance in order to implement reforms in border management policies and refugee 
protection. 
Cooperation in the latter two policy areas is demand-driven in nature, which means, the 
RF has to call EU’s financial and technical assistance programmes. In the case of border 
management, the RF has its own interests in improving its technologies and facilities, 
enhancing its border surveillance capabilities, applying efficient procedures at the borders, 
and implementing internationally agreed standards in combating transborder criminal 
activities. Refugee protection, however, is a matter of the RF’s commitment to 
international agreements, standards on human rights in general, and refugee protection in 
specific terms. The EU, therefore, is seen as an appropriate role model in these areas, 
and the RF is willing to align with the EU’s best practices. This gives the EU a certain 
leverage as the RF finds itself obliged to adopt. The EU and its member states, however, 
are the most significant norm setter in migration management or at least, its legislation fits 
the world standards well. 
“On readmission, I have to say that the EU wanted it more than Russia, and Russia 
accepted it as a price for the visa facilitation. The carrot for our side was the readmission 
and the stick was the visa facilitation. On border management, its clearly of mutual 
benefit that boarder guards do better and more efficiently their job and prevent illegal 
migration. The idea is to have a swift boarder crossing […] while fighting illegal migration. 
That´s in the interest of both sides. On asylum policy, there is not too much cooperation 
for the moment. The deal is that Russia has to implement the international standard – but 
we don´t have a carrot” (Interview with Commission official, DG JFS, Brussels, 17 April 
2009). 
What proved to be entirely true is the impact of salience or politicisation on the mode of 
cooperation. The higher the salience of an issue, the more difficult it became to try to find 
a compromise. As in the case of visa liberalisation, the scope of action of both actors was 
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rather narrow, due to the grandiose expectations of RF citizens and EU citizens’ critical 
resentments of security threats. The negotiations, therefore, were stagnated because of 
these controversial opinions. Linking visa facilitation with the readmission agreement was 
a way out of this dilemma, but, at the core, did not meet the RF’s wish for visa-free travel. 
Finally, both were able to move forward on visa liberalisation by tackling the issue merely 
as a technical one, by focusing on policies such as: biometrics, document security, 
training of border guards, etc. Thus, both launched the visa dialogue, in which members 
were able to define a road map that included the needed technical preparations on the 
path towards a visa waiver agreement.  
Lastly, this study takes into account the effect of international normative pressure on EU-
RF cooperation on certain policies. On the one hand, the EU insists on the inclusion of 
international norms into their bilateral agreement with the RF. On the other hand, the RF 
commits itself to international agreements and treaties, but often fails when it comes to 
implementation. Because of the compliance between EU and international norms and 
standards, the EU’s attempts to align the RF to EU aquis receive support from 
international agreements and treaties.  
To summarise the major findings of this study, four interrelated propositions and 
conclusions follow from the analysis of EU-RF cooperation on migratory issues: 1) An 
effort should be made for depoliticisation, in which cooperation is treated in a more 
pragmatic manner by defining clear and realistic technical details; 2) Spill-over effects 
occur because of interrelated policy issues; 3) Institutionalisation increases because of 
good experiences within the epistemic community; and 4) Regarding regime building on 
regional migratory management, issues such as readmission of irregular migrants call for 
a regional approach and affect third countries’ policy cooperation with other countries (e.g. 
Central Asian countries). 
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5 EU-Ukraine Cooperation: Integration beyond 
Membership 
The democratic revolutions of the early 1990s in the countries of the former communist 
bloc marked a beginning of geopolitical changes that experienced a turning point with the 
accession of the ten CEE states to the EU in 2004 and 200738 and to the transatlantic 
military alliance (NATO) in 1999 and 200439. European values and EU legislation came 
closer to the borders of the Ukraine. Because of these new geopolitical realities, the 
Ukraine revaluated its regional foreign policy approach and opted to further integrate into 
the wider European and Euro-Atlantic space (e.g. Ponomarenko 1999: 13). Leonid 
Kuchma, Ukraine’s president from 1994 to 2004, declared 1998 in a decree, that Ukraine 
would set the course for European integration (President of Ukraine 1998a). In 2000, 
another presidential decree confirmed Ukraine’s efforts of approximation to the EU 
(President of Ukraine 2000). In the first transition period after Ukraine’s independence the 
country sought to reinforce its role at the edge of Europe; between the former hegemony 
RF and the aspiring civil and economic power EU. The tremendous transformation in the 
region and the decline of the RF regional leadership increased the level of uncertainty and 
led to a more open-minded foreign policy approach. Already President Kuchma set the 
course for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, while maintaining close cultural and 
economical links with the RF. However, Kuchma’s Janus-faced strategy provoked 
uncertainty by its regional partners. In brief, during a period of major geopolitical changes, 
due to EU and NATO enlargement, Ukraine under the leadership of Kuchma tried to 
reinforce its role in the region by embarking on a Janus-faced strategy which however 
diminishes its future potential in Europe. 
Facing high expectation of eventual EU integration and economic recovery, years of 
stagnation caused disillusionment and frustration and increased the public opposition to 
the Kuchma regime. As a consequence, the predefined successor, the former Prime 
Minister from 2002 to January 2005 and RF-oriented Viktor Yanukovych, lost in the first 
round of the presidential elections in 2004 against his contender and Prime Minister from 
1999 to 2001 Western oriented Viktor Yushchenko (Central Election Commission of 
Ukraine 2004). The second round was won by Yanukovych due to massive voter fraud. 
                                                
38 In 2004 eight CEE states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia) and, in 2007 Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU. 
39 Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland got NATO members in 1999, whereas the Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined in 2004. 
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Masses of people called for a repeat of the ballot, which got finally approved by the 
Ukrainian Supreme Court (e.g. Aslund/ McFaul 2006). The final re-run ballot was held on 
December 26. Viktor Yushchenko was declared the winner with 52 percent of the vote to 
Yanukovych’s 44 percent (Central Election Commission of Ukraine 2004). 
The victory of the Western oriented democratic forces opened new possibilities for the EU 
to foster democratisation and promote its European values. The new leadership of the 
main opposition groups announced EU integration as their main foreign policy goal and 
stated that EU norms and standards should guide their policy reforms (e.g. Kuzio 2006a: 
89). Despite Ukraine’s new orientation, the EU appeared to be rather reserved and 
observant in the beginning, regarding the unclear domestic developments in the 
immediate aftermath of the Orange Revolution. 
With the completion of the eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007, the EU sought to 
intensify its interaction with the newly independent country marked by its extraordinary 
size, population and geopolitical standing in Europe. Ukraine was the first post-Soviet 
country with which the EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 
June 1994. Furthermore, the EU launched the ENP in 2004 and the Eastern Partnership 
in 2009. These are policy frameworks to manage the closer interdependence with 
neighbouring countries. They should help assist Ukraine’s reform efforts after the Orange 
Revolution and stabilise the political and economical system in the tremendous 
transformation from an autocratic regime with a state-directed economy to a democratic 
and pluralistic political system with a market economy based on the rule of law. There 
appeared a necessity to intensify the political dialogue and provide sufficient assistance in 
this reform process. The EU seemed to be clear about what it does want Ukraine not to 
become – an unreformed black hole of insecurity and instability, or an integrated part of a 
new RF-led pact. Yet, the EU was not entirely clear what it should or could offer Ukraine 
for closer integration in the EU and NATO. The current negotiations on a new Enhanced 
Agreement (NEA), started in 2007, might mark therefore the next step of the EU-Ukraine 
relationship, offering extended cooperation on a widespread range of issues and the 
creation of a common free trade area as well as the prospect for visa free travel. 
This chapter scrutinises the preconditions of the EU-Ukraine cooperation on migratory 
issues and analyses the applied modes and institutions of interaction. It is structured as 
follow: It starts by tracing the internal transformation process within Ukraine and its 
relations with the EU. A focus is the recent events of the presidential election and the 
victory of the pre-Revolution and RF oriented regime under Viktor Yanukovych. The 
chapter then highlights the main issues on the agenda including trade relations; energy 
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security; Ukraine-RF relations; NATO partnership; the frozen conflict in Transnistria and 
Ukraine’s role in settling the conflict; and, ‘soft’ security issues, such as efficient control 
over border, irregular migration, trafficking of drugs, weapons, goods and human beings 
and transnational organised crime. The chapter ends by analysing the institutional setting 
of EU-Ukraine cooperation on migratory issues and examines how certain conditions 
affect the actual modes of EU-Ukraine cooperation. 
5.1 EU-Ukraine Relations in the Context of Dense Political and 
Economic Transformations 
Ukraine’s development after its independence in 1991 was turbulent and included high 
frictions. Ukraine has not made any democratic experience before being governed by the 
Moscow centred Soviet autocracy. After centuries under foreign rule – apart from a short 
period of independence from 1918 to 192240 – many domestic struggles concerned the 
project of nation-building as such, and, the definition of its role in the altered geopolitical 
context. Three major phases after Ukraine’s independence can be distinguished: 1) the 
autocratic regimes of Kravchuk and Kuchma from 1991 to 2004; 2) liberalisation 
processes after the Orange Revolution under Viktor Yushchenko from 2005 to 2010; and, 
3) A pragmatic recurrence to Pre-Revolutionary Ukraine under Viktor Yanukovych since 
25 February 2010. 
The transition period after the independence from the Soviet Union was characterised by 
a lack of political and economical reforms. The first two presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma 
had been part of the Soviet regime. Their leadership sought to continue this autocratic 
tradition in order to preserve its leadership. Kuchma, however, was aware that Ukraine 
had to emancipate from RF dominance (President of Ukraine 1999). According to his 
view, the economy should be more Western oriented to attract FDI’s. Kuchma enacted 
several decrees to open Ukraine’s economy towards the economical powerful EU: in 
1998, the decree No. 148 on ‘Facilitating Implementation of the Agreement on Partnership 
and Cooperation between Ukraine and the European Union and Improving the 
Mechanism for Cooperation with the European Union’; In 1998, the decree No. 615 
approved the ‘Strategy for Integration of Ukraine into the European Union’; and, finally in 
2003 the decree on ‘Facilitating the Activities of Ukraine's Authorized Representative on 
                                                
40 Ukraine’s independence after the October Revolution last until the Ukrainian-Polish war 
1918/1919, which entailed being divided into a West and Eastern Ukraine, occupied by the Polish 
in the West and the Soviets in the East in 1921. 
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European and Euro-Atlantic Integration’ (Ukrainian Government 2003). President Kuchma 
and the government under Prime Minister Yushchenko, who held the position from 
December 1999 to May 2001, installed several executive bodies to ensure the 
implementation of the ‘Strategy for integration of Ukraine into the European Union’ 
(President of Ukraine 1999). 
Although initiatives were undertaken to demonstrate Ukraine’s willingness to harmonise 
with EU legislation and foster economic exchange, the measurements were more 
declaratory than effective. Kataryna Wolczuk (2003) named this, little flattering, as 
“declarative Europeanisation” (e.g. Sherr 1998: 12). However, Kuchma’s leadership set 
the first stage of EU integration, even if real measures were missed. As James Sherr 
(1998) pointed out: “Ukraine’s political leaders have sometimes acted as if they could 
achieve integration by declaration, or simply by joining and participating in international 
organisational and political clubs, rather than by undertaking concrete structural changes” 
(ibid.: 2f.). This declaratory EU rapprochement shows Kuchma’s foreign policy strategy of 
counterbalancing the influence of the RF by strengthening its independence and state 
sovereignty and confirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity (e.g. Shapovalova/ Ozymok 2008: 
29).  
In line with its economical interests, Ukraine sought to place itself as a strategically 
important edge to Asia. Ukraine has seen itself as an important geopolitical partner for 
both the RF and the EU and has sought to capitalise from this position. Kuchma’s janus-
faced foreign policy was not successful; also as the EU did not respond in the expected 
way and RF’s altered foreign policy with the inauguration of President Vladimir Putin who 
increased the pressure on Ukraine’s leadership.  
On the one hand Ukraine oriented towards the West and sought to gain more 
independence from the RF, reflected e.g. with its accession to the 1997 founded 
Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova) and, the ‘Black Sea Synergy’, an EU initiative to facilitate the 
economic and security cooperation among countries adjacent to the Black Sea. On the 
other hand, Ukraine signed the agreement on the creation of a Single Economic Space 
with the RF, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2003. It also approved the take-over of the 
Odessa-Brody pipeline by a RF company, which was crucial for “Ukraine’s energy security 
from a one-sided dependence on Russia” (Shapovalova/ Ozymok 2008: 31). Shapovalova 
and Ozymok (2008) emphasises that Ukraine’s gave up its aspirations for a NATO 
membership “in exchange for the Kremlin’s political support for Victor Yanukoviych […] in 
the presidential election” (ibid.: 31). 
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Kuchma’s slow path of political and economical reforms as well as his eastward course 
caused insecurity in the Ukrainian electorate. His proposed successor Victor Yanukovych 
did not get the expected majority at the presidential elections 31 October 2004. As the first 
round did not result in a majority for one of the candidates, the regime announced its 
candidate Yanukovych as the winner of the second ballot. Because of allegations of 
widespread vote-rigging, a revolutionary movement raised – to be known as the ‘Orange 
Revolution’. It successfully came to an end when the Courts annulled the results of the 
second round and mandated to rerun the second round. As Kataryna Wolczuk (2007) 
pointed out, this decision to repeat the election was preceded by a negotiated pact 
between the two main blocs on a constitutional reform. It stipulated a shift of powers from 
the presidency to the parliament and entered into force with the parliamentary elections in 
August 2006, which was won by Yushchenko’s former opponent Yanukovych (e.g. ibid.: 
11). The opposition leader and westward oriented Viktor Yushchenko come off as winner 
at the third round, held on 26 December 2004. He emphasised that he would call the EU 
for deeper ties and outlined a four-point plan: acknowledgement of Ukraine as a market 
economy, entry in the WTO, associate membership in the EU, and, finally, full 
membership (e.g. EU Observer 2004). The Orange Revolution of 2004 improved 
Ukraine’s prospects for EU integration and made the new leaders announce to the public 
that Ukraine’s could be an EU member in the near future. “We have chosen Europe: it is 
not just a question of geography, but a matter of shared spiritual and moral values”, 
stressed Viktor Yushchenko after his inauguration (Yushchenko 2005). 
However, even if the presidency of Yushchenko was outspoken in its declarations, it faced 
major domestic challenges to execute reforms. Four major problems caused a slowdown 
of Ukraine’s reforms: 1) a constitutional trap; 2) a power struggle within the ‘Orange’ bloc; 
3) a limited technical capacity; and 4) the EU’s cautious foreign policy towards the 
Ukraine. 
First, the power balance between the President and the Prime Minister turned Ukraine’s 
domestic politics into a ruinous power struggle. It contributed to a deadlock of the reform 
agenda after the 2004 Orange upheavals. Whereas the amendments to the constitution 
contain a shift of power to the parliament and therefore a strengthening of the position of 
the Prime Minister, the ministries for foreign affairs and defence are still the President’s 
prerogative. He nominates the respective ministers, who have to be approved by the 
parliament (e.g. Council of Europe 2005). Because of this competences share, it is easy 
to block each other’. As Yushchenko’s opponent Viktor Yanukovych held the position of 
the Prime Minister from August 2006 until December 2007, they both used their 
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competences to undermine the policy of the other, as a result, hindered the country’s 
progress and reforms. Yushchenko’s efforts to align with EU legislation would have 
needed a Prime Minister agreeing on these objectives, as the government is responsible 
to execute the proposed measurements. 
Second, Yushchenko’s former ally within the ‘Orange’ bloc and Prime Minister from 24 
January 2005, Yulia Tymoshenko, turned into an opponent and got dismissed by the 
president on 8 September 2005 (Fritz 2007: 184). Held together by the common objective 
of avoiding Kuchma’s candidate Yanukovych, a power struggle between them lead to a 
split after their bloc succeeded in the presidential election. This weakened the post-
revolutionary reforms. President Yushchenko stressed that the removal was a necessity: 
“Separate blocs that emerged within the team began playing their own games behind 
closed doors, which was rather unpleasant” (NY Times, 8 September 2005). Yushchenko 
nominated his confident Yuriy Yehkanurov from his party as the successor of 
Tymoshenko. Yekhanurov’s government, however, lost its power by a ‘vote of no 
confidence’ on 10 January 2006 and got removed by the parliamentary elections on 26 
March 2006 (e.g. Kuzio 2006b). 
Victor Yanukovych’s ‘Party of Regions’ won the election and formed a Government with 
the Socialists and Communists. He became Prime Minister until Yushchenko dissolved 
the parliament again in 2007. In the following election in December 2007, the former 
members of the ‘Orange bloc’ decided to form a new alliance to succeed against 
Yanukovych and signed a coalition agreement. Yanukovych got again the majority of 
votes with a share of 32.14 percent, the alliance of Tymoshenko and Yanukovych together 
reached around 36.8 percent and formed a new government under the leadership of 
Tymoshenko (Central Election Committee of Ukraine 2007). This government acted until 4 
March 2010 with moderate success. 
Third, Ukraine’s administration lacked efficient and transparent procedures, and well-
educated personnel to enforce legal reforms. Widespread corruption, highly politicisation, 
long-lasting and intransparent procedures undermined the rule of law and paralysed 
Ukraine’s bureaucracy and scared off FDI’s. 
Finally, the EU reacted observant to the ‘Orange Revolution’ and the coming into power of 
a pro-EU president. Despite the huge expectations and the euphoric policy vis-à-vis the 
EU of the new president and the orange bloc, the EU refrained from opening the 
‘membership question’ due to the unstable political situation and the lack of political and 
economical reforms (e.g. Wolczuk 2007: 11). 
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“Nonetheless the continuing political instability was not conducive to reform. [...] There is 
a continuing need to address the country’s problems with unity and leadership” (COM 
2009e). 
The EU insisted on deepening relations in the framework of the 2004 launched ENP, 
which failed to live up to Ukraine’s expectations. Ukraine’s criticism concerned the 
cautious foreign policy of the EU and the lack of defining long-term objectives of the 
relations (e.g. Derhachov 2007). But President Yushchenko reaffirmed to continue 
Ukraine’s reform path towards integration into the EU and emphasised that the EU could 
not continue to neglect Ukraine’s membership aspiration after the adoption of EU 
legislation and widespread support for EU values (e.g. Wolczuk 2007: 11). In his first visit 
to Brussels in 2005, President Yushchenko stressed, that: 
”Accession to the EU is the aim of my country, a major task of the new government and 
my personal objective. We are ready to prove the seriousness of declared intentions by 
hard everyday work. I want every internal decision in economy or in any other sector to 
be taken in the European integration spirit” (Derhachov 2007: 3). 
Ukraine’s tenaciousness can be explained by the revolutionary experiences and the 
promise of the new leaders to bring Ukraine closer to the EU, and become a member of 
the EU in the near future. A main driving force for the pro-EU attitude of the president was 
the positive public attitude towards EU-integration. Around half of Ukrainian citizens have 
been in favour of a possible EU membership of Ukraine. However, as the results of the 
opinion poll of the National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS) showed, the support for 
Ukraine’s membership in the EU has decreased from 55 percent in 2001, to 47 percent in 
2005, and 43 percent in 2006 (cited after Shumylo 2007: 7). 
EU-integration and the closely interlinked issue of economic recovery were the most 
salient issues on the political agenda. The new leadership called the EU to provide a 
credible road map towards an EU-integration of Ukraine. In response to EU-criticism 
concerning the lack of political and economic reforms, Yushchenko “promised to close the 
gap between declarations and domestic policy-making” (Wolczuk 2007: 11). The Progress 
Report 2010 and 2009 recognises Ukraine’s reforms in economic terms, which dominate 
most of the priorities of the Action Plan, whereas it highlights crucial lacks in terms of 
democracy, human rights and rule of law (e.g. COM 2010c; COM 2009e).  
The most active ministries in putting reforms in place or accelerate rapprochement with 
the EU have been the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of the Economy 
and European Integration (MEEI). According to an evaluation of Kataryna Wolczuk (2007) 
the MFA “aligned itself with 549 out of 589 CFSP declarations or 93% compliance with the 
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EU position” (ibid: 16). The MEEI is guided by a strong self-interest, as the EU is the most 
prosperous market on the continent and the main trading partner. Ukrainian political and 
business elites have urged for the WTO accession and were keen to attract international 
FDI’s. 
An example of Ukraine’s new policy towards the EU was its visa policy. In 2005, 
energised by the victory of the annual Eurovision Song Contest, which was held in Kiev in 
May 2005 and already contained a visa lift starting from 1 May to end of August 2005, 
Yushchenko passed on the 26 July 2005 a decree ‘On the Establishment of Visa-Free 
Regime for Citizens of the EU, Switzerland and Liechtenstein’ for short-term visas 
(President of Ukraine 2005). This one-sided visa repeal was hoped to energise further 
EU-Ukraine talks on a mutual visa-free regime. The EU, however, refused a visa free 
entry regime for Ukrainian citizens as demanded reforms would not be implemented. The 
EU insisted on the implementation of the 2004 Action Plan – negotiated under Kuchma – 
and denied any concrete statement on Ukraine’s membership prospects. Yushchenko 
only reluctantly agreed to sign the Action Plan in February 2005. He emphasised its 
temporary character and referred to the forthcoming negotiations of an enhanced 
agreement in 2007 (e.g. Wolczuk 2007: 12).  
In contrast to the EU as a whole, individual member states expressed more clearly on the 
prospects of an eventual EU membership for Ukraine. Especially the new member states 
and Spain and Italy were in favour of an integration of Ukraine into the EU, according to a 
study of TNS Sofres (e.g. Gromadski/ Lopata/ Raik 2005; Shumylo 2007: 8; Roth 2007; 
Copsey/ Mayhew 2010). Poland has taken a particularly active position in promoting 
Ukraine’s integration into the EU (e.g. Barburska 2006). Also the European Parliament 
took a proactive position on EU’s policy towards Ukraine and passed a motion, on 13 
January 2005, which supported Ukraine’s path towards the EU and stressed that Ukraine 
has an option for membership by referring to Article 49 of the TEU (European Parliament 
2005). 
In the meanwhile, the EU has launched a new regional initiative, seeking to be more tailor-
made for Eastern European countries. It seeks to take into account specific country needs 
and to decouple the eastern dimension from the southern dimension (COM 2008a). The 
EU presidencies of Sweden and the Czech Republic promoted the idea of an Eastern 
Partnership (EaP), referring to the former Northern Dimension. The EaP came into force 
in May 2009. It aims to engage the Eastern countries in tackling common challenges and 
provides a framework of interaction on matters of common interest on a multilateral and 
bilateral basis. Four main areas are defined: (1) democracy, good governance and 
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stability; (2) economic integration and convergence with EU policies; (3) energy security; 
and, (4) contacts between people (COM 2008a).  
As the previous PCA and the ENP as well EaP initiatives did not raise the credibility of the 
EU in the eyes of the Ukrainian population, the negotiation on the new enhanced 
agreement is seen as a litmus test for EU-Ukraine relations. Starting on the 2 March 2007, 
Ukraine will be the first country with this kind of association agreement (COM 2007d). 
“The Association Agreement will renew our common institutional framework, facilitate the 
deepening of our relations in all areas, strengthen political association and economic 
integration between Ukraine and the European Union by means of reciprocal rights and 
obligations. It will provide a solid basis for further convergence between Ukraine and the 
EU on foreign policy and security issues, including promoting respect for the principles of 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders. [...] The 
establishment of a deep and comprehensive free trade area with large-scale regulatory 
approximation of Ukraine to EU standards will contribute to the gradual integration of 
Ukraine to the EU Internal Market. The Association Agreement will also enhance 
cooperation on a broad range of aspects of justice, liberty and security, including 
migration issues” (12th EU-Ukraine summit 2008). 
The negotiations have been ongoing since March 2007. The core of the new agreement 
shall be a free-trade agreement, which presumes Ukraine’s accession to the WTO. . The 
enhanced agreement will mark a privileged relationship between the EU and Ukraine, 
building upon mutual commitments to common values and agreed policy objectives. 
Despite the up-and-downs in domestic politics of the Ukraine, the negotiations have taken 
place without major friction. 
Due to the conflict within the Orange bloc, the little progress on political and economic 
reforms and the dramatic gas crisis with the RF, Yushchenko’s electorate support strongly 
decreased. It was no surprise that he failed to challenge Yanukovych, who run again at 
the presidential election on 17 January 2010. Instead of Yanukovych, who got only 5.45 
percent of the votes, Yulia Tymoshenko entered into the second ballot with Viktor 
Yanokovych. In the second round on 7 February 2010, Yanukovych defeated 
Tymoshenko with 48.95 percent to 45.47 percent of the votes (Central Election 
Commission of Ukraine 2010). Whereas Yanukovych became the new President and 
ended the leadership of the ‘Orange bloc’, Yulia Tymoshenko remained Prime Minister but 
got dismissed by the President and succeeded by the Yanukovych-ally Oleksandr 
Turchynov on 3 March 2010 (Kyiv Post 2010b). Yanukovych installed his ally as Prime 
Minister, and repealed the constitutional amendments of 2006, and “reinstated the semi-
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presidential system of government provided by Ukraine’s original Constitution in 1996” 
(Kyiv Post 2010c).  
The election of Yanukovych resulted in less constrained relations with the RF compared to 
the predecessor Yushchenko. The relations with the RF played in the election campaign a 
crucial role. But Yanukovych is unlikely to change Ukraine’s strategic course towards EU 
rapprochement, as the public opinion and business elites are in favour of a closer 
integration with the EU institutions (e.g. Shapovalova/ Boonstra 2010: 10). Tymoshenko’s 
position towards the RF has also become less hostile in recent years, mainly due to 
pragmatic considerations. Pragmatic aspects, in general, dominate the current foreign 
policy of Ukraine.  
Yanukovych seeks to benefit from Ukraine’s geopolitical position. He seeks an integration 
in EU and RF markets and, strengthen its role as an important transit country for energy 
supplies to the EU. In the negotiations for a NEA, it is a priority for Ukraine to get access 
to the European market through a FTA with the EU. The Ukraine seeks to strengthen 
Ukrainian sovereignty by becoming an associate partner of the EU and entering the main 
international agreements, which should help to reduce RF’s influence in Ukraine. This 
influence is strong through the take-overs of energy enterprises as the Ukrainian 
Naftoghaz Ukrajiny by Gazprom. 
Although, Yanukovych continues Ukraine’s EU rapprochement, he made a shift in 
Ukraine’s transatlantic relations and declared that he want the Ukraine to be a “non-
aligned European country“ (The Times 2010). He does thus not seek a NATO 
membership. But, following the model of the Finnish neutrality, a strategic cooperation with 
the NATO should remain in place. Yanukovych signed a treaty on extending the lease on 
the Russian Black Sea Naval base at Sevastopol, but refused to join the Customs Union of 
the RF, Kazakhstan and Belarus. This would contradict Ukraine’s aspiration for the WTO 
accession (e.g. Kyiv Post 2010d). Apart from Ukraine’s foreign policy, Yanukovych 
reversed the 2006 constitutional reforms and returned back from a presidential-
parliamentarian system to a presidential political system in order to consolidate its 
leadership by a strict vertical power.  
5.2 EU-Ukraine Relations at a Crossroad 
In recent years the EU-Ukraine relations improved. With the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004 
the Ukraine started reforms and accelerated its path into EU integration. But the economic 
and political reforms are merely done on the paper and are criticised by the EU due to 
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their limited implementation. In the following, an evaluation is done on the determinants of 
EU-Ukraine relations. Five main areas will be discussed: Trade relations and economic 
integration; Role of the RF for EU-Ukraine relations; Transatlantic Relations and NATO-
partnership; Combating security threats; Democracy and good governance; and, migration 
management. 
5.2.1 Dependencies and Potentials in Economic Relations 
In1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. The common market experienced a crucial crisis. 
From 1996 to 1999, Ukraine’s export to CIS-countries decreased to half. They even got 
outrun by the exports with the EU with 3277.3 mln. USD to 3252.2 mln. USD in 1999 (e.g. 
Shapovalova/ Ozymok 2008: 84). Due to RF’s and economic decline after the breakdown 
of the Soviet Union, Ukraine under Kuchma started to reorient its economy towards the 
prosperous EU market. This got manifested by several bilateral agreements. The main 
agreement was the 1998 signed PCA, which intensified the EU-Ukraine relations 
significantly. However, Ukraine’s external trade suffered from the eastern enlargement of 
the EU to its immediate neighbourhood and major export markets. The EU launched the 
ENP to outweigh the loss of the market separation and provided financial and technical 
assistance for the Ukraine to improve its competitiveness. The basis for any economic 
cooperation were the 2005 action plan, containing articles on the basis of the PCA (title III 
‘trade in goods’) and the provisions of the GATT (Articles XI, XII, XIV, XIX, XX, XXL) 
(European Council 2005e: Art. 25). The key issues have been, inter alia, an improvement 
of business and investment climate; the adoption of WTO-related banking and insurance 
legislation; the adoption of international customs standards; and the establishment of a 
modern company law framework (COM 2008b: 3f). These priorities have been important 
for Ukraine’s integration into the world’s trade and economic systems as well as for the 
country’s economic growth and development. The trade in steel products got partly and 
trade in textiles has been fully liberalised since 2005 (e.g. Shapovalova/ Ozymok 2008: 
88). The EU has granted reduced customs tariffs to preferential imports including 
chemicals, plant oils, minerals, base metals, machinery, and mechanical appliances, 
which accounted for EUR 1.61 billion of Ukraine’s export to the EU in 2009 (see figure 
27). EU’s accession to the WTO in May 2008 boosted Ukraine’s trade and has provided a 
more attractive investment climate for FDI’s.  
After the implementation of certain reforms, the EU has granted Ukraine better access to 
its internal market, with a prospect for a common free trade zone. The total trade between 
the EU and Ukraine has progressively increased since 2005. By now, the EU is the most 
important trade partner and biggest investor in Ukraine. In 2010, 29% of Ukraine’s exports 
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in goods went to the EU/EFTA market (31.6% in 2007), whereas, only 26% of the total 
share went to RF’s market (25.7% in 2007). Compared to 2003, the total amount of 
Ukraine’s exports to the EU/EFTA increased by a rate of 57.8% until 2010, accounting by 
1 January 2011 51.4 mln. USD. Imports of goods from the EU/EFTA grew 1.5 times 
between 2003 and 2010, accounting by 1 January 2011 60.7 mln. USD. The EU has 
become Ukraine’s largest trading partner, accounting for one-third of its external trade.  
Figure 24. Ukraine’s Foreign Trade in Goods, 2010/2007 
 2010 2007 
   
Exports Imports 
Balance 
Exports Imports 
Balance thsd.USD thsd.USD thsd.USD thsd.USD 
Total 51430521 60739969 -9309448 49248064 60669923 -11421859 
CIS 
countries 18744497,2 26697422,3 -7952925,1 18615176,8 25629473,71 -7014296,91 
of which             
Russia 13431881 22198005,8 -8766124,8 12668323,9 16837595,5 -4169271,6 
Europe 14921426,1 20230008,6 -5308582,5 15559490 23068058 -7508568 
of which             
EU + EFTA 14526033 20066992,1 -5540959,1 14823162 22893421 -8070259 
Asia 13019222,4 9796833,7 3222388,7 10189672 8921559 1268113 
of which             
Iran 1030745 49911,4 980833,6 509496,9 48324,5 461172,4 
India 1426117 680748,6 745368,4 736941,33 321406,92 415534,41 
China 1316550,1 4700393,5 -3383843,4 431655,2 3307056,7 -2875401,5 
UAE 277257,5 50866,3 226391,2 612241,2 32270,7 579970,5 
Saudi Arabia 644548,7 37358,9 607189,8 523471,3 3952,6 519518,7 
Syria 646816 44569 602247 846941,6 36347,5 810594,1 
Turkey 3026668,7 1298282,2 1728386,5 3650005 972079,2 2677925,8 
Africa 3018692,1 874429 2144263,1 2792098,3 673087,2 2119011,1 
of which             
Algeria 159343,5 4870,4   618254,99 4939,91 613315,08 
Egypt 1327993,7 84182,6 1243811,1 880028,4 77497 802531,4 
America  1625808,8 2878910,3 -1253101,5 2075491 2247472 -171981 
of which             
Brazil 359896,3 459597,4 -99701,1 366795,6 430889,4 -64093,8 
Mexico 200071,5 63353 136718,5 166827,4 23788,9 143038,5 
USA 812209 1766757,5 -954548,5 1058085,2 1397285,3 -339200,1 
Australia 
and Oceania 28398,3 261358,6 -232960,3 15704,9 128432,7 -112727,8 
Source: State Statistic Committee of Ukraine. [Retrieved from http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/, 22 April 2011] 
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Figure 25. Ukraine´s Foreign Trade in Goods, 2005/2003 
 2005 2003 
  
Exports Imports 
Balance 
Exports Imports 
Balance thsd. USD thsd. USD thsd. USD thsd. USD 
Total 34286748 36141094 -1854346 23080187 23020771 59416 
CIS 
countries 10739718,76 17030312,34 -6290593,58 6048314,59 11508372,42 -5460057,83 
of which             
Russia 7495821,72 12843419,16 -5347597,44 4311395,47 8645741,17 -4334345,7 
Europe 11371233 12675650 -1304417 9458122 8212653 1245469 
of which             
EU + EFTA 9920061 12275840 -2355779 5333913,9 6108227,4 -774313,5 
Asia 8185937 4639663 3546274 5128338,5 1953894,9 3174443,6 
of which             
India 736941,33 321406,92 415534,41 202789,42 153974,74 48814,68 
Iran 577012,01 18188,53 558823,48 295611,02 8662,63 286948,39 
China 711241,23 1810404,15 -1099162,92 1003176,9 519026,44 484150,46 
UAE 345667,66 10357,18 335310,48 137118,84 4817,77 132301,07 
Saudi Arabia 386484,29 3039,91 383444,38 236671,81 1529,43 235142,38 
Syria 676163,25 27725,9 648437,35 281811,3 10894,8 270916,5 
Turkey 2034974,78 607697,21 1427277,57 901872,44 312281,23 589591,21 
Africa 2405679,38 426207,12 1979472,26 1250377,76 248760,71 1001617,05 
of which             
Algeria 618254,99 4939,91 613315,08 351231,39 3947,99 347283,4 
Egypt 802501,88 37066,63 765435,25 291561,71 8641,64 282920,07 
America 1570195 1264858 305337 1190327,2 1043123,9 147203,3 
of which             
Brazil 110023,14 312514,95 -202491,81 177943,63 360529,9 -182586,27 
Mexico 116900,78 8497,3 108403,48 43907,9 4607,81 39300,09 
USA 956510,52 710072,65 246437,87 718649,03 498268,36 220380,67 
Australia and 
Oceania 13720,97 103951,32 -90230,35 4707,27 53448,52 -48741,25 
Source: State Statistic Committee of Ukraine. [Retrieved from http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/, 22 April 2011] 
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In terms of member states, Italy was one of Ukraine’s main partners for exports in goods, 
together with Poland and Germany, followed by Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. Italy represented 18.5%, followed by Poland with 13.7%, Germany with 11.5% 
and Hungary with 6.6% in 2010. There is a dominance of new member states, which had 
the main concentration of Ukrainian exports, with a total share of 44.3%. Germany was 
Ukraine’s most important import partner, holding 24% of the total Ukrainian imports.  
Figure 26. Ukraine’s Foreign Trade in Goods with EU Member States in 2010 
  Export Import Balance    Export Import Balance 
Total 13051,9 19101,2 –6049,3  Total 13051,9 19101,2 –6049,3 
Italy 2412,4 1390,3 1022,1  Lithuania 264,4 637,5 –373,1 
Poland 1787,2 2788,8 –1001,6  Latvia 180,2 88,1 92,1 
Germany 1499,5 4605,3 –3105,8  Cyprus 175,4 90,5 84,9 
Hungary 860,1 1214,6 –354,5  Greece 164 104,1 59,9 
Romania 705,8 682,2 23,6  Denmark 124,5 240,5 –116,0 
Czech 
Republic 626,2 747,9 –121,7  Portugal 121,8 51,5 70,3 
Slovakia 568,2 442,6 125,6  Estonia 106,3 123,4 –17,1 
Netherlands 563,2 837,9 –274,7  Sweden 77,8 358,8 –281,0 
Austria 508 697,6 –189,6  Malta 49,6 13,4 36,2 
United 
Kingdom 506,5 821 –314,5  Finland 34,1 429,8 –395,7 
France 476,9 1106,7 –629,8  Slovenia 11,6 212,6 –201,0 
Bulgaria 450,6 218 232,6  Ireland 4,5 112,1 –107,6 
Spain 411,7 468,6 –56,9  Luxembourg 4,5 29,1 –24,6 
Belgium 356,9 588,3 –231,4      
Source: State Statistic Committee of Ukraine. [Retrieved from http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/,  22 April 2011] 
The EU has replaced the RF as Ukraine’s most relevant trading partner. There is a huge 
trade imbalance between the EU and Ukraine – in 2010 the EU absorbed 29% of 
Ukraine’s exports worth 14.9 bln. USD and provided 33% of its imports worth 20.2 bln. 
USD. Thus, the trade balance is negative by 5.3 bln. USD. EU-Ukraine trade relations are 
asymmetric. In 2010 Ukraine accounted for only 0.8 of the EU’s total imports and 1.3 of its 
total exports (Eurostat/ GD Trade A2). Such small share of Ukraine in the EU trade, 
combined with the high significance of the EU for Ukraine’s trade means that Ukraine is 
more exposed to losses or benefits from closer economic cooperation than the EU. 
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Although the trade between the EU and Ukraine got more liberalised, the Ukraine is 
disadvantaged due to its weak market competitiveness. Major problems are the old-
fashioned industry, which is still highly concentrated on raw materials and is highly energy 
intensive. Further, the Ukrainian export portfolio is not very diversified. Metal products, 
energy and agricultural products account for more than half of its exports. 
Figure 27. Commodity Patterns of Foreign Trade of Ukraine, 2010 
Commodity code and title by 
Ukrainian Classification of 
Commodities in Foreign Trade 
Exports Imports 
thsd. USD 
% of the 
total 
volume thsd. USD 
% of the 
total 
volume 
Total 51430522 100 60739969 100 
Agricultural and food industry 
products 9936094 19,3 5761877 9,4 
Mineral products 6731329 13,1 21127917 34,8 
of which:         
Coal 563056,8 1,1 1781372 2,9 
Crude oil – – 4171265 6,9 
Natural gas 2023,1 0 9392940 15,5 
Products of chemical and 
allied industries 3479169 6,8 6441659 10,6 
Base metals and preparations 
thereof 17332547 33,7 4127967 6,8 
Machines, equipment and 
mechanisms, electric and 
technical equipment, audio 
and video equipment, TV 
equipment 5670416 11 8166975 13,4 
Ground, air and water 
transport facilities 3262441 6,3 3664287 6 
Source: State Statistic Committee of Ukraine. [Retrieved from http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/, 22 April 2011] 
Due to Ukraine’s energy needs, especially in metallurgic industries, almost 45% of 
Ukraine’s imports are fossil fuels. The main energy supplier is the RF. It has granted 
discounted sales for gas and oil and has a dominating role on the energy market. Being 
dependent on the RF for internal energy consumption, Ukraine is vulnerable to a price 
increase of the supplied energy resources. Gas prices are used by the RF to enforce 
Ukraine concession. After the coming into power of the West-oriented ‘orange’ bloc, the 
conflicts between the two countries increased. They were mainly related to the RF’s 
reconsidering of energy prices. The national joint-stock company Gazprom started to 
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increase the prices for gas exports to Ukraine to the level of the world market price. 
Several gas disputes were the result since 2005 due to Ukraine’s struggle to pay for its RF 
imports. In 2009, the negative climax of Ukrainian-RF gas disputes got out of hand. The 
RF started to block gas deliveries to Ukraine as of1 January 2009. This did not only affect 
Ukrainian consumer, but also had crucial implication on EU’s gas supply. The Ukraine is 
the main transit country for RF’s gas deliveries to the EU. Today around 38% of EU’s 
demand of gas gets purchased from the RF and is delivered through Ukrainian gas 
pipelines (e.g. COM 2009f: 5). The Ukrainian-RF gas dispute turned out to be a crucial 
challenge for the security of the energy supply (e.g. Council of the EU 2003a). The RF 
reacted due to these disputes and its contractual relations with EU consumers by 
constructing the North and South Stream pipelines which shall mitigate RF’s dependence 
on Ukraine’s pipeline facilitates to transport gas to the EU. But the security of gas delivery 
still plays a key role in the EU-Ukraine relations. The pipeline projects diminish Ukraine’s 
role as a main transit country of RF gas and reduce its ability to use its geostrategic role 
as a bargaining chip. 
The EU initiated already with the PCA in 1998 a framework for the EU-Ukraine energy 
relations. The first ENP Action Plan which got agreed in February 2005 and the 
Memorandum of Understanding which got signed in December 2005 both emphasised 
energy security as a key priority (e.g. COM 2005c: par. 52; COM 2007e: Annex 1; COM 
2007f: 7). Ukraine is a founding member of the Energy Community and signed the Energy 
Community Treaty in October 2005, which “acts as the basis for an emerging regional 
energy market” (COM 2007e: 23). The main objectives are to create a stable and 
regulatory market framework capable of attracting investment; to create a single 
regulatory space for trade; to enhance security of supply; to improve the environmental 
situation and to develop electricity and gas market competition on a broader geographical 
scale (e.g. Energy Community 2005: Art.2). These initiatives aim to facilitate the stable 
delivery of energy resources to the EU; to help the Ukraine to diversify its sources of 
energy supply and, hence, to gain more independence from the RF; and, finally, to 
increase its efficiency of energy production and consumption, as well as, to integrate into 
the European energy market. 
Due to the old and sparely diversified industry, FDI’s became crucial for Ukraine’s 
economic development. They should increase the competitiveness of Ukrainian products 
at the world market. Growing import from the EU had a positive effect in that it brought 
new technologies and equipment to the Ukrainian market, and thus improved the 
investment climate for foreign investors. The major obstacles have been, for example, in 
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areas such “fight against corruption, a more transparent plan for further privatisation 
consistent with the rule of law, the adoption of the Joint stock company law, 
incompatibilities between the civil and commercial codes and court systems, the overall 
improvement of transparency and predictability and further reduction of the burden of 
licensing and inspection regimes” (COM 2006c: 11). 
In recent years, Ukraine sought to create a more predictable and safer environment for 
investments to encourage investors (e.g. Copsey/ Mayhew 2006). Apart from its 
geographical position between the Western-European and Eastern-Eurasian market and 
its large inward consumer area of 45.8 mln. people (as of 1 December 2010, State 
Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2011), Ukraine’s orientation to the West after the ‘Orange 
Revolution’ and its accession to the WTO in August 2008 were the most important factors 
for FDI attraction. By 1 January 2011, a total of 44.7 bln. USD has been invested in 
Ukraine. This equates to an increase of more than 9-times, compared to 5.3 bln. USD in 
2003.  
The EU is by far the largest foreign investor in Ukraine, accounting for 76% (around 35 
bln. USD) of the total share, leaving behind the RF with 7.6% (3.4 bln. USD) and the USA 
with 2.6% (1.2 bln. USD). Before the revolutionary upheaval in 2004, the FDI from the EU 
were on a level with investments from the USA. Two years later, in 2006, FDI flow from 
the EU already ranked at a share of 71% of the total FDI in the Ukrainian economy. Within 
the EU, the main foreign investors came from Germany (29% within EU / 15.8% of total 
amount), the Netherlands (13.8% / 10.5%); followed by Austria (7.8% / 5.9%); France 
(6.7% / 5.1%) and UK (6.9% / 5.3%). Although the analysis shows a clear trend and 
highlight the importance of several actors, we have to take into account specific 
circumstances of the international financial system and the mobility of capital. The specific 
characteristics of the financial market in Cyprus and the British Virgin Island are used as a 
hub, mainly by Russian and also Ukrainian investors, to invest money in Ukraine from 
Cyprus than from their home countries (Crane/ Larrabee 2007: 17). Cyprus (22.2%) and 
the British Virgin Island (3.3%) run together for more than a quarter of the total FDI’s in 
Ukraine, as it is a combination of both Russian and Ukrainian investments. 
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Figure 28. Volume of Direct Investments in Ukraine in mln. USD 
  
as of 
1.1.2011 
In % to 
the total 
as of 
1.1.2008 
In % to 
the total 
as of 
1.1.2006 
In % to 
the total 
as of 
1.1.2003 
In % to 
the total 
Total 44708 100 29489,4 100 16375,2 100 5339 100 
 of which                 
Cyprus 9914,6 22,2 5941,8 20,1 1562 9,5 602,6 11,3 
Germany  7076,9 15,8 5917,9 20,1 5505,5 33,6 312,1 5,8 
Netherland 4707,8 10,5 2511,2 8,5 721,8 4,4 398,8 7,5 
Russia 3402,8 7,6 1462,2 5 799,7 4,9 322,6 6 
Austria 2658,2 5,9 2075,2 7 1423,6 8,7 no data no data 
France 2298,8 5,1 1046,2 3,5 no data no data no data no data 
UK 2367,1 5,3 1968,8 6,7 1155,3 7,1 510,5 9,6 
Sweden 1729,9 3,9 1006,6 3,4 no data no data no data no data 
Virgin Islands, 
British 1460,8 3,3 1045,7 3,5 688,7 4,2 337 6,3 
USA 1192,4 2,7 1436,8 4,9 1374,1 8,4 898 16,8 
Italy 982,4 2,2 no data no data no data no data no data no data 
Poland 935,8 2,1 670,5 2,3 224 1,4 no data no data 
Switzerland 859,4 1,9 583,8 2 445,9 2,7 272,7 5,1 
Other 
countries 5121,1 11,5 3421,8 11,6 2111,3 12,8 1303,3 24,5 
Source: State Statistic Committee of Ukraine. [Retrieved from http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/, 22 April 2011] 
To sum up, the EU has become the most crucial economic partner for the Ukraine. The 
economic interaction in trade and investments has boosted after the ‘Orange Revolution’ 
and the reinforced orientation to the West in political and economical terms. Since 2005, 
the EU shaped its economic cooperation with Ukraine mainly through the ENP and the 
respective action plan. The ENP envisaged as a mid-term goal a further trade 
liberalisation and the establishment of a FTA provided compliance with the trade-related 
EU acquis. Ukraine has run several economic reforms to comply with EU and Western 
market regulations. In 2008, it accessed the WTO, which was a prerogative for the 
beginning of negotiations on a common Free Trade Agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine. The FTA will be a core element of the new enhanced Association Agreement, 
currently under negotiations. 
5.2.2 Ukraine’s Path between Old Allies and New Friends: Fragile Western Options vs. 
Though Arguments from the East 
When the RF’s role as the regional hegemony was jeopardised, Ukraine’s foreign policy 
oriented itself towards alternative power centres in the West, first and foremost towards 
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the EU. This reorientation is based on security and economic considerations. The RF was 
not considered anymore as powerful enough to ensure security and economic well-being. 
Despite the common identity in history, culture and religion, Ukraine’s leaders looked for 
alternative options. The foreign policy of the Ukraine in the beginning 1990ies aimed to 
gain national sovereignty and independence from foreign influence. In this sense, an 
independent Ukraine means, first and foremost, getting independent from RF. Ukraine 
was a founding member of the 1997 established Organisation for Democracy and 
Economic Development GUAM, named after its members Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan 
and Moldova. Uzbekistan also got a member but withdrew in 2005. The GUAM has it’s 
headquarter in Ukraine and aims to strengthen the cooperation between its member 
states, and to develop an independent regional policy from RF’s dominance. After years of 
little relevance, Ukraine revived the organisation in 2005. In 2006 GUAM got an 
international organisation. 
Ukraine’s position has to be seen in its geopolitical and historical context, located between 
the RF dominated Eurasia, and the Euro-Atlantic hemisphere. The RF still considers 
Ukraine to be in its immediate sphere of interest. It has a crucial interest in Ukraine, inter 
alia: as a puffer state between the extended EU and NATO alliance and the RF territory; 
as a huge market for RF businesses; as a transit country for RF gas towards consumers 
in the EU; and, from a military strategic point of view.  
Despite the still strong influence of RF in Ukraine, EU-Ukraine relations advanced 
continuously and boosted with the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004. But already during 
Kuchma’s leadership from 1994 to 2004, Ukraine went for an EU rapprochement as an 
answer to RF’s influence by harsh power and signed as the first post-Soviet country a 
PCA with the EU. The EU-Ukraine relations didn’t develop as expected by Kuchma, not at 
least due to its autocratic political system. With the RF’s economic recovery, Kuchma 
sought again closed cooperation with the RF. However, Kuchma’s protégé Yanukovych 
failed to win the presidential elections in 2004 and, the new president Yushchenko adopt a 
clear pro-EU and pro-NATO policy. 
The RF regime was not pleased about this clear anti-RF position of the new president. 
Further, RF’s former president Putin was afraid of a spill-over to other post-Soviet 
countries, as happened in Georgia in 2003 (Rose Revolution) and Kyrgyz Republic in 
2005 (Tulip Revolution). Due to these coloured revolutions, RF’s reaction was harsh. It 
was concerned to lose its influence in the post-Soviet region and be surrounded by a 
more unpredictable neighbourhood. Especially, Ukraine got the centre for RF’s foreign 
policy of demonstrating its power. It used the country to warn other post-Soviet countries 
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to follow this path. The RF also adopted a clear position on EU’s engagement in the 
shared neighbourhood. Since the enlargement of the EU and of the NATO to the East, the 
RF got clearer in rebuffing Western exertion of influence as too condescending and too 
competitive with its own interests in the common neighbourhood. Ukraine was the centre 
of this competition on influence between the EU and RF. 
The EU introduced the ENP in 2005 and the EaP in 2009 to provide a framework for 
intense interaction with countries in the eastern neighbourhood. A membership 
perspective, however, is not foreseen. Nevertheless, the question of EU membership is a 
sensitive and rather divisive issue between the neighbour states. Ukraine, Georgia and 
Moldova still envisage EU membership as the ultimate objective in their foreign and 
internal policies (e.g. Popescu 2001). EU-Ukraine relations have advanced most within 
the ENP, which also affect EU’s relations with the RF. Ukraine is the most important 
neighbouring country when it comes to size and its geostrategic position and should serve 
in the eyes of EU officials as a reference for the relation with other third countries. The 
result of the current negotiations on the new enhanced agreement, started in March 2007, 
will probably serve as a model for other contractual relations between the EU and its 
eastern neighbours.  
The EU-Ukraine cooperation is influenced by the RF’s role in the region. EU officials are 
willing to take into account RF’s attitude and interest, including the question whether the 
RF as a ‘third party’ can be integrated in the EU’s regional policy. In the last 10 years, 
RF’s reaction to EU’s proactive policy in the common neighbourhood is bound to be one 
of deep suspicion and resentment. The EU doesn’t want to provoke the RF, in order not to 
jeopardise a stable neighbourhood and risk a further lack in energy supply. As stressed in 
the Commission’s paper outlining the EaP: “Third countries could be involved in the work 
of a thematic platform, a panel or an initiative on a case by case basis and if there is 
agreement that common interests in a topic, geographical proximity or existing economic 
links would make this beneficial” (COM 2008a: 14). Over time, however, the RF has 
become used to Ukraine’s alignment to EU legislation and accepted Ukraine’s effort as 
long as it helps to achieve a better business climate, and to make the Ukrainian market 
more predictable and more beneficial for RF investments. 
Regarding Ukraine’s rapprochement to Western security alliances, notably the US-
dominated NATO, the RF takes a clear disclaiming position. Already in July 1997, 
Kuchma advocated Ukraine’s partnership with NATO by signing the Charter on a 
Distinctive Partnership (NATO Council 1997) and, ratified the Partnership for Peace 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in March 2000 (NATO 2002). Ukraine’s pro-Nato 
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strategy got further supplemented by the 2004-elected President Yushchenko, 
emphasising that: “We must intensify our work to win membership in the European 
security system and strengthen the defence capabilities of our country [...] entry into the 
Euro-Atlantic security system is the only way to protect the lives and ensure the well-being 
of our families, children and grandchildren” (The Times 25 August 2008). 
The RF is concerned to be surrounded by a military alliance of the former opponent and to 
lose its influence in the areas of crucial security and economic topics (e.g. RF presidency 
2008). At the moment, RF already shares land and sea borders with six NATO-countries. 
The RF has a negative attitude to any further expansion of the NATO in its self-defined 
sphere of influence, which would bring NATO military infrastructure closer to RF territory. 
As the NATO council in Bucharest in April 2008 declared it would welcome Ukraine’s and 
Georgia’s aspiration becoming a member of the NATO (NATO Council 2008: par. 23), this 
step was strongly opposed by the RF. Due to RF’s harsh reaction, Ukraine’s and 
Georgia’s membership Action Plan got, consequently, postponed (FAZ 3 December 
2008). For the NATO, the dialogue with RF is a priority which should, if possible, not be 
undermined by an expansion further east. In the meanwhile, the NATO-RF relations 
improved and reached a new quality of cooperation, which will have an impact on 
Europe’s security regime in the upcoming years (see section 4.2.3). 
The RF answered to Western pro-active policies in the post-Soviet area by its own 
integrationist projects (e.g. Prystayko 2009; and, section 4.2.2). Its economic recovery 
since 2000 and the determined leadership of Putin have allowed intensified engagement 
in its post-Soviet neighbourhood. The latest Foreign Policy Concept of the RF, assigned in 
July 2008, attests that the RF “has now acquired a full-fledged role in global affairs” and 
emphasised that “the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS 
Member States constitutes a priority area of RF’s foreign policy” and should create 
“strategic partnerships and alliances” with those CIS states that “demonstrates their 
readiness to engage in them” (RF presidency 2008). 
Imitating Western-style initiatives, the RF launched the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EurASEC) in 2000 and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) in 2002 
aimed at “strengthening the integration process in the CIS” (Medvedev 2008b). The 
EurASEC is the most advanced of them. It is based on the 1996 Custom Union between 
the RF, Belarus and Kazakhstan and associates also Central Asian countries Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Ukraine has refused to take part at any of RF’s led 
institutions. 
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However, the RF is willing to use political pressure to achieve an integration of its 
neighbouring countries. In the case of Ukraine, the RF used the dependence of Ukraine 
on RF energy imports as a lever. The RF declared to stop its price discount for gas and 
increases the price on the level of the world market. Further, the RF sought to get access 
to Ukraine’s energy industry, in order to increase Ukraine’s dependence and gain higher 
profit for RF’s state-dominated Gazprom. 
In short, the shared neighbourhood between the EU and the RF is subject to intense 
struggles. Ukraine, due to its geostrategic importance, is at the core of them. Both attempt 
to integrate the Ukraine into its sphere of influence. In recent years, EU has benefited 
from Ukraine’s serious willingness to integrate into the EU and the NATO. However, the 
2010 presidential election implied a fundamental change. The ‘Orange bloc’ with its 
president Yushchenko and its pro-Western policy were voted out of office. The new 
presidency of Yanukovych is seen as pro-RF and may reorient Ukraine’s foreign policy 
towards the East. What can be said by now is that Yanukovych seeks for a more 
independent Ukraine from any Western or Eastern bloc, benefiting from its geostrategic 
location. The renunciation from the West is also based on a lack of willingness to offer the 
Ukraine a membership perspective. Another reason is that, Ukraine’s political and 
economical development is still dependent on RF’s patronage and that Yushchenko’s anti-
RF policy brought disadvantages including the gas disputes, trade conflicts, demarcation 
of Ukraine-RF border, and, hostility of the Russian minority in the Eastern part of Ukraine 
and in Crimea. 
Yanukovych has chosen a more pragmatic foreign policy and, has opened up the country 
for both the EU and the RF. When Yanukovych came to power, one of his first actions 
was to extend the lease on the Black Sea Port of Sevastopol for RF’s military fleet until 
2042. The RF, in return, has granted discounts for gas import to the Ukraine (e.g. The 
Seattle Times, 3 June 2010). But Yanukovych made it clear in a speech, that the “Ukraine 
should make use of its geopolitical advantages and become a bridge between Russia and 
the West. Developing a good relationship with the West and bridging the gap to Russia 
will help Ukraine. We should not be forced to make the false choice between the benefits 
of the East and those of the West [...] join the European Union when the time comes” 
(Yanukovych 2010). Yankovych’s rebalancing act is seen by Mykhaylo Paskov from the 
Razumkov Centre for Political and Economic Studies as: “This is about Ukraine choosing 
a foreign policy that will allow it to get the maximum result out of its cooperation with 
Russia, the EU and the U.S.” (Pashkov In: Bloomberg 2010). 
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To underscore its new strategy for Ukraine’s foreign policy, Yanukovych rejected 
Ukraine’s previous intention to join the NATO. He and declared that, "Non-aligned status 
is an objective need for new Ukraine, which is dictated by the contemporary geopolitical 
reality. By deciding not to join military alliances, we both alleviated significant tensions 
surrounding this issue at home and made a step toward improving security in all of 
Europe” (Yanukovych in Kyiv Post, 29 March 2010e). The parliament approved on 15 July 
2010 a law stipulating the country’s non-aligned status. James George Jatras, Deputy 
Director of the American Institute in Ukraine, sees in Yanukovych’s new foreign policy: 
“[t]he starting point might be consideration of institutionalizing a form of Ukrainian 
neutrality, or ‘Finlandizing’ Ukraine, to ease Russian concerns about Ukraine’s joining a 
potentially anti-Russian security organization, while giving Ukraine adequate security 
guarantees until a broader European security architecture is elaborated” (Jatras 2009). 
5.2.3 ‘In Values We Trust’: Political Dialogue between ‘Declaratory Europeanisation’ and 
Living Values in Common 
Over the past 20 years, Ukraine has experienced far-reaching economic and political 
transformations. Ukraine has, besides the Baltic States and Moldova, certainly become a 
more democratic nation than other former Soviet countries. Ukraine’s transformation since 
the breakdown of the Soviet Union was characterised by the gain of national sovereignty 
and the consolidation of the new leadership of Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) and Leonid 
Kuchma (1994-2004). Their ruling was criticised by the EU, Council of Europe and the 
OSCE for a lack of democratic governance, rule of law and transparency (e.g. COM 
2010c; GRECO 2007; Kovryzhenko/ Chebanenko 2009; OSCE 2008: 400-430). The 
public disapproval with their corrupt leaders, the weak economic recovery and the lack of 
democratic procedures led to 2004 Orange Revolution. As observers noted (e.g. 
Bogomolov 2007: 2), “the Orange Revolution was not about East versus West but about 
democracy versus autocracy” (ibid.). Far more than changing its geopolitical approach, 
the EU was seen as a reference for reforms and enjoyed high esteem in the Ukrainian 
public. 
The Ukraine has sought to integrate into the Western value system, defined by the EU, 
Council of Europe, OSCE, WTO and the UN. The Ukraine successfully adopted economic 
reforms, which led to the accession to the WTO in 2008. It was granted the market 
economy status by the EU in 2005. Ukraine became a member of ‘Group of States 
Against Corruption’ (GRECO) in 2006, and agreed with the Council of Europe on an 
anticorruption action plan in 2007 and cooperated with the Council of Europe’s Venice 
Commission on constitutional reforms (COM 2008b). Moreover, it sought for a 
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membership to the NATO and was approved as a possible member of the Alliance in 
2008 (‘Bucharest Declaration’, NATO 2008). The main reference for any reforms has been 
the EU. In 2005, the EU and Ukraine agreed on a common Action Plan, which, inter alia, 
contains measurements to improve Ukraine’s democracy, human rights, rule of law, the 
principle separation of powers, judicial independence, economic and social reforms, as 
well as cooperation on foreign and security policy (COM 2005c: par. 2.1). In detail, 
measurements to implement the action plans concern, e.g.: 
Figure 29. EU-Ukraine Action Plan (COM 2005c: par. 2.1) 
- Strengthen the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the 
rule of law 
- Further judicial and legal reform, so as to ensure the independence of the judiciary and 
strengthen its administrative capacity, and to ensure impartiality and effectiveness of 
prosecution 
- Ensure the effectiveness of the fight against corruption 
- Ensure respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, in line with international and 
European standards 
- Foster the development of civil society 
- Ensure respect for the freedom of the media and expression 
- Ensure respect for rights of persons belonging to national minorities 
- Ensure equal treatment 
- Further develop co-operation in addressing common security threats, including combating 
terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal arms exports 
EU’s leverage in Ukraine’s transformation process benefits from: the positive attitude 
towards the EU of the public; the elite’s fear of RF dominance; and, the prospect of market 
integration. Western market integration should ensure the independence of Ukraine’s 
industry. Ukraine became a willing “norm taker” although its implementation record is 
relatively weak. This is explained by the free-and-easy commitment of President 
Yushchenko, also termed as “declarative Europeanisation” (Wolczuk 2003). It got 
challenged by the lack of capacity and know-how in implementing public reforms. The 
willingness was based on the hope of an eventual EU membership. The EU has sent 
distinct signals to the Ukraine but the EU never declared a concrete membership 
perspective in any of its official agreements. In brief, the expectations of a fast EU 
integration have been a main motivation force behind Ukraine’s efforts. In the meanwhile, 
this ‘EU-phoric mood’ has disappeared and a new pragmatism has been defining Ukraine-
EU relations. 
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The Orange revolution and the election of Viktor Yushchenko as President of Ukraine in 
December 2004 marked a turning point in Ukraine’s transformation. Yushchenko’s policy 
was “unequivocally embarked on a course of Euro-Atlantic integration” (Larrabee 2007: 
30). Ukraine progressed and was classified by the Freedom House index as politically free 
in 2006 onwards (e.g. Sushko/ Prystayrko 2010). The parliamentary (2006, 2007) and the 
2010 presidential elections were quite free and fair; Civil Society groups got more than 
doubled since 2004; media is mostly free; and, the essential elements of free market 
competition have been established (e.g. Sushko/ Prystayrko 2010; Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index 2010). 
Figure 30. State of Reforms in Ukraine 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Electoral Process  3.50 3.50 4.00 4.50 4.00 4.25 3.50 3.25 3.00 3.00 3.50 3.50 
Civil Society 4.00 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.75 3.00 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 
Independent Media 5.00 5.00 5.25 5.50 5.50 5.50 4.75 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.50 3.50 
Governance* n.a. n.a. 4.75 5.00 5.00 5.25 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
National Democratic              
Governance* n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.00 4.50 4.75 4.75 5.00 5.00 
Local Democratic              
Governance* n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 
Judicial Framework             
and Independence 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.50 4.75 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.75 5.00 5.00 
Corruption 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 
Democracy Score 4.63 4.63 4.71 4.92 4.71 4.88 4.50 4.21 4.25 4.25 4.39 4.39 
             
EBRD transition 
index 2.48 2.52 2.59 2.63 2.74 2.78 2.81 2.89 2.96 n.a. 3.07 n.a. 
* Starting with the 2005 edition, Freedom House introduced separate analysis ratings for national democratic 
governance and local democratic governance.  
Source: Freedom House, Nations in transit; EBRD, Transition report 
According to observers (e.g. Moshes 2007, Bogomolov 2007) the achievements of the 
Orange revolution are remarkable and enabled a democratic Ukraine, which is unlikely to 
backslide into a post-Soviet autocracy style as observed in other former Soviet countries. 
But the democratic and economic transformation is incomplete. 
“But it is no less evident that today’s Ukraine is solely an electoral democracy – where 
people can indeed elect their future leaders – and not yet a full democracy, where their 
leaders conduct policies based on the people’s interests and expectations and where 
voters can also affect the behaviour of the leadership during the term” (Moshes 2007: 
24). 
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Ukraine still faces major problems challenging it’s recent democracy and market 
economy. As stressed by the democratic index of Freedom House, Ukraine still has a 
weak parliament, widespread corruption, intransparent decision-making and elements of 
an authoritarian culture in state institutions (e.g. COM 2010c; COM 2008b; Sushko/ 
Prystayrko 2010; Moshes 2007). Yushchenko’s reform efforts have partly failed due to the 
incapacity of the institutions to implement new laws and the constitutional order facilitating 
that the President and the Parliament can block each other; and, the collapse of the 
Orange bloc of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. The latter is seen by Larrabee (2007: 30) 
as a matter of “personal animosities and petty political ambitions”. After years of 
stagnation and corruption scandals, the electorate lost their faith in the former democratic 
elite and made Yanukovych to the new president. 
Yanukovych’s return to power had a sobering effect. But, Yanukovych made clear that he 
will continue further integration into the EU market and denied to join the RF’s led Single 
Economic Space and the CSTO. He refused the NATO membership aspiration of his 
predecessor Yushchenko and declared that Ukraine will stay neutral between the two 
major blocs based on the role model of Finland. In brief, he sought a more pragmatic path 
for Ukraine, taking advantage of its geopolitical location and acknowledging the EU’s 
refusal to consider Ukraine as a candidate state. Yanukovych attempts to gain the 
maximum benefit for his leadership, which means reaching a free trade and visa free 
agreement with the EU, safeguarding Ukraine’s energy supply and returning to privileged 
energy treatment by RF. Moreover, he restored the supremacy of the President by 
reversing the constitutional amendments introduced after the ‘Orange Revolution’. “With 
the decision coming into force Ukraine re-establishes the presidential-parliamentary 
republic according to the initial version of the Constitution adopted in 1996” (WNU, 1 
October 2010). Yanukovych justified his move by referring to the ineffectiveness of the 
post-2004 political system and stressed the necessity of a strong president. The President 
would need “real powers to coordinate and control the implementation of key reform 
issues and the country's strategic course” (Yanukovych in Kyiv Post, 24 August 2010f). 
5.3 Legal Basis and Institutional Framework of EU-Ukraine 
Relations 
This section outlines the institutional architecture of EU-Ukraine interaction. Similar to the 
EU-RF relations, the EU-Ukraine relations are built on the PCA, which entered into force 
in 1998. The ENP in 2004 and the EaP in 2009 further deepened the cooperation in 
salient policy issues and aimed at a harmonisation of Ukraine’s legislation with EU rules 
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and norms. Several financial and technical assistance programmes of the EU, its member 
states and other IO’s provide the financial means for the cooperation. This section will 
analyse the institutionalisation of legal approximation of EU laws within the Ukrainian 
executive bodies. 
The main EU-Ukraine bilateral institutions, responsible for interaction on the political level, 
are defined by the PCA. Both signatories commit (EU-Ukraine PCA: Art. 1): 
– to provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the Parties allowing 
the development of close political relations; 
– to promote trade and investment and harmonious economic relations between the Parties 
and so to foster their sustainable development; 
– to provide a basis for mutually advantageous economic, social, financial, civil scientific 
technological and cultural co-operation; 
– to support Ukrainian efforts to consolidate its democracy and to develop its economy and 
to complete the transition into a market economy. 
The institutional structure provides, on the political level, regular consultation at annual 
Summit meetings between the EU High Representative for CFSP, the President of the 
Commission and the EU presidency and the Presidency of Ukraine (EU-Ukraine PCA: Art. 
6-9). The 14th and most recent summit meeting was held in Brussels on the 22 November 
2010. A Cooperation Council supervises the implementation of the agreed Action Plans. 
Members of the Ukrainian government on the one hand, and Council and Commission 
representatives, on the other, meet on an annual basis. The Cooperation Council is 
assisted by the Cooperation Committee. It monitors the implementation of the Action Plan 
on an expert level. It meets biannual and provides the Council with evaluations and 
recommendations. The Cooperation Committee includes seven Sub-committees, each 
standing for a specific policy area including: Trade and Investment (SC 1); Transport, 
Energy, Civil and Nuclear Cooperation, Environment (SC 4); Customs and Cross-Border 
Cooperation (SC 5); and, Justice, Liberty and Security (SC 6). The implementation of the 
action plan is also observed by a delegation of the European and Ukrainian Parliament, 
meeting twice a year. EU-Ukraine relations are complemented by formal and informal 
meetings between the EU Political and Security Committee, the EU Special 
Representative and their Ukrainian counterparts at the presidential administration, Ministry 
for Justice, Foreign Affairs and Defence. 
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Figure 31. Institutional Framework of EU-Ukraine Cooperation on Migratory Issues 
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Already in 1993, President Kuchma recognised the need of institutional innovation to 
come closer to the EU. The decree of 28 August 1993 established the Inter-Departmental 
Committee of Ukraine for the EU, which aimed at coordinating the cooperation with the 
EU (President of Ukraine 1993). This committee consists of deputy directors of ministries 
and other key institutions, such as the Chamber of Commerce or the State Custom 
Service (e.g. Shapovalova/ Ozymok 2008: 7). With the entry into force of the PCA in 1998, 
the institutional architecture was changed. To improve the coordination with EU 
institutions, new institutions were created (President of the Ukraine 1998b). Instead of the 
former inter-departmental committee, the National Agency for Development and European 
Integration was created. It functioned as a sub-unit of the Ukrainian Cabinet with limited 
executive power (President of Ukraine 2003c). The key role in the process of EU law 
alignment is taken by the respective Ministries – mainly the Interior, Justice, Trade and 
Economy – and their task-specific sub-units. These got also created in reaction to the 
PCA and were tasked to implement the National Strategy on Integration to the European 
Community (e.g. President of Ukraine 1999; 1998a). The Co-ordination Bureau for 
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European and Euro-Atlantic Integration got launched as the secretariat of the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine, tasked with the administration of the EU-Ukraine cooperation. On the 
political level, the main actors are, first and foremost, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and 
its Department for European Integration. This is followed by the presidency and the 
Ukraine Committee for European Integration Issues at the Verkhovna Rada. 
The institutional structure lacked a coherent strategy and clear guidelines. The progress in 
implementing EU law was rather low. Ukraine’s rapprochement to the EU was limited 
under Kuchma. With the new ENP initiative, the cooperation got again intensified. The 
coordination of the EU rapprochement became a priority under Yushchenko presidency 
after the Orange Revolution. Yushchenko’s pro-active strategy for EU integration was 
supported by the public. The Orange coalition of President Yushchenko and Prime 
Minister Tymoshenko made efforts to approximate Ukrainian law with the acquis 
communautaire. They transformed the former Centre for Comparative and European Law 
into the newly created State Department for Legislation Approximation (SDLA) in 2004. It 
became an extended mandate to supervise the adoption of the ENP action plan (e.g. 
Shapovalova/ Ozymok 2008: 9). The SDLA was modelled after similar institutions in 
candidate countries, as e.g. the Polish State Committee for European Integration (e.g. 
Wolzcuk 2007: 9).  
In brief, following governmental bodies have been the key actors in coordinating the 
Ukraine-EU cooperation on law alignment: The European Integration Department (EID) is 
in lead and subordinated to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The EID stays in close 
contact with other executive bodies in the respective ministries – Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Finance –; aiming to 
define a common strategy on implementing the action plan (e.g. Shapovalova/ Ozymok 
2008: 15). Despite the horizontal institutional architecture, there has been a lack of 
interdepartmental coordination. A clear division of competences and a common strategy 
of the actors SDLA, EID and the Parliamentary Committee for European Integration have 
been missing. According to Shapovalova and Ozymok (2008) this lack of a competent 
central body with a clear agenda to avoid a duplication of competences and ensure 
effective and coherent mechanisms to implement the Action Plan is problematic (e.g. ibid: 
11). One reasons for the duplication of competences was the constitutional reform in 
2006, which established a complicated sharing of competences between the President 
and the Prime Minister. This overlap of competences between the coordinating unit 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the one hand, and the implementing Ministries has been a 
key challenge in the path towards EU integration. 
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As discussed, the institutionalisation deepened with the ENP initiative in 2004. The EU 
widened its assistance mechanisms for the eastern neighbours to improve the alignment 
with the EU acquis, to create a common economic and security area and to avoid new 
dividing lines in that geopolitical area. In the ENP Commission Strategy Paper, the main 
objectives have been formulated as “to give new impetus to cooperation with the EU’s 
neighbours following the enlargement. Relations with partner countries will be enriched 
drawing as appropriate on the experience gained in supporting the process of political and 
economic transition, as well as economic development and modernisation in the new 
Member States and candidate countries” (COM 2004a). 
A key element of the ENP is the three-year Action Plan, which identifies concrete targets 
and measures and should strive for “full implementation of PCA commitments” (COM 
2005c: Art. 2.3.1). The Action Plans are negotiated jointly and are the basis for technical 
and financial assistance of the EU. In 2007 the EU introduced an extended assistance 
programme with the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) for the period 
2007 to 2013, which replaced the previous TACIS programme (Council of the EU 2006h). 
The ENPI is seen as “a new framework for planning and delivering assistance is proposed 
in order to make the Community’s external assistance more effective” (Council of the EU 
2006e: Art. 1) and provides technical and financial assistance to harmonisation measures. 
EU’s assistance includes: the exchange of experts between public administrations of EU 
member states and a partner country (e.g. Twinning and TAIEX); the support of 
translating services for EU legislation texts; the training of implementing bureaucrats; the 
organisation of seminars to present best practice models; and, the application of new 
technologies and new procedures (e.g. Border Surveillance, biometric passports). All 
measures are identified in several stages: formulate common targets in crucial policy 
areas (Country Strategy Report, National Indicative Programme); conduct feasibility 
studies; monitor and evaluate its implementation with further recommendations for revised 
action plans (Progress Report). Besides the bilateral institutions, formally held responsible 
for these tasks, the EU and Ukraine launched the Ukrainian-European Policy and Legal 
Advice Centre (UEPLAC) and the Ukraine’s National Coordination Unit (NCU). They 
should facilitate the guidance and monitoring of Ukraine’s EU-law approximation. 
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Figure 32. Coordination of EU Assistance to the Ukraine 
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Source: Complementary Technical Assistance to the EU-Funded Budget Support to Ukraine's Energy 
Strategy Implementation. [Retrieved from http://esbs.kiev.ua/en/eu-ukraine-cooperation/eu-ukraine-
cooperation-and-assistance-framework, 23 March 2011] 
The total amount of EUR 494 mln. of the ENPI funding 2007-2010 concentrated on the 
following three priority areas: (1) Support for Democratic Development and Good 
Governance (30% of the total funding); (2) Support for Regulatory Reform and 
Administration Capacity Building (30%); and, (3) Support for Infrastructure Development 
(40%) (COM 2007h: 4). For the funding period 2011-2013, the budget got increased by 27 
percent with a total amount of 470 mln. (COM 2010d: 9). The main ENPI funded 
programmes are the Governance Facility, Cross-Border Cooperation, Twinning and 
TAIEX. Apart from the ENPI, further thematic assistance programmes are provided, as 
e.g. dealing with: migratory issues (AENEAS), human rights (EIDHR), Border Surveillance 
(EUBAM), transport (TRACECA) and energy issues (INOGATE).  
Despite many critics, the EU launched a new initiative on the 7 May 2009 at the European 
Council in Prague, which was thought as an attempt to take better into account regional 
differences. It added to the ENP a southern and an eastern specific policy, called 
Mediterranean Union and Eastern Partnership (EaP). The new EaP initiative addresses all 
six former Soviet countries (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and 
Azerbaijan) and aims “to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political accession 
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and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner 
countries” (European Council 2009). The EaP should offer a tailor-made initiative for the 
eastern neighbours, promoting cooperation on four thematic platform – Good 
Governance, Economic integration, Energy security and cross-border cooperation and 
contacts – at a multilateral level. Further novelties are: institutionalised sector-specific 
ministerial meetings once a year; the establishment of the EU-Eastern partners 
Parliamentary Assembly (EURONEST); and, the involvement of non-state actors within 
the EaP Civil Society Forum. Joe Boonstra and Natalia Shapovalova (2010) expect that 
“through government meetings and due to the involvement of non-state actors, the 
multilateral track activities open up a number of channels for socialisation and social 
learning” (ibid: 6). The EaP is less institutionalised than the Mediterranean Union, which 
has its own secretariat. The EU Commission solely administers EaP activities and 
meetings (e.g. Drescher 2009: 10). Despite the multilateral approach, Boonstra and 
Shapovalova (2010) criticises its regional limitation, without a suitable mechanism to 
include third countries, at least on a case-by-case base. They suggest extending the level 
of participation to countries crucial for regional specific issues, as the RF and Turkey and 
to major donors in the region, as the USA and Japan, and IO’s, as the OSCE, the Council 
of Europe and the UN (ibid: 8). 
5.3.1 Excursus: EU-Ukraine Association Agenda: Facilitate Interaction and Increase 
Ukraine’s Commitment through New Contractual Relations 
The Ukraine didn’t seem to be satisfied with the recent foreign policy initiatives of the EU – 
the ENP and EaP (e.g. Linkevicius 2008; Korduban 2009). Both initiatives undermined 
Ukraine’s hopes for full EU integration. The country perceived the EU’s policy as a stalling 
tactic to avoid a clear stance on the issue of membership. The main criticism was that the 
EU has put all neighbouring countries under one umbrella, neglecting the distinct ambition 
and efforts of these countries’ EU rapprochement (e.g. Linkevicius 2008: 77). Gromadzki 
and Sushko (2005) state: “Ukraine’s initial reaction to the ENP was that of indignation for 
being put in the same basket with clearly non-European countries of Northern Africa and 
the Middle East” (ibid: 6). However, Ukraine showed a positive will while trying to realise a 
privileged relation with the EU. According to Ukraine’s progress in EU law alignment and 
the 2008 expired PCA, the EU and Ukraine are ready to open the next stage of their 
relation and have started the negotiations on an enhanced agreement (NEA). 
The negotiations on a NEA have lasted since 5 March 2007. The Council authorised them 
on the 2 January 2007 and defined the guidelines and procedure (COM 2007d). The NEA 
will offer a privileged partnership. It aims at realising the maximum of political and 
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economic integration beyond an EU membership. This is in line with the famous speech of 
Commission President Prodi in 2002 emphasising that the EU is “offering everything but 
institutions” (Prodi 2002). The NEA will be similar to a Europe Agreement (EA) with the 
candidate countries of CEE-countries, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 
with the Western Balkan countries (e.g. Hillion 2007: 174) or the Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreement (EMAA) with Southern ENP countries (e.g. Council of the EU 
2005f). Therefore, the NEA would be an association agreement in form and function 
based on Article 310 EC. 
This implies that the NEA will be a legally binding instrument – in contrary to the previous 
instruments. This will require a reform of the current institutional arrangements into a more 
“active and influential framework” (ibid.: 179). A central decision making organ (e.g. an 
Association Council) with clear powers and tasks will be set up, as “already conferred 
upon the EMA’s association councils” (ibid.: 180). The NEA is a further development of 
the EU-Ukraine’s contractual relations, increasing the commitment of both partners which 
“go beyond and above the PCA with respect to cooperation, in various fields” (ibid.: 171). 
The former instruments, as the ENP Action Plan, the EaP and other arrangements in 
existence, will remain in place to support Ukraine’s alignment process. An innovation has 
been the initiation of a new policy instrument called the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda 
which aimed at preparing and facilitating the implementation of the Association Agreement 
(EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council 2009). The new instrument got approved at the 
thirteenth meeting of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council held on 16 June 2009. As a first 
result, the Joint Committee at Senior Official’s Level (JCSO) was established on 25 
November 2009. It is responsible for the monitoring of the progress in terms of 
implementing of the Association Agenda (Ukrainian Government 2010).  
In short, the NEA will offer an enhanced opportunity for EU integration, although it will not 
tackle the issue of membership. In its form and function, it is similar to previous EA’s, 
which have led, in the past, frequently to a membership perspective in the medium term. 
The NEA is therefore of great attractiveness to Ukraine and was used by the EU as 
leverage to induce Ukrainian reforms. Important examples were the alignment of EU 
regulatory standards in trade policy and the definition of WTO membership as a 
prerequisite for the start of negotiations. Further, the realisation of free and fair 
parliamentary elections in 2006 made conditional on its opening. 
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5.4 Governing Migration Management within the EU-Ukrainian 
Space 
In view of the altered situation in its Eastern neighbourhood, the EU intensified its effort to 
“develop partnership and practical cooperation between the European Union, its Member 
States and Ukraine in the field of justice and home affairs” (Council of the EU 2003c). JHA 
issues are at the very core of the relations next to trade. The priorities on JHA-issues are 
defined by the EU-Ukraine JHA Ministerial Troika meetings. The cooperation is laid down 
in the JHA Action Plan of 2001/2003 (Council of the EU 2003c), the EU-Ukraine ENP 
Action Plan of 2005 (Council of the EU 2005e), the revised JHA Action Plan of 2007 
(Council of the EU 2007a) and the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda, adopted by the EU-
Ukraine Cooperation Council on 23 November 2009 (COM 2009c). 
The EU-Ukraine cooperation is a particularly advanced one in the Eastern neighbourhood 
and serves as role model for other third countries. The EU is interested to minimise the 
risks related to various kinds of legal and irregular border crossing, and considers issues 
such as border surveillance, readmission of people and the treatment of asylum seekers 
according to international standards as a priority. If cooperation on these issues is 
successful, the EU might become willing to consider the facilitation of the issuance of visa 
or, in the long term, the abolition of visas. This should ensure improved mobility 
throughout EU-Ukrainian space and improve cross-border cooperation of economic, social 
and cultural character.  
In detail, the migratory related priorities, assigned in the revised EU-Ukraine JHA Action 
Plan (Council of the EU 2007a: 3-6), include, inter alia: 
Figure 33. EU-Ukraine JHA Action Plan (pages 3-6) 
Concerning institutions and procedures: 
• Develop an appropriate legislative framework related to migration management; 
• Establish the State Migration Service of Ukraine in order to ensure an adequate 
intraagency cooperation at central, regional and local levels through the combination of 
existing structures; 
• Discuss statistical key data and information on migration management, including illegal 
migration and best practices; 
• Assess the scale of illegal migration via Ukraine and monitor migratory movements. 
Elaborate risk assessment and participate in international assessments on flow of illegal 
migrants of relevance for Ukraine and systems of early prevention of illegal migration; 
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• Increase participation in regional and international migration-related cooperation networks 
and fora; 
• Examine with EU Member States and the Commission possibilities for cooperation to 
improve the management of migration flows, including the assessment of statistics and 
measures to fight illegal migration; 
• Promote Ukrainian efforts to ensure the issuance of secure travel documents and the 
development of issuing procedures corresponding to the minimum security standards 
adopted by the EU; 
• Prosecute persons using multiple identities; 
• Promote the introduction of machine-readable passports and travel documents and 
encourage further harmonisation of their security features, including biometric identifiers 
based on ICAO standards; 
• Increase the use of the Interpol database on lost and stolen blank and issued travel 
documents (ASF-STD) by national law enforcement agencies; 
 
Border Management 
• Adopt, develop and implement an integrated border management strategy; 
• Enhance inter-agency cooperation among State authorities involved in border 
management, including the clear division of responsibilities and competencies of all 
agencies. Strengthen the institutional and administrative framework and the capacity to 
implement border controls as well as improving border surveillance; 
• Improve the existing legal framework and procedures of integrated border management 
in particular at border crossing points; 
• Support the process of delimitation and demarcation of Ukrainian borders that are 
presently not demarcated according to international standards; 
• Support the setting up of a system of mobile Border Guard units, both at the border and 
covering the in-land territory; 
• Continue support for improvements of border crossing points, in particular through 
exploring the advantages of a joint use of infrastructure; 
• Review recruitment procedures for the State Border Guards Service and existing staffing 
system. Reduce as quickly as possible the use of conscripts for carrying out border 
management tasks; 
• Develop basic and specialised training for staff involved in border management functions; 
• Strengthen cooperation on issues regarding border management and improve 
cooperation between the units on the common border. Facilitate the exchange of 
information by introducing a system of joint contact offices; 
• Develop working arrangements on operational cooperation with FRONTEX, including 
evaluation, analysis and management of risks; 
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• Continue cooperation with Moldova on border issues and with the EU Border Assistance 
Mission on the Ukraine-Moldova border; 
• Engage actively in, and ensure practical follow-up to, the trilateral expert talks on border 
related issues involving Ukraine, Moldova and the European Commission; 
 
Visa Facilitation 
• Conclude the EC-Ukraine Agreement on facilitation of the issuance of visas with a view to 
entry into force at the same time and parallel implementation with the EU-Ukraine 
readmission agreement; recognise that the introduction of a visa free travel regime for the 
citizens of Ukraine is a long term perspective; 
• Encourage EU Member States to apply the common consular instructions as regards the 
documents to be submitted when applying for short-stay visas; 
• Establish an online connection between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, border crossing 
points, the Ministry of Interior and diplomatic missions and consular posts abroad, 
supported by a National Visa Register; 
• Implement decisions already taken on limiting the number of documents accepted for 
entry into Ukraine by citizens of third countries; 
 
Return Policy 
• Conclude the EC-Ukraine readmission agreement with a view to entry into force at the 
same time and parallel implementation with the EC-Ukraine Agreement on facilitation of 
the issuance of visas; monitor implementation of the readmission agreement in the joint 
readmission committee under this agreement; 
• Ensure appropriate conditions in detention centres for illegal migrants; ensure compliance 
with European standards of the administrative legislation in respect of persons detained 
for illegally crossing the Ukrainian border; ensure appropriate judicial control over all 
decisions on detention longer than 72 hours; 
 
Refugee Protection 
• Implement the 1951 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees and i.a. its 1967 
Protocol, including the right to seek asylum1 and respect for the principle of 
'nonrefoulement' by all countries in accordance with European standards and in 
cooperation with UNHCR where appropriate; 
• Develop further legislation on asylum in accordance with European standards and in 
cooperation with UNHCR where appropriate; 
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• Improve procedures related to treatment of applications on refugee status and asylum in 
accordance with European standards; 
• Register and document efficiently all asylum seekers and refugees; 
• Resolve issues related to subsidiary, humanitarian and temporary protection by adopting 
and implementing relevant legislation; 
• Improve the conditions in reception centres for asylum seekers; 
• Support, where appropriate, the objectives above, including through the pilot Regional 
Protection Programme; 
These priorities of the 2007 EU-Ukraine Action Plan on JHA seek to improve the handling 
of migratory issues, including guaranteeing migrant rights, freedoms and legal interests.  
In the following, the study examines the applied modes of cooperation in these migratory-
related issues. Importantly, the EU has sought to improve the legal and institutional 
framework. It has financially and technically supported the strengthening of crucial 
principles of democratic and good governance; rule of law; and, fundamental rights. The 
main objectives have been to implement the respective EU acquis and support Ukraine in 
aligning with international standards and values in handling legal and irregular migration. 
This includes the respect of refugee seekers’ rights and the human treatment of detained 
migrants, without a valid residence permit. The EU does put an emphasis in its migration 
management that Ukraine does not only establish these laws, but also that they are 
implemented in the day-to-day practice. The main problems to realise this relate to the 
low-skilled staff, a lack in capacities and inadequate facilities. 
The EU has been aware of the need of capacity building in Ukraine’s administration. Its 
general (e.g. Governance Facility) as well as thematic programmes (e.g. CBC, AENEAS) 
provided funding to implement a set of legislative, institutional and organisational. Within 
these programmes, several projects (e.g. GDISC-ERIT41, CBMM42) got implemented, with 
the assistance of the main IO’s in the field of migration management: IOM and ICMPD. In 
the case of fundamental rights the UNHCR has been a main partner, in border 
management the EU agency FRONTEX and in combating human trafficking EUROPOL. 
                                                
41 The EU-funded project „Capacity Building and Technical Support to Ukrainian authorities to 
Effectively Respond to Irregular Transit Migration – A comprehensive and complementary 
approach to migration management support in Ukraine (GDISC-ERIT)” gets implemented by 
ICMPD and facilitates knowledge transfer on good governance between the migration services of 
six EU Member States (Czech Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and the 
United Kingdom) and Ukraine. 
42 The EU funded programme „Capacity-Building of Migration Management: Ukraine (CBMM)” gets 
implemented by IOM and aims at improving Ukraine’s migration management capacity by 
establishing five holding facilities for the State Border Guards Service (SBGS). 
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The financial and technical assistance has sought to contribute to the modernisation of 
facilities and equipments and the improvement of law enforcement through knowledge 
transfer. The scope of action of EU agencies was enlarged for these purposes. The 
Ukrainian-European Policy and Legal Advice Centre (UEPLAC) was established by the 
EU Commission and the Ukrainian government with the mission to facilitate the legal 
approximation with EU law43. Its areas of responsibility include the consultation with 
Ukrainian authorities on drafting legal texts, the conduct of comparative legal studies, the 
facilitation of information and best practices, the training of public servants in rule 
enforcement and, the monitoring as well as the evaluation of the implementation of legal 
texts. 
Apart from EU’s support for legal reforms, it called for major institutional and 
organisational reforms in Ukrainian’s to ensure the enforcement of adopted laws. An 
objective has been the merging of competences by creating a single authority being in 
charge of developing and implementing migration policy. According to the EU-Ukraine 
JHA Action Plan of 2007, a central State Migration Service supervised by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs should be created. This new State Migration Service should combine 
several tasks of migration management by superseding the Migration and Refugees 
Department under the State Nationalities and Migration Committee (SNMC) and the State 
Department for Nationality, Immigration and Registration of Private Individuals under the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (e.g. ICPS/ IPA 2006: 34). 
These reforms have sought to reverse the former duplication of competences, which 
came as a by-product of the institutional mess after the constitutional reform of 2006. After 
this reform, parts of migration policy were under the control of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs – subordinated to the presidential administration –, and the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs – subordinated to the Prime Minister. Similar reforms have been encouraged by 
the EU for the State Border Service, suggested to be placed only under the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (ibid.: 36). In both areas, the Ukraine achieved substantial progress (e.g. 
Jaroszewicz 2011). The merging of several competences in the field of migration 
management under one roof, entitled the State Migration Service, was approved by a 
presidential decree of the 9 December 2010, which sought to optimise the public 
administration (President of Ukraine 2010). The decree No. 1085 foresees a considerable 
                                                
43 For an overview of legal reforms in Ukraine in the area of JHA: UEPLAC (2008): The inventory of 
Ukrainian Legislation and policy on the sectors covered by Action Plan on Justices, Freedom and 
Security. UEPLAC working document. [Retrieved from http://ueplac.kiev.ua/downloads/outputs/ 
assessments/08_inventory_JFS/inventory_JFS.pdf, 12 March 2011] 
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administrative reform. It centralises the tasks and competences by closing 43 
governmental agencies throughout all policy areas, inter alia in migratory-related areas. 
As Jaroszewicz (2011) emphasises in her analysis  
“the recent decision to set up the migration service is just a first step towards the creation 
of an effective system of migration management. The main problem of the new service 
will be the creation of a civil system for registering foreigners, issuing residence permits, 
granting refugee status, monitoring the migration situation, and coordinating migration 
policy in a situation when its supervisory authority (the Ministry of the Interior) remains an 
unreformed, policy-type bureaucratic institution, which is focused on combating illegal 
migration rather than legalising migrants” (Jaroszewicz 2011). 
The most effective mode to ensure alignment with the EU’s acquis communautaire is the 
use conditionality, offering rewards in return for successful implementation of reforms (e.g. 
Schimmelfennig 2007). This mode was particularly successful in the rapprochement of 
candidate countries to the EU. The membership perspective was a crucial motivation 
force for these states. This incentive is now missing in the EU’s policy towards the ENP 
countries. Already in the PCA, the EU included a human rights clause (Council of the EU 
1998a: Art. 2) as a prerequisite for the agreement’s entering into force. The conditionality 
scheme is also a main principle of the EU-Ukraine JHA Action Plan of 2001 and 2007 as 
well as the Association Agenda of 2009. The EU’s strategy is to create beneficial 
outcomes for Ukraine. This includes putting together acceptable package deals, to 
outweigh the implementation costs by adequate fund and, to elaborate a credible road 
map with step-by-step measurements to reach an attractive incentive in a more long-term. 
This conditionality mode was also applied in the EU-Ukraine cooperation on migratory 
issues. The EU has held out the prospect of financial assistance in the case of 
implementing the agreed action plans. Also, the attractive incentive of visa facilitation was 
used as a reward for signing the readmission agreement (Council of the EU 2007b). Both 
agreements entered into force on 1 January 2008. This package deal worked out rather 
well, although the Ukrainian side was quite disappointed about the final result of the 
rewarded visa facilitation. 
“Daher ist die Ukraine enttäuscht, da sie realisiert haben, dass nicht der große Wurf 
gelungen ist und die Verfahren nach wie vor großen bürokratischen Aufwand bedürfen. In 
diesem Punkt ist eine Erleichterung sicherlich nicht gelungen” (Interview with Official from 
the German embassy, Kyiv, 18 September 2009). 
The EU has used the prospect of a total lift of visa requirements for other reforms in the 
area of border management and visa policy. For that reason, the EU published a road 
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map (EU-Ukraine visa liberalisation action plan cited in: Kyiv Post, 24 November 2010g) 
with concrete actions to be taken before the abolition of visa requirements. It installed the 
visa dialogue, which consists of senior officials who observe the progress made by the 
Ukrainian administration. 
The issue of visa requirements for entering the EU is a salient issue in Ukraine. At each 
election campaign since 2004, the abolition of visa requirements for the EU has been a 
central topic and has been debated explicitly by politicians and the electorate (e.g. 
Interview with Official from the German Embassy, Kyiv, 18 September 2009). The 
Ukraine, announced the unilateral lift of visas for EU citizens in 2005, in the wave of 
hosting the Eurovision Song Contest (e.g. EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council 2008: 5). 
“Visapolitik ist ein hochsensibles und hochemotionales Thema, wobei mit falschen 
Erwartungen gespielt wurde und wird. […] Im Falle der Ukraine hatte es zu hohe 
Erwartungen gegeben, die zum Teil auch gezielt von den verantwortlichen Politikern 
geschürt worden sind. Vor allem vor Wahlen” (Interview with Commission official, DG 
JFS, Brussels, 17 April 2009). 
“[…] if you go to Kreschatik (main shopping boulevard in Kyiv] and ask the people about 
the EU – it’s all about visa” (Interview with Official from the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, 
Kyiv, 18 September 2009). 
The Ukrainian hopes for a fast track to a visa-free regime, however, weren’t met by the 
EU. The EU rather, asked for further reform efforts by Ukraine. Government officials such 
as the Foreign Minister Pjotr Poroschenko in an Interview with the Ukrainian weekly 
‘Korrespondent’ in January 2010 create hopes that a visa-free regime with the EU is 
installed soon (e.g. Ukraine Nachrichten 2009). At the same time, officials threaten the EU 
with the re-introduction of visa for EU citizens (e.g. Ukraine Nachrichten 2010). Such 
statements, however, are more propaganda directed to Ukrainian citizens as the re-
introduction of visa requirements would cost a lot of money and harm Ukrainian business 
development (e.g. Interview with Official from the German Embassy, Kyiv, 18 September 
2009). 
The implementation of the visa facilitation agreement and the readmission agreement is 
further observed by a joint committee. Both agreements are framework agreements that 
leave specific regulations and requirements open for bilateral negotiations in these joint 
committees. They consist of senior officials and experts of the relevant administrative 
bodies, as e.g. representatives from the EU Troika and, Interior Ministry, State Border 
Guards as well as Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health. Within this 
institutionalised meetings, the members develop detailed provision to implement the 
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agreements. The subject concern the readmission of irregular migrants to the country of 
origin or transit on the one hand, and to regulate and enable the facilitation of visas for 
Ukrainian citizens on the other (Council of the EU 2007b; c). The respective joint 
committee deal with issues such as readmission procedures (Art. 5-9), identification and 
documentation of readmitted individuals, data protection (Art. 13), submission of a 
readmission application between the contractual parties and the guarantee for refugee 
seekers’ rights by mandatory checks (e.g. ICPS/ IPA 2006: 17f.). Apart, both, the EU and 
Ukraine, also agreed on the readmission of third country nationals after three years of 
entry into force of the agreement. Ukraine, therefore, have agreed to take care about 
irregular residents in the EU, who entered the EU through the Ukrainian territory; and, 
take them back. Anyway, as officials from the German embassy in Kyiv and officials from 
the Council affirmed, the EU will in that case, firstly try to return the individuals to their 
countries of origin as they are afraid that individuals, who are returned to Ukraine, will 
again try to enter EU territory (e.g. Interviews with: Official from the German Embassy, 
Kyiv, 18 September 2009; and Officials from the Council, Brussels, 21 April 2009). 
In the case of the visa facilitation agreement, a key subject has been the definition and 
clarification of certificates (Art. 4). To ensure implementation, the EU has granted 
readmission-related assistance for improving infrastructure and capacity to deal with 
irregular migrants. This includes the building of detention centres and the training of 
responsible staff in dealing with irregular migrants (COM 2007i: Annex II). 
Regarding Ukraine’s objective of establishing a visa-free regime, the parties agreed at the 
EU-Ukraine summit in Paris on 9 September 2008 on the launching a “visa dialogue, 
developing the relevant conditions, with the long-term perspective of establishing a visa 
free regime between the EU and Ukraine" (Council of the EU 2008d). In some meetings of 
the visa dialogue, the current Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation was drafted and adopted 
on 22 November 2010 (e.g. Council of the EU 2010d: Art. 7). It sets requirements in four 
key spheres: (1) Document security, including biometrics; (2) Illegal immigration, including 
the full and effective implementation of the EU-Ukraine readmission agreement and of 
asylum policy provisions; (3) Public order and security, as combating organised crime and 
corruption, judicial protection and data protection; and, (4) External relations and 
fundamental rights, concerning the free movement within Ukraine, conditions and 
procedures for issuing identity documents and the protection of citizens’ rights (EU-
Ukraine visa liberalisation action plan cited in: Kyiv Post, 24 November 2010g). The Action 
Plan on Visa Liberalisation again is based on conditions to be fulfilled in order to reach the 
final goal of a visa-free regime. The EU hence uses visa-free incentive in diverse policy 
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areas, ranging from readmission of irregular migrants, border surveillance, refugee 
protection and data protection (which would be a necessity to launch the process of 
issuing biometric documents). 
To conclude, both, the conditionality mode and regulatory networks are used in EU-
Ukraine cooperation. Both modes result in aligning Ukraine’s legislation with that of the 
EU. Increasingly, the EU has applied soft modes, seeking for persuasion by: (1) promoting 
best practice models of policy regulation and facilitating the exchange of information and 
knowledge; and, (2) offering sufficient financial and technical assistance to help the 
Ukraine in implementing needed reforms. According to the theoretical model, presented in 
section 3.1.3, these modes correspond to information and implementation networks 
between the EU and Ukraine. Several projects and programmes (e.g. TAEIX, Twinning, 
UEPLAC, CBMM, AENEAS), financed by the EU, aim to support Ukraine in reforming its 
legislation. The assistance is provided for implementing reforms on border surveillance, 
document security, human resources, combating corruption, police cooperation on human 
trafficking, data protection, processing readmission and application for asylum and custom 
control. It also seeks to tackle the weak capacity by improving infrastructure (e.g. 
reception and detention centre) and high-tech equipment (e.g. biometric technology). 
Regarding border security, a major project was initiated on the 30 November 2005 
between the Ukrainian-Moldovan borders, called the EU Border Assistance Mission at the 
Ukrainian-Moldovan border (EUBAM) (Council of the EU 2005h). The main objectives 
which were  defined by a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between the three contractual 
parties are as follow: to contribute to the implementation of the EU ENP Action Plans with 
Ukraine and Moldova; to build up appropriate operational and institutional capacity to 
ensure effective border control and surveillance; to reduce possible security threats 
originating from the frozen conflict in Transnistria; and, to improve transnational 
cooperation on border management (COM 2005d: Annex). EUBAM is funded by the ENPI 
and has it’s headquarter in the Ukrainian city Odessa. Similar programmes, named ENPI 
Cross Border Cooperation (CBC) programmes), got initiated at the sea and land borders: 
Black Sea Basin, Romania/Ukraine/Moldova, Hungary/Slovakia/Romania/Ukraine and 
Poland/Belarus/Ukraine (COM 2010c: 23). 
Other thematic programmes, called Regional Protection programme (RPP) (COM 2005e) 
and ‘for the Cooperation with Partner Countries in the Areas of Migration and Asylum 
(AENEAS) (COM 2006a) were set up by the EU in Ukraine to comprehensively tackle 
asylum issues. The regional dimension of these two thematic programmes is eye-catching 
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and shows the EU attempt of implementing region-wide standards in border management, 
readmission and refugee protection, based on its own legislation in the field. 
Apart from the EU’s thematic assistance, EU agencies were also active in the EU’s 
cooperation with third countries. Frontex signed a working agreement with Ukraine on 
border management issues on 14 September 2007 at the EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv 
(Council of the EU 2007d). The new working agreement enables the Ukrainian Border 
Guard Service to benefit from Frontex training tools, which are “aimed at making the 
Service ‘Schengen compatible’” (EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council 2008:6). In addition, 
several projects got implemented by IO’s as the IOM and ICMPD and agreements with the 
EU agencies Europol and Eurojust are being negotiated. 
In brief, we can observe, in addition to the conditionality mode in negotiating on a visa-free 
regime and regulatory mode within the joint committees on visa facilitation and 
readmission, widespread activities of information and implementation networks to 
implement reforms on border control and border management, refugee protection, and 
return policies.  
5.5 Conclusion: Policy Networks in Asymmetric Relationships 
The relationship between the EU and Ukraine is out of the ordinary. Due to its size, 
geopolitical location, economic potential, and positive attitude towards EU membership, 
Ukraine is of strategic importance in the EU’s neighbourhood. However, in order to 
analyse Ukraine’s economical and political developments, its crucial historical, cultural, 
economic and security ties with the RF must be taken into account. Ukraine is central to 
the EU’s success in its neighbourhood policy. Despite internal deficiencies and a 
challenging geopolitical position, Ukraine has demonstrated its willingness to integrate into 
the Western and EU hemisphere. It can be a role model for other neighbouring countries 
and is a litmus test for the EU’s capability to act as a regional power. 
EU-Ukraine relations have intensified since the Orange revolutionary upheaval in 2004 
and the coming into power of the pro-Western coalition of Yushchenko as President, and 
Tymoshenko as Prime Minister. The EU launched several policy initiatives for 
neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe, such as the ENP in 2004 and the EaP in 2009. 
It also strengthened the financial and technical assistance programmes to support 
cooperation with these countries. Although Ukraine has complained about a lack of a 
concrete prospect for membership in these initiatives, it has become a front-runner in 
implementing the policy objectives. It is currently negotiating a new Enhanced Agreement 
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with the EU, which would includes further integration into EU institutions and policies, but, 
again, would lack a membership perspective. 
Ukraine’s leaders emphasise their willingness to integrate as soon as possible into EU 
institutions. Their priorities include visa-free travel and a common trade area. Necessary 
reforms, however, have been more declarative and poorly implemented due to internal 
political crises and weak administrative capacities. 
“[with the ‘Orange Revolution’ and the ENP] we really started cooperation with Ukraine, 
and it was fully intensive as the one with Russia. But since then they have been disturbed 
by major internal political crisis” (Interview with Commission official, Council/Dpt. on JHA, 
Brussels, 21 April 2009). 
Apart from domestic factors, this study focused on the impact of external conditions on 
EU-Ukraine cooperation as well as its applied modes and instruments. Due to the fact that 
EU-Ukraine cooperation became increasingly institutionalised and legalised since the 
PCA in 1998, the study inquired into the pre-conditions for such an institutionalisation of 
the EU’s external policy. The analysis considered the main parameters of IR to be 
bargaining power and credibility. Furthermore, issue-specific parameters, such as cost-
benefit calculation, issue salience and international normative pressure, have been taken 
into account. 
The EU-Ukraine relationship is an asymmetrical one. Ukraine can look back on a difficult 
and uncertain transformation process from a Moscow-led autocratic regime to a 
democratic political system and from a planned to a market economy. Its geopolitical 
position in between the EU and the RF – two regional powers – is seen as both a burden 
and an opportunity to function as a bridge between them. For the moment, Ukraine was a 
battleground for the EU and the RF in their struggles for influence in the common 
neighbourhood. The national sovereignty of the Ukraine, therefore, has been challenged, 
first and foremost, by its dependencies on the RF. However, the membership incentive 
may contribute to Ukraine’s reduction of this dependency. 
The EU, in general, has a variety rewards to offer, apart from the prospect for 
membership. Visa-free travel, a free-trade agreement, and an association agreement are 
all attractive leverages, set as conditions to make Ukraine implement policy reforms. The 
EU can define the cooperation by setting conditions and offering desirable rewards. The 
EU’s strategy has been to deepen cooperation and integration with Ukraine without 
offering it a prospect for membership.  
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Because of the EU’s advantages in bargaining power, conditionality in EU-Ukraine 
cooperation works rather well. Nevertheless, the EU introduced several networks to 
facilitate further reforms and assist in their implementation. With the forthcoming NEA, the 
EU strives for a “genuine enhancement of their cooperation”, strengthening the 
“obligations foreseen by its provisions” (Hillion 2007: 182). The Ukrainian side, however, 
wishes to have an EU membership prospect included in the agreement. “If the EU 
membership prospects of Ukraine are not reflected in the association agreement with the 
European Union, this agreement will be empty“ (Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych 
cited in Ukraine Media, 20 Oktober 2011). Currently, the negotiations of the EU and 
Ukraine on a trade and association treaty came to an end in October 2011 and should be 
ratified in the upcoming weeks (Wallstreet online 2011). But, according to the politicised 
trial on former Prime Minister Tymoshenko and her part in a gas deal with the Russian 
Gazprom, the EU stopped the process and the further development on the ratification of 
the agreement is uncertain (ibid.) 
“The EU will reflect on its policies towards Ukraine. The way the Ukrainian authorities will 
generally respect universal values and rule of law, and specifically how they will handle 
these cases, risks having profound implications for the EU-Ukraine bilateral relationship, 
including for the conclusion of the Association Agreement, our political dialogue and our 
co-operation more broadly” (High Representative Catherine Ashton In: COM 2011c). 
An enhanced system of monitoring and evaluation would allow the EU to guide Ukrainian 
reforms, and would also increase the chances of successful implementation and 
enforcement of legal reforms (e.g. Shapovalova 2008; Hillion 2007). The formulation of 
common procedures and rules, as well as the introduction of several networks, has 
created a stable framework for cooperation that has remained in place even after major 
changes in the political environment, such as the election of the RF-oriented Yanukovych 
as Ukraine’s president. 
However, the EU’s positive conditionality approach is challenged by Ukraine’s 
disappointment over rewards that fail to meet its expectations (e.g. visa facilitation 
agreements) and, the unclear ‘finalité’ of their relationship. The new president Yanukovych 
again, stresses Ukraine’s endeavour on becoming a fully-fledged EU member one day, 
and, hence, resume Ukraine’s foreign policy under the Orange bloc. 
“The lack of membership perspective along with the ill-defined goal of the ENP has 
limited its impact on Ukraine” (Wolczuk 2007: 20).  
"Regardless of the fact that some member states don't want to pursue further integration, 
our position remains unchanged. [...]Some sceptical member states would like to hear 
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from us: 'You don't like us. So we are going into the Customs Union [with Russia].' But 
this is not the case. I re-iterate - this is not the case. […] Despite what you may want, we 
continue to aspire to one day become a fully fledged member of the European Union“ 
(Ukraine's ambassador to the EU, Kostyantyn Yeliseyev In EuObserver, 21 October 
2011) 
Hence, the EU’s credibility as a partner has suffered, given that Ukraine feels that it must 
bear the burden of costly reforms without the promise of the ultimate carrot. Nevertheless, 
the institutionalisation of their relationship has made cooperation more predictable and 
has, in a sense, compensated for this lack of EU credibility. 
The EU has provided widespread financial and technical assistance to support costly 
reforms. Interaction within networks has helped persuade Ukraine of the necessity and 
advantages of these reforms. Together with the degree of issue salience, the possible 
costs have determined the degree of their cooperation’s legalisation. If the issues were 
salient and costly, both actors aimed to tackle these issues in an unbinding, depoliticised, 
and loose framework (e.g. visa dialogues; human rights consultations). In the case of 
salient issues, both have sought to depoliticise them, by defining technical preparations 
that must be implemented (e.g. a road map on a visa waiver agreement) (e.g. 
Jaroszewicz 2011). In such cases, the cooperation has taken place within information 
networks that include experts from both administrations. To tackle the issue of visa 
facilitation and readmission, both partners have agreed on an imprecise framework 
agreement, whose implementation is coordinated within regulatory networks of officials 
from both sides. 
Finally, the study elaborated on the impact of international normative pressure on the 
cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. As in the case of Ukraine, its leadership 
adheres to international laws and standards, as long as they support its national 
sovereignty and limit the influence of the RF. The EU is seen as Ukraine’s promoter in the 
international community, an example of which is EU support for Ukrainian access to the 
WTO. Some EU member states are strongly in favour of integrating Ukraine into the Euro-
Atlantic security regime. 
 271 
6 EU-Belarus Cooperation beyond Political Dialogue 
This chapter takes stock of EU-Belarus relations in due consideration of their mutual 
dependencies, Lukashenko’s autocratic regime, and the role of the RF. In the light of 
these matters, I seek to explain the possibilities and limitations of EU-Belarus cooperation 
on migratory issues. The attention, however, is mainly turned to the modes and 
instruments that could offer a way out of the current political deadlock and allow for 
cooperation and rule transfer. 
The following chapter begins by tracing the development of EU-Belarus relations, the 
chapter then goes on to discuss internal conditions and the role of the RF in EU-Belarus 
relations. The bulk of this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of EU-Belarus cooperation 
on migratory issues, and the applied modes necessary to succeed in rule transfer or at 
least to improve Belarus‘s border surveillance and its handling of refugee seekers. In a 
final step, the results will be discussed under the theoretical framework of external 
governance, and this chapter will conclude with an outlook on how EU-Belarus 
cooperation could evolve after they have gained experience in their cooperation on 
migratory issues. 
6.1 Belarusian Foreign Policy: Captured by Particular Interests of 
the Lukashenko Regime and the RF as its Protector State 
Belarus declared its independence on the 24 August 1991, after the reversal of the coup 
by communist hardliners in the RF (e.g. Sadowski/ Wierzbowska-Miazga/ Wisniewska 
2005: 6). Belarus’s political leaders, however, remained unaffected, and founded the new 
autonomous republic on a post-soviet style economy and political system. Then, in March 
1994, a new constitution was adopted, which replaced the soviet-style system with a 
presidential political system based on basic democratic principles. At that time, EU-
Belarus relations began to evolve, and so did Belarus’s relations with other Western and 
international organisations, such as the OSCE, Council of Europe and NATO. Belarus’s 
efforts to keep a door open for the West and especially for the EU was demonstrated by 
the 1993 drafting of the Foreign Policy Concept calling for ‘Belarus’s return to its 
European home’ (e.g. Ulakhovich 2001: 84). The basis for cooperation was then laid out 
in the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the EU and the USSR on 
18 December 1989; the EU, however, decided at their Council summit in February 1992 to 
replace this previous agreement with individual Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
(PCA) to improve the institutional, legal and administrative framework of cooperation with 
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its neighbours (COM 1992: Article 130; 228). The first version of a PCA with Belarus was 
signed on 6 March 1995 (e.g. Paznyak 2003: 5). 
Nevertheless, with the success Aleksandr Lukashenko in the 1994 presidential elections, 
the positive trend in EU-Belarus relations came suddenly to an end. From this date on, 
Lukashenko introduced an authoritarian leadership at the expense of a pluralist 
democratic political system. In 1996, he reformed the 1994 Constitution in an effort to 
concentrate competences around the presidential administration, and replaced the 
democratically-elected parliament with a national assembly nominated by the president 
(e.g. Paznyak 2003: 5; Sadowski/ Wierzbowska-Miazga/ Wisniewska 2005: 7). 
The EU – and its ‘Western’ allies – have turned away from the Lukashenko autocratic 
regime and have not recognised electoral results since 2001. This is due to certain 
activities or policies that for example, infringe on international law or human rights, do not 
respect the principal of rule of law, or depart from democratic principles, such as electoral 
fraud in the 2001, 2006 and 2011 elections; the alternation of the Constitution in 2004 to 
allow the president to stay in power for more than two terms (e.g. Rontoyanni 2005: 54); 
massive repression against opposition forces; restrictions on independent media (e.g. 
Kreutz 2009: 5); and the proliferation of arms to rogue states such as Libya, Syria and Iran 
(Kegö/ Molcean/ Nizhnikau 2011); As a result, beginning in 1997 the EU decided upon a 
number of diplomatic and economic sanctions against Belarus, including: 1) the EU’s 
decision not to ratify the PCA; 2) the suspension of high-level political dialogue and 
bilateral relations at ministerial level; 3) the freezing of EU technical assistance (TACIS) 
programs (with the exception of humanitarian aid, cross-border cooperation, nuclear 
safety programs and programs directly benefiting the democratisation process); and 4) 
restrictive measures – frozen assets and travel bans – against Lukashenko and 192 
officials of Belarus (Council of the EU 1997b: 13; Council Decision 2010/639; Council 
Regulation 2006/765). 
Furthermore, Belarus does not take part in the ENP as long as there is no PCA in force, 
but is still invited to participate in democratisation programs funded by the ENPI. The 
Council of Ministers declared in 1997 that “(t)he Council reminds the Belarusian 
authorities, and in particular President Lukashenko, that relations between the European 
Union and Belarus will not improve while Belarus fails to move towards respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and to observe the constitutional principles inherent in a 
democratic State governed by the rule of law” (Council of the EU 1997b: 13). 
Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State under the Bush administration, was even more 
direct when she called Lukashenko “the last dictator in Europe” (cited in The Guardian, 19 
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December 2010). As Paznyak (2003) pointed out, “(t)he EU continues to assert the 
importance of the reestablishment of democratic conditions, human rights and legality in 
Belarus as a necessary condition for the restoration of full Belarusian participation in 
European affairs” (ibid.: 5). 
Belarus, however, was seemingly unimpressed by the harsh tones coming from the EU. 
As a result of Lukashenko´s isolationist foreign policy, the Belarusian administration 
turned back to its big brother in the East and attempted to tighten and renew its ties with 
the RF (e.g. Rontoyanni 2005: 47). Consequently, Lukashenko and the RF’s President 
Boris Yeltsin signed several treaties to define the alliance between Belarus and the RF. 
On the 2 April 1996, the RF’s President Boris Yeltsin and Belarusian President 
Lukashenko signed a cooperation agreement on security, economy and foreign policy 
issues. One year later, on the 2 April 1997, both declared the foundation of a RF-
Belarusian Union and adopted the respective treaty another two years later, on the 8 
December 1999 (e.g. Rontoyanni 2005: 58f.; Zylus 2005: 150; Sadowski/ Wierzbowska-
Miazga/ Wisniewska 2005: 7). This treaty on the RF-Belarusian Union stipulated common 
institutions – Supreme State Council, Council of Ministers, Standing Committee, Court 
and a bicameral Union Parliament – as well as a common budget. Major objectives 
included the creation of a common economic area and a common currency (e.g. Zylus 
2005: 151f; Fischer 2007: 19). Besides signing the Collective Security Treaty in 1993, 
Belarus became a member of the Collective Security Treaty in 2002, the Eurasian 
Economic Space, and the Single Economic Space launched in 2003 (e.g. Rontoyanni 
2005: 61; Gromadzki 2009: 98). 
With the exception of regional initiatives, the idea of a Union State between the RF and 
Belarus has stagnated after Yeltsin’s loss of power: The Constitutional Act, envisaged for 
1999, didn’t even conclude in a draft; the supposed elections for the Union parliament in 
1999 didn’t take place; a common Union Court was not installed; and, the common 
currency was postponed sine die (ibid.: 61). Though these agreements resulted in almost 
no further steps towards the integration of the RF and Belarus, it clearly demonstrated 
Belarusian foreign policy and its rapprochement to the East throughout the 1990s. The 
reasons for Belarus’ eastward foreign policy are manifold and are mainly based on the 
misperceptions of both contractual partners. On the one hand, Lukashenko envisioned a 
Union in which Belarus was an equal partner to the RF, and now sees Belarus in an 
asymmetrical position, in which the constitution and the policy of the Union State will be 
dominated and dictated by the RF (e.g. Dura 2008: 4; Ambrosio 2006: 413; Dreyermond 
2004). As Zylus (2005) notes, “Lukashenka’s argument is that the federation is 
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unacceptable to Belarusians because it would mean the complete renunciation of national 
sovereignty” (ibid.: 158). This is further clarified in an article by Danilovich (2006), who 
cites Lukashenko as follows: “renouncing the course to bring Belarus closer to Russia 
would mean political death for me” (ibid.: 124). 
On the other hand, the RF pursues an ambitious goal, aiming to bring order to its 
geopolitical hemisphere, strengthen its position in Eurasia, and establish an attractive 
counterweight to the EU (see also section 4.2.2). 
“Russia’s pressure on Belarus to speed up the creation of the Union State according to the 
model proposed by Russia can be seen. In Russia, the union of two Slavic states is seen as 
a stabilising factor that strengthens Russia’s positions in the CIS and the “near abroad”. 
However, the ruling nomenclature of Belarus is not interested in establishing the Union State 
as this would put into question its future and position in the structures of the Union State that 
would be dominated by the Russian nomenclature” (Zylus 2005: 168) 
 As for the RF, it views Belarus an important geopolitical partner and a crucial ally when it 
comes to the RF’s integrationist policy towards former soviet countries. However, since 
Putin’s inauguration in 2000, their relations became more strained as Putin calls for strict 
loyalty in the RF’s foreign policy, and economic reforms in Belarus in return for the RF’s 
financial support (e.g. Vesely: 2007: 4; Gromadzki 2009: 95). Lukashenko, in contrast, 
drew attention to Belarus’s geopolitical trump cards – its part in gas and oil pipeline 
routes, its access to the RF exclave Kaliningrad, a common air raid defence system and a 
commando tower for RF submarines – and showed less willingness for economic reforms. 
Additionally, Lukashenko didn’t shy away from playing the Western card, even though his 
Janus-faced foreign policy lost its credibility and plausibility over time. This double-dealing 
became rather obvious in 1999, when both Belarus and the RF were negotiating the 
Constitutional Act for the Union State, and Yeltsin’s regime endorsed Vladimir Putin the 
successor of Boris Yeltsin. Lukashenko called for renewed cooperation with the EU and 
“more decisive steps towards Europe”, stressing that “[…] we have made a big mistake 
[…]. We have been leaning on the East too long” (Lukashenko cited in Bosse/ 
Korosteleva-Polglase 2009a: 155). 
“Change in Belarus’s attitudes and policy towards the EU – whether for better or for worse – 
have always been triggered by changes in relations with Russia. One could say that 
Belarus’s policy towards the EU is a card that Lukashenka has been playing in his relations 
with Russia. Increasing tensions in relations with Russia are followed by signs of openness 
towards the EU – and the other way around. During the energy crisis of January 2007, for 
example, Lukashenka proposed open dialogue and cooperation with the EU on such issues 
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as energy, transport, and illegal migration and announced that he would rather join the 
eurozone and the EU than adopt the Russian rouble and create a union with Russia under 
the terms dictated by Moscow” (Gromadzki 2009: 98). 
The fact remains that the RF subsidies the Belarusian economy in the form of gas and oil 
deliveries at preferential price rates (e.g. Dura 2008: 3; Glagolew 2006). Furthermore, it 
granted huge loans to Belarus both before and also during the financial crisis. The RF has 
chosen not to use its potential leverage over Belarus due to fears that turning against 
Lukashenko would result in losing Belarus to the West, as is what already happened in 
Ukraine and Georgia (e.g. Silitski 2005: 43). The RF’s passivity, however, has a decisive 
price, as it strengthened Lukashenko’s regime on the one hand, and damaged the RF’s 
image in the Western international community on the other. Therefore, Putin’s 
administration decided to handle relations with Belarus on more pragmatic footing, and 
began to demand rewards in return for the RF’s crucial support.  
To underline this request, Putin flexed his muscles, which resulted in gas- and oil-price 
aggression in 2002, 2004 and in late 2006 (e.g. Bosse/ Korosteleva-Polglase 2009a: 155; 
Fadeev 2007: 100; Mangott 2005: 91). Further, the 2006 presidential election marked a 
kind of watershed in the already-worsening relationship between Belarus and the RF. The 
election proceeded without domestic regime critics, and received massive criticism from 
the international community, who protests the 2004 constitutional changes that allowed 
Lukashenko to serve for more than two terms as the president of Belarus (OSCE 2006). 
Thus, the election results went unrecognised by the EU, Council of Europe and OSCE, 
because the election, due to massive electoral fraud, prosecution of political opponents, 
and restrictions on the media, failed to meet OSCE and other IGOs’ standards for 
democratic elections (OSCE 2006; Council of Europe 2006: PACE Resolution 1482). The 
Council of the EU decided in the aftermath of this undemocratic election, and based on 
the on-going violation of human rights and repression of political activists, to adopt other 
restrictive measures or rather extend the previous ones against Lukashenko’s regime 
(Council of the EU 2006f). 
The self-imposed isolation of the Lukashenko regime thus reached its peak, and its only 
remaining ally became the RF. Still the RF’s support was also not without controversy, as 
Putin attempted a regime change and called on Lukashenko to leave the presidency after 
his second term (e.g. Fischer 2007: 14). The RF knew that it could potentially be harmed 
by supporting the Lukashenko regime, which could have a negative influence on the RF’s 
rapprochement to the West as well. The RF, however, tried to take advantage of the 
isolated Belarus and intensified its interests in its relations with Belarus. In 2006, Putin 
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finally ordered an end to the subsidies for Belarus and called for a gradual increase in the 
gas price (starting from $46.68 in 2006 to $150 in 2009, which still remains far below the 
European market price of $250 in 2009), an acquisition of a 50% share in Beltransgaz by 
Gazprom and a 70% share in tax revenues for deliveries of transit gas to EU countries 
(e.g. Dura 2008: 3; Haukkala/ Moshes 2007: 3; Socor 2007; Korosteleva 2007: 8, 
Glagolew 2006: 13; Timmermann 2006: 5). Against all odds, the RF decided to build the 
North Stream pipeline to bypass Belarus and abandoned previous plans to build the so-
called Yamal-Europe II pipeline through Belarus (e.g. Dura 2008: 3). In light of the fact 
that refined oil and gas is one of the main export goods of Belarus and account for a large 
share of the Belarusian GDP, the Lukashenko administration came under enormous 
pressure. Dura (2008) noted that: 
“… the new conditions dictated by Moscow, however, Lukashenko´s ´economic miracle´ 
may become more difficult to sustain […] Belarus may in the short run continue to rely on 
adjustment loans granted by the Russian Federation to cover its budget deficit, but it may 
become more inclined to consider certain economic reforms, a diversification of its energy 
supplies and the attraction of foreign capital and trade partners from the EU” (ibid.: 4). 
Although Lukashenko’s regime was under immense pressure due to Putin’s new policy 
towards Belarus, he has no other options if he wants to maintain his regime. The EU put 
in place clear conditions that which would allow for a renewal of EU-Belarus relations; this 
would mean, first of all, the ratification of the PCA. Lukashenko is aware of this, and 
knows that, if he were to agree on reforms to remove the sanctions, his regime would be 
under enormous pressure and possibly end. In this context, Dura (2008) stressed that 
“Lukashenko would have to democratise Belarusian politics and society, thereby seriously 
jeopardizing his future as Belarus’ president” (ibid.: 6). So, Lukashenko see himself in a 
kind of deadlock. As long as the RF supports his country, he could maintain his regime; 
however, the RF under Putin will let him soak for that. Hence, the RF’s attempt to include 
Belarus in an RF-dominated mere economic area received a new impetus in recent years 
(see also section 4.2.2). The question is how long the business elites and the military 
forces will support Lukashenko under these circumstances. 
Since 1996, Belarus has languished in a state of self-imposed political isolation. All these 
years, it has ignored the risks of its isolationist foreign policy and its growing dependence 
on the RF’s subsidies and resources. 
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“By 2005, Belarus has become an anomaly in Europe, an isolated authoritarian state, 
surrounded by a sea of democracies or states on the path towards democracy. Belarus is 
not in ‘transition’; it seems to have ‘arrived’ and in a lonely, dark corner of Europe” (Trenin 
2005: 107). 
However, since 2006, the geopolitical situation has changed, mainly because of the RF’s 
intensified political pressure on Lukashenko, their conflicts over gas prices, and the 
international financial crisis. Belarus’s dependency on the RF harms Belarus’s interests 
and complicates its relations to other countries and international actors, which compels 
Lukashenko to achieve a greater balance between the RF and the West. However, 
Lukashenko’s options are quite limited due to sanctions in force by the West. In the non-
paper ‘What the European Union could bring to Belarus’, the EU made clear what 
Belarusian authorities must do to become a partner of the EU (COM 2006i). 
Lukashenko repeatedly emphasised the need to end Belarus’s one-sided relationship with 
the RF and create a multi-vectoral foreign policy, meaning first and foremost the need to 
seek closer relations with the EU and pursue cooperation in several areas of mutual 
interest, including transport, borders, and energy (e.g. Racz 2010: 8; Gromadzki 2009: 
101; Dura 2008: 4). 
“Our strategic line to the European Union is clear. We are saying frankly: without 
intending to join the EU, we offer a mutually beneficial partnership with this strong 
neighbour […] Belarus is not an enemy of the EU, she is their partner. We are ready to 
cooperate” (Lukashenko 2006). 
In another speech, Lukashenko spoke even more directly, stating that “(w)e are very 
interested in cooperating with the West, especially the EU” (ibid. 2008). Belarus’s turn-
around is explained by its need to attract FDI’s, gain access to financial assistance to 
combat the financial crisis and, at the same time, to reduce its dependency on the RF. 
Further, in 2008 Lukashenko demonstrated his shift towards the West by releasing six 
internationally recognised political prisoners, declaring non-recognition of South-Ossetia 
and Abkhazia independence, and signing an agreement to establish the Delegation of the 
European Commission in Minsk (e.g. Vieira 2008: 3). In return, the EU began talks with 
Belarus on energy cooperation (ibid.) and, for a period of 6 months, suspended the visa 
ban against high-ranked Belarusian officials (Council of the EU 2008h). The suspension of 
the visa ban was enacted during the establishment of the Eastern Partnership in May 
2009 in order to include all participants of this initiative in the preparatory talks. Hence, 
EU-Belarus relations began to thaw, and official contacts were restored at EU-Belarus 
Troika meetings, which addressed internal developments in the country, regional matters, 
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the economic situation, and energy issues. Regarding the resumption of official contacts, 
before the Troika meeting with Belarus on 27 January 2009, European Commissioner for 
External Relations and ENP, Benita Ferrero-Waldner emphasised in a press release that: 
“We recognise that some positive steps have already been taken by Belarus, and in 
response, the Commission has entered into an intensified dialogue with Belarus on energy, 
environment, customs, transport and food safety. I will be calling on my Belarusian 
counterpart to take further steps in the right direction so that we can develop our 
relationship” (Ferrero-Waldner in COM 2009h)  
The new value of EU-Belarus relations is based on the renewed high-level political 
dialogue and intensified technical cooperation that has been initiated by the Commission, 
“as a way of building mutual understanding and providing an opportunity to address the 
parties´ concerns and issues of common interest” (Council of the EU 2009d). 
Furthermore, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership, which provides a more structured 
relationship with all Eastern neighbours in a regional format. For Belarus, this is currently 
the only way to maintain a political dialogue with EU officials, as long as there is no PCA 
in force. 
To sum up this analysis of EU-Belarus relations, Lukashenko has had his day. His 
options, regarding Belarus’s foreign policy, are restricted, and his self-imposed isolation 
left the country reliant solely on the courtesy of the RF, who were subsidising 
Lukashenko’s economic miracle all these years with huge loans and reduced oil and gas 
prices. The re-export of oil and gas to the EU was considered one of the engines of the 
“Belarusian economic miracle in the early and mid-2000s” (Zlotnikov 2009: 77). However, 
since Lukashenko has his back up against the wall, the RF has intensified its interest in 
Belarus, and attempts to include Belarus in its hemisphere by establishing an RF-
dominated economic area in Eurasia. The EU, again, asserted its position against 
Lukashenko’s violation of democratic principles and human rights and broke tie with 
Belarus officials.  
Furthermore, the EU imposed restrictive measures against the Lukashenko regime, and 
halted the ratification of the PCA. However, due to the RF’s political and economic 
support, the EU’s sanctions failed to show any success at all. This is also a major 
disadvantage for the EU’s regional policy, and hinders its attempt to combat possible 
negative externalities, such as supply shortages of gas; weak border surveillance 
facilitating irregular migration and trafficking of weapons, human beings and drugs; and, 
environmental threats. Moreover, the EU’s sanctions hinder its companies’ access to the 
Belarusian market, and therefore put at risk the profits from the on-going privatisation of 
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state-owned companies. As a result, the EU initiated, inter alia, the Eastern Partnership, 
as a new forum for interaction and addressing mutual interests. On the 16 March 2009, 
the EU declared its suspension of the visa ban against Lukashenko and 35 other officials 
of his cabinet on a six-month temporarily basis. 
Although trade between the EU and Belarus has grown in recent years, the EU has 
suspended movements towards a closer economic partnership with Belarus until the 
Lukashenko government shows a greater commitment to democracy and civil rights (COM 
2008c). Despite the limitations on trade and economic relations between the EU and 
Belarus, the EU’s significance for Belarus increased. In 2010, the EU accounted for 30% 
of Belarusian exports (26.3% according to EC data), and was the second biggest market 
for Belarusian products, behind the RF with 38.5% (40.9%) and followed by Ukraine with 
10.1% (10.6%) (WTO 2011; COM 2011b). Belarus, however, accounts for only 0.5% of 
EU exports and is therefore behind countries such as Tunisia, Nigeria, and Libya. Hence, 
EU-Belarus trade relations are far from reaching their potential; this is, on the one hand, 
because of deficient economic cooperation due to a lack of high-level contacts and, on the 
other hand, because of the temporary withdrawal of the EU Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) from Belarus due to violations of labour rights against core principles 
of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (COM 2007l). 
Additionally, trade relations between the EU and Belarus are not really diversified, and 
around two-third of Belarus’s exports are made up of oil and gas deliveries (ibid.). Before 
the financial crisis hit the European markets, the EU was already Belarus’s most important 
export market, due to oil and gas exports. In 2008, the EU accounted for 43.9% of 
Belarus´ exports compared to the RF with 32.2% and Ukraine with 8.5% (WTO 2010). 
Additionally, against all odds, 21.6% of all imports into Belarus came from EU member 
states. The RF, as expected, lead this statistic by accounting for 59.8% of all Belarusian 
imports (ibid.). 
Despite Lukashenko´s newly proclaimed adherence to reforms and liberalisation, 
especially in the economic sphere, its reputation for human rights and freedom has again 
deteriorated throughout the course of the financial and economic crisis in Belarus. As a 
result of the immense debt in the Belarusian budget, Lukashenko had to cut its welfare 
system. This, in turn, created crucial difficulties for his regime. Following his welfare cuts, 
Lukashenko again ordered for an increase in the repression of political opponents, civil 
society activists, and journalists. The escalating pressure on critics of the regime was 
mainly related to the presidential election on 19 December 2010. In the course of the 
presidential campaign, Lukashenko ensured the RF’s support for his re-election by signing 
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a treaty on the foundation of a common economic area between Belarus, the RF and 
Kazakhstan on the 9 December 2010. A further step in RF’s plans for integration came 
after the Custom Union between these countries came into force on the 6 July 2010. 
According to a news report, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan should be the next to join (RIA 
Novosti, 6 July 2010). 
With the renewed intensity of Lukashenko’s systematic repression of his critics, he lost all 
of his credibility in the West, and the improved interaction between the Belarus and the 
EU was shot down. Therefore, the RF is left as the only ally of Lukashenko’s regime, an 
ally that demands rewards for its support. On the one hand, the RF assured of having 
Belarus’s loyalty in the RF’s integrationist policy in the post-Soviet area and, on the other 
hand, expects huge economic reforms and privatisation of state-owned companies (e.g. 
Silitski 2011: 17; Meister 2010). All these years, Lukashenko bridled the Belarusian 
market against the expansion of Russian companies; however, under the current 
circumstances, he soon won’t be in the position to prevent them from accessing key 
Belarusian industries, thus increasing Belarus’s dependence on the RF. 
The EU, however, again intensified its pressure on Lukashenko’s regime, and extended 
previous sanctions against the regime until 31 October 2012 (Council of the EU 2011a). In 
the course of the presidential election campaign, the EU’s High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton noted that:  
“The European Union expresses grave concern over the recent harassment of 
representatives of independent media, civil society and opposition organisations, including 
restrictions on the freedom of assembly, association and expression, as well as regrets 
continued difficulties with the registration of NGOs and opposition parties. EU urges 
Belarus to address the concerns regarding the democracy, situation for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the country” (COM 2010g). 
EU-Belarus relations again ended up at point zero, best exemplified by the refusal of the 
Belarusian authorities to send a representative to the Eastern Partnership Summit in 
Warsaw on the 29-30 September 2011 (e.g. Melyantsou 2011).  
To conclude, this section pointed out the crucial influence of the RF on EU-Belarus 
relations (e.g. Interview with Official from the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, Minsk, 8 June 
2009). Many authors agree that the EU-Belarus struggle and the current deadlock can 
only be solved by including the RF into the dialogue; therefore, many call on the EU to get 
the Belarus issue on the agenda of their dialogue with the RF (e.g. Lynch 2005: 7; 
Timmermann 2006: 20). 
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6.2 EU-Belarus Cooperation on Migratory Issues: Between 
Pragmatism and Political Conflict 
EU-Belarus relations have undergone several up and downs; it seems that, whenever 
relations take one step forward, they soon fall two steps back. Over the past 15 years, 
EU-Belarus relations have been under the influence of a variety of large-scale political 
processes: imposed sanctions by the EU on many Belarusian senior officials, which in 
2011 continues to include 192 officials; the eastward enlargements in 2004 and 2007; the 
accession of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia to the Schengen Area; the Belarusian-RF gas 
crisis; and on-going violations of democratic standards and fundamental rights. 
Recently, relations reached another deadlock in the official political dialogue. The strong 
conditionality of EU’s policy towards Belarus prevents the development of regional 
cooperation and impedes the provision of assistance to mitigate the negative 
consequences of EU enlargement on migratory issues for both sides. However, since 
2008, the EU revised its logic of pure conditionality in its policies regarding Belarus. While 
the EU continued to stress that, in order to establish deep and intense partnership, it is 
necessary to comply with its core values of fundamental rights, democratic principles and 
economic liberalisation, the EU did open a new door, enabling cooperation in the fields of 
regional and sub-regional security, combating cross-border threats, environmental 
protection, transport, and energy. 
Furthermore, it considers Belarus to be an effective barrier to the flow of illegal migrants 
and trafficking of weapons and drugs. Without any option for political dialogue, the EU has 
shown signs that it might consider cooperation at a more technical level (e.g. Bosse/ 
Korosteleva 2009a: 150f.; Dura 2008: 6). “Without being able to engage official Belarus 
within the framework of the ENP, the EU has to explore other foreign policy tools” (Dura 
2008: 7). Belarus, in return, has expressed an interest in developing pragmatic relations 
with the EU, in order to counterweight its dependency on the RF, attract FDI’s from the 
West, and gain access to financial assistance to tackle the financial and economic crisis. 
One the one hand, the EU’s neighbourhood programs also contribute financial and 
technical assistance to projects in Belarus, but this admittedly is limited to projects 
promoting or facilitating: 1) support for democratisation and civil society via the ENPI 
thematic programmes ‘Democracy and Human Rights’ and ‘Non-State Actors and Local 
Authorities Development’; 2) actions to alleviate the consequences of the Chernobyl 
catastrophe; 3) cross-border cooperation (CBC)  and Regional Action Programmes (RAP): 
Latvia-Lithuania-Belarus, Poland-Belarus-Ukraine and the Baltic Sea Programme; and, 4) 
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the strengthening and reinforcement of asylum, migration and border management 
standards via the ENPI thematic programme ‘Migration and Asylum’, and capacities within 
the framework of the ‘Söderköping Process’ (e.g. COM 2004d; 2006b). These 
programmes are comprised of national, regional, cross-border and thematic components, 
and until 2007 were mainly funded by the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (TACIS), until they were replaced by the European Neighbourhood 
Policy Instrument (ENPI). Additional assistance is also provided via the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). 
Due to the suspension of political dialogue with Belarus in 1996, cooperation in all areas 
became rather limited. During the eastward enlargement process and Belarus‘s political 
concessions in 2008, the EU renewed its dialogue with Belarus in main policy issues and 
allowed for ENPI support of projects in Belarus (Council of the EU 2008h). The EU’s 
initiative in launching the Eastern Partnership in 2009, again, invited Belarus to engage in 
intensified cooperation and established regional fora for the purposes of tackling common 
challenges and raising issues of mutual interest. Hence, both parties agreed to establish a 
Human Rights Dialogue on the 17 June 2009 (Council of the EU 2009e) and an Energy 
Dialogue since 2007.  
Furthermore, many projects of mutual interests were funded by the EU, with the aim to 
improve cross-border cooperation, border surveillance, and refugee protection in Belarus. 
More  specifically, TACIS and ENPI funding covered projects dealing with the: 
demarcation of the borders with EU member states Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, as well 
as with Ukraine and the RF, including the improvement of infrastructure and administrative 
capacities (CBC/ RAP funding); technical assistance for national authorities, local 
executive and administrative bodies, and judicial and law enforcement bodies (Technical 
Assistance Information Exchange (TAIEX), Twinning); organisation of immigration control 
and border management (BOMBEL-1 and BOMBEL-2); implementation of biometric 
technologies (MIGRABEL); prevention of trafficking of illegal goods and human beings 
(BUMAD-1, BUMAD-2 and BUMAD-3); management of migration flows at the border and 
inside the country, with the goal to equip border guards with technical assistance for the 
fingerprinting of persons detained at the border and the creation of a system of 
information on migrants‘ countries of origin (ENEY-3); equipment of border guard training 
centres; establishment of detention centres for irregular migrants and refugee seekers; 
implementation of common frontier guard operations with Frontex (ARIADNE); and, lastly, 
support for Belarus in complying with international standards in their asylum policy and 
meeting the criteria according to the 1951 Geneva Convention (e.g. removal of procedural 
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barriers for refugee seekers during the admission for asylum; detention of refugee 
seekers; application of the safe third country principle in their return policy; and, the social 
integration of refugees) (AENEAS project ‘Strenghtening of the Asylum System in the 
Republic of Belarus) (e.g. COM 2006j: 11ff.; Kalitenya 2011: 119; Paznyak 200317f.). 
The EU’s financial and technical assistance came to be coordinated by the National 
Coordinating Unit (NCU), launched in 1992. Its mandate was determined by a Decision of 
the Belarusian Council of Ministers on the 12 August 1997 (Belarusian Council of 
Ministers 1997), and renewed by the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
European Commission and Belarus on the 7 March 2008 (COM 2008d). Contributing an 
amount totalling € 216 million, EU is the single largest donor of assistance to Belarus44. 
The NCU’s main tasks are to: assist the Delegation of the European Commission in Minsk 
in formulating and developing national strategy papers, indicative programmes and action 
plans; evaluate project proposals; assist and monitor project implementation; and, 
maintain ties with other donors. EU-Belarus cooperation in the field of financial and 
technical assistance is guided by a Framework Agreement, signed on the 18 December 
2008 (COM 2008c). The Framework Agreement outlines the technical, legal and 
administrate framework for implementing EU assistance in Belarus. 
The implementation of all these projects is done, mainly, by: intergovernmental and 
international organisations (IO), such as IOM, UNHCR, OSCE, UNDP, IAEA; the national 
authorities of individual member states and of Belarus (e.g. State Border Guards 
Committee (SBGC), Department on Migration under the Ministry of Labour, Ministry of 
Justice and Ministry of Internal Affairs); and, partially by EU agencies such as FRONTEX, 
EUROPOL or EUROJUST. Additionally, the EU organises regular coordination meetings 
between donors in order to facilitate the exchange of information regarding individual 
projects and to adjust their activities (COM 2006j: 15). 
In addition to implementing these actions, Belarus also participates in regional dialogues 
on migration and asylum policies, such as the Söderköping process (established by a 
Swedish Initiative in 2001 and coordinated by IOM, UNHCR and the Swedish Migration 
Board ‘Migrationsverket’) and the Budapest process (established by a German Initiative in 
1991 and guided by the ICMPD). Both initiatives aim to provide a framework for countries 
and other stakeholders to address issues of common concern and exchange information 
                                                
44 Website of the Coordinating Unit for European Union’s TACIS Programme in the Republic of 
Belarus, http://cu4eu.net/en/, 12 October 2011 
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and best practice models on the subject of migration and border management issues 
between European countries. 
For now, the EU-funded implementation and information networks work rather well, and 
have resulted in a significant improvement in EU-Belarus cooperation since 2008. These 
funded projects are mainly targeted at securing the common borders between the EU and 
Belarus, preventing irregular migration, and establishing Belarus as a safe third country 
for asylum seekers. Regarding visa issues and the readmission of irregular migrants, 
hardly any progress could be observed, due to a lack of high-level dialogue. The 
suspension of the political dialogue between the EU and Belarus made it impossible to 
decide on further steps in these areas. Problems over the issuing of visas have been 
around at least since the eastward enlargement of the EU on the 1 May 2004, and 
especially since the extension of the Schengen area on the 21 December 2007. Not only 
does EU´s restrictive visa policy undermine its goals in its regional policy, postulating the 
need to facilitate people-to-people contacts with its eastern neighbours, but it also 
prevents improvements of borderland communities’ mobility across borders. 
Lithuania and Poland issue the most Schengen visas because of their historical, cultural 
and, of course, geographical positions. However, compared to visa requirements before 
the eastward enlargement, visa issuance has become rather restricted and tightened for 
Belarusian citizens. For example, before accession into the EU, Poland maintained a visa-
free entry regime for Belarusian citizens (e.g. Kaltineya 2011: 113). Recently, most of the 
bordering EU member states have eased their requirements for national visas and 
facilitated border crossings for borderland communities through the use of local border 
traffic permits (e.g. Interview with Official from the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, Minsk, 8 
June 2009). Further, on the 23 September 2003, Poland launched its so-called ‘Polish-
Card’, which provides long-term multi-entry visas for non-Polish citizens whose ancestors 
are of Polish origin (e.g. ibid.: 116). According to Polish statistics, around 900.000 persons 
in Belarus would be eligible to apply for the Polish Card (e.g. ibid.). Furthermore, in 2010, 
Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania signed bilateral agreements to facilitate the travel of 
residents of border areas (e.g. Kaltineya 2011: 123). 
“[…] innerhalb der EU gibt e seine Reihe von Staaten die wirklich es begriffen haben, 
dass die bisherige Visapolitik der EU mit Belarus, ich will nicht sagen falsch war, sonern 
nicht korrekt war” (Interview with Official from the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, Minsk, 8 
June 2009). 
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While Belarus entered into visa facilitation agreements with the RF in 2007, with the 
Ukraine and Moldova in 2008, and with Georgia in 2011, there is no such agreement in 
sight between the EU and Belarus due to their political deadlock. Apart from that, the EU 
started talks on easing its visa regime with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Belarus, therefore, is 
the only neighbouring country participating in the Eastern Partnership without a concrete 
road map on easing Schengen visas for its citizens. Though informal consultations on the 
simplification of technical requirements for visa procedures began in February 2008, 
official negotiations have not yet begun (e.g. Policy Association for an Open Society 2011: 
7). 
However, because of successful cooperation in the areas of border security and migration 
management, the EU cannot deny visa facilitation for Belarusian citizens in the long run. 
Furthermore, doing so appears to be counter-productive, as the EU itself formulated the 
creation of a visa-free regime throughout the participating countries of the Eastern 
Partnership. Article 3.3 of the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the EaP-states directly that “mobility is a key litmus test for 
engagement with the EU and promoting mobility in a secure environment should be a 
priority for the EaP” (COM 2008e: Art. 3.3). 
The Council of the EU only recently revised its previous policy on the visa issue – which 
had become a hostage of conflicts at the highest political level – and reacted to a 
recommendation by the Commission submitted on the 12 November 2010. Thus, on the 
18 February 2011, the Council authorised the Commission “to open negotiations for the 
conclusion of an agreement between the European Union and Belarus on the facilitation 
of the issuance of short-stay visas” (Council of the EU 2011b). 
6.3 Conclusion and Outlook on Further Developments in EU-
Belarus Relations: Depoliticised Cooperation as a Chance for 
Rule Transfer? 
2008 marked an important change in EU-Belarus relations. After ten years of restrictive 
measures and sanctions against the Lukashenko regime, which involved the suspension 
of all political contacts with Belarus to below ministerial level, their relationship reached a 
new quality due to Belarus’s readiness to agree to some of the EU’s requirements. 
Lukashenko demonstrated his good will by releasing six internationally recognised political 
prisoners, by declaring Belarus’s non-recognition of South-Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s 
independence in direct opposition to its patron, the RF, and by signing an agreement to 
establish the Delegation of the European Commission in Minsk (e.g. Vieira 2008: 3). 
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Vieira (2008) and other scholars see Lukashenko’s about-face in these issues as an 
attempt to create a counter-weight to the influence exerted by the RF. 
“The official Minsk is interested in the institutionalized expression of the normalization of 
relations with the EU, first and foremost because it signals to Moscow that, if necessary, 
alternatives to the foreign-policy orientation on Russia can be found” (ibid.: 4). 
Due to Belarus’s political concessions, the EU renewed its dialogue in crucial policy 
issues and extended its major instrument, the ENPI, to include Belarus, in order to initiate 
several projects of mutual interest (Council of the EU 2008h). A framework agreement, 
signed in 2008, is the basis for their cooperation, and regulates the implementation of EU 
assistance in Belarus (COM 2008c). In the EU’s recent Eastern Partnership initiative, 
Belarus received a full invitation to participate, a so-called “Wild Card” (Interview with 
Commission official, Council/Dpt. on JHA, Brussels, 21 April 2009). It was only with the 
EaP that the EU agreed to shape closer political ties and economic integration, 
irrespective of whether the countries in question had achieved a satisfactory level of 
democratic change at that time. In addition to these new political initiatives, both the EU 
and Belarus agreed to establish a Human Rights Dialogue on the 17 June 2009 (Council 
of the EU 2009e) and an Energy Dialogue in 2007. 
Still, political dialogue remains rather limited, and as of yet there is no fruitful basis for 
widespread cooperation to speak of. Even though both the EU and Belarus took steps 
forward in their relations in 2008, the grievances that occurred over the presidential 
election on the 19 December 2010 caused a new political deadlock. However, by the time 
of rapprochement in 2008, both agreed to enable technical cooperation in various issues. 
Several EU-funded projects were launched, and are implemented within networks of: IO’s, 
such as the IOM and UNHCR; national authorities, such as the SBGC; and, specialised 
agencies of the EU (FRONTEX, EUROPOL) and of EU member states. These 
implementation and information networks emerged and progressed quite successfully, 
even though political dialogue was suspended. It has to be emphasised that the role of 
IO’s is of crucial importance for the success of EU-Belarus cooperation. For all intents and 
purposes, the actions of IO’s are seen as non-politicised. Although their actions are mainly 
funded by EU programmes and, consequently, they tend to act on behalf of the EU’s 
interests, the IO’s involved are solely focussed on the projects’ technical matters. Hence, 
the established IO-led implementation and information networks are credible partners for 
Belarusian authorities. Without these IO’s, it would be almost impossible or at least 
extremely difficult for the EU to deliver assistance to Belarus. Especially international 
organisations such as the IOM play a crucial role in improving Belarusian standards in 
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migration management. The EU needs to pay attention to the strategies of the relevant 
IO’s and donors, and forge synergies between them. 
The analysis shows that EU assistance was welcomed by Belarusian authorities, as long 
as it went along with its own interests. Apart from that, however, we see that Belarus is 
ready to comply with EU norms only when: Belarusian authorities acknowledge the 
capability of EU norms and legislation to tackle migratory issues; these norms and 
legislation are coherent with internationally agreed standards, such as e.g. biometric travel 
documents and asylum policy; and, at the very least, they contribute to the success of 
other goals, such as e.g. a visa-free regime with neighbouring countries that are member 
of the EU. 
However, EU-Belarus cooperation was partly separated from general political 
developments described in the EC non-paper ‘What the European Union could bring to 
Belarus’ (COM 2006i), and focused much more on the technical details and 
cooperativeness of the Belarusian authorities, for example in their willingness to curtail 
illegal immigration, to improve border management practices, etc. This benefits both 
parties, as no one has to make political compromises. 
“Ja, zuerst hatte man auf Isolation gesetzt. Begonnen mit den harten Beschlüssen nach 
dem Referendum 1994. Dann hat man 5 Jahre gewartet und geschaut, dann für weitere 
5 Jahre. Und dann ist man plötzlich zum Schluss gekommen, ach das hat nicht geholfen, 
wir wollen eine andere Taktik finden.  […] Für uns ist es total unklar gewesen, wie diese 
Doppelstandards in den Außenbeziehungen angewandt wurden. Von wegen Belarus 
gehört zu Europa, daher wollen [wir] Belarus nicht mit Aserbaidschan, Kirgisistan und 
Kasachstan vergleichen” (Interview with Official from the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, 
Minsk, 8 June 2009). 
Thus, separating political dialogue from the fostering of further technical cooperation might 
be a policy through which the EU could both improve its own security and also exert a 
certain influence over the Lukashenko regime. Experience gained through current 
cooperation and EU assistance helps to increase trust between the actors, and will have 
socialisation effects on the participating bureaucrats (e.g. Raik 2006b). 
However, besides the improvement of individual technical issues, real progress in 
enhancing Belarus‘s migration management would require the political wills of both sides. 
For example, in issues of visa facilitation and readmission, there is no solution in sight. 
The EU has hardly any leverage with which to compel Belarus to undertake any reforms 
and, furthermore, has no instruments with which to create package deals, as no political 
contact exists, in which such a deal could be negotiated. Trenin noted in 2005 that: 
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“the ability to create serious incentives to comply, either positive through ‘carrots’ or 
negative through ‘sticks’ – or both – is a vital component. […] If the demand is too all-
encompassing, it will be difficult to create a sense of urgency for the target to comply. 
Finally, a target states´ ability to find other sources of external support to offset the 
pressure is important” (ibid.: 106). 
In addition to the success in implementing standards mainly in border management, 
document security, and asylum policy, an efficient migration management would require a 
holistic approach that would engage all countries in the region and link technical aid with 
foreign policy. Issues such as visa facilitation and readmission, as well as the fights 
against the trafficking of weapons, goods and human beings and international crime, 
cannot be tackled on a bilateral basis alone; they also need a political solution (e.g. 
Custom Union between Belarus, the RF and Kazakhstan). As for visa facilitation, major 
technical preconditions were implemented through EU assistance in recent years. As of 
2012, Belarus is equipped to issue biometric passports, and further projects address the 
issuance of travel documents and issues of data protection (Policy Association for an 
Open Society 2011: 3). 
In sum, the analysis comes to the conclusion that various information and implementation 
networks caused improvements in Belarus migration management, and emerged as a 
good model for rule transfer to authoritarian third countries as long as the cooperation 
remained less politicised and more technically-driven (e.g. Bosse/ Korosteleva-Polglase 
2009a: 150). These soft modes help escape the dilemma stemming from the conditionality 
logic. 
“The EU introduced sanctions against Belarus. In this sense, the EU´s technical aid has 
been contradictory, but this particular instrument, paradoxically enough, has been and 
remains the only way to move forward in relations with Belarus” (Vieira 2008: 5). 
Despite the discrepancies between Western and Belarusian values and the restrictive 
measures in force to persuade Lukashenko’s regime to comply with Western values, the 
EU has a strong interest in creating a functioning relationship with Belarus for various 
economic, security and political reasons (e.g. Fischer 2009: 18; Bosse/ Korosteleva-
Polglase 2009a: 150f.). Furthermore, the EU should raise issues regarding Belarus in its 
talks with the RF, and look for ways to engage them, for instance, through trilateral 
meetings on far-reaching issues such as energy, migration management, and trade. 
However, the analysis also shows that cooperation guided by these information and 
implementation networks has a limited scope of action without a political platform capable 
of advancing this cooperation into further areas. The current legal and institutional set-up 
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of EU-Belarus relations is rather loose and incapable of tackling issues of a broader 
range, such as e.g. visa facilitation and/or readmission. Apart from that, the EU presently 
has little leverage over the Belarusian regime, and cannot enforce reforms against its will. 
In fact, cooperation only takes place when Belarus sees in it some practical benefits. 
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7 Conclusion: From Neighbourhood to Integration 
Policy. Introducing Policy Networks in EU’s External 
Policy to govern beyond its Territorial Limits 
The aim of this research project has been to examine the EU’s cooperation with its 
neighbouring countries in the East – Ukraine, Belarus, and the RF – on migration 
management. In particular, the analysis applied the theoretical framework of EU external 
governance highlighting different modes of interaction (see section 3.1.3 ‘Conclusion: 
Introducing Institutions to Govern Beyond – Innovation in EU´s External Policy’). 
Concretely, the study has sought to enhance our knowledge about the distinct modes and 
instruments applied by the EU to coordinate the approximation of migration standards and 
norms in its association policies with neighbouring countries. The analytical framework 
has elaborated on various conditions at the macro-level – Bargaining Power and 
Credibility – as well as at the micro-level – Cost-Benefit Calculation, Issue Salience and 
International Normative Pressure (see section 3.3 ‘Settings of International Cooperation: 
Clarification of Contextual Conditions in International Cooperation’). 
The aim is to get a better understanding of new styles and forms in EU foreign policy-
making. These new styles and forms are characterised by an institutionalised interaction 
within so-called expert networks of EU agencies, IO’s, national and EU authorities and 
NGOs (e.g. Bauer et al. 2007; Lavenex 2004; Wolff/ Wichmann/ Mounier 2009; Lavenex/ 
Lehmkuhl/ Wichmann 2009). These sectoral organised networks are launched to 
coordinate technical assistance funded by the EU. 
The institutionalisation and the legalisation of the EU´s external relations is a recent 
phenomenon which has started with the entry into force of PCA´s with the RF in 1997 and 
the Ukraine in 1998 and is continuing with the current negotiations on a New Enhanced 
Agreement. Other EU initiatives such as the Northern Dimension, the ENP and/or the 
EaP, as well as MS-initiatives such as the Söderköping and the Budapest Process 
complement the association policies in the migration policy. The research interest of this 
study, however, is based on the applied instruments and modes within this institutional 
and legal framework.  
The research interest is to trace the very modes of interactions within this multilayered 
institutional and legal framework. In addition to the well-established application of 
conditionality in EU´s foreign policy, more and more task-specific policy networks got 
launched. Some of them have sought to facilitate the communication to foster the 
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exchange of information and best practices. They have contributed to raising common 
understanding for collective action problems. Others have focused on implementing 
concrete projects, road maps and agreements. All of them have had in common to be less 
political and, as a matter of fact, quite independently from reoccurring political tensions 
which frequently popped up in the bilateral relations (e.g. Lavenex/ Lehmkuhl/ Wichmann 
2009: 21). 
As mentioned, the research is done on EU´s cooperation with Ukraine, the RF and 
Belarus. While EU-Ukraine and the EU-RF cooperation have been advancing, EU-Belarus 
interaction has remained weak due to existing political tension. Unlike the RF Belarus has 
not sought to become one of the EU’s strategic partners. It has also not strong political 
forces, like in Ukraine, which have embarked on the objective to become a full member of 
the EU one day.  
“As you can see we have two big extremes: a rather elaborated institutionalised 
interaction with Russia and Ukraine, and cooperation on ad-hoc basis with Belarus, with 
no specific cooperation” (Interview Commission Official, DG Relex, Brussels 20 April 
2009) 
“[W]ith Russia it is fully reciprocal and that is something Russia puts attention to it. I 
would say the EU-Russia relation is special in the context with other eastern neighbours, 
because it is the biggest neighbour we have. It is the most important strategic partner. I 
would say both sides try to pursue their own self-interest on the base of a common 
ground. And there is no forcing against the other side” (Interview Commission Official, 
DG JFS, Brussels 17 April 2009). 
All three countries share their dissatisfaction with the negative consequences of the EU’s 
Eastern enlargement which has implied a divide between West and East. National 
representatives of these countries have named the Schengen area enlarged in 2007 a 
‘paper curtain’ in the style of the previous ‘iron curtain’ during the cold war.  
The breakdown of the Soviet Union and the revocation of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation 
of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (1955-1991), commonly referred to as 
the Warsaw Pact, created new borders and geopolitical realities between the former 
satellite states in Eastern Europe and Russia as well as within the former Soviet states. 
On the one hand, issues of border demarcation and surveillance as well as new visa 
requirements brought a challenge to established notions of security and mobility in the 
region. On the other hand, the EU has came to share a common border with states, which 
it perceived as a threat for EU’s security, notably in the fields of irregular migration and 
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transborder crime. One of the consequences has been that the EU has sought to integrate 
these neighbouring countries in its migration management policies. 
In the following, I will now summarise the main results of the case studies which have 
focused on following issues within the broad migration area: visa facilitation, readmission, 
border management and asylum policy. In the final part, I discuss the results in light of my 
analytical hypotheses. 
The first case study has concerned the EU-RF relationship, a particularly challenging 
yet central external cooperation framework.  The EU and Russia, both regional 
powers, have sought to gain influence in Central and Eastern Europe and have competed 
for leadership. Unsurprisingly, their relation has been marked by suspicion and mistrust. 
For a long time, the actors have engaged in geopolitical rivalry and experienced 
diplomatic tension that prevented them from deepening their cooperation.  
After a presidency of President Boris Yeltsin that struggled with considerable internal 
problems, the Putin administration has improved the economic performance of the RF and 
sought to reinforce the role of the RF’s role in IR. The ‘reawakening of the bear’ has been 
based on the increasing prices and demands on RF’s natural resources. This has filled its 
foreign policy with a new sense of self-confidence. The EU’s dependency on oil and gas 
supply from the RF, increased by the eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007, influenced 
the power relations in favour of the Kremlin. However, the resurrection of the regional 
power cannot conceal the troubled Russian economy: its exports of manufactured goods 
to former allies decreased; the old-fashioned industry was not able to compete on the 
global markets; and, the unsecure legislation and market regulation frightens off FDI’s 
from abroad. As a result, its exports got rather one-sided, as its GDP is dominated by the 
exports of fuels and mining goods to the European market.45 
The outcome is thus a mutual dependency between these two markets. Furthermore, the 
EU is conscious about the intentions of the RF in the previous Soviet states and the role it 
has played in regional conflicts and in the political and economical development in the 
common neighbourhood. The RF sees in the EU a strategic partner for its economic and 
security interests. It is also keen in its technical and financial assistance. In brief, both the 
EU and the RF are aware of their interdependency and have therefore an interest in 
cooperation on many policy areas. The potential of cooperation is however not utilised 
due to mutual mistrust; the EU’s politicisation of its policy towards the RF; and, RF’s zero-
                                                
45 Source: World Trade organization (WTO). [Retrieved from http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/ 
WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=RU, 17 May 2011 
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sum power game. Their relation is characterised by misunderstanding, resentments, 
muscle flexing and defiantness.  
Several events in the last 10 years have contributed to the fact that EU-RF relations 
reached a low. On the EU side, several actions affronted the RF administration including 
the eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007; extension of the Schengen acquis to Russia’s 
former allies; and EU’s policy initiatives – ENP, EaP – in the common neighbourhood; 
EU’s role in the democratic revolutions 2004 in Ukraine (‘Orange Revolution’) and 2003 in 
Georgia (‘Revolution of Roses’), as well as, EU’s support for political opposition in 
Belarus; and, support for NATO membership in Central and Eastern Europe. The EU, by 
contrast, was concerned about the RF’s ‘gas diplomacy’, resulting in several gas crisis in 
Ukraine and Belarus, which affected also consumers in EU member states; Kremlin’s 
consolidation of internal power at the expense of democratic freedom and human rights; 
the long-standing conflict in Chechnya; the recent conflict with Georgia; and, its support 
for the independence of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia. 
Despite an atmosphere of suspicion, both actors have agreed on the improvement of their 
dialogue and cooperation. An institutional set up was introduced to coordinate their 
cooperation and facilitate their interaction. The current EU-RF framework for cooperation 
is laid down with the PCA, signed in June 1994 and entered into force in December 1997 
as the first of this kind. This institutional framework got enriched by the Strategic 
Partnership (1999), Common Space Initiative (2004) and the Modernisation Partnership 
(2010). Currently the EU and RF are negotiating on a NEA, which will replace the PCA 
and should create an extended legal and institutional framework to tackle a broad variety 
of issues. The legal and institutional framework – introduced by the PCA – and the 
launched Common Space Initiative provide a well-developed system of bilateral 
interaction between the different administrations at various levels. The increasing 
involvement of the RF in EU’s and European policy networks enhanced mutual 
understanding at subordinated hierarchical levels and, in these less politicised circles, 
created an atmosphere of good-neighbourliness. 
The PPC on JHA is the main decisive body in the coordination of EU-RF cooperation on 
migratory issues including the negotiations on agreements, package deals and 
compensation measures. It has been a good basis for political dialogue as it guaranteed a 
structured and regularly interaction. Whereas the PPC set the course on the EU-RF 
cooperation with the help of jointly formulated objectives, several technical subcommittees 
– as the joint committee on visa facilitation and readmission, as well as the visa dialogue - 
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coordinate the implementation of political agreements and materialise them in concrete 
road maps and/or action-oriented papers. 
In contrast to the political dialogue within the PPC, the issue specific committees are 
composed of high-ranked civil servants of the European Commission, EU member states 
and the RF. Yet in practice, RF sends either high-ranking officials or diplomats and seeks 
to keep the autonomy of these networks as narrow as possible (e.g. Interview with Official 
from the EC Delegation to the RF, Moscow, 28 May 2009). The joint visa facilitation and 
readmission committee meet bi-annual and are responsible for the implementation of the 
respective agreements on visa facilitation and readmission. Although, the committees 
have no central secretariat, a civil servant at the DG JFS carries out the administration of 
the meetings (e.g. Interview with Official from the EC Delegation to the RF, Moscow, 28 
May 2009). 
In any case, the implementation of the concrete measures formulated in the road maps 
and action-oriented papers is done mostly by expert networks, which focus on realising 
concrete projects. The EU provides via ENPI, TAEIX and the Common Space Facility 
technical and financial assistance to the RF to comply with the defined goals. These 
expert networks consist mainly of practitioners from the EU (e.g. FRONTEX, EUROPOL, 
civil servants of MS) and the RF (e.g. FMS, SBG, Interior Ministry) and are assisted by 
some IO’s (e.g. IOM, ICMPD, UNHCR). In brief, EU-RF cooperation has increasingly 
taken place within EU-RF networks on the information exchange (e.g. visa dialogue), 
support for implementing the agreed road maps and, for the visa facilitation and 
readmission agreement. The FMS – from RF side; and the intergovernmental organisation 
IOM have been the most important bodies in the coordination of EU-RF cooperation (e.g. 
Interview with Official from the EC Delegation to the RF, Moscow, 28 May 2009). 
The analysis of EU-RF cooperation on migratory issues has shown a clear trend to 
delegate authority to expert networks to implement agreements agreed at the political 
level. Additional channels for interaction and cooperation were introduced, which have 
shifted the cooperation from the political level to issue-specific expert networks. This kind 
of task sharing has helped to depoliticise the implementation of an agreement and to 
reduce high salient issues of their technical content. Good examples are the 2005 
approved visa facilitation and readmission agreement and the 2007 launched visa 
dialogue. 
In the case of the visa facilitation and readmission agreement, both parties set up a dense 
framework of cooperation and authorised an expert network (joint visa facilitation and 
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readmission committee) to materialise it by defining the details. This corresponds to a 
highly institutionalised and legalised regulatory network with a far-reaching mandate to 
substantiate legal obligations of the agreement. The visa dialogue was established to 
provide a forum for examining the conditions for visa-free travel as a long-term prospect 
and formulate a concrete road map. This information network was defined without a clear 
date and/or a commitment for a visa-abolition at the end of this process. However, it 
helped to remove it from the political agenda. 
Unlike previous EU’s external policies towards candidate countries and other 
neighbouring countries, which heavily relied on conditionality in all forms, the EU-RF 
cooperation has had a completely different drive, away from an EU-led coordination to a 
relationship based on reciprocity and mutual benefit. It was the RF, who denied any form 
of conditionality by the EU. The RF has wished to be treated as equal rather than being 
patronised or corrected by the EU. Still the bases of all measures are EU norms and 
values. Regarding visa liberalisation, the EU set the Schengen acquis as the legal basis 
for any steps towards a visa-free travel between the EU and the RF. While the legal basis 
is the EU’s legislation, the RF has an important say in terms of timing and speed of 
reforms. The technical and financial assistance provided by the EU, therefore, is demand-
driven due to RF’s self-interest to take actions. But, above all, conditionality is still an 
instrument applied by the EU. Visa liberalisation has been instrumentalised as the EU’s 
most effective incentive to initiate reforms in the RF in the areas readmission, border 
surveillance and asylum policy. The EU set clear requirements for visa liberalisation by 
linking the visa facilitation agreement with the agreement on readmission and by 
formulating a road map to realise visa-free travel. 
“… trade off in visa liberalisation, as it is highly politicised in Russia” [(Interview 
Commission Official, DG JFS, Brussels 17 April 2009) 
In conclusion more and more issues have been treated by non-hierarchical modes of 
governance. The trend to remove high salient issues from the political agenda and tackle 
it as technical issues in expert networks is determined by the equal power relationship, on 
the one hand, and the high mistrust, on the other. The balance of power is a result of 
mutual dependencies, caused by the interlinked economies and the influence in the joint 
European neighbourhood. The EU’s position as the most prosperous and modern 
economy is, therefore, challenged by its dependency on RF’s energy resources, and its 
vulnerabilities to instability in the region (e.g. frozen conflicts) and the security threats of 
transborder crime. The RF, however, is trapped in a zero-sum power game and tries on a 
case-by-case basis to benefit by demanding concessions from the EU. In that zero-sum 
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game, the RF is tempted to use its vast energy resources, its specific role in regional 
frozen conflicts and its influence in the common neighbourhood as a trump card vis-à-vis 
the West.  
As already stressed previously, another factor of influence why the EU-RF political 
dialogue is below their potential is the lack of trust and credibility. EU’s policy towards the 
RF is perceived by the Kremlin as uncertain and to be driven by a hidden agenda, which, 
in reality, aims to increase the EU’s role in the region at the expense of the RF’s influence. 
“There is a high lack of trust, but how should we increase our cooperation on a visa free 
regime without any trust?” (Interview with Olga Potemkina, Institute of Europe at the 
Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 12 June 2009). 
One explanation is that the RF is still trapped in zero-sum logic, where no mutual benefit 
is possible. Another explanation is the solidarity with the USA and that most of the EU 
member states are member of the US-led NATO. Apart from that, the EU’s initial 
approach towards the RF was perceived as arrogant. It is true that this initial approach 
was based on conditionality, similar to what was applied towards the candidate countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe. The EU wanted to include the RF in their ENP, which was 
seen as disregarding the RF’s historic and current role in the region.  
The EU’s credibility is also challenged by the decision making on foreign policy issues at 
the supranational level. Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, EU’s foreign 
policy was seriously challenged by 27 individual foreign policies. Although the European 
Commission led negotiations with third countries, when it comes to decision making, the 
Council – and therefore the member states – are the main decision makers. This may 
irritate or disappoint the EU’s partner states, as it happened with vetoes from Poland and 
Lithuania on the start of negotiations on a NEA in 2007 and 2008. Several of the new 
member states from Central and Eastern Europe are relatively sceptical towards the 
political ambitions of the RF and use the EU as their ‘political hostage’ to give weight to 
their demands. 
“I had the feeling, that the commission really favoured visa facilitation, but member states 
try to slowdown the process, or try to keep the status quo” (Interview with (Olga 
Potemkina, Institute of Europe at the Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 12 June 2009). 
Another source of mistrust was related to the divergent expectations on the visa 
facilitation agreement, which, in the eyes of the RF, didn’t bring the easing of visa 
issuance as expected (Interview with Olga Potemkina, Head of the Department in the 
Institute of Europe at the Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 12 June 2009). 
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The level of mistrust has decreased with the years of cooperation. In consequence to 
increasing interdependencies, both parties have had an interest to harmonise their 
legislation and have agreed on common rules aimed at establishing more predictable 
behaviour. Regular interaction and the introduction of common institutions have led to 
mutual understanding and a tentative rapprochement of interests. The members of the 
networks got socialised with norms, the procedural logics within this networks and have 
internalised the modus operandi. Becoming an epistemic community, these bureaucrats 
are advancing the EU-RF relationship and have driven the expansion of the cooperation 
(e.g. Interview with Official from the EC Delegation to the RF, Moscow, 28 May 2009). 
“There is an intense interaction on a daily basis (every daily contact or at least on a 
weekly basis). Visa facilitation and readmission is the most intensive one, as we have 
close institutionalised structure … [in form of] the joint committee. […] Border 
management not, as we have the FRONTEX. […] But we have some ad-hoc meetings 
with the Russian [authorities]” (Interview Commission Official, DG JFS, Brussels 17 April 
2009). 
Because of their positive experience, more and more issues have come onto the political 
agenda and have been tackled within these networks. What is still missing is the 
formulation of a common vision of the strategic partnership and on a regional policy for the 
common neighbourhood.  
The second case study has concerned the EU-Ukraine cooperation; Ukraine is 
characterised by a pro-EU policy since 2004. Its governments have voiced the ambition to 
become member of the EU one day. Their institutional and legal framework is similar to 
the one of the EU and the RF. A PCA between the EU and Ukraine entered into force in 
1998. It introduced a political dialogue (Troika meetings and the PPC on JHA) and 
technical subcommittees dealing with specific policy issues of e.g. visa, readmission, 
border management and asylum policy. The information exchange and the 
implementation of formulated road maps and action-oriented papers have also happened 
in expert networks. The actors in the established networks are practitioners and experts of 
EU bodies (COM, civil servants of MS and from EU agencies as FRONTEX, EUROPOL 
and EUROJUST) and Ukrainian authorities (e.g. SBG, State Committee Nationalities and 
Migration). A lot of projects were implemented in networks in cooperation with IO’s (e.g. 
IOM, ICMPD, and UNHCR). These IO’s are important contractors in assisting the 
Ukrainian authorities and funded mostly by EU programmes as the ENPI, AENEAS and 
EUBAM. 
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Although the EU-Ukraine cooperation is highly institutionalised and legalised and implies a 
lot of less-hierarchical modes, it is not a relationship on an equal footing. The EU has 
dominated the cooperation, has set the conditions and has put on pressure the Ukraine to 
implement reforms and to approximate with the EU’s legislation in migration management. 
The Ukraine has differed from the RF and Belarus in that it has clearly expressed its 
willingness to integrate into the Western and EU hemisphere. The EU’s approach of 
positive conditionality – copied from the accession process of EU candidate countries – 
turned out to be successful, as long as it helps to bring the Ukraine closer to the EU. 
Thus, the EU’s bargaining power is rather high and got even higher with the revolutionary 
coming into power of a pro-Western government in 2004. Ukraine’s geopolitical position, 
being in between the two regional powers EU and the RF, is seen as a burden and a 
chance at the same time.  
After the revolution, Ukraine embarked on the objective of EU integration and had high 
expectations on an intense cooperation with the EU – probably too high if compared to 
what the EU was willing or able to offer. The flimsy statements by EU officials on the 
finalité of their relationship challenged the EU´s credibility and hence undermined its 
governance by conditionality. The EU’s credibility as a partner suffered, given that the 
Ukraine has had the feeling of taking the burden of costly reforms, while missing credible 
and tangible incentives, not at least the perspective of EU accession. In the last years, the 
EU did not get clearer on what should be offered to the Ukraine; on the contrary, it 
disappointed their leaders by dealing with them in ways comparable to all other 
neighbouring countries. The Ukraine expected to be treated as a potential candidate due 
to its progress in reforms and its clear foreign policy position. But the EU maintained its 
‘umbrella’ policy for all neighbours, irrespective to their individual characteristics. As a 
consequence, Ukraine’s reform efforts have become less ambitious. 
In any case, the cooperation within the established institutions and networks has 
advanced since 2004 and has been rather fruitful. Similar to RF’s cooperation with the EU, 
most of the cooperation has taken place within issue-specific networks. These networks 
are limited in action to concrete projects funded by the EU. The advantages of these 
networks are the limited commitment, the focus on technical than political issues and the 
autonomy for its participants to work within an agreed framework. In the case of high 
salient issues, such as the contested abolition of visa requirements for Ukrainian citizens, 
these networks have been proven to be effective. 
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The third case study on EU cooperation with Belarus shows that, due to political 
tensions, this relationship is the least advanced. The EU pursued a consistent strategy in 
its policy towards Belarus since 1996: So long as Belarus violates fundamental rights and 
neglects democratic principles, the EU will suspend all high-level contacts. The EU 
formulated conditions in the Non-Paper ‘What the European Union could bring to Belarus’ 
(COM 2006a) which Belarusian authorities sought to fulfil in order to relaunch the political 
dialogue. 
In 2008 Lukashenko made a slight turn towards the West, with the purpose to strengthen 
its position towards the RF. The EU welcomed Lukashenko’s about-turn and declared the 
temporarily suspension of the visa ban against high-ranked Belarusian officials to facilitate 
the interaction in the course of the new EU regional initiative EaP (Council of the EU 
2008).  During this short period, the EU provided the basis for cooperation on technical 
issues by EU funds. In addition to some Troika meetings during these periods, a 
delegation of the European Commission was established in the country; the National 
Coordinating Unit (NCU) for EU’s aid programmes was renewed by a Memorandum of 
Understanding on the 7 March 2008 (COM 2008b) and by signing a agreement to define 
the technical, legal and administrative framework for implementing EU assistance in 
Belarus on the 18 December 2008 (COM 2008a). 
Due the widespread violations of fundamental rights and democratic standards, notably in 
the context of the December 2010 elections, EU-Belarusian relations got suspended 
again. However, the expert networks have been maintained. In the meantime, they have 
implemented several projects. The analysis confirms a twin-track approach in the EU’s 
policy towards Belarus including ‘hard’ governance through conditionality and ’soft’ 
governance based on information exchange and stimulating reforms by financial and 
technical assistance within expert networks (e.g. Bosse/ Korosteleva 2009: 159). This new 
pragmatism comes in response to the fact that EU governance through conditionality has 
had little effect on Lukashenko’s autocratic regime (e.g. Interview with Commission 
official, DG JFS, Brussels, 17 April 2009).  
“So we are really trying to get away from this thinking, we are going one step you are 
going one step as we see the overall attempt of enabling an intense cooperation around 
a lot of topics. With Belarus we do targeted projects as we think it is important to be in 
contact on several issues. […] And also some of our neighbours states need support on 
their security demands on their borders. It is a mixture of enlightened self-interest and 
also to push the Belarusian authorities to reform” (e.g. Interview with Commission official, 
DG Relex on Belarus and Ukraine, Brussels, 20 April 2009). 
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What are the reasons for that? While governance by conditionality has hardly brought any 
progress in the EU-Belarus relations, less-hierarchical modes have contributed to rule 
approximation and improvements of Belarus´ border management and asylum policy. 
The EU-Belarus relations are characterised by serious mistrust on the side of the EU, due 
to the many broken promises and false signals send by the Lukashenko administration. 
On the side of Belarus, the reason for the mistrust is related to the opposition of the EU to 
the way Lukashenko’s regime governs and the restrictive measures against him and his 
senior officials which the EU introduced. The EU’s political leverage is rather limited, 
regardless of the fact that its member states are major trade partner of Belarus. The RF 
has regarded Belarus as one of its geopolitical priorities and has therefore subsidised its 
economy and budget by cheap loans and prices for gas and oil far below the prices on the 
European market. 
Thus, in the light of high adoption costs and the high degree of politicisation of policy 
issues, the EU-Belarus cooperation is limited to issues of shared interest and is not 
governed by the EU’s conditionality. Quite the contrary, Lukashenko is aware that he 
would risk the stability of his regime if he complies with the EU’s conditions; Faced with 
the choice between two little attractive possibilities, he opted for the RF demand of closer 
integration into a RF-led economic union. Because of EU’s strict conditionality, a political 
dialogue is not established, which is a prerequisite for the visa facilitation and readmission 
dialogue. The EU tackles these issues foremost as political and not as technical ones. 
“[The Belarusian government] haben versucht ihnen [European Commission] das 
Problem nahe zu bringen und zu erklären, dass man dieses Thema [visa issuance] aus 
der politischen Agenda endlich herausnehmen sollte und separate behandeln sollte” 
(Interview with official from the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, Minsk, 8 June 2009) 
We can conclude the analysis of the EU-Belarus cooperation that the little cooperation, 
which has taken place, has been constrained to EU funded expert networks or bilaterally 
between member states and Belarus. This is rooted in the EU’s lower bargaining power, 
the high level of mistrust between them, and the high adoption and political costs for 
Belarus. The only EU demands that were approved by Belarus were: 1) congruent with its 
own interest (e.g. improve border surveillance by adopting modern equipment, refurbish 
Belarus´ infrastructure at the border and optimise its travel documents; and/or 2) the EU 
provided technical and financial aid for Belarus to comply with international norms (e.g. 
biometric passport, asylum policy). In the case of visa facilitation and readmission there 
has been little cooperation, as the issue was rather politicised by the EU, and, hence, 
linked to compliance with EU values in fundamental rights and democratic standards. It 
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seems that the EU has to put Belarus on the agenda of its dialogue with the RF, if it wants 
to end the deadlock in its relations with Belarus. 
What comes next is to summarise the results in order to answer the first research 
question “which instruments and modes are applied in EU’s external governance 
towards third countries”. The phenomenon of the institutionalisation and the legalisation 
of the EU’s Foreign Policy towards the RF, Ukraine and Belarus are empirically 
substantiated, although the extent differs widely among these three countries. The 
analysis of the cooperation on migration management has shown that the cooperation 
between the EU and its neighbouring countries is organised primarily in decentralised 
networks and along task-specific jurisdictions. They have applied more ‘soft’ than ‘hard’ 
modes of governance. In the case of Belarus, ad-hoc networks have been the only way to 
overcome the deadlock in the political dialogue. 
The EU and the neighbouring countries have delegated agenda setting, monitoring and 
enforcement powers to bilateral policy networks; these can be considered as institutions, 
that define the procedure of cooperation, reduce uncertainties in the cooperation and 
facilitate the exchange of information to gain the best possible outcome for all members. 
Presented as a pathway to sectoral integration of third countries in certain EU policies, the 
analysis has scrutinised the different frameworks of cooperation and has discussed its 
efficacy in practice. It has investigated the influence of certain conditions on the choice of 
modes and instruments.  
First, a division of tasks can be seen among different levels of international cooperation: 
Polity, Coordination/Administration and Implementation (e.g. Interview with Official from 
the EC Delegation to the RF, Moscow, 28 May 2009). At the polity level, the framework of 
international cooperation has been negotiated by the principle of conditionality (e.g. visa 
facilitation and readmission agreement). Arrangements at the technical implementation 
have been made within task-specific networks. Others have had the task to facilitate 
interaction, share information, promote EU’s norms and rules for policy regulation and 
formulate common objectives and action-oriented papers (e.g. visa dialogue). 
The negotiation process on the visa facilitation and readmission agreement was explicit 
governed by conditionality. In the case of the costly and unpopular readmission 
agreement, the framework agreement was negotiated in exchange with the beneficial visa 
facilitation agreement. The Ukraine and the RF agreed on a package deal in order to 
facilitate the mobility of their citizens into the EU. The detailed formulation of both 
framework agreements, however, has happened merely within common regulatory bodies 
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– the so-called joint committees on visa facilitation and readmission. The indefinite 
framework agreements have left an astonishingly wide mandate for experts of both 
countries to define the legal obligations and have contributed to a high level of 
misunderstanding (Interview with Olga Potemkina, Institute of Europe at the Russian 
Academy of Science, Moscow, 15 June 2009 and Commission Official from the EC 
Delegation to the RF, Moscow, 28 May 2009). The implementation of both agreements 
has suffered from this even if progress has been achieved on technical issues e.g. 
document security, data protection, readmission procedure. 
The highly salient issue of visa liberalisation was further dealt with within the visa 
dialogue. The visa dialogue is constituted as an information network aimed at creating a 
visa free zone between the partners in the long term. The network consists of experts of 
both sides, similar to the joint visa facilitation committee, to exchange information and to 
define a possible road map with concrete measurements to realise the common goal of a 
visa free area in the long term. The visa dialogue has recently concluded a definite road 
map. It has had the advantage focus within the topic of visa-free travel more on technical 
details than on political considerations.  
“My experience is that in this particular field [visa dialogue] cooperation works pretty well. 
There is a good mutual understanding of each others positions. That we are able to enter 
into the detail of the issues” (Interview with Commission official, DG Relex, Brussels, 21 
April 2009). 
In the case of the areas border management and asylum policy, the cooperation is rather 
technical. The relevant issues are tackled within information and implementation 
networks. I would conclude, that we might also speak from a ‘division of tasks’, as I would 
argue, that within information networks, experts from both sides try to formulate common 
objectives and needed measures, which in a next step get realised by implementation 
networks. I have to stress, that this causality is not always in case, as most of EU 
assistance programme have already defined measures they fund. However, EU’s 
assistance is demand driven and, therefore, its RF’s choice to call on them and to accept 
EU’s conditions. 
“[…] I would out it on the persuasive tactic side. [in the case of] Asylum [policy] is just a 
repetition of saying ‘there is an international convention, please do that’. There is no room 
for manoeuvre. [In the case of] border management, this cooperation is rather technical” 
(Interview with Commission official, DG JFS, Brussels, 17 April 2009). 
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Secondly, and in addition to the previous paragraphs, EU’s use of visa liberalisation as a 
carrot to reach concessions by associate countries on other policy issues is clearly 
evidenced by this analysis.  
“Der Versuch Personenfreizügigkeit und Visaerleichterung als ‘Incentives’, als ‘Karotten’ 
zu verwenden, um andere Zugeständnisse zu erreichen. Diese Konditionalität hat 
taktische und strategische Gründe. Aus diesem Grund ist die EU versucht, diese ‘Karotte’ 
nicht zu leichtfertig aus der Hand zu geben. Beispiel ist die Verlinkung ‘visa facilitation’ 
und ‘readmission’. Auch mit der Vision eines ‘Visa-free regimes’, einer Karotte die weit 
weit weg liegt, versucht man in Themen der Demokratisierung, ‘Human rights’ 
Zugeständnisse zu bekommen” (Interview with official from the Belarusian Foreign 
Ministry, Minsk, 8 June 2009) 
Thirdly, several specialised IOs (e.g. IOM, ICMPD, UNHCR) run several projects and 
coordinate certain networks on behalf of the EU’s and EU member state’s aid 
programmes (e.g. ENPI, TAEIX, AENEAS). Their main task is to support countries in 
implementing new standards in migration management, which means approximating third 
countries’ legislation to that of the EU. Additionally, in recent years, an increasing number 
of projects of EU-led programmes have received financial and technical support from US 
government bodies. Moreover, the role of international organisations is of incremental 
importance to the EU’s external relations with Belarus. Without any designated relations 
between the officials of these two actors, legal approximation between the EU and 
Belarus has been triggered mainly by information and implementation networks under the 
guidance of the respective international organisations. 
Fourth, an aspect, which was highlighted in interviews with experts and state officials, has 
concerned the people of these networks. The term ‘network’ implies the inclusion of 
several actors in the field, including technical experts, bureaucrats, state officials and 
NGO representative. The research investigated that the networks have been controlled by 
state officials on the side of the third countries. None of the analysed networks has 
exhibited an autonomous corps of national experts. The secretariats have been small and 
officials in those secretariats are often seconded officials. 
“The process is always under political control as well the technocratic part gets more and 
more. The frame will be negotiated by official bodies; where else the technical details get 
in the following worked out by technocrats” (Interview with Commission official, 
Council/Dpt. on JHA, Brussels, 21 April 2009). 
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The degree of institutionalisation in terms of providing a permanent administration of 
networks has varied. In some cases it has increased over time. The institutional deficits 
include limited autonomy, competence and commitment to the different networks. They 
have been showing that there is still a sensitive lack of credibility and trust of the 
neighbouring countries vis-à-vis the EU.  
Figure 34. Summary of Applied Modes in EU’s Interaction with Ukraine, RF and Belarus 
  Ukraine Russian Federation Belarus 
hierarchical 
Modes    
    
Governance by  
visa facilitation 
agreement 
visa facilitation 
agreement  
Conditionality 
readmission 
agreement 
readmission 
agreement  
         
    
non-hierarchical 
Information visa dialogue visa dialogue through IO´s projects 
Networks border management border management border management 
  asylum policy  asylum policy  asylum policy 
    
Implementation border management border management through IO´s projects 
Networks  asylum policy  asylum policy border management 
    asylum policy 
Regulatory joint committee  for  joint committee  for   
Networks  implementing the visa   implementing the visa   
  facilitation and   facilitation and   
  
readmission 
agreement 
readmission 
agreement  
 
The final part will explicitly deal with the initially formulated hypotheses (see section 3.4). 
By comparing the three countries and four policy issues of migration management under 
research here, the analysis seeks to identify the factors, that have affected the extent of 
institutionalisation and/or legalisation of their bilateral cooperation with the EU and, 
therefore, to answer the question on “why and under what conditions countries agree on a 
tightened institutional cooperation in IR”. 
(H1): The role of bargaining power is emphasised by the realist theory. It is believed to be 
of central importance in international cooperation. Albeit differences, the EU’s bargaining 
power has been rather low vis-à-vis the three countries Ukraine, the RF and Belarus. 
Further, EU’s policy towards Ukraine and Belarus is also challenged by the second 
regional power - the RF. 
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“We have to be realistic on this topic. There is no ultimate instrument, on what we can 
use to force Russia to do something they do not want to do” (Interview with Commission 
official, DG JFS, Brussels, 17 April 2009). 
The offers of the EU has been less attractive and not promising enough (e.g. 
Ukraine’s membership aspiration). Thus, the formerly successful mode of 
governance by conditionality – as applied towards candidate countries – has been of 
less relevance in this setting.  
(H2): Related to the bargaining power of a country, the credibility is the second crucial 
factor. For the RF and Belarus, the EU was not seen as a credible actor. 40 years of cold 
war have left an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust which increased by what was seen 
as an EU’s expansionist policy towards Central and Eastern countries and its opposition 
to their authoritarian regime-character. In addition, the EU has not met RF’s and Ukraine’s 
expectation to have a quick visa free regime. 
The two factors on the macro level have affected the mode of cooperation as follows: 
Because of EU’s contested bargaining power and credibility, partner countries have 
not accepted EU conditionality – apart from attractive package deals as in the case 
of visa facilitation linked to the readmission agreement. Cooperation has taken 
place on a more informal, ad-hoc and less binding basis and/or within network 
governance. Network governance in this sense, has been based on a certain 
degree of institutional and procedural rules. At the same time, it has kept the legal 
commitment of the actors low. Thus, the cooperation has become more predictable 
and has increased the trust over time. 
On the micro-level, the adoption costs of required measures, the salience of policy issues 
and the EU’s normative power have been seen as the decisive indicator on the mode of 
cooperation. 
(H3): According to hypothesis three, the expected benefit or rather the promised 
compensations by the EU have been the crucial preconditions for cooperation. The 
willingness for cooperation has depended on the determinacy of conditions, the size and 
speed of rewards, the credibility of threats and promises, and the size of adoption costs 
(e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 11f.). 
EU’s assistance is demand driven. Thus, it depends on the associate country if it calls on 
assistance for policy reforms or not. On a broad variety of issues, third countries are 
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welcoming financial and technical assistance from the EU, as EU’s experience and 
knowledge on most of the issues is acknowledged (e.g. biometric passports, asylum 
policy, border surveillance and data protection). 
The cooperation has taken place when the partner country has been interested in 
its own. An empirical proof has been that EU-funded programmes are demand-
driven and therefore the implementation of action-oriented papers has happened on 
a voluntarily basis. The implementation, however, has taken place mainly within 
networks of experts and practitioners from the European Commission, EU agencies 
(FRONTEX, EUROPOL, EUROJUST), EU member states, partner countries46 and 
international and intergovernmental organisations (IOM, ICMPD, UNHCR). 
(H4): The cooperation of the EU with its neighbouring countries in Eastern Europe has 
been seriously challenged by the salience and politicisation of issues. Whereas issues of 
border surveillance, document security and detention of refugee seekers have not been 
salient issues, the liberalisation of visa issuance has remained a disputed topic on their 
agenda (e.g. Interview with Commission Official, DG Relex, Brussels, 22 April 
2009).Introducing an institutionalised dialogue on the visa issue has been effective to get 
out of the dilemma. It has helped to focus in the visa issue on technical measurements 
and to formulate a road map with more concrete requirements (e.g. Interview with Official 
from the EC Delegation to the RF, Moscow, 28 May 2009). 
“We introduced a road map in 2005 with Russia, which rather increased the cooperation 
with EU and Russia on JHA issues. There has been a specialisation of cooperation, [in 
the form of] more practical cooperation” (Interview with Commission official, DG JFS, 
Brussels, 17 April 2009). 
“As supposed to some other areas, issues where discussed on a working level more 
easily, than on the political level […] Politicians are not so used to find common solution 
as they fight for their own position. […] I think a lot of issues would be easily solved on a 
technical level” (Interview with Commission official, DG Relex, Brussels, 21 April 2009). 
                                                
46 E.g.: Ukraine: State Border Guard Service (SBGS), State Committee for Nationalities and 
Religion (SCNR), Department for Citizenship, Immigration and Registration of Physical Persons of 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Consular Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, State 
Department on Approximation of Legislation; Belarus: Border Guards, State Bureau for Passport 
Issuance, Office for Citizenship and Migration (Mol); Russia: Border Guards, Federal Migration 
Service (FMS); 
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Another example of a ‘politicisation trap’ is the relationship with Belarus. The EU 
suspended the political dialogue due to Belarus´ human rights violation. Therefore, the 
only way to cooperate has been to bypass the political level and to initiate information and 
implementation networks which have assisted the Belarus´ authorities in improving their 
policies on migratory issues. This new pragmatism in the EU’s Belarus policy has been 
informed by the EU’s perceived need to tackle security threats caused by Belarus lack of 
migration policies. 
The intensity of the politicisation of policy issues has burdened the bilateral 
negotiations. It has made it difficult to reach a compromise. Both parties have 
sought to depoliticise salient issues by transforming migration-related issues into 
technical ones. It was tackled within decentral expert networks. 
An obvious evidence of a politicisation of cooperation is laid down in the division of the 
cooperation within the EaP framework. Four thematic platforms: 1) Democracy, good 
governance and stability; 2) Economic integration and convergence with EU policies; 3) 
Energy security; and, 4) Contacts between people. Ukraine and Belarus complained the 
inclusion of visa issues within the first platform, tackling political issues. In their opinion, 
visa facilitation should better be tackled in the fourth thematic platform on people-to-
people contact (e.g. Interview with official from the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, Minsk, 8 
June 2009). 
“Europa sieht das Problem [n.b.: visa facilitation] als politisches, wir sehen das eher als 
technisches und menschliches. Und unser Gedanke ist, wir sollen so schnell wie möglich 
die Visafrage aus dem politischen Alltag herausnehmen und das auf einem separaten 
Weg besprechen. Genauso wie wir das im Bereich Energie, Transit, Zollzusammenarbeit 
und Landwirtschaft handhaben” (Interview with Official from the Belarusian Foreign 
Ministry, Minsk, 8 June 2009). 
(H5): The final factor which the analysis has taken into account has been the pressure of 
the international community on norm adoption. The impact of this condition on the mode 
of cooperation has been marginal. In fact, the role of EU as a normative power has come 
to the fore. Even if the partner countries have sought to reinforce their place in the 
international community and have committed to international agreement, standards on 
human rights and migration management, the EU’s acquis has been primarily seen as the 
appropriate role model for reforms. The EU’s acquis has been in line with relevant 
internationally agreed norms and in most cases has played a crucial role in formulating 
them. 
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“Take the example of data protection. Data protection is something the EU is proud off. 
Their acquis is noting to be negotiated with; it is a standard the partner has to fulfil in 
order to improve their integration towards EU” (Interview with Commission official, 
Council/Dpt. on JHA, Brussels, 21 April 2009). 
It demonstrates on the basis of its market power and its political stability a kind of gravity 
centre for neighbouring countries (e.g. Emerson/ Noutcheva 2004: 8). Trauner (2008), 
who analysed Europeanisation processes in Western Balkan states, highlighted the role of 
the EU for neighbouring countries: “The EU acts as the reference model for the 
modernisation of the political, economic and social systems of the state concerned” 
(Trauner 2008: 19).  
Further, on contrary to the thesis, the EU acted as an agent for international norms and 
defined several international norms as precondition for and the basis of cooperation (e.g. 
Council of the EU 2006b; Salminen/ Moshes 2009; EU-RF summit 2005, Art. 18).  
“As for the CoE, as far as I understand, one of the main purposes of the EU, when 
introducing this road map, was to make Russia to sign and ratify the conventions. And so 
the purpose, the EU succeeded, as Russia ratified many of these conventions” (Interview 
with Olga Potemkina, Institute of Europe at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 
12 June 2009). 
Thus, the EU rules have been seen as legitimate and useful to increase the efficiency and 
problem solving capacities of internal policies. 
The international normative pressure has not shown any direct impact on the EU’s 
cooperation with third countries, but has affected the cost-benefit calculation for a 
partner country and has increased the legitimacy of EU’s requirements, as long as 
they are coherent. 
(H6/A6): In line with hypothesis six, the analysis has verified less evidence. The period of 
observance has been too short to substantiate strong results. However, the existing 
results are supporting anti-thesis six. The introduced institutions, to all appearances, have 
turned out to be rather stable and have geared a certain extent of autonomy. Therefore I 
suppose that a further institutionalisation could occur. The reasons have been the output 
legitimacy through beneficial outcome of the cooperation for all participating actors, as 
well as the socialisation of common norms, procedures and objectives within the 
epistemic community. 
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“In diesen [n.b.: joint visa facilitation and readmission] Komitees  kommt es auch zu 
Sozialisierung und Internalisierung von Normen und Prinzipien. Vor allem in technischen 
Detailfragen“ (Interview with Commission Official, DG JFS, Brussels, 22 April 2009). 
In Ukraine the main events have been the re-election of the pro-Russian President Victor 
Yanukovych on the 25 February 2010. In Belarus they have been the renewed sanctions 
against the Lukashenko regime due to repeated violations of fundamental rights and 
democratic principles in the course of the presidential elections held on the 19 December 
2010. But the established institutional and legal framework has remained stable and 
operative. 
“Kooperation ist nun auf eine gewisse Weise institutionalisiert, was sie gewissermaßen 
unabhängig von Regierungswechseln macht und zu mehr Kontinuität führt” (Interview 
with Commission official, DG JFS, Brussels, 17 April 2009). 
The introduced institutional set up proved to be resilient and once it has been fixed, 
it has facilitated a further institutionalisation and legalisation than degrading it. 
(H7): This brings us to hypothesis seven. It assumes spill-over effects, as soon as 
institutions are created to tackle specific policy issues. This functional spill-over has 
happened primarily in interrelated issues or due to the increasing socialisation of actors 
arising from their positive experience and/or their satisfaction with previous cooperation 
(e.g. Interview with Commission Official, DG Relex, Moscow, 22 April 2009). For example: 
several reforms needs in the areas border management or asylum policy raised by the 
implementation of the visa facilitation and readmission agreement, as well as, reform 
needs will also arise from the road map toward further visa liberalisation. 
This has brought them to extend their model of cooperation also to other policy issues. 
Since the first institutional framework introduced by the PCA in 1997 with the RF and in 
1998 with Ukraine, the cooperation has experienced an ever deeper institutionalisation by, 
first and foremost, the ENP and the ‘Four Common Spaces’ initiatives and the ongoing 
negotiations an new Enhanced Agreement with both countries. 
Ongoing institutionalisation responds to two processes: First, the socialisation 
processes among the respective bureaucracies; and, secondly, the spill-over effects 
are resulting from tackling interrelated policy issues. 
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To sum up, the following table illustrate the correlations between the conditions and the 
modes of governance. Governance by conditionality has been a result of an asymmetry in 
power, though an actor still must maintain a certain amount of credibility. The more 
powerful an actor is the more able he is to force its partner to implement desired reforms 
even if they are costly. If policy issues are not salient and the international community is 
not exerting pressure, the political costs are minimal and the officials can bargain with 
rational arguments. They can try to find sufficient compensations for the adoption costs. 
A highly institutionalised cooperation – and therefore the introduction of efficient policy 
networks – is determined by following conditions: 1) the cooperation is of mutual interest; 
2) rules and conditions are determinate and agreed by both; 3) technical and financial 
assistance is certain, sufficient; 4) adoption costs are low or get minimised by EU fund. 
In contrary, the preconditions for governance by conditionality – which are 1) rules and 
conditions are determinate; 2) rewards are certain, high, and quickly distributed; 3) threats 
to withhold rewards are credible; 4) adoption costs are low; and 5) players with the 
capacity to exercise veto power is low (e.g. Romaniuk 2010: 64) – are challenged by: 1) 
EU’s political conditionality, which is strongly refused by Belarus and the RF (e.g. human 
rights and democratic standards); 2) rewards are uncertain, below the expectations of the 
associated countries and only granted in the long term (e.g. visa liberalisation and 
Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations); 3) EU is because of its dependence on this 
countries not really in the position to force them and to vocalise threats (e.g. energy 
supply, negative externalities in security terms); 4) the RF is a crucial intervening factor in 
EU’s relations with Ukraine and Belarus.  
The introduction is facilitated by a high degree of politicisation of a policy issue and a 
given normative pressure by the international community. Both have defined the political 
costs of any action and therefore have affected the cost-benefit calculation of any decision 
made by state officials. Again, the level of democracy in a country affects the extent of 
political costs, depending on public interests. In countries with limited democratic 
participation and in international isolation, the political costs have been low. 
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Figure 35. Correlation between Conditions and Modes in International Cooperation 
 EU attributes  policy specific characteristics  
 Bargaining  Credibility  Cost-
  
Salience  Int. Normative  
 Power   calculation   pressure  
Governance by 
Conditionality  
(++)  (+)  (++)  (-)  (-)  
Information Networks  (- -)  (-) (+)  (++)  (+)  
Implementation 
Networks  
(+)  (+)  (-)  (-)  (++)  
Regulatory Networks  (-)  (++)  (-)  (-)  (-)  
 
8 Outlook and Implications for Further Research: 
Breaking New Ground in International Relations? 
The analysis contributes to the literature on the EU’s foreign policy towards third 
countries. It improves our understanding how the EU organises its cooperation with third 
countries. Beyond previous research done in this research area, this analysis has 
focussed on the determinants affecting the applied modes and instruments of cooperation. 
Getting a better insight into these factors helps evaluate current instruments in force and 
assess future models of EU external governance. 
Cooperation on migratory issues is a litmus test for how relations with the EU's 
neighbouring states could unfold in practice, as these issues are loaded with serious 
tension. By emphasising on the technical aspects of policy issues, the EU’s cooperation 
with third countries has been increasingly depoliticised. It has become facilitated in a wide 
range of issues. The future development of this less-hierarchical cooperation by task-
specific networks is uncertain albeit it has some promises due to the new pragmatism in 
the EU’s foreign policy. Although the value gap between the EU’s norms and principles 
and that of its partner countries is visible, the EU started cooperation on specific policy 
issues. The previously applied political conditionality did not achieve the expected result. 
The EU’s strategy – from the angle of security threats and economic considerations – has 
therefore changed as ‘any cooperation is better than no one’ (e.g. Noutcheva/ Pomorska/ 
Bosse 2011). Further research has to be done to investigate the possible spill-over effects 
towards other policy areas as well as the efficacy of the chosen modes. It may answer the 
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question on: “how and under what conditions could sectoral integration in EU policies 
through network governance be an alternative to enlargement?”  
According to the reoccurring debates on a possible membership of Turkey, it seems to be 
promising to conduct research on alternative forms of international cooperation and 
modalities of integration into EU institutions along the lines of this study. Not only Ukraine, 
Belarus and the South Caucasian States but also the countries of the Maghreb and 
Mashreq have a different perspective of cooperation, especially in the wake of the 
transitions in the countries of the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions. Thus, the institutionalisation 
and legalisation process of EU’s external governance could be a role model to organise 
relations with these countries.  
The EU has used its normative and economic power to transpose its internal structure, 
procedures and legislation to expand its regulatory scope to third countries (Interview with 
Official from the DG Relex on EU-RF relations, Brussels, 24 April 2009). The EU initiatives 
have aimed to create a regional framework to integrate neighbouring countries into a 
common area of interest using the EU as the reference model. In the terminology of Smith 
(1996), this means an extension of its institutional and legal boundary towards third 
countries. The EU’s approach on norm setting on migratory management (e.g. 
readmission, border demarcation, local border traffic, visa policy and refugee protection), 
call for a coordination in a regional context (e.g. EU-Belarus Union, Central Asian 
countries and borderland communities between Schengen member states and 
neighbouring countries) (e.g. Interview with Official from the EC Delegation to the RF, 
Moscow, 28 May 2009). 
“If the EU and Russia have a readmission agreement as well as EU and Ukraine have 
one, it is rather logic that Russia and Ukraine agree on a readmission agreement, as well 
as with countries beyond” (Interview with Commission official, Council/Dpt. on JHA, 
Brussels, 21 April 2009). 
As was stressed in the conclusion, the EU has to take into account that the RF still plays a 
central role in the region and is going to play it also in the future. An efficient EU 
neighbourhood policy, therefore, needs to include the RF in its integrationist project in the 
common neighbourhood. However, the RF renewed its regional policy to increase its 
influence in former Soviet and allied states (see also ‘Economisation’ of RF’s foreign 
policy (Meister 2010)) as well as seeks to integrate former Soviet states into RF-led 
regional policies as e.g. the Eurasian Union. “And so the migration policy lays in the focus 
of this new [n.b.: RF-led integration] framework cooperation” (Interview with Olga 
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Potemkina, Institute of Europe at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 12 June 
2009). 
The EU’s neighbourhood policy still lacks a clear vision of the ‘finalité’ of their partnership 
with associated countries. This weakens the geopolitical position of the EU in the region 
and thus diminishes the possibility to create an area of security, stability and prosperity. 
Already in 2002, former President of the EC Romano Prodi formulated such a vision and 
expressed the EU’s willingness to offer widespread integration into EU policies. Prodi 
described its concept for integration beyond the EU as “sharing everything with the Union 
but institutions” (ibid. 2002). This means the creation of strategic partnerships or an 
interest community with EU neighbours. In the style of the European Economic Area 
(EEA) – including the Non-EU member states Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein – the EU 
could seek similar agreements and establish analogue institutions with interested 
neighbouring countries. 
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9.1 Modes of Interaction (Lavenex 2008) 
Voluntary Instruments,
process-oriented: bench-
marks, common standards
Regulation 
networks
Voluntary instruments,
process-oriented: 
Data, information, 
operational cooperation, 
capacity building
Implementation 
networks
Multilevel: 
transgovernmental 
and transnational 
(including (supra- and  
subnational actors)
Non-State actors: 
bodies, agencies
Private actors
CoordinationVoluntary Instruments,
process-oriented: Data, 
information, best practices
Information-
networks
N
e
t
w
o
r
k
s
Supranational EU 
Institutions and 
Council vis-à-vis 3rd 
country governments
Policy transferEC and EU law,
precise requirements 
HierarchyM
o
d
e
s 
o
f
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
I
o
n
ActorsOutput
Instruments
 
 
 315 
9.2 Interview List Brussels, Kyiv, Minsk and Moscow 
Date Institution Department Topics Length 
Brussels         
17.April ´09 Commission JFS.A.2 International Officer RF 1,5 h 
20.April ´09 Commission RELEX.DDG2.E.1 
Relations with Ukraine, 
Moldova 1,5 h 
20.April ´09 Commission RELEX.DDG2.E.1 Relations with Belarus 30 min 
21.April ´09 Council Council Secretariat Visa, Frontiers 45 min 
22.April ´09 Commission JFS.B3 
International aspects of 
migration and visa policy 1,5 h 
22.April ´09 Embassy of Belarus Rep. to the EU 
Coop. With the EU on 
JHA 1 h 
23.April ´09 Embassy of RF Rep. to the EU 
Coop. With the EU on 
JHA 1 h 
23.April ´09 Embassy of Ukraine Rep. to the EU 
Coop. With the EU on 
JHA 45 min 
24.April ´09 Commission RELEX.DDG2.E.1 Relations with RF 1 h 
24.April ´09 Commission RELEX.DDG2.E.1 
Ukraine, Moldova, 
Belarus 40 min 
Moscow         
26 May ´09 EC Delegation  
Institutional Framework 
and General 
Cooperation 30 min 
26 May ´09 EC Delegation Political Section JFS 
Cooperation in the 
Common Space of FSJ 1,5 h 
28 May ´09 
Russian Academy of 
Sciences 
The Institute of 
Europe 
Cooperation at all and 
specific on Migration 
Management 1h 
29 May ´09 
Moscow State 
Institute of 
International 
Relations Law Department   40 min 
Minsk         
5 June ´09 
Belarusian State 
University Dean "IR Faculty"   1h 
5 June ´09 
International Non-
governmental 
Association for 
Scientific Research, 
Information and 
Educational 
Program "Evolutio" Executive Director   30 min 
8 June ´09 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Consular Department   1,5h 
8 June ´09 EC Delegation     1 h 
9 June ´09 State Border Guards     1,5 h 
9 June ´09 State Border Guards     30 min 
9 June ´09 Ministry for Interior Dpt. Migration Visa policy 
group 
interview 
9 June ´09 Ministry for Interior Dpt. Migration 
Irregular Migration and 
Refugee Protection 1,5 h 
9 June ´09 Ministry for Interior Dpt. Migration 
Irregular Migration and 
Refugee Protection   
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9 June ´09 Ministry for Interior Dpt. Migration Border Management   
10 June ´09 IOM Operations Specialist   45 min 
10 June ´09 IOM CT Specialist   30 min 
10 June ´09 IOM Programme Assistant   1 h 
Moscow         
15 June ´09 
Academy of 
Sciences Prof. Dr. Potemkina   2 h 
16 June ´09 IOM 
Programme 
Coordinator Return Policy 1,5 h 
17 June ´09 IOM   
Irregular Migration and 
Refugee Protection 45 min 
18 June ´09 
Moscow State 
Institute of 
International 
Relations Law Department   1 h 
19 June ´09 Embassy of Finland   Visa facilitation 50 min 
Kyiv         
01. Sep. ´09 IOM Programme Director   1,5 h 
01. Sep. ´09 IOM 
GUMIRA project 
manager   40 min 
01. Sep. ´09 IOM 
HUREMAS project 
manager   30 min 
03. Sep. ´09 
Verkhovna Rada – 
EU Integration 
Committee 
Borys Ivanovych 
Tarasiuk, Head of the 
Committee   1 h 
08. Sep. ´09 
Centre for Peace, 
Conversion and 
Foreign Policy of 
Ukraine (CPCFPU 
Prof. Oleksandr 
Sushko, Director 
Deputy 
Visa facilitation and 
readmission agreement 1,5h 
09. Sep. ´09 Ministry of Justice 
Assistant to the 
Director of State 
Department   1 h 
09. Sep. ´09 ICMPD Liaison Officer   1,5 h 
11. Sep. ´09 
Embassy of 
Germany Consulate 
Visa facilitation and 
readmission agreement 2 h 
15. Sep. ´09 
EC Delegation to 
the Ukraine 
Co-Coordinator for 
Cooperation   1 h 
15. Sep. ´09 UNHCR Programme Manager   
16. Sep. ´09 Embassy of Sweden Head of Policy Affairs Technical assistance 1h 
16. Sep. ´09 Embassy of Austria Consulate 
Visa facilitation and 
readmission agreement 1,5 h 
17. Sep. ´09 
EC Delegation to 
the Ukraine 
For asylum, migration, 
visa and readmission 
matters   45 h 
17. Sep. ´09 
EC Delegation to 
the Ukraine 
For border 
management and 
customs service   30 h 
18. Sep. ´09 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Head of Department 
for European 
Integration   1 h 
18. Sep. ´09 Embassy of Sweden     1 h 
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